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1 Introduction
From the Indignados to Occupy: Prospects for Comparison
Pascale Dufour, Héloïse Nez and Marcos Ancelovici
In the spring of 2011, public squares in Spain were taken over by thousands 
of residents and activists calling for social reforms and a transformation 
of the political system. The so-called ‘Indignados’ or 15 May movement 
(15M movement), as it is known in Spain, is still active today, but its forms 
of action have changed. Instead of mass demonstrations and occupations 
of public squares, the movement has developed at the neighborhood level, 
primarily around housing and social solidarity issues.
Similarly, anti-austerity protests emerged in Greece in the wake of the 
Spanish 15M movement, with daily gatherings of ‘outraged’ Greeks in Syn-
tagma Square in Athens. These protests are considered to be a f irst “peak in 
the cycle of struggles in Greece against an unpopular government and the 
patronage of the country under the Troika of the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), the European Union (EU) and the European Central Bank 
(ECB)” (Sotirakopoulos and Sotiropoulos 2013: 1-2).
In Israel, a “sudden and unexpected movement saw 10 percent of Is-
rael’s total population go out on the streets” (Grinberg 2013: 2) to demand 
affordable housing and increased economic equality. From mid-July to 
the beginning of September 2011 (two months prior to the occupation of 
Wall Street), a massive occupation of public squares led mainly by young 
people took place throughout the country. This protest received massive 
support from the population and, for the majority of Israel’s observers, was 
unexpected.
In the fall of 2011, the occupation of public squares crossed the Atlan-
tic Ocean and took hold of New York City, followed by the rest of North 
America. In Montreal, campers occupied a downtown public square for 
several weeks until they were evicted by the police on 25 November. Follow-
ing the example of Occupy Wall Street (OWS), Montreal was one of many 
North American cities to join the ‘Occupy movement.’ These mobilizations 
enjoyed exceptional media coverage and succeeded in pushing the issue 
of growing socio-economic inequality to the center of the public debate. 
After the evictions from public squares, the Occupy movement petered 
out somewhat but carried on in different forms. In Montreal, for example, 
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it supported the student movement and participated in the six-month 
student strike of 2012.
Of course, these events unfolded in specif ic local contexts. Nevertheless, 
they also emerged within a specif ic timeframe, following what has been 
dubbed the ‘Arab Spring’, which began in Tunisia in December 2010. For most 
observers, the mass protests in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, and Syria in 2010 and 
2011 and the protests in Europe and North America in 2011 belong to the 
same wave of protests and can be considered together (Interface 2012; Cur-
rent Sociology 2013; Flesher Fominaya and Cox 2013; Della Porta and Mattoni 
2014a). But is the fact that protests emerged more or less simultaneously a 
suff icient reason to put them in the same category? The main objective of 
this introductory chapter is to discuss the following question: Do the 2011 
protests that shook Europe and North America belong to the same family of 
protests? And how is it possible to simultaneously study their commonalities 
and their unique features? These questions lie at the heart of the collective 
endeavor of this volume. All the chapters are involved in a comparative 
dialogue which a single researcher could not have carried out alone. In the 
conclusion of the volume, we will propose some elements and leads for a 
more systematic comparison.
To facilitate the comparison, we have excluded from our discussion the 
Arab revolutions as well as the most recent protests in Brazil (2013), Turkey 
(2013), and Hong Kong (2014). The primary reason for this exclusion is the 
drastic difference in terms of socio-economic context. The global f inancial 
crisis did not hurt all countries equally, with some currently experiencing 
economic growth while others are deteriorating. Consequently, we chose to 
focus on a comparison of cases with the highest degree of similarity, thereby 
reducing the scope of the argument. If we set aside developing countries 
from our discussion, is it possible to consider the post-2010 protests in 
Europe and North America as part of the same phenomenon?
This chapter is divided into two main sections. We begin by surveying 
the growing body of literature on the 2011 protests in different locations, 
identifying both the hypotheses and the blind spots. We then propose to 
def ine this new family of protests on the basis of three dimensions, that is, 
a political economy, a constitutive tension with representative democracy, 
and specif ic modes of action (at least in the initial phases of the protest), 
suggesting that the issue of diffusion must be included in the analytical 
framework for the purpose of comparison.
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Abundant Literature but Few Connections to Social Movement 
Theory
The Occupy and Indignados movements in Europe, Israel, and North 
America have given rise to a rich body of literature in the years following 
their emergence. These publications are nevertheless rather unequal in 
terms of status, quality, and range of cases covered. We have listed more 
than 150 references, over half of which cover the 15M movement in Spain. 
The others consider the Occupy movement in the United States, Indignados 
and Occupy in Europe, and the Tent movement in Israel. Some studies have 
also developed a European or international comparison. To elaborate upon 
this selection, we have considered books, articles in scientif ic reviews, and 
papers presented at the conferences and workshops in which we participat-
ed.1 We do not, however, claim to be exhaustive.2 Many of these publications 
have a militant tone, blending testimony, analysis, and pamphleteering. We 
have excluded books authored solely by activists or journalists, scholars’ 
interventions in demonstrations and assemblies, newspaper articles, and 
blogs. Although some of these interventions are intellectually stimulating 
and illustrate the high level of reflexivity of the movements’ participants, 
we chose not to engage with them for two main reasons. First, their diversity 
made any synthesis very hazardous; and second, they were generally framed 
in normative terms while we wanted this volume to be fully anchored in 
the sociology of social movements and contentious politics.
The academic literature is plural in and of itself. Numerous pieces have 
been written by researchers directly involved in the movements and 
often relying on participant observation and ethnography. They propose 
a personal interpretation, nourished by a dual belonging. In these cases, 
authors do not use social science tools to analyze mobilizations as much 
as they develop positions from their own insider knowledge of movements 
(in the US, for instance, see Byrne 2012; Gitlin 2012). These publications 
represent an important contribution to the public debate and the reflex-
ivity of movements in relation to their own practices, but they do not 
participate in academic debates concerning the nature and dynamics of 
1 Most of the chapters in this book were presented at the “Street Politics in the Age of Auster-
ity” Conference (Montreal, 21 February 2013); the 20th International Conference of Europeanists 
(Amsterdam, 25-27 June 2013); and the Congress of the Spanish Federation of Sociology (Madrid, 
10-12 July 2013).
2 This review is limited in particular by language. Our references consist of publications in 
English, Spanish, French, and Catalan. Greek publications, for example, are not accessible to 
us.
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social movements. That is the main reason why we do not include their 
discussion in our review. However, numerous essays written in the heat 
of the moment describe democratic practices and suggest interpretations 
of the meaning of these mobilizations (in Spain, for example, see Botella 
2011; Nez 2011; Romanos 2011; Serrano 2012; Pestaña 2013). Others have 
explicitly employed the conceptual apparatus of political science (Welty et 
al. 2012). But most publications available to date do not rely on f ieldwork. 
They either build upon research conducted on past mobilizations (e.g., the 
global justice movement) and extrapolate on this basis (Alberich 2012), or 
they make general claims, for example, concerning the transformation 
of democracy (Subirats 2011) or the ‘principle of democracy’ (Ogien and 
Laugier 2014).
The publications we consider here provide us with some indication 
of who the protestors are, how protests work, and where they originate. 
Nevertheless, we still possess very few tools for building a solid comparative 
argument.
Who Are the Protestors?
Certain studies have used a quantitative approach to describe the social 
composition of the mobilizations and the aims and motivations of activists 
and participants. For example, during the 15M camp, questionnaires were 
distributed in Salamanca (Calvo et al. 2011) and Bilbao (Arellano et al. 2012) 
as well as in the New York camp (Panagopoulos 2011). In Spain, data has also 
been recollected later from a sample of people who participated in the 15M 
in Madrid (Likki 2012) and from studies of major demonstrations between 
2010 and 2011 (Anduiza et al. 2013a). Other studies in the United States have 
relied on an online survey (Costanza-Chock 2012b). Calvo (2013) puts in 
perspective three surveys conducted in Spain (demonstrating that the least 
politicized participants left the movement after the summer of 2011), and 
Castells (2012) proposed a synthesis of these data for both Spain and the 
US. Other North American studies have illustrated that certain categories 
of the population (particularly those most affected by the economic crisis) 
were underrepresented in the occupations. For example, Ancelovici (2012) 
argues that while the collective action frame “We are the 99%” is effec-
tive in mobilizing a wide variety of people, it also conflates very different 
categories that we need to sort out in order to obtain a solid grasp of the 
socio-economic inequalities and power relations. In Spain, more classic 
public opinion studies have also been used to assess the high degree of 
support for the 15M movement (CIS 2011; Metroscopia 2011). Among these 
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quantitative studies, some have attempted to measure the influence of 
mobilizations on elections (Jímenez 2011; Anduiza et al. 2013b).
In spite of the methodological problems they raise (problems the au-
thors have acknowledged in certain cases), these studies provide us with 
important information on the participants’ prof iles. In Spain, the portrait 
is actually quite different from the one the media put forward during the 
2011 mobilization: the Indignados are not primarily youths directly hurt by 
the economic crisis, nor do they consist mainly of marginal and anti-system 
people. In contrast, it is an intergenerational and highly educated move-
ment, strongly supported by national public opinion. Although the students 
and the unemployed have been involved in the mobilizations, the majority 
of respondents claim to be in a rather good f inancial situation but are afraid 
for their future. Few of them are involved in social or political groups. They 
vote in greater numbers than the average population, and most of them 
identify with a left-wing ideology. They are concerned about economic and 
political issues, and their criticism targets political leaders as well as bank-
ers. Some authors have proposed typologies of participants. For example, 
Taibo (2013) differentiates Indignados originating from alternative social 
movements, who make anti-capitalist claims, from those without prior 
experience, who are more inclined to be moderate. Some results show that 
the 15M movement led to an increase in the number of blank and spoiled 
ballots, which penalized majoritarian parties (especially the Socialist Party, 
PSOE) during the elections of 2011. Nevertheless, the causal link between the 
two phenomena (elections and protest) has not been clearly demonstrated. 
Similarly, although the media have recently paid a signif icant amount of 
attention to new Spanish anti-austerity political parties close to social 
movements – Podemos at the national level and Ganemos at the municipal 
level – the connection between parties and movements is still pretty much 
in flux and, in spite of some victories of these new parties in the May 2015 
municipal election, it is impossible to determine at this stage the direction 
it may take.
In the US, the picture is substantially different. According to Milkman, 
Luce, and Lewis’s study (2013), the New York Occupy Wall Street protest 
was composed mainly of highly educated young adults, with a low rate of 
ethnic/racial and class diversity. Many had experienced problems with the 
job market, and those under the age of 30 were burdened by substantial debt. 
Very few were immigrants. The majority of those actively involved in the 
movement had previous protest experience (in community groups, unions, 
anti-war organizations, immigrant rights, human rights or women’s rights 
groups, community groups as well as more traditional political groups). 
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Unlike the Spanish protest, the New York protest was less intergenera-
tional in scope. As in Spain, however, the people involved in Occupy Wall 
Street were not the most marginalized of American society. Though very 
supportive of Obama in the 2008 election, many were disappointed by 
his administration while others were already skeptical of representative 
democracy before the movement emerged.
How Do Protests Work?
Ethnographic studies primarily question the meaning that activists give 
to their experiences, especially in terms of organizational practices and 
internal democracy (Juris 2012; García 2012; Nez 2012; Razsa and Kurnik 
2012; Rivero 2012; Estalella and Corsín 2013; Ezquerra and Cruells 2013; 
Razquin 2014; Nez and Ganuza 2015). These studies highlight the specif ics 
of the Occupy and Indignados movements in their respective contexts (for 
example, the 15M in Madrid, Cáceres and an Andalusian town, or Occupy 
in Boston, Slovenia, and New York). We note a variety of practices and 
forms of direct democracy: deliberation and consensus are highly valued in 
general assemblies in Spain and the US; working groups appear to be more 
autonomous from the general assembly in Slovenia, and consequently most 
of the activists’ time is dedicated to action and concrete activity as opposed 
to deliberation (Razsa and Kurnik 2012).
In particular, these studies propose a genealogy of the democratic prac-
tices of the assemblies, which allows us to understand variations from 
one location to another. In Spain, several sources of influence overlap: the 
political culture of the self-organized social centers, a generation of highly 
educated professionals participating in the assemblies, various forms of 
discussion on the Internet and social networks, as well as a civic culture 
open to dialogue (Nez and Ganuza 2012; Ganuza et al. 2013). In Slovenia, 
the democratic practices implemented originated more from the struggle 
for migrants’ rights, which explains why a slogan such as “We are the 99%”, 
with its potential nationalist connotation, was only cautiously received in 
this country (Razsa and Kurnik 2012).
Furthermore, the practice of direct democracy over time in the assem-
blies of various Spanish towns indicates that although participants are able 
to limit the emergence of hierarchies and leaders at the beginning of the 
process by adopting particular rules with respect to the decision-making 
process and voicing of opinions, in the longer run the principles of inclusion 
and horizontality are more diff icult to apply because of the specialization 
of tasks and the defection of participants (García 2012; Nez 2012; Rivero 
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2012; Estalella and Corsín 2013; Razquin 2014). In addition, though women 
have gained more space and visibility compared with previous social 
movements and though some frames incorporate the intersectionality of 
inequalities and oppressions (Cruells and Ruiz 2014), interventions and 
political proposals continue to be spearheaded primarily by men (Ezquerra 
and Cruells 2013).
As Razsa and Kurnik (2012) argue, ethnography and comparison have 
a specif ic role to play in describing and discussing variation in the form 
and practice of the direct democracy that emerged within the Indignados 
and Occupy movements. Ethnography can also be used to question the 
interactions between online and offline mobilizations with a view to testing 
general assertions according to which a space of autonomous communica-
tion between a virtual and physical public space has emerged (Castells 
2012). Such an approach would complement contributions that focus on 
the digital practices of the Indignados and Occupiers, stress the role of the 
Internet in the consolidation of social mobilization (Arellano et al. 2012; 
Fuster and Subirats 2012; Gerbaudo 2012; Subirats 2012; Candón and Redondo 
2013; Anduiza et al. 2013a) and the emergence of informal political debates 
(Vicari 2013), and highlight the influence of activists in the development of 
online practices (Costanza-Chock 2012a). This f ield of research is still quite 
recent, and we need more data to be able to understand how virtual and 
physical protests are related. For example, it is generally taken for granted 
that the use of social media explains the forms that protests took on and 
the diffusion they underwent (for example, Candón and Redondo 2013; Gaby 
and Caren 2012). But we do not know precisely how central and important 
social media actually are, nor do we know the exact way in which they work.
Where Do the Protests Come From?
Some of these studies situate the recent protests in relation to previous 
movements; we are therefore justif ied in inquiring into the points of 
continuity and change. Juris (2012), for example, argues that the main dif-
ference between the global justice movement and Occupy is the shift from 
pre-existing group networks to a logic of aggregation of individuals who 
do not necessarily possess prior activist experience. This shift allows for 
an expansion of the mobilization to other social categories. These changes 
are connected to the use of Facebook and Twitter, virtual social networks 
that enable the convergence of numerous participants to a specific location. 
This type of activism is more diff icult to sustain over time, more diff icult to 
structure around a formal program or set of shared claims, and can be less 
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socially and racially inclusive. Adell (2011), who has followed demonstra-
tions in Madrid since the democratic transition in the 1970s, shows that 
direct links exist between 15M demonstrations and earlier ones (such as the 
2003 protests against the war in Iraq and the 2004 protests related to the 
Atocha train station bombings in Madrid). Through a detailed description 
of the 15M demonstrations, he points out two innovations: participatory 
democracy practices as well as the Internet and use of live streaming.
Other authors have developed a temporal comparison of movements, us-
ing mostly secondary sources to describe previous movements (Baumgarten 
2013; Romanos, 2013a). When they do not rely on recent f ieldwork, this type 
of research tends to transpose onto the Occupy and Indignados movements 
analytical frameworks and theories elaborated to make sense of other cases 
(Smith and Glidden 2012; Della Porta 2012; Fougier 2012; Flesher Fominaya 
2015). The merit of these contributions lies in their search for continuity in 
collective action, thereby avoiding the pitfall of treating all recent events as 
new phenomena. They demonstrate that the post-2010 protests amplify or 
deepen previously existing practices, particularly in autonomous and global 
justice movements (Maeckelbergh 2012; Shihade, Flesher Fominaya and 
Cox 2012; Della Porta 2014; Flesher Fominaya 2015). Therefore, autonomous 
movements in Spain or the global justice movement in the US have much 
in common with recent protests in terms of claims, action repertoires, 
and social composition. Various differences have nevertheless been noted 
with the global justice movement, such as the superiority of the national 
level as the main target of protest (Della Porta and Mattoni 2014b; Flesher 
Fominaya 2014), the strength of the territorial anchoring in contrast with the 
network form (Halvorsen 2012), or the decision-making procedures with the 
shift from consensus among organizations to consensus among individuals 
(Aguiton and Haeringer 2012). Some authors also argue that activists from 
the global justice movements have been spectators rather than leaders in 
the Occupy and Indignados protests (Fougier 2012).
In Spain, comparisons have been made with the Okupa movement (i.e., 
squatters’ movement), which inspired some of the democratic practices of 
Indignados and supported them in terms of logistical resources. The 15M, 
in turn, changed the public perception of the squatters (Abellán, Sequera 
and Janoschka 2012; Martínez and García 2012). Another comparison 
includes the free culture movement, which exerts an inf luence on the 
15M at the level of actors and claims (Fuster 2012; Fuster and Subirats 
2012). In the US, pre-existing informal anarchist networks (and ideas) 
appear to be at the heart of the core group of activists (Milkman et al. 
2013; Graeber 2013).
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What Comparisons Can Be Drawn?
Very few international comparisons can be found in the existing literature, 
with the vast majority of studies being single case studies, focusing on 
a city or a country. Specif ic contexts are identif ied to explain why the 
movement, originating in central Spain, failed to f ind its way into the 
Basque country (Arellano et al. 2012), or why it followed a specif ic path in 
Catalonia (Díaz and Ubasart 2012), or why the massive protests in Israel 
declined abruptly (Alimi 2012; Gordon 2012; Grinberg 2013). Other studies 
have attempted to explain the ‘failure’ of certain cases: in Italy, where 
political opportunities are unfavorable and where anti-austerity protests 
compete with the Indignados identity (Zamponi 2012); in Portugal, where 
the protests rely more on traditional organizations and focus on national 
issues (Baumgarten 2013; Accornero and Ramos 2014); in Greece, where it 
is diff icult to identify targets and prepare victorious actions in a context 
of strong police repression (Sotirakopoulos and Sotiropoulos 2013). Some 
works compare two cases, such as Canada and the US (Ancelovici 2012), 
Occupy Amsterdam and Occupy Los Angeles (Uitermark and Nicholls 2012), 
or Occupy Slovenia and Occupy Wall Street (Razsa and Kurnik 2012). In 
these instances, the continuity of movements is related to their capacity 
to build strong links with the existing local activist milieu. Finally, some 
studies adopt an approach explicitly based on the political process model 
and emphasize political-institutional and organizational variations across 
European countries (Ancelovici 2015).
Various special issues of journals, certain conference proceedings (Teje-
rina and Perugorría 2012), and books (Castells 2012; Flesher Fominaya and 
Cox 2012; Della Porta and Mattoni 2014a) have developed an international 
comparative perspective with various levels of detail and analysis. Social 
Movement Studies (2012) dedicated two special issues to Occupy movements 
in very diverse local and national settings, but this comparison is more a 
juxtaposition of short texts, sometimes in the absence of a large amount of 
data, than a real analytical comparison (Pickerill and Krinsky 2012). The 
special issue of Interface (2012), which attempts to compare three waves of 
contention (the Arab revolutions, the 15M in Spain, and Occupy in the US), is 
similar in nature. The American Ethnologist (2012) published a less ambitious 
but much more coherent special issue at the analytical level. It consists of two 
very stimulating articles (Razsa and Kurnik 2012; Uitermark and Nicholls 
2012) and one comment that generates dialogue on the contributions sur-
rounding certain themes, such as time and temporality, moral imaginaries, 
and the conception of democracies (Nugent 2012). Nugent demonstrates 
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that these movements are rooted in a specif ic temporality of capitalism, 
“in which the political is no longer autonomous from the economic” (281). 
Given increasing levels of social and economic inequality, several articles 
of the Current Sociology issue (Benski et al. 2013; Langman 2013; Tejerina et 
al. 2013) also underscore the interest of bringing economic policy back into 
the study of social movements. This last collective production offers a more 
integrated comparison between the Indignados and Occupy movements in 
various countries (Spain, Greece, Portugal, Italy, Israel, and the US) as well 
as the Arab revolutions, which the issue’s coordinators include under the 
umbrella of a ‘new cycle of contention.’ In the special issue of Development 
and Change (2013), the emergence of a new generation of activists and the 
properties common to the various post-2010 movements are questioned.
Several points of debate cut across such comparative analyses. First, how 
can we define these movements? Various expressions are used: ‘Occupy so-
cial movements’ in reference to the contentious occupation of public places 
(Tejerina et al. 2013), ‘Activisms 2010+’ to emphasize current transformations 
of activism (Biekart and Fowler 2013), or ‘the movements of 2011’ which 
constitute a new global social movement (Glasius and Pleyers 2013). If we 
look beyond the words, what is at stake is the construction of an analytical 
object of research and, as a result, the possibility of comparing cases. Until 
now, the majority of comparative studies have attempted to identify com-
mon characteristics, such as the increased role of the Internet and social 
networks (Castells 2012; Biekart and Fowler 2013), while recognizing that 
they belong to specif ic contexts. Some researchers discuss the emergence 
of a new generation of activists similar to that of 1968 (Gills and Gray 2012; 
Glasius and Pleyers 2013); others refer to the appearance of “diverse mani-
festations of a new international cycle of contention” (Tejerina et al. 2013: 
1) or of “non-centralized and innovative momentum of multiple protest 
expressions” (Biekart and Fowler 2013: 532). Several authors propose novel 
frameworks for analyzing these mobilizations and stress the importance 
of emotions (Benski and Langman 2013) or the strategic uses of humor 
(Romanos 2015).
Lastly, in spite of the abundance of references, the literature does not 
put forward a clear sense of what the post-2010 protests mean. We have a 
good understanding of how the occupations and demonstrations unfolded 
and evolved, but we lack empirical studies that deliver a microanalysis of 
activists’ trajectories before, during, and after the protests. This type of 
microsociology would allow us to address the continuity/change issue in a 
more focused and grounded manner. Similarly, aside from a few stimulating 
reflections (Gamson 2011; Romanos 2013b; Roos and Oikonomakis 2014), we 
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lack studies that trace the ties and networks (real or virtual) that connect or 
fail to connect these movements across space. Given that so many questions 
remain unanswered, does it make sense to group together all the post-2010 
protests under a single umbrella?
The Analytical Framework: A New Family of Protests, but Not a 
Single Movement
It would appear quite logical at f irst glance to consider these post-2010 
mobilizations as part of a single set of protests for at least two reasons. The 
f irst reason is the time period during which they emerged (2010-2012) in 
a very specif ic economic context in the US, Canada, and most European 
countries. These protests are part of a particular temporality of capitalism. 
Second, activists emphasize (to differing degrees) the failure of the capitalist 
system and of representative democracy.
However, given that we are questioning the assertion that all of these 
protests fall in the same category, let us take a closer look. The political 
process approach suggests the concept of the protest cycle (Tarrow 1994) or 
waves of contention (Koopmans 2004) to describe a phase of “heightened 
conflict and contention across the social system” (Tarrow 1994: 153). Tar-
row’s emphasis on the idea of a cycle suggests a form of iteration over time, 
while the wave metaphor simply refers to an increase and decrease in the 
number of protests. Nonetheless, these two expressions suggest at least 
three interrelated processes:
First, protest waves are characterized by a strong expansion of conten-
tion across social groups and sectors, superseding the narrow boundaries 
of policy f ields, and often transcending national borders. Second, protest 
waves are invariably characterized by a transformation of contention, 
i.e., changes in strategies, alliance structures, identities, and so forth, 
which inevitably arise in processes of dynamic interaction and make that 
no protest wave ends up where it began. That protest waves come to an 
end is the third seemingly trivial truth, but the reasons for that contrac-
tion of contention have commanded little attention in the literature so 
far. (Koopmans 2004: 21)
The post-2010 protests do not appear to possess the necessary characteristics 
to f it this definition. First, movements are still too recent to be able to speak 
of a signif icant expansion of protest, both in length and scope (except 
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perhaps for Greece and Spain). Some authors have even argued that Occupy 
Wall Street is not a social movement per se but a “moment” of protest and a 
“dramatic performance” (Calhoun 2013: 35). The ‘social movement’ category 
was debated in Spain, where some authors prefer to talk about a “space of 
mobilization” (Calle 2013), while others contend that a “social movement” 
is forming as the internal organization of the Indignados becomes more 
structured (Ibarra 2013). Second, the global diffusion of protest is mostly 
geographical and much less sectoral in nature, except in certain places such 
as Spain and Greece. In most locations, there is little or no radicalization 
or intensif ication of conflict. In other words, reasoning in terms of a cycle 
for the post-2010 protests implies a conceptual stretch that undermines the 
value of such a concept.
As Tejerina et al. (2013) argue, the concept of wave is sustained empirically 
by common action repertoires (such as the use of social media, see Biekart 
and Fowler 2013) and frames used by activists during protests (such as rights-
based demands, ibid.). However, as mentioned earlier, very few studies have 
actually demonstrated the presence of a concrete diffusion process (for 
an exception, see Della Porta and Mattoni 2014a) or even a transnational 
coordination of movements. Moreover, we lack the necessary temporal 
perspective to be able to characterize ongoing mobilizations as part of a 
cycle of protest. In some countries, struggles are not over. The notion of a 
‘cycle’ has been used in the past as an a posteriori analysis. For example, it 
was only at the end of the 1980s that studies showed how a cycle of protest 
had occurred in Italy, France, and Germany in the 1960s and 1970s (Della 
Porta and Tarrow 1986; Kitschelt 1986; McAdam 1988). Finally, if we want to 
identify a ‘cycle’ or a ‘wave’ – all the more if it is transnational – we need to 
specify which protests are to be included and which are not. For example, in 
2011 and 2012, several contentious episodes involving the student movement 
took place in Chile (Peñafiel 2012) and Quebec (Ancelovici and Dupuis-Déri 
2014). We believe that these protests are not part of the same wave, even 
if the temporality and some of the claims made are comparable. How can 
we go about drawing clearer analytical boundaries?
We agree with scholars who state that we must “study and comprehend the 
local conditions of the specific case” (Grinberg 2013: 493) as well as “the social 
conflicts and tools used by the dominant groups to maintain their power, 
and the sequence of events that provoked the political dynamics of protest, 
including the influence of international waves” (Kriesi et al. 1995: 4). In other 
words, rather than asserting that these events are akin to one another (or 
considering, for example, that they belong to the same global social move-
ment, see Glasius and Pleyers 2013) or that they can be treated analytically as 
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belonging to a single global cycle of protest, we hypothesize that they share a 
contemporaneity and emerged in a specific global context. Their singularity 
(demonstrated by testimonies and published studies) should not prevent us 
from considering them together analytically. But we should not instill them 
with global meaning a priori. This should be an empirical question.
Notwithstanding their local peculiarities and the different names and 
labels that activists have used to describe them, three common features 
stand out. First, all these mobilizations denounce the concentration of 
wealth and the rise of income inequality at the expense of the vast major-
ity of people, the so-called ‘99%’. They also all put forward a critique of 
mainstream institutions and representative democracy. But beyond the 
actors’ discourses and frames, it is important to consider the particular 
structural context in which these movements emerged (the economic 
crisis) and determine the manner in which it conditioned and shaped the 
mobilization. Second, the criticisms directed at representative democracy 
have specif ic implications for the social practices and trajectories of these 
movements. Third, it is possible to trace the process of diffusion that con-
nects them (even if it is a loose connection). These three features underlie 
the emergence of the post-2010 protests.
The Economic Crisis: More Than a Context for Action
From the collapse of the American f inancial sector and the bank bailouts to 
the bursting of the real estate bubble in Spain and the Euro crisis, the global 
f inancial and economic crisis that began in 2008 represents the structural 
context in which these mobilizations unfolded. This crisis occurred in the 
wake of a broad trend toward neoliberal deregulation, trade liberalization, 
offshore manufacturing, welfare retrenchment, and the rising indebtedness 
of consumers, students, and households. Although the intensity and specif-
ics of the crisis may vary, austerity is spreading among developed countries 
as it had spread in many Latin American countries in the 1980s as a result 
of the debt crisis. The deepening of the social and economic precariousness 
that affects a signif icant part of the population constitutes fertile ground 
for mobilizations and the radicalization of certain ideologies. On the right, 
nationalist and xenophobic movements are gaining strength. On the left, 
the picture of a corrupted political-f inancial elite that underlies the crisis 
feeds anti-systemic sentiments and contributes to the renewal of sectors of 
the radical left (e.g., Syriza in Greece and Podemos in Spain).
However, this global context does not automatically generate protests. 
The latter have been massive in certain instances, as in Greece and Spain, 
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but relatively weak in others, even when the crisis was hitting the national 
economy very hard, as it did in Ireland. How can we make sense of such vari-
ations? How has the economic crisis affected mobilizations and protests? 
Since the 1970s, the social movement literature has focused on cultural, 
organizational, and political-institutional factors at the expense of socio-
economic ones. Indeed, as Hetland and Goodwin (2013) have highlighted, 
since the 1970s, we note a “strange disappearance of capitalism from social 
movement studies”. While the changing dynamics of capitalism have been 
central to the work of Fox Piven and Cloward (1979), Tilly (1978, 1981), Skocpol 
(1979), and McAdam (1982), more recent studies tend to ignore both the 
enabling and constraining effects of capitalism on collective action in the 
short term and long term (for exceptions, see Kousis and Tilly 2005; Della 
Porta 2015). Rather, the focus has shifted almost exclusively to the state 
structure, eliminating the explicit link to economic structures and condi-
tions that shape the very grievances and resources at the heart of current 
mobilizations. “The results are clear and ironic: during an era in which global 
capitalism became ever more powerful – an era when capitalism triumphed 
over Soviet-style Communism – it also became increasingly invisible to 
scholars of popular movements” (Hetland and Goodwin 2013: 90-91).
Nevertheless, in recent publications on the Occupy movement and the 
Indignados, it would appear that ‘capitalism’ is back in the analysis. We have 
observed three possible approaches for analyzing the economic context:
1 The f irst consists of taking into account the specif ic economic moment 
of the emerging protests, in particular the economic crisis of 2008 and 
its consequences in terms of social cutbacks, increased precarization3, 
unemployment, and pauperization. Here, analyses assume that a 
link exists between the objective economic situation of activists and 
protests. The assumption is that the intensity of the crisis will correlate 
strongly with the level of protest. However, empirical results are not 
always consistent with this hypothesis: those who took to the streets 
were not necessarily the ones most hurt by the crisis or the most vulner-
able. For example, in France (see the chapter by Chabanet and Lacheret) 
and, above all, in Ireland (see the chapter by Royall and Desbos), severe 
recessions and austerity measures were not followed by strong protests. 
Here, counter-examples and ‘negative’ cases are important to allow for 
a better understanding of the dynamics of the protests and their precise 
links with the effects of the crisis.
3 Precarization refers to the process by which people’s working and living conditions become 
more precarious.
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2 The second approach complexif ies the link between capitalism and 
protests. From this perspective, the Occupy movement is viewed as 
the product of capitalist contradictions (Langman 2013: 13). Even if the 
wave of protest has declined, the movement itself will continue over 
time insofar as the crisis of legitimacy that fostered it has not disap-
peared. Among the contradictions that the capitalist system produces, 
the impossibility of economic integration is one of the most discussed. 
The relative deprivation argument, developed by Gurr (1970), relates 
a given population’s level of expectation of well-being to objective 
material conditions. In a nutshell, a strong discrepancy between the 
two is expected to create the conditions for rebellion. This theory has 
been strongly criticized, mainly for its inability to explain why people 
tend not to protest even though the conditions are met. In spite of its 
mechanistic aspect and simplistic expression, we note a return to a 
variant of the relative deprivation argument. In Spain, for example, 
young educated students have had rising expectations in terms of 
employment access and general well-being. The incredibly high level of 
unemployment for young people (above 50 per cent for youths under 25) 
prevents them from fulf illing these expectations, creating a favorable 
context for (mass) protest (Ibarra 2013).
3 The third approach is based on the idea that an analysis in terms of the 
political economy of protest could produce multiple results that are not 
f ixed or structurally determined, constituting an empirical puzzle that 
remains to be solved. Biekart and Fowler (2013: 530-531) advance, for 
example, two related questions: why did movements emerge precisely 
when they did, and why did a single protest appear to have spread 
around the globe? This perspective, which we share, has analytical 
implications. It requires detailed empirical research to identify: (a) 
the socio-economic location of activists (and their objective relation 
with the changing socio-economic structure), AND (b) differences 
among varieties of capitalism. Put differently, the particular impact 
of the capitalist structure is circumscribed and left open rather than 
presumed.
How does the economic crisis affect mobilizations? Hetland and Goodwin 
(2009: 12) describe four ways in which movements can be affected by the 
dynamics of capitalism: (1) the impact on identity and solidarity-building; 
(2) the impact on the evolution of movements and the kind of victories they 
can expect; (3) the impact on the class balance within movements; and 
(4) the impact on strategies and goals mediated by the capitalist ideology. 
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These points are certainly valid for the post-2010 protests and should be 
explored further.
A political economy of protest must consider the social composition 
of the mobilization. Is it a movement of the middle class? In Canada and 
Israel, there is no serious economic crisis, but there is a middle-class crisis, 
one that is related to indebtedness and access to education and housing 
(Rosenhek and Shalev 2013). Given the absence of a f inancial crisis in these 
two countries, we have to understand who are the people involved in the 
protests. One can put forward the hypothesis that the threat of downward 
mobility or ‘déclassement ’ – where you cannot afford middle class status 
even if you have the required education and family background – shapes 
mobilizations in terms of claims, frames, and strategies. Here, there is a 
clear connection to a kind of ‘relative deprivation’ argument: those who 
expected to maintain or improve their living conditions are suddenly faced 
with the strong probability that they will have less than their parents did. 
Furthermore, we should not rely on a narrow view of the crisis. In addition 
to considering the cutbacks in social spending, we must also take into 
account broader structural transformations of the economy and society in 
the long term (Joshua 2013). Thus, according to Della Porta:
The evolution of the last 30 years or so has (…) deeply transformed the 
social structures. Fordism was said to have created a two-thirds society, 
with new social movements emerging from the pacif ication of class 
conflict, and even the embourgeoisement of the working class, with the 
crisis of the 1970s producing a short but radical wave of protest by the 
excluded one-third. Today’s mobilizations seem instead to reflect the 
pauperization of the lower classes as well as the proletarianization of 
the middle classes, with the growth of the excluded in some countries 
to about two-thirds of the population. (2015: 13)
We can push the analysis a little further and ask how varieties of capital-
ism and welfare regimes are related to protest in the age of austerity. The 
literature on varieties of capitalism and welfare regimes illustrates how the 
type of welfare state and historical social institutions have played a role 
in terms of access to resources, levels of equality (social and political), and 
the way in which economic crises impact citizens, workers, and families 
(Palier et al. 2012). For example, the US is very different from southern 
European countries in terms of who is responsible for the well-being of 
citizens. In the US, citizens are expected to take care of themselves by 
working in the labor market; the state is not a major provider of protection. 
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In southern European countries, the family and the state are pillars of 
well-being (Dufour, Boismenu and Noël 2003). Does this difference in terms 
of welfare mix have an impact on grievances and claims in situations of 
economic crisis? Could it explain certain types of alliances? Does it affect 
the intensity of mobilizations or the likelihood of success or failure? Can we 
relate ‘varieties of capitalism’ to ‘varieties of protest’? And if so, how exactly 
should we go about doing this? What are the causal mechanisms at play? 
While several scholars of the welfare state have explored these questions 
in the past (O’Connor 1993; Pierson 1996; Anderson 2001; Graefe 2004), we 
believe that social movement scholars have neglected them for too long.
The Political Crisis Dimension at the Heart of Activist Practices
According to Biekart and Fowler (2013: 532), a clear link exists between 
current global economic transformations – in particular the disproportion-
ate role of transnational corporations in state affairs – and the reactions 
of citizens across the globe (i.e., a loss of trust in political parties). In this 
respect, Activisms 2010+, as Biekart and Fowler call it, can be interpreted 
as the emerging counterpart of political disaffection and disillusionment. 
Nevertheless, the connection between the diagnosis of the ‘crisis’ of rep-
resentative democracy and mobilizations/protests is not self-evident. This 
connection is made by protesters (Graeber 2013), but where does it come 
from?
Commentators often claim that the practice of horizontalism is the low-
est common denominator of the recent wave of protest. Such practice is 
based on direct democracy and non-hierarchical, prefigurative alternatives 
that allegedly embody the desired ideal society. Another def ining feature 
is the call for autonomy vis-à-vis political parties and other institutional 
actors such as trade unions. There is a clear rejection of the principles and 
logic of representative democracy. The ‘political crisis’ diagnosis appears 
to express, among other things, a civic desire to be empowered by taking 
ownership of the polity as opposed to delegating one’s power to elected of-
ficials. However, as in the case of the economic crisis, the political crisis does 
not generate discontent automatically. Moreover, the boundary between 
institutional and extra-institutional actors is not always clear. For example, 
certain trade unions and political parties support and sometimes actively 
participate in protests (Calle and Candón 2013; Béroud 2014). We should 
refrain from taking the current anti-institutional discourse at face value 
and assuming that it is equally common to all instances of protest. It is an 
empirical question that needs to be addressed. Furthermore, some activists 
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that were criticizing elections and representative democracy in 2011 have, 
since then, joined existing or new political parties, such as Syriza in Greece 
or Podemos and Ganemos in Spain.
The literature has approached the democratic preferences and practices 
of activists from various perspectives:
1 First, some studies consider the political practices employed during 
the protests. What modes of organization and action (assemblies, open 
space, occupation) have been developed and are being used? How is 
consensus rule implemented, and what debates does it generate among 
participants (see the chapters by Nez and Ancelovici)? What are the 
possibilities and constraints that this specif ic mode of organization 
creates (Kauffman 2011; Nez 2012; Schein 2012; Smith, Castañeda and 
Heyman 2012)? In particular, the question of continuity/discontinuity of 
movement and action is central and echoes some of the questions raised 
during the 1960s and 1970s in certain self-managed networks (Kitschelt 
1993). How do individuals use horizontalism not only in movement as-
semblies but also in their neighborhoods and everyday lives during and 
after occupations (Maeckelbergh 2012)? How is it related (or unrelated) 
to past practices in other activist milieus?
2 Another focus, related to the f irst, consists of studies that attempt to 
situate the frames, discourses, emotions, and practices of activists with 
respect to other movements and organizations in order to explain the 
particularities of the post-2010 protests (Liboiron 2012; Maeckelbergh 
2012; Della Porta and Rucht 2013; Perrugoria and Tejerina 2013). Maeck-
elbergh (2012) shows, for example, how the practice of occupying public 
squares during the 15 May movement in Spain built upon and expanded 
some of the methods developed by the global justice movement (see also 
Flesher Fominaya 2015). For Juris et al. (2012), the capacity of inclusion 
of the Occupy movement stems from its use of networking logics to 
address power differentials within the 99%, even if it created a tension 
with the basic principles of general assembly and direct participation.
3 Lastly, other types of research focus more on the links (or lack thereof) 
between protests and other arenas, such as the electoral arena. Gener-
ally more quantitative in nature (with some exceptions, such as Fish-
man 2012), these studies ask whether or not participation in protests 
affects voting behavior (Jímenez 2011; Anduiza, Mateos and Martin 
2013). Unfortunately, we clearly lack studies that systematically explore 
the actual articulation of different arenas of political participation 
in order to better understand what the post-2010 protests mean for 
representative democracies and their transformation.
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Overall, it is not clear whether post-2010 activist practices, ideas, interests, 
and emotions are really redefining the relationships to institutional politics 
in Western representative systems. As Agrikoliansky suggests, “recourse 
to consensus, the importance granted to deliberation, or the absence of a 
spokesperson, are old practices that have characterized protest movements, 
from European anarchist groups at the end of the nineteenth century, 
to the American civil rights movement of the 1950s, and the groups that 
proliferated in France at the end of the 1980s” (2007: 34). Tracing the his-
tory of American social movements in the 20th century, Polletta (2002) 
demonstrates that activists have found a strategic value in participatory 
practices. The ‘new social movements’ in the 1960s and 1970s represent 
an important sequence in this history, and one of their peculiar features 
was the rejection of the centralized and hierarchical organization of the 
workers’ movement and the promotion of autonomous and decentralized 
operational structures (Touraine 1985; Berger 1979; Offe 1985; Melucci 1989). 
These social movements in educational, environmental, and women’s strug-
gles def ined themselves against institutional politics and thus challenged 
the boundaries of politics. General assemblies and a strong commitment 
to internal democracy were preferred, while electing representatives was a 
suspicious practice. The same concern cuts across the global justice move-
ment, which emerged at the end of the 1990s. The participatory principles 
put forward by the global justice movement not only expressed adhesion 
to a value system (Della Porta 2009; Pleyers 2010) but were also a way to 
address practical problems, such as reconciling diversity and cooperation in 
a myriad of organizations that included the world social forums (Sommier 
2003; Della Porta 2004; Aguiton and Cardon 2005; Agrikoliansky 2007). In 
this regard, the central characteristic of social movements is to redefine the 
possibilities of collective action, whatever the period or place considered, 
and thus to actively participate in the transformation of politics. What is 
really new in post-2010 protests has yet to be demonstrated.
Post-2010 Protests in a Comparative Perspective: The Issue of Diffusion
The third feature of the post-2010 protests is directly related to our capac-
ity to compare movements. Beyond structural economic conditions (with 
all their varieties, as illustrated in the chapter by Ross) and beyond the 
democratic practices of activists, which vary from place to place, what 
do we know about the links between protests and their processes of 
transnationalisation? From a comparative perspective and putting aside 
the question of similarities or differences between movements, the issue 
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of actual connections among them is very interesting and probably the 
strongest argument in favor of grouping them in a single ‘family’.
In the literature on the Occupy and Indignados movements, the ques-
tion of diffusion is raised by several authors (Castañeda 2012; Kerton 2012; 
Shihade et al. 2012; Della Porta and Mattoni 2014a). However, only a handful 
of scholars have conducted empirical studies on the issue, which may be 
addressed in four ways:
1 From the perspective of contagion or mimetism. The main idea is that 
movements will f ind some inspiration abroad and will attempt to 
establish certain links between their own local protests and other 
mobilizations abroad. It can be diff icult to show precisely how the spirit 
of the time has a direct or indirect effect on place-based protests, but 
certain studies have suggested indicators: a comparison of collective 
action frames, activist discourses, imaginaries, and tools. In a short 
text that unfortunately contains few empirical elements, Gamson (2011) 
suggested an understanding of the connections between the Arab 
Spring and the Israeli Summer on the basis of collective action frames. 
He shows that ‘agency’ (“the consciousness that it is posible to alter 
conditions or policies through collective action”, 464) plays a critical 
role in diffusion from one movement to another (see also Tarrow 2005). 
As a result, the speed of the dictators’ departure in Tunisia and Egypt 
strengthened the belief in other countries – such as Israel (Gamson 2011) 
or Spain (Romanos 2013b) – that people can make things happen. In 
the 1980s, McAdam (1982) used the concept of ‘collective self-eff icacy’ 
to describe the same kind of phenomenon.
2 Using the genealogy of diffusion processes through an analysis of activ-
ists’ mobility across national and/or sectoral boundaries (physical or 
virtual). How do ideas, people, tools, strategies, and tactical and cultural 
repertoires travel? How are they adapted to local circumstances in other 
places? Romanos (2013b) is one of the few scholars who has studied the 
transnationalization of the post-2010 protest on the basis of empirical 
and multi-sites research. Applying the now-classic framework devel-
oped by Tarrow (2005) and relying on interviews with Indignados in 
Madrid and Occupiers in New York, he demonstrates that the influence 
of the Arab revolutions on the 15M in Spain is connected to indirect and 
impersonal channels, while Spanish immigrants and Spanish activists 
who travelled to New York played an important role in the emergence of 
Occupy Wall Street and the transmission of knowledge from one camp 
to another. In this volume, Oikonomakis and Roos propose another 
original answer to the above questions by developing the concept of 
iNtroDuc tioN 31
‘resonance’ to explain the diffusion of tactics and claims in Spain, 
Greece, and the US.
3 Examining the issue of continuity/rupture between generations of activists 
and movements. Diffusion is not only a matter of travelling abroad but also 
across different periods in the same place. In the case under scrutiny here, 
what ties have been built (or not been built) with previous movements? 
What type of learning has taken (or not taken) place? Smith’s chapter 
deals with these issues for Occupy Pittsburgh, which she compares with 
the US Social Forum. This diachronic comparison across time should be 
developed to identify the ruptures and the continuities of the Indignados 
and Occupy movements with previous mobilizations beyond the global 
justice movement (Flesher Fominaya 2015; Romanos 2013).
4 Comparing simultaneous mobilizations within the same country to trace 
and assess diffusion processes across movements. This is the case of 
the mobilization ‘waves’ in Spain, which emerged in various public 
service sectors (in Madrid, for instance, the ‘green wave’ in education, 
the ‘white wave’ in health, and so on) to oppose budget cuts and were 
to some extent inspired by the practices of the Indignados (Adell 2013; 
Calle and Candón 2013).
All four strategies require very detailed empirical analyses to follow the 
trajectories of activists and their circulation among activist milieus in their 
respective country and abroad and through different types of organizations. 
For example, contending that Occupy was influenced by anarchism is not 
the same as showing that specif ic activists who were at the heart of the 
mobilization process come from anarchist networks and aff inity groups. 
Thus, a combination of micro, meso, and macro-level analysis is needed 
to address the similarities and differences of post-2010 movements across 
space and time.
Outline of the Volume
The great variety of cases discussed in this introduction raises the question 
of the unit of analysis and the ‘comparability’ of protests. The media have 
indeed presented them as different expressions of a single phenomenon. But 
are we really looking at just one phenomenon? Are ‘Occupy’ and the ‘Indig-
nados’ the same? Is relying on similar modes of action and organizational 
forms (occupations, assemblies, etc.) and denouncing the consequences 
of the economic crisis or the democratic def icit enough to justify talking 
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about a single phenomenon? As discussed above, we argue that, in spite of 
local peculiarities, all of these mobilizations are part of a broader family 
of anti-austerity protests. The latter are def ined as contentious collective 
actions targeting austerity policies (cuts in education, housing, health care, 
pensions, government jobs and services, etc.) implemented by governments 
under pressure from financial markets and/or supranational institutions in 
connection with def icit and debt problems (Walton and Ragin 1990: 882).
In order to make sense of, and account for, this family of anti-austerity 
protests, the contributors to this volume propose two kinds of comparison. 
The first one is straightforward and implies that some of the chapters (2, 3, 4, 
and 9) compare several cases. The second one builds on the complementary 
aspects of a series of single case studies (chapters 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, and 11) that are 
engaged in an empirical and analytical dialogue. Although taken separately, 
these chapters are not comparative as such, for taken together they put 
forward a broad and contrasting analysis of the post-2010 protests that 
a single researcher, or even a small team of researchers, could not have 
achieved. We believe that this diffused comparative perspective is one of 
the core assets of this volume.
We have organized this volume into four sections with a view to explor-
ing, analyzing, and comparing this new family of protests:
1 The first section examines the manner in which structural factors shape 
the current mobilizations. It offers a broader view of the ‘crisis’ context 
– both economic (chapter by Ross) and political (chapter by Kriesi) – and 
the possibility of combining these two contextual dimensions to under-
stand mass protest in a comparative perspective (chapter by Perugorría, 
Shalev and Tejerina). This last chapter analyzes in particular the role 
of political cleavages in protests that have attracted mass support, that 
is, in Spain and Israel.
2 The second section looks closely at the practical and spatial dimensions 
of activism in three national contexts: in Spain, with Nez’s chapter on 
the localization of the Indignados and their forms of organization and 
actions; in Greece, with Kousis’s chapter on the spatial dimension of 
the Greek anti-austerity campaign from 2010 to 2013; and in Montreal, 
with Ancelovici’s chapter on the organizational forms of public square 
occupations and the choice of horizontalism to solve practical problems 
in the camp.
3 The third section deals with the complex issue of diffusion within a 
country and among countries. Smith’s chapter discusses cross-fertili-
zation and tensions between the global justice movement and Occupy 
Pittsburgh. Oikonomakis and Roos propose the concept of ‘resonance’ 
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to examine the complex diffusion of collective actions during post-2010 
struggles on the basis of participant observation in Spain, Greece, and 
the US.
4 The last section of this volume explores two ‘negative’ cases (Desbos 
and Royall’s chapter on Ireland and Chabanet and Lacheret’s chapter 
on France) where a strong movement should have developed given the 
external opportunities but where internal dynamics among collective 
actors prevented important protests from emerging. This section aims 
at avoiding the common problem of selecting on the dependent variable 
and looking only at ‘positive’ cases. It thus extends the reach of the 
comparative perspective of the volume.
Finally, the concluding chapter proposes to answer the main question posed 
in our introduction: Can we compare? If so, why and how, and what results 
can we expect to obtain?
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Part 1
How Structural Factors Shape Mobilization

2 Austerity and New Spaces for Protest
The Financial Crisis and Its Victims
George Ross
The first major economic crisis of the 21st century is comparable to the ‘Great 
Depression’ after 1929. Like its 20th century predecessor, the epicenter has 
been the US and Wall Street. The 2008 collapse of Lehman Brothers is its 
symbolic core, with the City of London not far away. The major differences 
with 1929 are the dense web of f inancial globalization and new technologies. 
The disaster has had two distinct phases. The f irst involved the collapse of 
major Anglo-American f inancial institutions that led to a credit crisis and 
a crippling of the ‘real economy’. The second began with contagion from 
the US-UK crisis to the Eurozone, the group of EU members belonging to 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), which wrought havoc on EMU’s 
poorer members, the EMU itself, and the EU more broadly. The origins of 
both phases are now well understood, as are the public policies proposed 
to restore economic health. The results are less clear, however. Recovery 
from both crises has been halting, and their consequences will take many 
years to be clear.
Large f inancial crises change social structures, disrupt lives, and shatter 
shared understandings of the world, leaving millions confused, uncertain, 
and forced to cope with disrupted lives. Most people submit and improvise 
solutions on their own, for better or worse. Large crises can also, however, 
produce unpredictable anger, collective mobilization, protest, and large 
political changes. The distribution of protest responses depends on both 
social and political variables and the creativity of protest actors. The years 
after 1929 provide many, sometimes unpleasant illustrations. There was 
rapid contagion of fascist movements practically everywhere, for example, 
threatening fragile democracies and incorporating intolerance, violence, 
and, in time, militarism. The Great Depression devastated working classes 
but eventually stimulated new workplace militancy, changed trade unions, 
and spawned innovative approaches to social reform. Looking back on all 
this from the post-1945 years, the cornucopia of social protest that occurred 
fed brutal warfare but also helped recast politics, economics, and social 
structures in more positive ways.
Epochal capitalist crises have usually begun in f inancial sectors 
and spread throughout economies and societies. As this happens, ‘real 
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economies’ collapse, often because credit and investment capital dry up, 
production and consumption decline, stock markets implode, and transna-
tional contagion often follows. One of the central tasks of governments is 
to prevent such processes, and if they cannot do so, to try and stop things 
from getting worse. This chapter will f irst review the American crisis that 
began in 2007-2008, providing an overview of what happened and the 
economic and social damages that it caused. We will then do the same for 
the Eurozone-EMU crisis. We will also be looking at seriously hurt social 
groups from whom, according to some theories, protest might be likely 
to come. It is important to be clear, however, that social protest does not 
automatically follow from structural changes. Groups that are devastatingly 
hurt are as likely not to protest as to do so. Explaining protest and the forms 
that it assumes are diff icult matters that cannot be answered by consulting 
the map of crisis-induced social disruption that we will provide. The hard 
work of answering questions such as ‘Why do protesters protest?’ and ‘Why 
do they protest in the ways they do?’ is the task of colleagues in the rest of 
this volume.
Wall Street to Our Street
Big economic crises have many causes. The ‘Great Recession’ began when 
an out-of-control American housing bubble burst (Chinn and Frieden 2011; 
Blinder 2013). Home ownership has been an important part of the ‘American 
dream’ for a very long time, and even if the excesses of housing markets have 
been the source of several crises, the payoffs of encouraging wider home 
ownership have been difficult for politicians to resist. In the 1990s, Bill Clinton 
rewrote national legislation and instructed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 
two huge government-supported providers of mortgage funding, to loosen 
their lending standards. Home ownership grew signif icantly thereafter. 
The Clinton administration, whose f inancial leaders were high-level Wall 
Streeters, also furthered the deregulation that had begun in the later 1970s 
by repealing central parts of the New Deal Glass-Steagall Act to allow greater 
overlap between banks, investment houses, insurance companies, and other 
f inancial institutions. Clinton was also a powerful promoter of American 
globalization strategies, facilitating the international diffusion of Anglo-
American financial practices that would later help spread the crisis (Panitch 
and Gindin 2012). Clinton’s policies set the table for what would follow.
The crisis culprit most often named is Alan Greenspan, neoliberal 
f inancial guru and Chairman of the US Federal Reserve from 1987 to 2006. 
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One high point of his Fed leadership, seen at the time as f inancial policy 
genius, was lowering interest rates to 1 percent in the early 2000s to prop 
up the US economy after 9/11 and the collapse of the dotcom boom – and 
to keep them low for several years thereafter. This dropped borrowing 
costs on everything, including housing, and stimulated a gold rush in 
housing loans. Greenspan was also an important supporter of the view, 
shared by f inanciers and economists alike at the time, that self-regulating, 
self-correcting markets priced products accurately, that f inancial market 
innovations spurred broader economic success, and that American capital-
ism in the early 21st century had achieved a miraculous ‘Great Moderation’ 
of steady, robust growth without inf lation. Rising interest rates to rein 
in the Greenspan bubble coupled with a housing market downturn that 
followed almost immediately after Greenspan left the Fed were the factors 
that caused the US housing market to collapse.
Some analysts also accuse a foreign culprit. China, in the full bloom 
of emerging market growth, manipulated exchange rates to increase its 
exports and to accumulate vast reserves. These policies were subsequently 
blamed for creating an international ‘savings glut’ and accentuating danger-
ous imbalances in globalization. China benefited because these policies in-
creased exports, growth, and rapid industrialization. The US also benefited 
because it could draw on the savings of rapidly growing export-oriented 
countries like China to help f inance American consumption.1 Put another 
way, the Chinese invested their collective savings in US financial markets in 
ways that allowed Americans to live well beyond their means, supported by 
the US’s unique position as an international f inancial haven, in particular by 
consuming imported Chinese goods on credit and by floating the housing 
bubble (Eichengreen 2010a; Streeck 2011; Pettis 2012). The availability of 
cheap imported goods and vast consumer credit also masked the dangers 
of an American development strategy that pushed income and other 
inequalities to levels not seen since 1929. These conditions also created a 
vast increase in f inancial sector prof its, allowing the f inancial sector to 
gain even greater influence over US economic governance.
The deeper mechanisms behind the imminent disaster of crisis lay in the 
risky practices of the f inancial sector. First, the real estate and mortgage 
1 This argument underplays one of the rationales for Chinese practices. The 1997 South 
Asian crisis involved overnight outflows of Western investment (‘hot money’) that then obliged 
affected countries to implement tough restructuring reforms. The Chinese concluded that they 
should always have suff icient reserves to prevent this from happening again. These reserves 
had to be put in a safe place, thus constituting much of the ‘savings glut’.
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f inance industries reconf igured business plans in ways that verged on 
white-collar gangsterism, using ‘sub-prime’ mortgages and other misleading 
marketing techniques to target new customers whose low incomes and 
dubious credit backgrounds were disregarded. Next, the f inancial sec-
tor purchased and repackaged these mortgages into derivative products 
(CDOs, collateralized debt obligations) that were structured into tranches 
that disguised the risks they contained. Then, to hedge their investments, 
buyers of CDOs purchased CDSs (credit default swaps) from a booming 
risk-insuring business. The incentives of eased standards, cheap money, and 
new f inancial techniques opened the prospect of vast profits and fortunes. 
Real estate agents and brokers made more by selling more houses, and the 
construction industry made more by building more houses. The banks and 
mortgage companies made big money from selling risky mortgages and 
could then wash their hands of risk and responsibility for their dubious 
marketing practices by handing off loans immediately to huge f inancial 
f irms, including the country’s largest banks and Wall Street investment 
houses. Financial f irms in turn came to dominate the f inancial side of 
the mortgage market, making more fees the more mortgages they could 
convert into derivatives and sell off, with loyal help from ratings agencies 
that they hired who provided misleadingly high ratings. Finally, the more 
CDSs that were contracted to hedge these new derivatives, the more insur-
ance companies profited and grew. The pace became frantic because the 
quicker things could be sold rather than held as collateral, the greater the 
profits, leading the f inancial sector to leverage itself well beyond what was 
prudent (Fligstein and Shin 2007). Once these processes were set in motion, 
they compelled everyone – whatever they felt about risk or morality – to 
follow or lose out (Fligstein and Goldstein 2011).
The most misleading underlying process in the bubble was that as the real 
estate market grew hotter, house values climbed, leading homeowners to 
feel wealthier and tempting them to take on ever more debt. When the bub-
ble began bursting in 2006-2007, house values declined. Mortgage holders 
who were in over their heads were then threatened by foreclosure, and many 
who had borrowed against their houses went ‘underwater’, owing more than 
their houses were worth. Another result was that the questionable value of 
mortgage-based CDOs led CDS holders to invoke their insurance. It was not 
long before over-leveraged f inancial institutions and the vast, unregulated 
‘shadow banking’ system were endangered. The first epochal f inancial crisis 
of neoliberal capitalism in the era of globalization was beginning.
The signs of impending doom f irst appeared in mid-2007, when Bear 
Stearns hedge funds failed, Citigroup wrote down assets, the UK’s Northern 
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Rock was bailed out in an emergency government move, two large BNP 
Paribas hedge funds closed, and Dexia bank in Belgium came under pres-
sure from lenders, stockholders, and ratings agencies. Central Banks – the 
US Fed, the Bank of England, and the European Central Bank – quickly 
opened international swap lines to ensure that credit did not freeze. Then, in 
spring 2008, the Fed saved Bear Stearns by subsidizing a bargain-basement 
acquisition by JP Morgan and helped Bank of America acquire Merrill 
Lynch. There were both political and f inancial limits to these responses, 
however. When the US Treasury and Fed failed to f ind a buyer in September 
to prevent Lehman Brothers from failing, generalized panic followed. A day 
later AIG, a huge insurance company loaded with CDS contracts, received 
$85 billion to stay afloat from the same sources. In a few months, the stock 
market lost more than half of its value and the critically important overnight 
credit supply of commercial paper froze.
With f inancial markets in free fall and credit blocked, the ‘real 
economy’ stalled, growth stopped, consumption dropped, pensions and 
savings shrunk, companies went bankrupt, real estate loan operations 
collapsed when mortgage-holders could not longer pay, unemployment 
shot up, government revenue streams diminished, and public debt rose as 
a depressionary spiral began. One result, which might otherwise not have 
happened, was that Barack Obama was elected. The experts, including 
Bernanke, the Bush and Obama Treasury teams, and most economists, 
converged on short-term ‘neo-Keynesianism’ to limit the damage and stop 
the downward spiral by huge Fed interventions – several trillions of dollars 
– to re-open credit markets with newly printed money (Irwin 2013). Massive 
emergency legislation passed under Bush (the 2008 TARP – Trouble Assets 
Relief Program) and Obama (the 2009 ARRA – American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act). TARP, meant to isolate ‘toxic assets’, was used instead 
to bail out banks. ARRA f inanced stimulus plans to subsidize threatened 
industries (automobiles, in the f irst instance) and job-creating public works 
(Blinder 2013; Burtless and Gordon 2011). The f inancial ‘f ire-f ighting’ did 
not stop at US borders either. The spread of the crisis from Wall Street and 
the City of London to other places demonstrated global f inancial sector 
interconnections, as did international public policy responses to limit the 
damage.2
2 Internationally, some countries had ‘better’ crises than others. Canada escaped the worst, 
despite connections between its large f inancial sector and Wall Street, because its real estate 
industry and banks were better regulated. Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, and other 
Northern Europeans fared better because of superior international competitive and budgetary 
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These efforts were largely successful in moderating the Great Recession 
and stopping the spiral towards depression. Six years after the f irst signs 
of crisis, however, the US economy’s recovery has been slow, patchy, and 
unequal. US growth became negative in the last quarter of 2007, dropped 
to -4 percent in 2009 but returned to low positive levels in 2010, since 
then hovering around 2 percent. The recovery has been relatively jobless, 
however, and unemployment, which had risen from 5 percent in 2008 
to 10 percent by the end of 2009, only dropped below 8 percent in 2013, 
while new claims for unemployment insurance have barely returned to 
pre-recession levels. 8.5 million jobs were lost, with the construction and 
manufacturing sectors (and male workers, minorities, the lower skilled, 
and immigrants) hardest hit. Unemployment episodes have remained very 
long – a median of 20 weeks since 2008 – and the long-term unemployed 
face a grim future. One estimate in mid-2013 was that 14.3 percent of the 
workforce was unemployed, underemployed, or out of the workforce 
altogether (CBPP 2013: 8). Labor force participation has declined (from 
67+ percent in 2000 to 63.5 percent in 2013). The US’s Gini coeff icient – a 
commonly used measure of income inequality – which had been 0.38 in 
2008 is now at the ‘bad’ end of OECD numbers next to Turkey and Mexico 
(OECD 2012).
Some had hoped that the ‘neo-Keynesianism’ triggered by the f inancial 
crisis would be the start of a new Keynesian era. This was not to be: the 
bailouts, stimulus plans, and Fed’s massive ‘quantitative easing’ are all 
nearly over.3 The sectarian turn of American Republicans, engaged in 
political trench warfare about f iscal policy to starve federal government 
to minimalist dimensions, also ensures that it will not happen anytime 
in the near future. In addition, despite some regulatory reform, crisis 
politics has re-installed Wall Street and ‘too big to fail’ banks back at 
the core of the American economy in hypertrophied form, explainable 
by the need to re-stabilize the American f inancial system rapidly and 
by the political inf luence of the f inancial sector. The status quo ante 
has been restored, at the cost of an estimated 14+ trillion US dollars 
(Atkinson et al. 2013)!
Which, if any, American groups might have been tempted to protest 
because of the crisis? The most visible mobilization came from the radical 
situations and because of their labor market f lexibility. Poland was the only European country 
to avoid a recession. 
3 Marc Blyth, in his brilliant essay on austerity in economic theory, ironically labels the 
European version of this ‘twelve month’ Keynesianism (Blyth 2013).
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populist right, embodied in the Tea Party.4 The Tea Party emerged primarily 
from the South and the Middle West, where American populism has been 
recurrent historically. The south has been anti-Washington and against the 
Eastern elite since the Civil War, usually on racist grounds, and its indigna-
tion was rekindled by the Democratic Party’s promotion of civil rights 
laws in the 1960s and 1970s. The Middle West has been de-industrialized 
by technological change and globalization, which decimated its large 
industries and diminished ‘middle class’ unionized manufacturing work. In 
both regions, Washington’s neo-Keynesian responses to crisis were received 
as statist mistakes produced by corrupt collusion between politicians, 
experts from the Eastern elite, big f inancial interests, and the mega-rich.
Tea Party mobilization quickly found a home inside the Republican Party, 
explainable by the ways in which crisis issues meshed with older, hard-right 
Republican frames of religious and moral fundamentalism, anti-statism, 
and opposition to social transfers to racial minorities, immigrants, and 
youth. Financial support for the movement has also f lowed from wealthy 
American right-wingers taking advantage of the recent liberalization in 
campaign f inance law and seeking to manipulate the Republican Party 
further rightwards. The Tea Party example may suggest that the impor-
tant far-right movements f ind it easier to move into ‘conventional’ party 
politics than ‘progressive’ mobilizations. A similar movement from protest 
mobilization to party form is found all across Europe, strongly fed by anti-
immigrant xenophobia, the effects of the crisis, and burgeoning hostility 
to the European Union.
This volume is interested primarily in left-leaning ‘progressive’ move-
ments. They have been omnipresent throughout US history, in fact, and 
particularly signif icant since the protest cycle beginning in the civil rights 
and anti-Vietnam war movements in the 1960s. Such movements have often 
taken on the forms of decentralized, rank-and-f ile mobilizations that – 
once they are well-organized around specif ic ‘social justice’ issues – tend 
to lobby parties indirectly rather than taking on party form, particularly 
because the majoritarian US system makes it diff icult for ‘third parties’ 
to succeed. Many such mobilizing and lobbying strategies have actually 
succeeded to a degree, despite the recent rightward movement in American 
politics. Equality-related matters have been the stock-in-trade of most of 
these ‘progressive’ movements, even if the concept of equality has been 
redef ined away from older focuses on class-economic inequality. Older 
frames returned, however, taken up by movements, left-wing intellectuals, 
4 See Kriesi’s chapter in this volume.
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and progressive publications after the crisis hit. The Occupy movements, 
coined by a non-prof it, anti-consumerist Canadian organization and 
partly inspired by the Arab spring and European protests, provides the 
best example.
Later chapters in this volume will explore the connections between 
movements like Occupy Wall Street and social groups hurt by crisis. 
Canvassing some possibilities may help, however. Income stagnation in 
the US, excepting vast increases for the top 1 percent (and a small fraction 
even of this group), the decline of ‘middle class’ manufacturing jobs, and 
growing employment insecurity have been salient issues for some time in 
the United States. Such changes have recently taken on specif ic forms for 
youth. Upward mobility through higher education, the ideal life course in 
recent interpretations of the American Dream, is no longer what it once may 
have been (Corak 2012). Finding good jobs for non-technically-specialized 
university graduates had become harder for some time. The wage premium 
going to university graduates still exists but in diminished forms, and educa-
tion costs, especially for private universities, have skyrocketed along with 
student debt. The crisis considerably strengthened these processes. Entering 
the labor market has become much more diff icult, obliging many to accept 
work beneath their expectations and straining families. ‘Young people’ have 
always been likely protesters, but crisis circumstances – with US youth 
unemployment twice the national average – have made the likelihood 
greater.
More broadly, persistent unemployment, underemployment, and 
unemployment-induced long-term labor market exits have touched 
millions. The decline in American trade unionism over recent decades – 
membership, at 11 percent, is one-third what it was in the 1970s – caused 
by globalization, technological change, labor market dualization, and 
neoliberal anti-union crusades may help explain the relative paucity 
of strikes, labor demonstrations, and strong political lobbying around 
employment issues in the US. On another level, millions have lost their 
homes to foreclosures, which have risen to 6-7 times their pre-crisis level 
(roughly 3 million annually), in ways that also disproportionately hurt 
minorities. This may have fueled deep resentment against banks and 
pre-crisis housing market shenanigans, but private debt and bankruptcy 
issues in American culture tend to become more a matter of individual 
shame than a spark to collective protest. Finally, US opinion polls point 
to serious problems of political legitimacy. Very few Americans believe 
that the US Congress is functional, for example, let alone responsive to 
citizen needs. Manichaean partisan conflict, in which both parties seek 
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possible electoral support with huge energy and resources, may mean 
that crisis-generated anger f inds its way more quickly into conventional 
politics than into protest (Kenworthy and Owens 2011).
Contagion: The Eurozone Crisis
Europeans f irst hoped to escape the crisis because they were better regu-
lated and armed with more automatic stabilizers than the US. The collapse 
of the global f inancial sector in 2008 obliged Europe to acknowledge the 
spread of dubious American f inancial practices to their banking systems, 
however. The f irst responses to the crisis went smoothly. The European 
Central Bank (ECB) provided liquidity to keep credit f lowing and closely 
coordinated its actions with other central banks (Trichet 2010; Quaglia 
et al. 2009: 74-75), while EU member states agreed to common policy 
objectives (Bastasin 2012). National authorities in the EU retained most 
f iscal prerogatives, implying ad hoc coordination to general objectives 
rather than common EU policies (Bastasin 2012; Quaglia et al. 2009: 76-77; 
European Commission 2009). Bailouts came f irst, with banks sometimes 
recapitalized or semi-nationalized; deposits were guaranteed; and private 
banks consolidated and merged.5 Then came stimulus packages, again 
organized around coordinated general objectives and different national 
paths, which, together with automatic stabilizers, amounted to between 3.3 
and 4 percent of EU GDP, with special plans for newer central and eastern 
European members.6 Financial sector regulatory reform was urgent, and a 
‘High Level Group on f inancial supervision’ recommended imposing higher 
capital requirements, reforming credit-rating agencies, and introducing 
new asset valuation and accounting techniques. The High Level Group 
also concluded that those parts of the f inancial system with systemic 
importance needed new regulation and supervision plus core regulatory 
5 Coordination went beyond the EU’s borders. The G-7 rapidly convened the G-20, enlarging 
discussions beyond the rich North. The November 2008 G20 meeting in Washington concluded 
that members should use f iscal stimulation to avoid collapse and initiated an avalanche of good 
international intentions replicating both US and EU outlooks.
6 New EU members faced projections of a 15.8 per cent GDP decline through 2009 (Darvas 
2009), despite great differences and varying national responses. Poland, the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, and Slovenia weathered the initial storm well; less developed Baltic and Balkan 
countries had larger def icits and debts; and Hungary faced bankruptcy and needed IMF help. 
Many CEECs also had dangerous Euro-denominated, EU-15-originated consumer debts (often 
mortgages), necessitating special public-private deals. Different exchange rate regimes created 
different dilemmas. 
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and supervisory standards within a new EU crisis management framework 
(Pisani-Ferry and Sapir 2009; Véron 2010).
These responses helped to stem financial sector collapse and to limit real 
economy damage (Ross 2011). But a much larger drama for the EU’s Economic 
and Monetary Union (the Euro and its institutions) began in later 2009 after 
a new government announced that Greek statistics had been manipulated 
and that Greece’s budget deficit was higher than anyone had suspected. The 
bond markets, sensing that Greece might default, then raised interest rate 
spreads between Greece and Germany. International credit rating agencies 
downgraded Greece. Greece was the poster child for exploiting the flaws 
in Eurozone economic governance. EMU’s one-size-f its-all interest rates 
provided a windfall to poorer EMU countries and had also allowed them to 
gain much easier access to transnational capital flows, encouraging Greece 
and others to grow by overborrowing (Fernandez-Villaverde and Santos 
2013; Aglietta and Brand 2013; Blyth 2013). The EU’s responses to the crisis 
after 2007-08 then contributed to larger national def icits and debts, and 
crisis-changed economic conditions began to lower growth and government 
revenues while also pushing up government spending (Mitsopolous and 
Pelagadis 2012; Jones 2012).7 The main EMU rules from the 1993 Maastricht 
Treaty – the 3 percent annual def icit and 60 percent cumulated debt ceil-
ing – were arbitrary, narrowly focused on public debt, and pro-cyclical, and 
the treaty itself had provided few effective mechanisms for enforcing them 
(Eichengreen 2012). In addition, there were few emergency provisions, no 
plans for a country to default and leave, and the treaty ruled out f inancial 
solidarity among EMU members.
Institutions Make Policies!
First responders in the American crisis included a strong central govern-
ment, a single national jurisdiction, and a powerful central bank with 
flexible mandates. EMU, in stark contrast, was a single currency without a 
central government, with multiple national jurisdictions, and a European 
Central Bank (ECB) with a legal mandate restricted to fighting inflation. The 
result was that the Eurozone’s crisis responses had to be negotiated among 
many countries and decisions had to be made in either the Eurogroup 
(the leaders of EMU member states) or the European Council (national 
7 Responsibilities also lay with the Euro-zone’s richer members who had prof ited from EMU’s 
perverse incentives by exporting goods and capital to poorer countries in ways that increased 
divergence within the Euro-zone (Dullien and Schwartzer 2009; Eichengreen 2010, 2012).
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leaders of the broader EU), both intergovernmental.8 Past experience with 
intergovernmental processes indicated that they took a signif icant amount 
of time, let to incremental decision-making, and often produced suboptimal 
compromises. The differences in size and economic power between EMU 
countries meant in addition that decisions would probably be biased 
towards the preferences of the most powerful members. It followed that 
the institutional arrangements for responding to a crisis could matter as 
much as actual policies themselves.
It took six months for new Eurozone policies to begin to be decided, allow-
ing crisis contagion towards Ireland (which had a worse housing-banking 
bubble than the US) and Portugal (whose debt issues flowed from its relative 
poverty). Eurozone leaders, faced with threats from the stock market, f inally 
agreed in May 2010 to set up a temporary €750 billion European Financial 
Stability Facility (EFSF) that would provide conditional loans to menaced 
Eurozone countries at ‘non-concessional’ interest rates that would quickly 
prove to be too high.9 The Greek government then signed a ‘memorandum of 
understanding’ (MOU) to borrow €110 billion. The MOU, tailored to specific 
national conditions, as were those that later engaged Ireland, Portugal, and 
Cyprus, involved tough quarterly reviews by the European Commission, 
the ECB, and the IMF (known as the Troika). The terms of Greece’s f irst-
quarter MOU (through June 2010) obliged the Greeks to begin reducing 
their deficit to 3 percent by 2014 (an utterly unrealistic demand), cap public 
sector pay for three years, reduce the public sector wage bill, eliminate 
public sector bonuses, increase VAT and other taxes, reduce high pensions, 
eliminate pension bonuses, freeze all pensions, reform the labor market 
by decentralizing negotiations, reduce public investment, undertake tax 
reforms, reform bank governance, rebuild local administration, enhance 
competition by installing a new competition authority and breaking the 
power of a wide range of private professional monopolies, make it easier to 
8 As in any EU crisis – and this was the greatest in EU history – there were secondary actors. 
The bond markets, whose eruptions pushed bargaining forward, were the most important. 
The supranational ECB stretched its legal mandate to limit the crisis and influence member 
responses. The European Commission was present mainly because it alone could propose legisla-
tion following the European Council’s strategic leadership, and because of its administrative 
charges. Finally, the IMF helped provide and structure bailout loans.
9 The Commission proposed loans without the IMF, and France suggested European bonds. 
IMF participation was opposed by the ECB and Commission, but Germany insisted on its 
presence, believing that IMF conditionality would strengthen pressure on Greece to change 
and that IMF loans would lower f ire-f ighting costs (Bastasin 158). Merkel opposed ‘Eurobonds’ 
out of moral hazard fears and worries about Germany’s credit rating, plus anticipation that the 
German Constitutional Court would f ind them unconstitutional.
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start businesses, and more (European Commission 2010). The conditions, 
which were parsed in three-month assignments until the end of the loan 
period, threatened a huge number of Greek social groups. Many of these 
received the conditions as invitations to protest, which they then did, in 
manifold ways. MOUs for other EMU members that later had to take loans 
were similarly harsh, similarly monitored, and also led to protest.
Lying behind Eurozone hesitations were differences between Germany 
and France, the leaders of EMU (Marsh 2010; Dyson 2013; Krotz and Schild 
2013). The French, worried about EMU banks, wanted more ‘economic 
government’ and a quick Greek bailout. Germany’s initial response was 
that Greeks had caused their own problems and should fix them themselves. 
Germany, far more powerful economically, maintained its ordoliberal 
economic orthodoxies, but its reunif ication had opened space for German 
leaders to assert themselves.10 This led to the resolve not to serve as EU check-
writer of last resort, removing the classic EU solution of German-subsidized 
bailouts from the table. Shorter-term domestic politics, public opinion, 
and German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s thinking supported this course 
(ECFR 2011; Gros and Roth 2011). The French were much weaker because 
the French economy was vulnerable. An imminent presidential election, 
which Sarkozy would lose in 2012, led him to posture about co-leadership 
(causing the term ‘Merkozy’ to be coined) for domestic consumption rather 
than challenging German power. The Germans and Merkel would thereafter 
shape most crisis responses.
The May 2010 decision revealed new German flexibility. If EMU was to con-
tinue, flaws in Maastricht’s EMU architecture had to be f ixed (Aglietta and 
Brand 2013). An annual ‘European Semester’ was thus inaugurated in which 
member states submitted budget plans for peer scrutiny before budgets were 
voted. There were also a ‘six pack’ and ‘two pack’ of directives and regulations 
for stronger and more sophisticated monitoring of national fiscal policies plus 
new, more automatic sanctions for bad behavior. New monitoring procedures 
and financial sector regulation were based on the 2010 Delarosière committee 
report (Batastin 2012; Jouyet 2012). There were problems obtaining f inancial 
backing for most of these reforms, however, usually because Germany sought 
to limit its exposure. Germany, backed by France, also urged new ‘treaties’ 
10 Ordo-liberalism structured the successful reconstruction of the post-war German economy. 
At its center were constitutional rules for a ‘social market economy’ that involved collaboration 
among producer groups and social programs. A politically independent Bundesbank devoted 
to price stability had the power to compel private and civil society actors to moderate egoistic 
interests. Ordo-liberalism provided the matrix for both the Maastricht EMU bargain and the 
1997 Stability and Growth Pact (see Blyth 2013: 138-147). 
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by coalitions of the willing. A 2011 ‘Euro Plus Pact’, signed by all Eurozone 
countries plus eight other EU members, pledged controls on wage growth, 
raising retirement ages, reducing payroll taxes on labor, and new EU debt 
and deficit rules with stiff penalties for non-compliance. The 2012 ‘Treaty 
on Stability, Coordination and Governance’ obliged signatories to commit 
to balancing their national budgets (Fitoussi 2013). More recent reforms that 
have emerged include the commitment to a ‘Banking Union’ to establish 
ECB supervision over EMU banks, a new European ‘resolution’ authority to 
restructure or close failing banks, and an EMU deposit insurance system.
Decisions were repeatedly sold to the public as far-seeing solutions to 
crisis but often included genuine mistakes that made things worse. The 
interest rates of the original 2010 Greek bailout were too high and repayment 
schedules too rapid, worsening Greece’s debt problems, upsetting bond 
markets, and hastening a second Greek loan in 2012.11 Next, while preparing 
the October 2010 European Council, Germany proposed ‘private sector 
participation’ (i.e. making bondholders pay their share in bailouts), which 
deeply upset the ECB and produced new market agitation (Bastasin 2012). 
Later in 2011, discussions about the second Greek loan, including haircuts, 
went on for months, upsetting bond markets again and precipitating con-
tagion to Italy and Spain (Financial Times 2011a, 2011b, 2011c; Boone and 
Johnson 2011). The October 2011 European Council sought to calm things 
with empty promises, causing renewed market agitation. It took more 
ECB ‘non-standard’ actions (quantitative easing) and Mario Draghi’s 2012 
public promise to ‘do what it takes’ plus a calming in global markets to keep 
things under control (Dyson 2013: 211-218).12 In November 2011, ‘Merkozy’ 
engineered the back-to-back removal of f irst Greek Prime Minister George 
Papandreou (who had proposed a referendum on the second Greek loan) 
11 These judgments are underlined in an extraordinary IMF internal review that followed 
an earlier IMF re-evaluation of the austerity multiplier effects of Euro-zone loans. The report, 
a useful overview of the f irst Greek loan, strongly criticized the workings of the Troika (IMF, 
Commission, ECB: 31-32) because the EC’s reform focus was “more on compliance with EU 
norms than on growth impact [… and …] was not able to contribute much to identifying growth 
enhancing structural reforms” (p.31). 
12 Despite repeated German criticism, the ECB used ‘non-standard’ methods of buying 
members’ national debt instruments from bond markets and injecting new, low-interest-rate 
liquidity into Euro-zone economies, partly in the hope that member states would devise more 
effective sanctions for bad f iscal behavior. Beginning in 2010, the ECB also lowered collateral 
requirements to purchase the bonds of those EMU members that were hardest hit (the Securities 
Markets Programme) and in 2011 started low-interest loaning to banks in ‘long-term f inancing 
operations’ (LTROs) and in 2012 ‘Outright Monetary Transactions’ (OMT – market purchases 
of bonds from member states that had requested EFSF/ESM aid).
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and then Italian Premier Silvio Berlusconi (who was stalling on promised 
reforms). They were both replaced by ‘technocrats’ with deep Brussels con-
nections. This did little to help Greece and Italy economically but further 
angered Greek and Italian citizens. Then in 2013, EU leaders made another 
bad move: in bailing out Cyprus, they called for deep haircuts that would 
have decimated small depositors before market threats caused them to beat 
a hasty retreat (Rachman 2013; Wolf 2013). Finally, hesitations about moving 
to a banking union in 2012-2013 – again because of German unhappiness 
at Eurozone collective risk-sharing – unsettled the situation once more.
Policies and Pain
Repeated crisis policy choices consistently imposed the views of other EMU 
governments, particularly Germany, on countries in need of help. It has been 
the actual crisis f ire-f ighting policies that have hurt the most, however. To 
avoid bankruptcy, four endangered Eurozone members – Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal, and Cyprus – had to accept conditional loans that looked an awful 
lot like IMF Structural Adjustment Programs, while the banking systems of 
two more countries – Spain and Italy – were kept afloat by loans, bearing 
their own conditions, from the ECB. Borrowers were kept to a draconian 
schedule for reducing debts and def icits, cutting back extensive budget-
ary and social programs, decentralizing the labor market, reducing public 
employment, and privatizing government-owned property and businesses. 
Such policies combined a German ordoliberal backbone with European-
ized Anglo-American neoliberalism from the Commission’s economics 
directorate, and, in the case of sovereign debt, traditional IMF loan rules. 
The economic mantra behind these approaches was that a rapidly applied, 
harsh dose of austerity would lower unit labor costs, abolish rent-seeking, 
and establish starting points for virtuous growth. Beyond this ‘austerian-
ism’, reforms to EMU’s architecture brought new invasions into national 
economic policy sovereignty through technocratic mechanisms lodged in 
the European Commission that lacked clear democratic mandates.
The consequences have been dramatic. There has been negative eco-
nomic growth since 2008 in the Eurozone as a whole, as seen in Chart 2.1. 
The worst of this was in the Great Recession period, with a brief recovery 
until 2011-12, and then a second recessionary dip until late 2013, followed 
by a slight uptick.
Growth in those Eurozone countries that were the objects of conditional 
loans and obliged to undergo ‘internal devaluations’ has been much worse, 
however. With the beginning of 2008 as a starting point, Greek GDP declined 
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by 4 percent in the Great Recession, but then dropped to a low of -9 percent 
in 2011, the low point of its crisis, before it slowly climbed to -2.5 percent in 
early 2014. The Irish economy performed somewhat better, dropping to -7.8 
percent at its low point in 2009-10, then slowly recovering to +2 percent by 
2012 before dropping back into recession and then recovering in 2013-2014. 
Portugal dropped to -4 percent in 2009, then grew by +1.8 percent in 2010, 
dropping back to -4 percent in 2013 before moving into positive territory 
recently. Spain and Italy, whose banks were helped out by the ECB, did 
better but still suffered much lost growth.
Unemployment across the Eurozone shot up in the crisis and remains 
very high, as Chart 2.2 shows.
The hardest-hit Eurozone crisis countries vary on the unemployment 
front. None have done well, but economic differences have created different 
employment profiles. Greek unemployment rose steadily from 6 percent 
to 28 percent from 2008 to the beginning of 2014. Ireland was at 4 percent 
in 2008 and is now at 12 percent. Portugal began at 7.6 percent, rose to 17.7 
percent in early 2013 and dropped to 15.3 percent in 2014. Spain was at 9.6 
percent in 2008 and was nearly at 27 percent in 2013. Italy rose slightly from 
9 to 12+ percent in 2013, the Eurozone average.
Youth unemployment is particularly signif icant if, as we suspect, young 
people are more protest-prone than their elders. The numbers in Chart 2.3 
are striking enough for the Euro-zone as a whole, and much worse for the 
countries hardest hit by the crisis.
These numbers do not take into account young people who are otherwise 
out of the labor force for non-labor market reasons, but they obviously 
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show youth unemployment rapidly rising. For the most part, the Eurozone 
crisis countries are well above the general Euro area. From 2008 to early 
2014, Greece’s youth unemployment rose from 21 percent to 60 percent; 
Ireland’s from 10 percent to 25 percent; Portugal’s from 20 percent to 36 
percent; Spain’s from 20 percent to 58 percent; and Italy’s from 21 percent 
to 47 percent.
Reducing long-term unemployment had been one of the most important 
goals of the European Union. The Eurozone crisis wiped out any progress 
made in this area, however, as Chart 2.4 shows.
‘Internal devaluations’ leave citizens of poorer EMU countries in condi-
tions of austerity that will persist for years. New growth, even where it 
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exists, is low and relatively jobless. Even the best-educated young people in 
stricken countries, and some other European places, face grim employment 
prospects, placing new strains on their families, delaying entry into the 
labor force, and leaving those affected in life-course limbo. Poverty and 
social exclusion have shot up, especially in these most afflicted countries 
(Eurostat 2014; EU Commission 2013a, 2013b). Migration to better-off EU 
countries is possible, and there is some evidence that it has grown, especially 
among the young, but mobility within the EU has always been limited by 
the diff iculty of coping with another culture, language, and place where 
better jobs are reserved for the locals. Those who stay face rising long-term 
unemployment as technologies and work processes change rapidly, implying 
permanent exits from the labor force, new poverty, and individual and 
family disaster. Social science knows much too little about how much and 
what kind of social cohesion is needed to keep developed societies from 
fraying, but these numbers – and others we might have highlighted – imply 
future problems. As we have earlier noted, there has been a punitive ‘cold 
shower’ logic to economic governance throughout the EU crisis. Countries 
in deep trouble, as well as others with precarious economic situations that 
have yet to make themselves dependent on outside help, are now told (and 
often constrained) to stand under cold water long enough to rid themselves 
of the results of their alleged bad economic habits. Those who prescribe 
the cold showers assert that only then will these countries be able to begin 
climbing upwards economically. The ‘cold shower’ approach is a bet against 
a very uncertain future. Many think that it is unlikely to pay off, or at least 
not in the ways that ‘austerians’ claim that it will. One way or the other, 
there will be a significant number of European citizens standing under cold 
water for some time to come.
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Polling has shown how many of these citizens have come to understand 
all this. The crisis has worsened the EU’s chronic legitimacy problems in ways 
threatening to the EU. Eurobarometer surveys show favorable opinions of 
the EU rapidly declining, with these trends stronger in the southern member 
states. Pessimism about the future is widespread, again more pronounced in 
those countries more affected by the crisis, where doubts about the EU’s anti-
crisis policies are profound (Debomy 2013; Walton and Zielonka 2013). The Pew 
Global Survey conducted in the spring of 2013 reported declining support for 
the European project – only 28 percent believe that European integration has 
helped their economies, with the loss of confidence particularly strong among 
younger people (Pew Research 2013). If we reflect on the recent shift of far-
right European parties toward supplementing anti-immigrant xenophobia 
with anti-EU nationalism, as well as the trend of harder-left parties that have 
emerged to the left of social democrats advocating a return to closed-border 
statism and embracing Euroskepticism, it is clear that the EU has become 
a veritable target of protest. Indeed, Euroskeptical attitudes and political 
currents have rapidly spread almost everywhere (Torreblanca et al. 2013).
These surveys correlate with election results. Since the beginning of the 
crisis, European voters have repeatedly removed the incumbent govern-
ments that had presided over crisis responses (excepting Germany). In 
Ireland, Fianna Fail electoral domination, which had seemed eternal, has 
ended – one consequence of a terribly mishandled and corrupt housing 
bubble, itself the product of American-style public policy mismanagement. 
Social democratic governments in Portugal, Spain (where the central issue 
has been another housing bubble created by bad public policy and banking 
cupidity), and Greece have all been replaced by right-wing regimes that 
themselves rapidly became precarious. The severe electoral defeats of Latin 
European social democracy – with France a possible future addition in the 
near future – has great signif icance. European social democratic parties, 
for a century the political hope for many on the left, have been slowly 
losing electoral support in recent years (Moschonas 2011). They can still win 
elections and lead governing coalitions, but their voting numbers – and, 
more signif icantly, credibility as carriers of popular grievances – have been 
declining. Europe’s south had been a particularly bright spot for social 
democracy because political parties there had been able to harness the 
promises of modernization from joining the EU. The Eurozone crisis may 
have ended this.13
13 There are deeper issues. Center-left parties have turned into electoral machines staffed 
by political professionals and policy wonks whose most important task is now to govern 
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The results of the 2013 Italian elections after the EU-imposed Monti-tech-
nocratic government’s time expired went well beyond f iring incumbents. 
In a campaign saturated by EU and Eurozone issues, nearly 25 percent of 
the vote went to the Five Star Movement (35 percent of those between the 
ages of 18 and 34), a party led by a professional entertainer whose appeal 
was a refusal to play the Italian political game in traditional ways. At about 
the same moment, Greek elections saw Pasok decimated, the center-right 
returned to power, and Syriza – a left party whose indignation was clearer 
than its policy proposals – doing better than anyone else, sinning, in fact, in 
January 2015. In general, anti-establishment protest parties on the left and 
the right have prospered in the crisis, including openly fascist extremists 
in Greece. In France, a country that has avoided the worst but has teetered 
on the edge of serious economic problems, Nicolas Sarkozy lost to socialist 
François Hollande in 2012, and within a year Hollande had acquired the 
lowest popularity ratings in the history of the Fifth Republic.14
Other crisis results include accentuated divisions between the Eurozone’s 
north and south. Northerners, arrayed around Germany, have been the 
main contributors to bailouts and have insisted most forcefully on the ‘cold 
shower’ line for the stricken southerners who had hoped for greater solidarity 
and flexibility. On some occasions, particularly during election campaigns, 
this has translated into quasi-ethnic attacks directed at Germany. Prior to 
the crisis, EU southerners had been among the most positively ‘European’ 
member states, but many of them have since changed their minds. The crisis 
has also deepened the division between EMU ‘ins’ and ‘outs’, nourished 
Eurosceptics in the UK and other places, and laid foundations for an ever 
more complex and ‘geometrically variable’ EU.
Storms Past, Storms Still to Come?
The US crisis brought huge social costs, but the American context made it 
particularly diff icult to anticipate protest beyond hard-right movements 
market capitalist societies in a threatening Europeanized and globalized world. Their offers 
and concessions to progressive electoral constituencies can be real but limited by this prior-
ity. Many potential progressives, including protesters, may vote for them in the absence of 
alternatives, but social democrats are seen as reliable vehicles for the kinds of changes that 
are needed. 
14 If one extended the list beyond the countries directly targeted by crisis but where incum-
bents were tossed out by the crisis, it would also include the UK, Belgium, the Netherlands, and 
Denmark, with more to come.
62 GeorGe roSS 
like the Tea Party and the progressive 2011-2012 Occupy movement. Ameri-
can crisis policies were more direct and effective than those in Europe, 
despite the US’ blocked federalism, because of its strong central bank and 
determined political elites who possessed the leverage to initiate anti-
crisis policies, its single national jurisdiction and favorable international 
f inancial position. Recovery has been slow, however, and it remains to be 
seen whether this will stabilize a situation in which the ‘middle class’ is 
being hollowed out and an unchastened f inancial sector is re-installed in 
its luxurious Wall Street lodgings. Widespread suffering has drawn new 
attention to growing inequality, declining social mobility, rudimentary 
social policies, and the weakness of traditional protective organizations 
such as trade unions. Protest is a time-honored American ref lex, but it 
coexists with a great reliance on individual resilience. US protests may or 
may not be aligned with major national partisan conflicts or with huge 
American lobbies, but one cannot help underlining that the US has been 
riven for decades by partisan mobilization about fundamental social 
choices between a neoliberal and culturally conservative new Repub-
licanism and a defensive ‘liberalism’ around the Democrats. This great 
divide will continue to play an important role in shaping the form that 
protests take in the US and whether or not it corresponds to ‘conventional’ 
American politics.
Europe is different. Salvaging the Eurozone has involved clumsy in-
tergovernmental decision-making that has led to an imposition of harsh 
policies by some on others. Indignados or Occupy-style ‘progressive’ 
protests have been important to varying degrees, particularly in 2011-2012, 
throughout crisis-stricken countries, even if the Arab Spring movement 
that inspired and, to a degree, guided these movements, has not always 
turned out happily. Analogous movements recur, as in Ukraine, and may 
help keep strategic and tactical memories fresh. Other types of protest 
have also occurred, including off icial and unoff icial strikes, repeated 
student protests about educational policies and budgets, and strident 
mobilizations by specif ic threatened interests. Resentment levels among 
those hurt most by the crisis remain high. And beyond any debates about 
EMU and the EU, national governments, with a few exceptions, seem 
progressively less able to provide plausible policy solutions to citizens’ 
problems. It is possible that Europe may be in the midst of a massive 
crisis of politics in which citizens lose their sense that existing democratic 
processes can produce the desired results. To the degree to which these 
things are true, stormy weather – including a great deal of new protest 
– may lie ahead.
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3 Mobilization of Protest in the Age of 
Austerity
Hanspeter Kriesi
In a recent piece, McAdam and Tarrow (2010) discuss the question of the 
relationship between contention and convention in political action. Self-
critically, the authors observe that their joint effort (together with Tilly) to 
overcome the compartmentalization of studies concerning different forms 
of political action had given little attention to elections. They consider their 
inattention to the connection between elections and social movements ‘a 
serious lacuna’ in their Dynamics of Contention (McAdam et al. 2001), “as it 
is in the entire broad f ield of contentious politics” (532). To overcome the 
segmentation of the study of elections and social movements, they propose a 
series of six mechanisms that they believe “link movement actors to routine 
political actors in electoral campaigns”. These mechanisms focus on how 
movements inf luence the electoral process: movements may turn into 
parties that participate in elections, or they may form within parties; they 
may introduce tactical innovations that can be adopted as electoral tools; 
they may become active in electoral campaigns or react to the outcome of 
elections. In my own attempt to link the two worlds of social movements 
and political parties, I have been interested in the opposite causal relation-
ship, i.e. in the question of how political parties influence mobilization by 
social movements (Kriesi et al. 1995). In our comparative analysis of the 
mobilization of the new social movements, we were able to show that the 
configuration of the old and new left – and whether the left was in or out 
of government – made a key difference to their success.
I share McAdam and Tarrow’s preoccupation with the segmentation of 
our discipline, because I believe that it fundamentally limits our possibili-
ties to understand contemporary politics. In my view, however, previous 
attempts to come to terms with this segmentation are too partial and 
should be replaced by a more fundamental approach. Electoral choices 
and protest, mobilization by political parties and social movements are part 
and parcel of one and the same process of political interest intermediation 
that continuously links the different forms of interest articulation in the 
various channels and arenas of the political system. Taking the mobilization 
of protest in the age of austerity as the point of reference, I would like to 
formulate some general conceptual points as an introduction of such an 
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approach, which I shall then go on to illustrate with the experience of 
protest mobilization in three countries – Greece, Spain, and the US – in 
the age of austerity.
Conceptualization of the Relationship between Contention and 
Convention
The literature on social movements tells us that political mobilization 
depends on the interaction between three sets of factors: grievances, 
organization, and opportunity. Grievances constitute the starting point: 
an exogenous shock like the f inancial and economic crisis creates a tremen-
dous amount of popular discontent, which constitutes a latent mobi lization 
potential. It is unlikely, however, that the crisis creates such mobilization 
potentials from scratch. In any given society, there are more or fewer latent 
mobilization potentials linked to the structural conflicts, which predate 
the crisis and which pre-structure the way the crisis mobilization will play 
out. The mobilization potential newly created by the crisis adds to this 
already existing stock of grievances that has already been present at the 
time of the intervention of the shock of the crisis. In different ways, the 
crisis may serve as a catalyst for protest mobilization. It may reshape an 
already ongoing mobilization process: it may redirect it by orienting it to 
new issues and goals, and it may reinvigorate it by intensifying the protest 
activities. Or it may trigger the articulation of mobilization potentials that 
have remained latent until the occurrence of the crisis.
People with grievances seek to express them, and they do so by rais-
ing their voice or by exiting (Hirschman 1970). They raise their voice to 
the extent that they are organized and have an opportunity to do so. In 
democratic societies, citizens have the right to vote and they have the 
opportunity to express their grievances as voters. As Piven and Cloward 
(1977: 15) have already noted a long time ago, “ordinarily, def iance is f irst 
expressed in the voting booth simply because, whether def iant or not, 
people have been socialized within a political culture that def ines voting 
as the mechanism through which political change can and should properly 
occur”. Accordingly, one of the f irst signs of popular discontent are sharp 
shifts in voting patterns. More generally, in democratic societies, the action 
repertoire of protests is likely to make use of the available institutio nalized 
channels of access, which means that the privileged institutional spaces – 
i.e. the privileged arena to voice grievances – are the electoral and, where 
available, the direct-democratic arena. In democracies, voters resort to the 
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protest arena to the extent that they are unable to express themselves in 
the electoral or direct democratic channel, or to the extent that their vote 
has no impact.
The voters may not be able to express their discontent in the electoral 
arena because the next elections are too far off to provide an opportunity 
to voice their grievances. This constraint imposed by the electoral cycle 
is alleviated by the availability of elections at different levels – there are 
not only national but also local, regional, and European elections taking 
place at different moments in time and offering as many opportunities 
to voice discontent. Voters may use each one of these elections to protest 
against the governments and their policies at various levels. But even if 
elections are held sooner or later, they may not provide an opportunity 
to voice discontent because of the lack of a suitable alternative offered by 
the parties competing in the elections. The menu of alternatives provided 
by the parties is extended when new challengers mobilize in the electoral 
arena or when established mainstream parties transform themselves into 
new challengers. New challengers certainly have greater opportunities to 
enter into the fray and to make a difference in proportional systems than 
in majoritarian ones.
The literature on economic voting provides us with more precise ideas 
about how the crisis may have played out in electoral terms (Lewis-Beck 
and Stegmaier 2007; Duch and Stevenson 2008). This literature indicates 
that incumbents are generally punished in times of an economic crisis but 
that the impact is likely to vary as a function of context conditions (Powell 
and Whitten 1993; Hellwig and Samuels 2007; Duch and Stevenson 2008: 
chapter 9; Kriesi 2013). Specif ically, this literature shows the importance of 
taking into account the kind of democracy (majoritarian vs proportional), 
the degree of institutionalization of the party system, and the openness of 
the national economy. It tends to suggest that the Great Recession is just 
another instance of economic distress, which has cyclical but no long-term 
effects on politics. Accordingly, the economic voting literature has largely 
failed to account for the kind of parties that may benefit when voters turn 
to punishing the governing parties (Van der Brug et al. 2007: 18-19; Tucker 
2006: 4-5).
In a longer-term perspective, one could argue that the external shock 
of the Great Recession reinforces long-term trends in the West European 
party systems that have already been under way before the crisis. One such 
trend concerns the erosion of the mainstream parties’ representation func-
tion. According to this trend, above all put into evidence by Katz and Mair 
(1995, 2009) and Mair (2000, 2002, 2006), mainstream parties have moved 
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their center of gravity from civil society to the state and have strengthened 
their governmental role to the detriment of their representation function. 
Mair (2000) summarized this development by what he called the rise of 
a ‘partyless democracy’. What he had in mind was a largely neutral and 
non-partisan system of governance, appealing to a largely undifferentiated 
mass electorate whose relations with the institutions of government are 
no longer mediated to any signif icant extent. As the mainstream parties’ 
representation function weakens, opportunities for populist protest in the 
party system increases. The decline of the parties’ representation function 
invites populist reactions in the party system. Mair (2011: 14) expected, in 
fact, a division of labor within the party system between mainstream parties 
that habitually govern and take responsibility and parties that give voice to 
the people, i.e. that fulf ill the representation function and that often adopt 
a rather populist style. He expected “a growing divide … between parties 
which claim to represent, but don’t deliver, and those which deliver, but 
are no longer seen to represent” (Mair 2002: 88). According to this thesis, 
by restricting the maneuvering space of the mainstream parties, the Great 
Recession has played into the hands of populist challengers within the 
party system by offering them the opportunity to mobilize against the 
mainstream parties and by presenting themselves as the true advocates 
of the people’s will.
Such new challengers in the party system may be movements turned 
into parties, or, even more importantly, the challengers in the party system 
may be movements that have taken the form of parties in the f irst place. 
Arguably, the most important recent movements in Western Europe have 
been movements of the right, the new populist right, which have established 
themselves in the form of parties and have more or less explicitly avoided 
protest mobilization. The exogenous shock of the Great Recession might 
contribute to reinforcing the transformation of the partisan space driven by 
the rise of the new populist right that we have already observed in Western 
Europe before the crisis. As I have argued together with several colleagues 
in previous publications (Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008, 2012), globalization has 
transformed the basis of politics in Western Europe by giving rise to what 
we have called a new ‘integration-demarcation’ cleavage opposing glo-
balization ‘winners’ and ‘losers’. We suggested that the mobilization of the 
group of ‘losers’ by new challengers – parties of the new populist right and 
transformed established parties of the liberal and conservative right – has 
provided the key impetus for the transformation of the party systems in 
the six countries of our study – Austria, France, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Switzerland, and the UK.
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The paradox of the populists from the new right relying on party instead 
of movement politics is linked to a strategy of ‘double differentiation’, which 
is rooted in core value orientations of populist right leaders and follow-
ers (Hutter and Kriesi 2013). Both try to set themselves apart from their 
adversaries on the left, whom they view as ‘chaotic’ protesters, as well as 
from the extreme and neo-fascist right – not only for historical but also for 
more practical reasons. If those who openly advocate the most right-wing 
and racist ideologies take part in the mobilization by populist right parties, 
then the populists run the risk of being equated with them. For both the 
challengers on the left and on the right, the ‘medium is the message’, i.e. 
the choice of the channel in which they express themselves is at the same 
time an expression of their underlying message. While the rebels on the new 
left are libertarian and more post-materialist, the rebels on the new right 
have authoritarian and materialist values, and prefer (orderly) conventional 
political action over (disorderly) protest politics. In other words, at least in 
Western Europe, while the left protests in the streets, any protest from the 
right is found above all in the electoral arena.
If mobilization in the electoral channel is the most obvious choice, direct-
democratic institutions are also increasingly available for the articulation of 
protest. As our comparative analysis of new social movements in Western 
Europe has shown, such institutions are readily used by social movements 
when they are available (Kriesi et al. 1995). Other institutional options 
for protest include litigation in courts. Kolb (2006) points out that courts 
provide access to the voices of those who might not otherwise be heard: “In 
contrast to the normal policy making process, access to and influence in 
the court system is not dependent on connections or social and economic 
position, but on the strength of legal arguments. In addition, judicial deci-
sions can have important extra-judicial effects – such as creating publicity 
or increasing the bargaining power of social movements.” Relying on courts 
for imposing reforms is, however, severely limited by the bounded nature 
of constitutional rights and by the fact that the judiciary is appointed by 
the other branches of government.
In the absence of available options in the institutionalized arenas discon-
tented citizens have no choice but to resort directly to protest and to try to 
force political concessions from political elites by appealing to the general 
public. This is Schattschneider’s idea (1960) of the expansion of conflict. 
Public protest is designed to unleash a public debate, to draw the attention 
of the public to the grievances of the actors in question, to create controversy 
where there was none, and to obtain the support of the public for the actors’ 
concerns. Controversial public debates and support by the general public 
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open up the access and increase the legitimacy of speakers and allies of the 
protest movements with journalists and with decision-makers who tend to 
closely follow the public debates (Gamson and Meyer 1996: 288). Wolfsfeld’s 
‘principle of political resonance’ (1997: 47) formulates this relationship in the 
following way: challengers who succeed in producing events that resonate 
with the professional and political culture of important news media can 
compete with much more powerful adversaries.
In Western Europe and North America, however, citizens do not only 
resort to the contentious mobilization of protest today, if no other options 
are available. In Western Europe and North America, protest mobilization 
has become increasingly conventional, as these societies have become 
what is aptly called a ‘movement society’ by Meyer and Tarrow (1998). The 
term suggests that political protest has become an integral part of modern 
life; that protest behavior is employed with greater frequency and by more 
diverse constituencies, and is used to represent a wider range of claims 
than ever before; and that professionalization and institutionalization 
may be changing the social movement into an instrument of conventional 
politics. As protest becomes a part of everyday politics, we facilitate the 
“normalization of the unconventional” (Fuchs 1991). At the same time, 
social movement organizations become rather like interest groups. While 
protest becomes conventional, the typical repertoire of protest may still 
vary from one country to the other. Thus, in southern Europe, the political 
strike combined with large demonstrations constitutes a core element of 
the protest repertoire, while it is much less common or conventional in the 
north of Europe.
As unconventional forms of participation become increasingly accepted 
and political systems become more open to unconventional forms of mobi-
lization, these forms are likely to become more moderate, less prominent, 
and less effective. As a result of its routinization, the protest repertoire 
loses some of its news value, its surprise effect, and its impact on the 
general public. As the repertoire of protest becomes routinized and loses 
its effective ness, tactical innovations (McAdam 1983) become all the more 
important – innovations that catch the adversaries off guard and force 
them to innovate as well, i.e. to neutralize the challengers’ moves through 
effective tactical counter-measures.
If a response to more or less conventional protest is not forthcoming, 
however, challengers, even in democracies, may not only try to innovate, 
they may also be tempted to step up their protest, to radicalize, and to 
create a political crisis through massive use of disruption (Keeler 1993). A 
political crisis can create a sense of urgency predicated on the assumption 
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that already serious problems will be exacerbated by inaction. In addition, 
a political crisis can create a sense of genuine fear predicated on the as-
sumption that inaction may endanger lives and property or even result in 
a revolution or coup d’état. When either of these mechanisms comes into 
play, the government may feel compelled to make substantive conces-
sions to the challengers or, if it is unable to implement such concessions, 
fundamental realignments in the party system may occur. Latin America 
provides telling examples of party system collapse and realignments as a 
consequence of economic liberalization reforms in the aftermath of the 
debt crisis of the 1980s and 1990s (see Lupu 2012; Morgan 2013; Roberts 2013; 
Rovira Kaltwasser 2013).
Finally, it is also possible that the challengers come to reject the institu-
tionalized channels of established democracies altogether. They may turn 
against representative democracy and the electoral process and demand 
more direct, participatory forms of democracy. This is, indeed, what the 
student movements of the late 1960s and the new social movements of the 
1970s and 1980s have called for and what the New Left had been pursuing 
from the start. Thus, in the late 1960s, exponents of the New Left had already 
denounced the deficiencies of existing representative models of democracy 
(e.g. Agnoli and Brückner 1968) and demanded more participatory forms 
of ‘strong’ democracy, as ref lected in the scholarly literature of the day 
(Pateman 1970; Macpherson 1977; Barber 1984).
Whatever the action form and the political objective, political mo-
bilization in both the institutional and the protest arenas requires an 
organizational infrastructure. In a democracy, the key political organiza-
tions are political parties, interest/advocacy groups, and social movement 
organizations (SMOs). Each type of organization focuses on a specif ic arena 
for its mobilization. Parties mainly, although not exclusively, mobilize in the 
electoral and the direct-democratic arenas, interest groups in the direct-
democratic and the administrative arenas, and SMOs in the protest arena. In 
the absence of a political organization, the exit option – taking the form of 
apathy or of ‘voting with the feet’ – is the most likely reaction to grievances. 
This also applies if the established political organizations do not pick up 
the grievances of the population and if no new challenger is available. 
People who are not mobilized or who do not feel that the available options 
of mobilization allow them to express their grievances in any meaningful 
way are unlikely to move at all. In the electoral and direct-democratic 
arenas, this means low turnout; in the administrative arena, this means 
no lobbying; in the protest arena, this means no mass protest, no strikes, 
and no demonstrations.
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The Dynamics of Contention and Convention in the Age of 
Austerity and the Transformation of the Party System
The f inancial crisis constitutes an exogenous shock of an extraordinary 
magnitude. At f irst, governments focused their efforts on stabilizing their 
national banking systems and alleviating the negative impact on the real 
economy. They adopted bank rescue packa ges (Weber and Schmitz 2011; 
see also the chapter by Ross in this volume). They also countered the 
economic impact of the crisis by adopting modest f iscal expansionary 
measures (Armingeon 2012), relying on some version of ‘liberal Keynesian-
ism’ (Pontusson and Raess 2012). Not all countries succeeded in reducing the 
short-term adverse effects of the crisis. Although the f inancial crisis had a 
severe impact on all the advanced industrial economies, the effect differed 
per country. As the crisis continued, governments generally changed poli-
cies and turned to austerity measures. In the case of the weaker economies, 
however, these measures largely failed to achieve their intended goal of 
reducing the public def icit. As a result, economic imbalances in Europe 
were aggravated, and the weaknesses in the EMU governance structures 
were revealed (Featherstone 2011; De Grauwe 2011; Eichengreen 2012). 
The ensuing complex policies of crisis management, which involved hard 
bargaining between European governments, their domestic constituents, 
and supranational actors (the European Commission, the ECB, the IMF, 
and the European Banking Authority), provided one of the key triggers for 
the political mobilization of grievances by European citizens in the face of 
the Great Recession.
My heuristic framework for the analysis of the interactive dynamics 
starts out with a set of f ive highly stylized political actors that includes: (1) 
international actors (such as the European Commission, the ECB, or the 
IMF), (2) the national government, (3) the (mainstream) opposition, (4) 
other (competing) public authorities (such as the [symbolic] president, the 
courts, [part of] the media, or the voters in a referendum vote) or established 
interest groups, and (5) outside challengers (populist parties, social move-
ment organizations, trade unions, public interest groups). I assume that, 
in times of crisis, the international actors and the national governments 
have the initiative, while the other three types of actors may or may not 
react to the actions of these key actors. I am most interested here in the 
interaction between the mobilization of protest in the different channels 
and its impact on the party system in particular.
I shall look at three cases – the US, Greece, and Spain. In none of 
these three cases has the new populist right – i.e. a party defending the 
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globalization ‘losers’ – had any significant electoral success before the crisis. 
In all of these countries, a rather majoritarian electoral system discourages 
the success of new challengers in the party system. Accordingly, Green par-
ties have also been very weak or non-existent in these countries, and even 
strong new social movements have not left behind a legacy of strong party 
organizations ready to mobilize discontent in these countries. Another 
similarity between the three countries is that, at the moment the crisis 
hit, the left-wing incumbent government made it diff icult, at f irst sight, 
for labor unions to organize any kind of mobilization.
United States
The focus on the interaction between contention and convention in the 
age of austerity suggests that we must broaden our view beyond ‘street 
politics’. Indeed, in the age of austerity, mobilization has not only taken 
place in the streets. In fact, what I have called the most important recent 
movements in Western Europe – the movements of the new populist right 
– have established themselves in the form of parties and hardly mobilized 
in the streets at all. This is also true of the functional equivalent of the 
new populist right in the US – the Tea Party – that has launched the f irst 
and, I would argue, the most consequential mobilization against the US 
government in the age of austerity.
Compared to the Tea Party that started to mobilize against the new Oba-
ma Administration in early 2009, the Occupy movement came late – it only 
mobilized in the fall of 2011 – and it faded away as quickly as it came onto the 
public scene. As Gitlin (2013) suggests, it was more moment than movement. 
Tarrow (2011) has noted as much early on: “‘[w]e are here’ movements often 
flare up rapidly and fade away just as quickly, or disintegrate into rivulets 
of particular claims and interests”. The number of people mobilized by the 
Occupy movement remained rather limited (they peaked at some ten to 
twenty thousand participants in the 5 October 2011 demonstration in New 
York City), and levels of support for the movement by the general public 
plunged rapidly. This does not mean that Occupy was inconsequential: 
the movement’s slogan (“We are the 99%”) struck a responsive chord and 
entered into popular lore. “This was brilliant framing” (Calhoun 2013: 33) 
that drew media attention to the problem of rising inequality, and even if 
media attention did subside after the movement’s eviction from Zuccotti 
Park, the broader political discourse continued “to be peppered with refer-
ences to ‘the 1 percent’ and to other issues Occupy had raised” (Milkman 
et al. 2013: 38). However, Occupy did not seek a direct political impact. It 
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did not target the government and its handling of the f inancial crisis but 
instead shifted the focus to inequality in society (Calhoun 2013: 33). As Gitlin 
(2013: 8) points out, the inner core of the movement “didn’t want different 
policies; it wanted a different way of life”. And it was “phobic about the risk 
of being coopted”, even though such risks were rather limited given that 
its natural political ally, the Democratic Party, “handled the movement 
gingerly, for fear that any more intense expressions of friendliness might 
tar them with unruly brushes”.
Contrary to the Occupy movement, the Tea Party movement has had 
considerable political impact, not least because it pre-empted the stage 
for mobilization by other movements. It has, of course, not been a reac-
tion to austerity, but it reacted to the f irst ‘liberal Keynesian’ phase of the 
government’s reactions to the crisis. Contrary to the Occupy movement, 
it targeted the government and it crucially shaped its natural ally – the 
Republican Party. Paradoxically, it mobilized against an administration 
that had inherited the mess from its predecessors and was trying to make 
the best of it by adopting the recipes already introduced by its predecessors, 
which were the recipes all the other governments applied at that time.
In presenting the case of the Tea Party, I essentially follow the study by 
Skocpol and Williamson (2012). The cast of characters is purely domestic 
in this particular case and includes the government (the incoming Obama 
Administration), the mainstream opposition (the Republicans), and three 
types of challengers: 1) grassroots local groups, composed of a gaggle of 
about 1,000 local groups (in 2011), not particularly well-coordinated and 
none of them directly controlled by the Republican party; 2) professional 
national advocacy groups (‘idea pushers’), top-down organizations leverag-
ing grassroots activism to gain new advantage, f inanced by a few billionaire 
families, especially the Koch family, whose resources allow them to push 
their own world view in civic and political affairs; 3) the highly partisan sec-
tor of the conservative media complex – including Fox News, the right-wing 
blogosphere, and nationwide networks of right-wing talk radio programs. 
The grassroots organizations got the movement off the ground, the con-
servative advocacy groups jumped on the bandwagon, and the conservative 
media quickly joined and helped to orchestrate the movement, breaking 
down the barriers between media and movement that have usually been 
so challenging for protesters to navigate. The thrust of local and national 
Tea Party activism through the November 2010 elections was maximized 
by loosely connected organizational efforts. The relationship between the 
local chapters and the national advocacy groups was loose and mutually 
beneficial, allowing the advocacy groups to set the agendas and disseminate 
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general arguments without becoming accountable to the local groups. The 
conservative media – Fox in particular – served as a kind of social movement 
orchestrator during the critical early period of initial mobilization: they 
forged a community of meaning. As a result of the segmentation of the 
public sphere, the Tea Party activists often unblinkingly believed wildly 
inaccurate things about what government does, how it is f inanced, and 
what is actually included in key pieces of legislation or regulation (Skocpol 
and Williamson 2012: 199).
Tea Party efforts moved forward within and across the edges of the 
Grand Old Party (GOP) but never came under party control. However, 
the movement had its greatest effect in the mid-term elections of 2010, 
when the Republicans gained 63 seats and control of the House, and took 
control of both the governorships and the legislatures in twelve states. The 
Democrats ended up with control of the fewest state legislative bodies they 
have had since 1946 (Drew 2013). Of course, the economic recession and 
high unemployment helped the opposition party, but the Tea Party and 
selective participation helped, too: the participation rate fell from 61.6 per 
cent in the 2008 elections to 41.6 per cent in the 2010 mid-term elections. 
Mid-term voters tend to lean to the Republicans, but in 2010 this was even 
more the case than usual thanks to the mobilization by the Tea Party. As 
Skocpol and Williamson put it: “The Tea Party and their adoring media 
surely helped re-inspire grassroots conservatives, set a national agenda 
for the election, and claim a Republican-wave election as vindication for 
a particular, extreme conservative ideology” (2012: 163). And Drew (2013) 
maintains that the 2010 elections were the single most important event 
leading up to the domination of the House by the Republican far right.
The bigger story is, indeed, the impact of the Tea Party on the GOP. 
The Republican Party has been moving toward the right for some time, 
and that movement only quickened after the advent of the Tea Party. The 
Republicans newly elected in 2010 were much more to the right than the 
outgoing Republicans. Moreover, the Tea Party activists fulf illed ‘watchdog 
functions’, barking at the heels of the GOP. They took over local committees, 
which is signif icant because Republicans who want to run for election or 
reelection to state legislatures and Congress will think twice before ignoring 
the stated policy preferences of even relatively small Tea Party minorities 
in their districts. According to Skocpol and Williamson (2012: 183), the 
Tea Party’s ultimate impact on Congress – and on state legislatures – lies 
in its capacity to coordinate national pressure from wealthy funders and 
ideological advocates with contacts from grassroots Tea Partyers who have 
a reputation for clout in local districts. When coordinated pressure can be 
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mounted – as it has been in budget battles – the Tea Party delivers a loud 
and clear absolutist message to legislators, a message that comes both from 
advocates in Washington DC and from local districts. Although the symbol-
ism of ‘the Tea Party’ is already fading in popularity, the power of hard-right 
ideologues consolidated during the first years of the Obama Administration 
is continuing to drive Republican politics, crowding Republicans into an 
ultra-right corner and contributing to the paralysis of the American political 
system (Drew 2013).
Greece
Greece has been arguably the country hardest hit by the Great Recession. It 
goes without saying, then, that anti-austerity protests appear to have been 
much more intense in Greece than elsewhere. International actors played 
a key role in how Greece dealt with the crisis and became, together with 
the government, the key target of the protests. The mainstream opposition 
did its best to undermine the government without openly joining the chal-
lengers, who were mainly organized by the (old) radical left and the trade 
unions. The government’s anti-austerity measures – whether unilaterally 
adopted (at f irst) or imposed by the Troika (beginning with the f irst Greek 
bailout in May 2010) – triggered the mobilization. The series of large-scale 
mobilizations was a direct response to the series of measures imposed by 
the government on an increasingly alienated population.
Timing is again crucial. Just as in the case of the US Tea Party, the move-
ment got off the ground only once a new government was voted into off ice. 
In the fall of 2009, the Greeks had the possibility to sanction the incumbent 
government in national elections. With a rapidly burgeoning public def icit 
necessitating increasingly tough austerity measures, the conservative Prime 
Minister Karamanlis announ ced in a dramatic televised address on 2 Sep-
tember 2009 the dissolution of parliament and early elections on 4 October, 
only two years after the previous one. As in 2007, Karamanlis sought to 
pre-empt the further erosion of electoral support for his government and 
to ensure the shortest possible campaign. But this time, he did not get away 
with it. Under the pressures of the economic crisis, Karamanlis’s center-
right New Democracy party (ND) could only promise austerity measures 
to decrease the runaway public debt. In sharp contrast, Pasok, the socialist 
party in opposition, offered not only a stimulus package to boost demand 
but also the vague prospect of ‘green development’ as a new model for 
the country. George Papandreou cheerfully proclaimed that the country’s 
problem was not the lack of resources but only their mismanagement. This 
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was enough to hand him the premiership after an overwhelming victory 
at the polls (Mavrogordatos and Marantzidis 2010: 997f). The elections 
constituted a typical example of economic voting: the incumbents were 
seriously punished and the mainstream opposition took over: Pasok won 
5.8 per cent, rising to 43.9 per cent, while ND lost 8.3 per cent, dropping to 
33.5 per cent, its lowest percentage ever. The radical left (KKE and Syriza) 
also lost some votes.
The new socialist government under George Papandreou was, however, 
quickly hit by the tough reality of the economic crisis. In December 2009, the 
new government admitted that the public debt f igures had been manipu-
lated by previous governments and that Greece was actually burdened with 
public debt amounting to 113 percent of GDP – nearly double the Eurozone 
limit of 60 percent. Rating agencies started to downgrade Greek bank and 
government debt. In January 2010, an EU report condemned Greece for 
“severe irregularities” in its accounting procedures. Its budget def icit in 
2009 was revised upwards from 3.7 per cent to 12.7 per cent, more than four 
times the maximum allowed by EU rules. Instead of a stimulus program, 
the Papandreou government was forced to implement a series of austerity 
measures in February 2010. These measures were immediately opposed by 
political forces further to the left. In spite of the fact that it was a socialist 
government who was forced to take these measures under heavy interna-
tional pressure, the unions and the radical left (KKE and Syriza) mobilized 
against the government’s austerity program. They believed that Pasok had 
“lost its soul”. As a result of the crisis, both major political parties had thus 
lost legitimacy. The master frame of the protestors was mobilizing against 
the political corruption symbolized by parliament. One of the central 
slogans was “burn, burn the brothel called Parliament” (Psimitis 2011: 196).
Over the next three years, Greece saw no less than 27 general strikes 
against the austerity programs. In addition to general strikes, Greece ex-
perienced large-scale demon strations, sit-ins, arson attacks against public 
buildings, and widespread destruction of private property, verbal and physi-
cal attacks against MPs and the parliament, and terrorist attacks, many 
of which were directed against immigrants. The anti-austerity protests 
in Greece un doubtedly constitute a mass movement in which, according 
to the estimates of Karyotis and Rüdig (2013), no less than 30 per cent of 
the entire population was engaged in one way or another in 2010. In spite 
of the large-scale mobilization of this movement, at its core, this was a 
movement rooted in Greece’s traditional left-wing political culture. As 
Karyotis and Rüdig (2013) argue, at the time of the outbreak of the crisis, 
Greece had a large reservoir of people who had previously been engaged in 
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protest and on whom any protest mobilization may have been able to draw. 
This was essentially a left-leaning protest potential that was part of what 
Andronikidou and Kovras (2012: 712) have called “a deep-rooted culture of 
resistance” that was extended during the crisis. Already before the crisis, 
the frequency of general strikes – which were a regular feature of Greek 
life well before the austerity protests – made Greece clearly stand out from 
other countries. Moreover, the role of trade unions in mobilizing people for 
these strikes had been crucial already before the crisis.
What the analysis of Karyotis and Rüdig clearly shows is the impor-
tance of this potential for the mobilization of anti-austerity protests in 
2010. Previous protest involvement turns out to be the most important 
predictor of involvement in anti-austerity protests. Those who have been 
involved in both strikes and demonstrations multiple times before are the 
most likely to take part in anti-austerity protests as well. The traditional 
network of trade union and voluntary group membership, as well as public 
sector employment, played a crucial role in recruiting protesters for the 
previous protests as well as for the anti-austerity protests. Once previous 
participation is controlled for, none of these network factors is a predictor 
of protest. For Karyotis and Rüdig (2013: 22), it is “beyond doubt that anti-
austerity protest involves, to a large extent, mobilizing an existing pool 
of experienced strikers and demonstrators”. While grievances (relative 
deprivation) are signif icant predictors of opposition to austerity policies 
and support for protest, they do not predict turning potential into actual 
participation.
Karyotis and Rüdig also show that this is not a middle class or ‘new’ 
social movement. Instead, the Greek anti-austerity movement is a move-
ment of ordinary people of all educa tional backgrounds and ages. It includes 
people fully involved in economic life, not people at the margins of the labor 
force. Only people with a job can take part in a strike, after all. What seems 
plausible is that “the usual suspects in Greece, through their organizational 
infrastructure, act as f irst movers in the generation of protest opportunities, 
who trigger the latent protest socialization of a broader public that is not 
strongly def ined ideologically in left-right terms” (239). No less than 29 per 
cent of Karyotis and Rüdig’s representative national sample indicated that 
they had previously participated in either strikes or demonstrations or both.
This enormous mobilization, which continued through 2011, had far-
reaching consequences for electoral politics. Eventually, Greece experienced 
a deep political crisis that culminated in the collapse of its party system 
during the consecutive parliamentary elections of May and June 2012. In 
the local elections that took place in November 2010, the two mainstream 
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parties seemed to hold out. The incumbent socialists (Pasok) took a beating 
(dropping by 9.3 per cent), but they still came out ahead with 34.7 per cent 
nationwide, compared to 32.8 per cent of the conservative ND (-0.7 per 
cent). However, there were already signs of a fundamental change as well: 
the analysis of Karyotis and Rüdig reveals the weakness of Pasok’s support 
base at the time already. This weakness manifested itself, among other 
things, in the weak turnout: for the f irst time in memory, more than half 
of all eligible voters abstained in the second round. Moreover, almost 
30 per cent of mayors who won run-off contests around the country were 
independents.1 In addition to independents, the clear winner was the old 
communist left, which benefited from a year of intense mobilization but 
still only to a limited extent (+3.3 per cent for a new total of 10.9 per cent). 
Syriza remained stagnant at 4.5 per cent.
Although the mid-term program of f iscal consolidation was adopted 
in June 2011, Papandreou continued to lose power and credibility. The 
second Greek bailout in July 2011 accelerated the decay. It was then that 
Papandreou made the fateful decision to submit the second bailout agree-
ment to a national referendum. The European leaders, who had fought 
hard for this agreement, felt betrayed by his decision; both Merkel and 
Sarkozy made it clear that if Greece wanted to have a referendum, it could 
be only about the country’s continued membership of the Eurozone. In 
the ensuing turmoil, Papandreou was forced to resign. He was replaced by 
a technocratic government under the leadership of Lukas Papademos, the 
ex-director of the Greek National Bank. Reluctantly and only under pressure 
from the Troika, the conservative opposition (ND) agreed to give its vote of 
confidence in the new government. In the aftermath of the second bailout, 
the two mainstream parties started to disintegrate and the party system 
reconf igured under the impact of a new political conflict opposing the 
partisans and foes of the bailout agreement (Dinar and Rori 2013: 274-276). 
Two interrelated issues dominated the campaign in May: the bailout agree-
ment and punishment of the political elites who were responsible for the 
crisis. Based on data from the European Manifesto Project, Halikiopoulou 
et al. (2012) show that, on the new political conflict dimension of the bailout 
issue, the two pro-European mainstream parties were radically opposed 
by the smaller opposition parties from the left (KKE and Syriza) and the 
right (LAOS). This new conflict could be regarded as the Greek version of 
the ‘integration-demarcation’ cleavage that we have identif ied in northwest 
European countries. The specif ically Greek aspect is that this conflict has 
1 The Economist, 20 November 2010: 35.
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predominantly been articulated by a populist left (KKE and Syriza). For 
the communists (KKE) in Greece and elsewhere, the EU is a product of 
imperialism, which the radical left opposes in an attempt to protect the 
nation (equated with class), its territory, and sovereignty. Syriza, by contrast, 
adopted an ambiguous position: while radically in favor of punishing the 
incumbents and opposed to the bailout agreement, it wanted to stay in the 
Eurozone. LAOS ended up supporting the technocratic government, which 
was equivalent to signing its death warrant in the upcoming elections. 
The fragmentation of the mainstream parties added to the forces opposed 
to the bailout. When early elections were announced in April 2012, the 
Greek party system had very little in common with what it had been in 
2009. Fragmentation and polarization reigned on both sides of the political 
spectrum.
The punishment of the two major parties was exemplary: together they 
lost no less than 45 per cent of their 2009 votes, jointly obtaining no more 
than 32 per cent. Pasok was literally destroyed, losing more than 30 per 
cent, but ND was not able to benefit from this collapse and also lost 15 per 
cent. The winning anti-bailout forces were, however, too fragmented to be 
able to form a government. The election resulted in a deadlock, which led 
to the organization of a second election in June. The June election saw a 
limited comeback of ND to become the largest party with 29.7 per cent. The 
big winner of the elections was, however, Syriza, a party that had started 
out in 2004 as a confederation of leftist organizations, which were, in turn, 
split-offs from the communist party (Moschonas 2013: 35). Gaining votes 
mainly from Pasok, KKE, the Greens, and other smaller parties of the left, 
Syriza rose to become the second strongest party in the June election, only 
three percentage points below the leading party (Dinar and Rori 2013: 
279). Moschonas suggests that “without the shock of the economic crisis, 
Syriza’s meteoric rise would not have occurred, and without Aléxis Tsípras’s 
leadership and strategy, Syriza would not have become the main party of 
opposition” (2013: 36). The collapse of Pasok and the rise of Syriza closely 
resemble the experience of Latin American countries, where parties of 
the left had to implement neoliberal reform programs and, in the process, 
diluted their party ‘brand’ to such an extent that their voters lost their 
party identity and abandoned them for a populist alternative (such as Hugo 
Chavez in Venezuela). In the early Greek elections in January 2015, Syriza 
won the elections with 36.3 per cent of the vote and was able to form a 
government together with the right-wing populists of ANEL (Independent 
Greeks).
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Spain
The Spanish Indignados movement also began rather late in the f inancial 
crisis, in May 2011. It was preceded by huge demonstrations in Portugal in 
March 2011, which were triggered by four young university graduates mobi-
lizing their ‘lost generation’ (‘geração à rasca’) via Facebook. Some 200,000 
persons took part in this not only peaceful but festive event in Lisbon, and 
80,000 in Porto. The discontent expressed in these demonstrations was 
fuelled by the announcement of another set of austerity measures (by then 
the fourth one in Portugal). At about the same time, Spanish students also 
began protesting massively against education cuts, calling attention to their 
unpromising future. The Spanish Indignados followed two months later.
As shown in the contribution by Perugorría, Shalev, and Tejerina in this 
volume, the Spanish Indignados were mainly composed of those with left-
wing sympathies but, like the Occupy movement in the US, they did not 
want to be associated with any established political force. For the Indigna-
dos movement was not only an outcry against politicians and bankers and 
a call for social justice, it was also a critique of the way Spanish democracy 
functioned and a demand for real democracy now, i.e. for more participa-
tion, transparency, accountability, and proportional representation. It was a 
protest against politicians and parties, against the powerlessness of politics 
in coping with the economic problems created by the crisis. Similar to their 
Portuguese predecessors, the Indignados mobilized people through trusted 
social networks without formal ties to established organizations. Compared 
to other protest move ments in Spain, the Indignados were younger, less 
male-dominated, more highly educated, and less organized, although they 
had a roughly equal amount of previous experiences with unconventional 
participation (Anduiza et al. 2013). If anything, this was a movement of 
the new left, comparable to the movements of the late 1960s and early 
1970s in the northwest of Europe. Its rejection of formal organizations and 
established elites and its call for real demo cracy resemble the original call of 
the new left for participatory democracy and autonomous cultural spheres. 
Contrary to the limited mobilization capacity of the Occupy movement, this 
Spanish movement reached high rates of active participation. As reported 
in the chapter by Perugorría, Shalev, and Tejerina in this volume, the overall 
active participation rate was 11 per cent of the Spanish population, which 
is lower than the corresponding rates in Israel and Greece but higher than 
active participation in the famous French revolt of May 1968, when the 
participation rate reached 8 per cent for the whole of France (although up 
to 30 per cent in the ‘hottest’ regions) (Converse and Pierce 1986).
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Why was there such a lag between the outbreak of the f inancial crisis 
and the emergence of the Indignados movement? One reason for the lack 
of protest was that the Spanish socialist government was late in taking 
austerity measures. The government expected public debt to stabilize at 
70 per cent of GDP, up from 60 per cent but well below the euro-area average. 
It was only after much initial hesitation that the Socialist Zapatero govern-
ment took some tough measures, which included cuts in the salaries of 
public sector employees, a freezing of pensions, and a loosening of employee 
protection against dismissal. Another reason is that the Spanish unions, 
although well-known for their radicalism, did not conspicuously mobilize 
against their government’s austerity measures. In spite of their militancy, 
the Spanish unions had adopted a cooperative stance and have participated 
in corporatist arrangements ever since the Moncloa Pact, which established 
the Spanish social partnership system after the transition to demo cracy in 
1977 (Pérez 2000). Unlike the Greek unions, the Spanish unions maintained 
a close relationship with the socialist government.
If the Spanish unions did mobilize against austerity, they did so mainly 
in the framework of cross-European events. The European Trade Union 
Confederation (ETUC) organized two European days of action for a joint 
protest across Europe. The f irst one – called ‘Fight the crisis: Put the people 
f irst’ – was organized in May 2009. The campaign was launched with a 
demonstration on 14 May in Madrid, with the support of some 150,000 
participants. This event was followed by a demonstration on 15 May in 
Brussels, involving about 50,000 participants, and by further events on 
16 May in Berlin (100,000 participants) and in Prague (30,000 supporters). 
Demonstrations were also held in other European countries, including 
Bulgaria, Poland, Slovakia, and the UK. A second European day of action 
followed in September 2010, when tens of thousands of protesters took to 
the streets across Europe as strikes and demonstrations caused widespread 
disruption. In addition to Brussels (around 100,000 participants), the main 
action took place in Greece, and again in Spain. On the second day of union 
action across Europe, Spanish unions organized the f irst general strike in 
eight years, protesting against the austerity measures of their government. 
The result of the strike was acceptable for both sides: the unions were able 
to save face, and the government was not really threatened. “Rarely can 
a general strike have been so placid”, commented The Economist2. The 
government all but laid down a red carpet for the unions. The Spanish prime 
minister Zapatero had sweetened the pill by announcing a tax increase for 
2 The Economist, 2 October 2010: 33.
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the rich in 2011. The unions seemed to be performing more out of a sense of 
duty than rage. The mutual restraint can only be explained by the fact that 
the Spanish socialists have been the unions’ traditional allies.
In January 2011, however, it seemed very likely that the unions would 
call another general strike, triggered by the government’s announcement 
of a rise in the retirement age from 65 to 67. But under pressure from a de-
teriorating economy and expected socialist losses at the coming municipal 
elections in May, the unions and the government (together with the business 
confederation) got together to negotiate a new social pact instead. After 
two weeks of intense negotiations, the three partners agreed on a pact to 
revive the economy and to cut the soaring unemployment rate (especially 
among the young). The main reform consisted of the previously announced 
measure to gradually raise the retirement age from 65 to 67 starting in 2013.
Just as the Greek incumbents, the Spanish socialists were in for a severe 
electoral lashing. Not only had they underestimated the crisis for too long, 
once they began taking measures against the crisis, these proved to be 
incapable of improving the situation. In the f irst elections after their an-
nouncement of austerity measures in May 2010 – the regional elections in 
Catalonia – the socialists had already lost heavily to the regionalists, and to 
the conservative People’s Party (PP), its main opponent at the national level. 
In local elections held in May 2011, right around the time of the Indignados’ 
initial mobilization, the socialists once again received a severe beating. In 
these elections, which had a rather high participation rate, the conservative 
PP became the largest party. These defeats forced Prime Minister Zapatero 
to step down and to call for early national elections in November 2011. In 
these elections, the socialists lost a record amount of 15.1 per cent, obtaining 
only 28.8 per cent of the vote. The winner was once more the conservative 
opposition, which gained 4.7 per cent for a total of 44.6 per cent and an 
absolute majority in the Cortès.
Thus, just as in France in 1968 when the voters returned General de 
Gaulle to power after the May events (Converse and Pierce 1986: 413-484), 
the Indignados did not seem to have any impact on the electoral outcome. 
However, more recent developments suggest that this would be too hasty a 
conclusion to draw. As a matter of fact, the Spanish public quickly became 
disillusioned with the new conservative government, too. For one thing, it 
proved as incapable as the socialists of leading Spain out of the depression. 
Indeed, the level of unemployment continued to increase under the new 
government. In addition, the new government was shaken by a series of 
corruption scandals that greatly undermined the credibility of the conserva-
tive prime minister. As a result, mobilization against the government has 
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broadened. The sentiment of not being represented by any party or union 
spread beyond the ranks of the Indignados, and by the end of 2012, there 
was hardly a day without a demonstration or a strike in the Spanish capital3. 
A movement against foreclosures enjoyed unexpected success, and the 
number of action committees to defend the interests of ordinary citizens 
increased. Most importantly, the monthly polls of the electorate have indi-
cated a steady decline of the PP’s support. By early 2015, it had dropped down 
to around 25 per cent. At the same time, however, the socialists have not 
been able to benefit from the decline in support for their main adversaries, 
but have instead stagnated at the level of support they obtained in the last 
national elections. The voters have been turning to either Podemos, a new 
radical left-wing party that grew out of the Indignados movement, or to 
Ciudadanos, a new center-right party that originated in Catalonia but has 
mobilized more broadly in recent years. In the 2014 European elections, 
Podemos, which had just been created, obtained 8 percent of the vote, while 
Ciudadanos polled 3.2 percent. In the regional and local elections in the 
spring of 2015, left-wing coalitions close to Podemos won the race for mayor 
in the two largest Spanish cities, Madrid and Barcelona. In the 20 December 
2015 national legislative elections, Podemos gained 20.7 per cent of the vote 
and Ciudadanos 13 per cent.
* * *
The three cases presented in this paper serve to illustrate the two key points 
that I wish to make. First, they show that the movements spawned by the 
Great Recession differ greatly from one country to the other, making it 
diff icult to generalize. In the case of the US, the key movement has been 
a conservative one. In Greece, it has been a movement of the old left. In 
Spain, it has been a movement that claims to be neither left nor right but 
that, if anything, resembles the new left of the late 1960s in the northwest of 
Europe. This brings me to my second point: the make-up of the movements 
in the age of austerity depends on the national political context. In all three 
countries, the target of the mobilization was the incumbent government, 
and in all three countries, this government was a centre-left government 
– the Democrats in the US and the socialists in Greece and Spain. But these 
governments were challenged for quite different reasons, and the opposition 
that benefited from the challenge was quite different, too. However – and 
this is a point that all three cases share – the mobilization by the movements 
3 NZZ, 12 December 2012. 
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had a tremendous impact on electoral politics, the party system, and the 
political process more generally.
In the US, the government was challenged not for its austerity measures 
but for its liberal Keynesianism. The opposition that benef ited was the 
mainstream opposition. Given the US two-party system, any movement 
seeking to impose its view in politics can try to capture one of two parties – 
the Republicans in the case of conservative movements, and the Democrats 
in the case of progressive movements – or it can try to run a third-party 
campaign. A precedent to the Tea Party’s capture of the Republicans is 
the presidential campaign of Barry Goldwater (1964); precedents on the 
progressive side are the presidential campaigns of William J. Bryan (1896), 
Franklin D. Roosevelt (1932-40), and Eugene McCarthy (1972). Third-party 
candidates have tried as well: George Wallace or Ross Perrot on the right, 
or Ralph Nader on the left.
In Greece and Spain, the governments were challenged for their austerity 
policies, but the challengers in the two countries were quite different from 
each other. The Greek challenge was carried out by a broad popular move-
ment that was rooted in the traditionally rather radical left subculture, but 
expanded beyond it. The movement destroyed not only the Greek socialist 
party but also the Greek party system in which two major parties pursuing 
centrist strategies dominated. It replaced the socialists by a new party on 
the left whose main characteristic is that it opposed the austerity policies 
imposed by the second bailout agreement. At the same time, it replaced the 
centripetal competition in the party system by a polarized competition. In 
Spain, by contrast, the movement constituted a new political force that did 
have roots in the left political culture but did not associate itself with the 
political organizations of the left. Its apolitical character explains why, at 
f irst, it did not have much impact on the party system other than that it 
contributed to undermining the incumbent government. In the long run, 
however, this movement may influence Spanish politics and society in 
an even more fundamental way than the Greek protest. While the Greek 
protest was purely reactive and concentrated on the austerity measures 
imposed by the government and its international backers, the Spanish 
protest took a broader view and contained a utopian element: a promise of 
a better society beyond a world of austerity and the restitution of traditional 
privileges. The Spanish movement may eventually not only contribute to the 
transformation of the Spanish party system but also to the transformation 
of Spanish democracy in a more fundamental way, just as the new left in 
the northwest of Europe had done back in the late 1960s and 1970s. As Fuchs 
and Klingemann (1995: 435) have argued, in the aftermath of the ‘silent 
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revolution’ of the late 1960s and 1970s, a ‘democratic transformation’ took 
place in these countries, involving a change in the interaction between the 
actors of the polity and the public, a process that actually produced greater 
responsiveness on the part of the major political actors towards citizens’ 
demands. There was a process of successful adaptation of representative 
democracy to the new participation demands of their citizens, and the 
emergence of new collective actors who articulated new issue demands in 
their collective actions. Citizens became generally more active as well as 
more effective in the political process.
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4 The Spanish Indignados and Israel’s 
Social Justice Movement
The Role of Political Cleavages in Two Large-Scale Protests
Ignacia Perugorría, Michael Shalev and Benjamín Tejerina
The 15M movement in Spain (15 May 2011) is widely regarded as the vanguard 
of the “networks of outrage and hope” or “occupy social movements” that 
swept several southern European states (Castells 2012; Tejerina et al. 2013b)1. 
Unlike Occupy Wall Street, the Spanish Indignados featured not only en-
campments and assemblies of the young but also very large protest events 
and wide public support. The mass demonstrations that occurred in Madrid’s 
Puerta del Sol and elsewhere mobilized participants with social and political 
profiles quite different from previous protest events and social movements 
(Anduiza et al. 2013). Polls carried out by the Center for Sociological Research 
indicate that in early June a majority (54 per cent) of the adult population 
supported the protests, and in a later poll following the November elections, 
one in ten reported they had actively participated in 15M protest activities.2 
Similar broad-spectrum mobilization and support was also a feature of the 
protests that occurred around the same time in Portugal and Greece. In all 
three countries, a profound political-economic crisis had been set in train 
by the f inancial crisis. What distinguishes Spain from these two European 
countries, and thus makes it a particularly interesting case for analysis, is 
that while events in Madrid remained at the center of media and public 
attention, the movement also spread to Spanish peripheral regions with long-
lasting anti-centralist stances. The Spanish 15M movement thus seemed to 
successfully surmount the profound social and politico-ideological divisions 
that have traditionally cut across Spanish politics: the left-right continuum, 
and the tension between centralism and regionalism.
From this perspective it is interesting to compare the Spanish 15M with 
the Israeli case, which, while less well-known, was exceptional in its scale 
1 This research was funded by the Israeli Ministry of Science, Technology and Space.
2 Reports and source data are available from www.cis.es. The approval rate was defined here as 
those who were ‘quite’ or ‘very’ positive divided by the entire sample, including non-respondents 
and those uninterested in the 15M who were not asked their opinion. Signif icantly higher rates 
of support and participation were reported in other, smaller polls. See www.simplelogica.com 
and www.metroscopia.org. 
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and support. What began as a small encampment of young people in Tel 
Aviv in mid-July 2011 protesting against the shortage and high cost of rental 
accommodation rapidly morphed into a social justice movement (hereafter 
denoted 14J, since it began on 14 July). This protest campaign dominated 
public and private attention for two months, gathering broad and enthu-
siastic endorsement. According to self-reports, one-quarter of the entire 
adult population participated in street protests.3 However, the economic 
background in Israel was much less severe than in other cases of mass protest 
like Greece, Portugal, and of course Spain. Prior to the protests, Israel did 
not experience either a collapse of its f inancial institutions or the threat of 
a sovereign debt crisis. The business cycle had been on the upswing since 
mid-2009, youth unemployment was moderate, and no new or controversial 
austerity plan was on the government’s agenda (Rosenhek and Shalev 2013).
No less intriguing is the fact that in spite of the deep and fractious ideo-
logical and social divisions that characterize politics in Israel, the protest 
movement was remarkably consensual – even more so than in Spain. It 
spawned a series of unprecedented mass demonstrations that peaked on 
3 September 2011 with a turnout of 400,000 – equal to the mobilization 
peak reached on 19 June in Spain, with a population six times that of Israel.4 
Opinion polls indicate that the Israeli protest movement enjoyed extremely 
broad approval among the mass public (support rates of 80 per cent or 
more).5 Unlike in Spain, it was praised and promoted in nearly all of the 
major organs of the mass media and was treated with tolerance and even 
sympathy by most local authorities and police.
In divided societies, it is not obvious how large segments of the public 
come to participate in demonstrations and award a social movement such 
broad popular legitimacy that it (temporarily) cannot be either ignored or 
repressed. The puzzle motivating this paper is the fact that in both Israel 
and Spain, broad and consensual protests occurred in societies rent by deep 
sociopolitical divisions that were seemingly unrelated to the distributional 
issues that animated the protests. Theoretically, focusing on the effect of 
political cleavages on contentious mobilization contributes to established 
3 The Israeli survey analyzed in this paper, carried out shortly after the protests peaked, 
yielded a participation rate of 24.4 per cent, compared with 25.5 per cent based on a survey by 
the Israel Democracy Institute in April and May the following year (Hermann et al. 2012).
4 Estimates of the number of protest participants in Israel are based on counts of mobile 
phone users in the relevant areas by TrendIt (http://trendit.net/en), published by all media 
sources and uncontested by either protest organizers or the authorities.
5 See for example www.peaceindex.org and http://truman.huji.ac.il/upload/truman_site_
poll_37_September2011(1).pdf. 
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understandings of the political opportunity for protest by adding a hitherto 
unrecognized hindrance (the cleavage structure of institutional politics). 
Empirically, common denominators discovered in Spain and Israel are 
likely to have signif icant explanatory power, given the sharp contextual 
differences between these two settings in institutional and noninstitu-
tional politics. The comparison may thus shed badly needed light on the 
recent protest wave, for which the social movement literature proved to 
be ill-prepared.
In analyzing the political dynamics of the two protests, we focus on 
their most distinctive shared characteristic: their unusually broad and 
cross-cutting public support. This is an intentional departure from much of 
the emergent research on the anti-inequality and anti-austerity protests in 
consolidated democracies since 2010, which has focused mainly on the sites 
in which the occupation of public space took place and in which innovative 
practices were developed (Benski et al. 2013). In some national contexts – 
notably the Occupy Wall Street movement in the US – this narrow focus is 
justif ied because active mobilization behind the anti-inequality protests 
was limited mainly to the camps themselves. However, in Israel and Spain, 
endorsement and participation extended far beyond the occupier activists. 
Thus, our interest is not in the ‘core militants’ but in the hinterland of both 
passive and active supporters.
We investigate the political and ideological determinants of the success 
of these two movements in mobilizing mass support. Specif ically, what 
is the relationship between individuals’ sympathy for active engagement 
and the cleavage structure of institutional politics? Our chapter presents 
comparative analyses of micro-level data from public opinion polls in Spain 
and Israel carried out soon after the mass demonstrations peaked. The 
f irst section reviews some of the main characteristics of the protests in 
the two countries, not including their organizational forms. The following 
two sections focus f irst on the economic background and second on the 
national political context, especially institutionalized cleavages. We then 
discuss our hypotheses and data sources. We present our f indings using 
three explanatory dimensions: the ‘master’ (left-right) political cleavage, 
support for redistribution, and the social cleavages relevant to each society.
The Protests in Spain and Israel
A wave of protests began in Spain in late September 2010, when trade un-
ions called for a general strike to f ight back austerity measures. In March 
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2011, Spanish university students joined the mobilizational tide and also 
launched a strike against rising tuition fees and budget cuts in public educa-
tion. A few days later, the platform Youth Without A Future (Juventud Sin 
Futuro) organized a demonstration against both the economic crisis and the 
bipartisan ‘PP-PSOE partitocracy’. They described themselves as ‘Homeless, 
jobless, pensionless, fearless’. On 14 May, a large demonstration took place 
in Barcelona, convened by 200 social organizations and unions f ighting 
against welfare cuts in Catalonia (Ubasart forthcoming). In this combustible 
context, the call issued by the digital platform Real Democracy Now (DRY, 
Democracia Real Ya) to take to the streets on May 15 – one week before 
regional and municipal elections throughout Spain – was the spark that 
ignited the so-called ‘Indignados’ mobilizations. Hundreds of thousands of 
people, communicating through the Internet and social media applications, 
took to the streets in f ifty Spanish cities in the ensuing days.
Triggered by police repression and the political response to the 15 May 
mobilization, the original call for ‘Real Democracy Now’ quickly gave way 
to an ‘Occupy the Square’ movement. Mobilizations were portrayed as 
“apolitical” and, downplaying their heterogeneity in both socio-economic 
and politico-ideological terms, participants defined themselves as “persons” 
working together in “common matters” for the “common good” (Perugorría 
and Tejerina 2013b). The central movement’s demands concerned electoral 
reform and political corruption, ending state subsidies to the Catholic 
Church, and finding immediate solutions to the problems of unemployment 
and precariousness. In its initial stages, the 15M movement was supported 
by 65-70 per cent of the public.6 Mobilizations reached a peak on 19 June, 
with 250,000 people demonstrating in the streets of several Spanish cities.7 
However, by mid-June the encampments were no longer sustainable due 
to increasing fears of repression and eviction, and they passed the torch 
to decentralized assemblies in urban neighborhoods, small towns, and 
villages. This transition was accompanied by a steep decrease in the number 
6 See note 2. In another survey carried out by the Spanish Youth Institute (INJUVE) in October 
2011, of the 15-29 age group, 62 per cent of interviewees had a positive opinion of the protests, 14 
specif ic 15M demands were approved by the majority, and 26 per cent reported attending 15M 
mobilizations (http://www.injuve.es/observatorio/valores-actitudes-y-participacion/jovenes-
actitudes-sociales-y-politicas-y-movimiento-15-m). According to surveys by Metroscopia for 
the El País newspaper, sympathy towards 15M declined from 64 per cent to 51 per cent between 
June 2011 and May 2012, but increased to 63 per cent in May 2013. (http://www.metroscopia.org/
datos-recientes/analisis-blog/item/clima-social-mayo-2013?category_id=3). 
7 The f igure of 250,000 protesters is the authors’ conservative estimate based on information 
in national newspapers and from groups close to the 15M movement.
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of participants but also by an internationalization of the protest that soon 
turned the 15M into a beacon for similar movements around the world (see 
the chapter by Nez in this volume).
The Israeli 14J social justice movement emerged on 14 July 2011 as a 
protest against the cost of housing by a small group of students who erected 
tents on Rothschild Boulevard in the heart of Tel Aviv’s f inancial district 
(Grinberg 2013). The ‘tent protest’ or ‘housing protest’, as it was initially 
called, quickly spawned a series of unprecedented mass demonstrations. 
The 14J movement was remarkably consensual, and it was praised and 
promoted by nearly all of the major organs of the mass media, including 
the business press. Until the protests quickly faded as summer ended, local 
authorities and the police adopted a tolerant or even sympathetic stance 
towards the tent encampments and mass demonstrations of the protest 
movement.
Contrary to the 15M, the Israeli 14J did not place demands on the political 
system. It did, however, call for the revitalization of the welfare state and 
for increased state support for young families. The movement adopted the 
deliberative and participatory democratic practices that originated in Spain 
but recognized the leadership of a cadre of young activists with two au-
thoritative spokespersons. It cooperated with a wide variety of interest and 
cause groups, but like the 15M it scrupulously avoided any kind of contact or 
collaboration with political parties. Protest leaders consciously adopted the 
all-embracing slogan ‘the people demand social justice’. Ironically, however, 
the most enthusiastic supporters and bearers of this slogan came from 
the ranks of the middle and upper-middle classes. They included affluent 
citizens who were among the winners from the neoliberal restructuring of 
Israel’s political economy since the 1980s but whose children found their 
incomes and employment conditions eroded by the longer-term effects of 
these very same reforms (Rosenhek and Shalev 2013).
Economic Background
In early 2011, the Spanish economy was in its third year of recession as 
a result of not only the worldwide f inancial crisis but also the bursting 
of a decade-long real estate bubble and the implosion of the market for 
mortgages. Following the lead of other developed countries, the Spanish 
government had taken measures to rescue vulnerable banks and to weather 
the socio-economic effects of the f inancial storm. However, as talks about 
Greece’s potential economic bailout began to intensify, attention turned 
to Spain amid worries over its public def icit (60 per cent of its GDP). This 
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prompted the government to backtrack and announce a slew of austerity 
measures.
The recession hurt most Spaniards but had a particularly severe impact 
on the young. Unemployment rates soared to more than 40 per cent for 20-24 
year olds. Those with jobs were, however, not much better off. Many were 
caught in a system of temporary contracts and poorly paid, low-status jobs 
unrelated to the occupations for which they had been trained (Tejerina et 
al. 2013a). Moreover, in mid-2011 almost 70 per cent of young adults aged 
18-29 still lived with their parents, thus putting further pressure on already 
tight family budgets and overburdened support networks.
Despite its scope and gravity, the Spanish crisis did not have the same 
socio-economic impact across the different Autonomous Communities. 
As a result, it produced diverse political reactions, either exacerbating or 
downplaying long-lasting regionalist sentiments. Politicians in some of 
the Communities governed by the People’s Party (PP) called for a return 
of some competencies to the central state. At the same time, regionalist 
political leaders in Catalonia complained that federalism was ‘bleed-
ing’ their budgets. The regional government enacted severe austerity 
measures and deferred payments to its employees, unleashing a strong 
anti-austerity movement that preceded and prepared the ground for the 
15M movement.
The economic background in Israel was much less severe than in Spain. 
Dissatisfaction with the high cost and limited availability of housing for 
students and f irst-time home buyers was widespread, as was resentment 
about price rises imposed by either the government or monopolistic private 
corporations. Income inequality in Israel rose in the 2000s, but unlike in 
previous decades this was due to regressive reforms of the tax and transfer 
systems. The main victims of cuts in transfer entitlements were not young 
people, nor were they drawn from the ranks of the middle classes, in whose 
name the protests were mainly conducted. Rising poverty reflected a sharp 
deterioration in the situation of the two most vulnerable groups in Israeli 
society – Arab citizens (20 per cent of the population) and ultra-orthodox 
Haredi Jews (about 10 per cent).
On the eve of the social justice protests, the business cycle in Israel was 
actually on the upswing and youth unemployment was relatively modest 
(12 per cent). At the same time, the average real wage had been essentially 
stagnant for a decade, while housing prices soared. The relative incomes 
of young adults and families had been falling due to the declining value of 
assets like higher education, which had previously enabled young people 
to attain middle-class lifestyles (Shalev 2012).
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Political Context and Institutionalized Cleavages
Spanish politics continues to be molded by historical processes. Some 
elements inherited from the political culture of Francoism (including its 
delegitimation of some forms of protest) have proven resilient (Tejerina 
2010), and the consensus forged between the major parties during the return 
to democracy in the late 1970s casts persistent shadows over contemporary 
politics, including the continuing distrust of social movements (Tejerina 
2010; Fishman 2012). Since re-democratization, politics in Spain has revolved 
primarily around two intersecting axes: left-right, and Spanish unionism 
or ‘centralism’ versus regionalism or ‘peripheral nationalism’. Since the 
1980s, two opposing parties have been hegemonic: the center-left Spanish 
Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) and the right-wing People’s Party (PP). 
Although armed separatism existed for a brief period in Catalonia, political 
attention has long focused on the ‘Basque (armed) conflict’. In 2009, the 
abertzale (Basque-nationalist) left, a coalition of different social move-
ment organizations and party formations, began a transition from a hybrid 
political-military strategy to a ‘purely political’ oppositional strategy, akin 
to the Irish and South African separatist causes (Perugorría 2012). As noted 
below, this transition had ramifications felt in the municipal elections that 
followed the initial protests of the 15M movement.
Electoral politics in Israel are a complicated mélange of parties, issues, 
and social groups (Arian 2005). The three main categories of parties tar-
get the Palestinian-Arab minority, the religiously observant Jews, or the 
majority of secular and moderately observant Jews. Parties representing 
the f irst two constituencies focus mainly on their community’s needs and 
worldviews. In the residual category of parties, which is the largest, the 
two main rivals were traditionally Labor on the left and Likud on the right. 
Historically, Labor defined itself as social-democratic and Likud as economi-
cally liberal, but the primary axis of contention in Israeli politics since the 
1967 war has been whether to trade territories occupied in that war for 
peace. Over the last several decades, Likud has been the indispensable party 
of government, usually in coalition with nationalist and clerical parties. The 
left bloc – comprising the Labor Party and its closest allies – has steadily 
lost ground to a succession of ephemeral center parties, as its peacemaking 
strategy was increasingly discredited. Efforts to revive the party by adopting 
a social-democratic agenda have largely failed.
If we were to characterize party supporters in the Jewish population 
by their issue positions on the role of territorial aspirations, the use of 
military force, the rights of Palestinian citizens, and the role of religion in 
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public life, they would be positioned on a roughly uni-dimensional left-right 
spectrum. In contrast, positions on social and economic issues tend to be 
consensual, since most Israelis would prefer a less unequal society (Shalev 
and Levy 2005; Shalev 2007). Parallel in part to the Spanish situation, ‘tribal’ 
collective identities institutionalized in Israeli politics have long served as 
a structural barrier to class-based demands for redistribution. The main 
divisions structuring ideology and partisanship are based on nationality, 
country of origin, or religiosity. At the same time, a vigorous arena of dis-
tributive politics flourishes alongside or outside of political parties, based on 
pressure groups, unions, NGOs, and others who lobby, bargain, and protest 
vis-à-vis the government, parliament and state bureaucracies. Contentious 
politics are a ubiquitous feature of this menu, but like party politics they 
are sectoral in character. For all these reasons, the mass popular protest 
that emerged in the summer of 2011 was highly unexpected.
Rationale, Hypotheses, and Data
Although public opinion in Spain and Israel was not entirely consensual, 
the majority of Spaniards and Israelis were supportive of the 15M and 14J 
movements, and among those who were not, lack of enthusiasm was more 
common than outright opposition. Still, the majority of the public stayed 
at home during even the largest demonstrations. How may these varia-
tions in passive and active support be explained? Our theoretical claim is 
that, in contrast to contentious political action resting on a narrower and 
therefore more homogenous support base, in order to explain support for or 
engagement in protests as broad as those observed in Spain and Israel it is 
essential to focus on the role of politicized social and ideological cleavages. 
By def inition, movements with broad public support are at least partially 
successful in breaching boundaries created by solidarities generated by 
class, place, ethnicity, religion, and cultural habitus. Such divisions are 
even less permeable when they already play an established role as political 
cleavages in the institutional sphere of mass politics, along with ideological 
divisions that have crystallized in the same sphere.
Israel and Spain are especially suitable cases for examining the relevance 
of the cleavage structure of institutional politics to non-institutional mobi-
lization because they represent ‘least likely’ conditions for our hypothesis 
to be vindicated. The contention waged by the 15M and 14J movements 
focused on ‘non-partisan’ issues of economic justice and the responsiveness 
of the political system, whereas the key social and ideological divisions 
that divide parties and voters in the electoral politics of both countries 
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ostensibly belong to unrelated domains. Precisely because many of the 
core social divisions and issues of ‘normal’ politics in Israel and Spain are 
seemingly orthogonal to the questions of equality, redistribution, and the 
economic and social role of the state that were so central to the protests, 
their emergence is even more puzzling. If it can be shown that factors like 
nationalism and religiosity structured individual engagement in 15M and 
14J, this would be a strong indication of the power of political ideologies 
and politicized social divisions to structure mass support for extensive 
protests.
Substantively, we expect ideological and social cleavages embedded in 
institutional politics to help predict who participates in protest activities 
and who remains outside, and among outsiders, to help explain different 
levels of passive support. However, the role of institutionalized divisions is 
not the same for passive and active engagement. As a political performance 
in a public space, the mass demonstration renders social divisions and 
partisan loyalties potentially more salient than in the context of passive 
support. As Klandermans (1997) has pointed out, when protest organizations 
or activists seek to mobilize the members of groups with socio-cultural or 
socio-political loyalties and identities that differ from those of the leaders, 
activists, and core supporters of a social movement, even individuals who 
sympathize with the movement’s grievances and demands may refrain 
from openly joining its mobilizations.
To identify connections between the cleavage structure of institutional 
politics and individual engagement with the protests that took place in 
Israel and Spain, we rely on nationally-representative public opinion polls. 
These polls asked respondents about both their sympathy and their active 
participation in the protests. (In Israel, the relevant question asked specif i-
cally about demonstrations; in Spain, it also included participation in camps 
or marches as well as demonstrations). The Spanish survey was carried 
out in November-December 2011, after the last of the mass protests on 
15 October; and the Israeli one in the third week of September 2011, after the 
climactic 3 September demonstration. The Spanish poll has a large sample 
(over 6000) while the Israeli sample included just over 1,000 respondents, 
which is typical of opinion polls in that country.8
8 For details on the Spanish CIS survey (Study No. 2920) see http://www.cis.es/cis/opencm/
EN/1_encuestas/estudios/ver.jsp?estudio=12604. The Israeli poll was a national sample survey 
carried out by the Smith Institute for the Taub Center for Social Policy Research in Israel during 
the third week of September 2011. 
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Findings
We begin by presenting responses to the questions on passive support and 
active participation that are the basis for our analysis (Table 4.1). Looking 
f irst at passive support, while respondents were offered different options 
in the Spanish and Israeli surveys, it is clear that the protests were much 
more broadly supported in Israel. Only 8 per cent of the sample expressed 
opposition to 14J, and a majority chose the strongest category of support. 
In Spain, however, nearly half (47 per cent) of the respondents ranked their 
sympathy for 15M at or below the perceived midpoint of the support scale. 
Moreover, just over one-tenth reported that they were not familiar with 
the movement (and accordingly were not asked about either passive or 
active support). In what follows, because the Israeli response pattern is 
so positively skewed, we focus on explaining variation in whether or not 
respondents ‘strongly supported’ the protests in their country. For Spain, 
‘strong support’ is operationalized as the top 4 ranks of the original 11-point 
scale.
Regarding active participation, the overall rate was more than twice 
as high in Israel than in Spain (24 per cent vs. 11 per cent). Although ac-
tive participation in both countries was highly correlated with passive 
support, not only strong supporters took to the streets. This may ref lect 
a time inconsistency problem – respondents were asked about their sup-
port of the protests after they had peaked but were reporting on active 
participation that would have occurred while the demonstrations were 
still in full swing.
The ‘Master’ Political Cleavage: Left-Right Polarization
In contextualizing our two country cases, it was emphasized that in the 
institutional political arena of both countries the left-right axis both sum-
marizes and symbolically represents the ideological domain of institutional 
politics. The issue positions of individuals, social sectors, and political 
parties can all be parsimoniously described on this axis. Yet the content of 
left-right variation differs substantially between the two contexts, and in 
each of them it is made up of several different layers of meaning. In general, 
the left-right division refers to both the ‘old’ tension between economic 
liberalism and support for the welfare state, and the ‘new’ tension between 
authoritarianism and a pro-growth orientation versus libertarianism and a 
pro-green orientation. As noted, however, in Israel these issues are weakly 
articulated by most political parties and do not form the basis for left/right 
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identif ication, which instead rests mainly on positions regarding territorial, 
military, and religious issues that are specif ic to the Israeli context.
In Spain it is also true – though to a lesser extent – that left and right serve 
as political markers for ‘non-standard’ beliefs and issue positions. Their 
meaning is linked to local conflicts that emerged in several historically 
Table 4.1  Passive and active participation in the Israeli 14J and Spanish 15M 
movements
ISRAEL: “To what extent do you support the social protest?”
Distribution of responses Proportion attending a 
demonstration
Strongly support  56% 37%
Support  29% 12%
oppose   5%  0%
Strongly oppose   3%  0%
Not sure   5%  3%
No reply   1% –
total 100% 24%
(n=1,005)
SPAIN: “To what extent do you sympathize with the 15M movement or ‘Indignados’?”
Distribution of responses Proportion attending a 
demonstration
full sympathy-8  12% 32%
7  10% 22%
6  11% 16%
5   8%  9%
4  18%  4%
3  10%  5%
2   9%  1%
No sympathy-1  10%  1%
unfamiliar / haven’t heard  11% –
No reply   4% –
total 100% 11%
(n=6,082)
Note: in Spain the original 11-point scale of passive support was collapsed into 8 levels, and the 
question regarding active support asked whether the respondent had attended a demonstration 
or participated in an encampment, march or protest.
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profound rounds of contention over state authority. The transition from 
Francoism to democracy three decades ago raised or amplif ied what 
continue to be contested issues concerning arrangements for recognizing 
and accommodating diversity between regions. These issues are partly 
embodied in the left-right dimension, as well as having their own ideo-
logical discourses based on demands for national recognition and/or local 
autonomy.
Against this background, it is of considerable interest to ask how far 
support and participation in the protests of 2011 followed the left-right 
division. Since political economy and redistribution are central to the 
left-right cleavage in Spain but not in Israel, we expect polarization around 
this cleavage to be more marked in the Spanish case. However, there is 
also a temporal dynamic to consider. A protest may enjoy widespread 
legitimacy at the initial moment of emergence, but after the f irst f lash of 
enthusiasm dies down it may align more closely with familiar political 
divisions. Accordingly, for each country Figure 4.1 presents the results 
of an initial poll carried out only a few weeks after the protests broke 
out, compared to a later one. In Israel, the second survey was f ielded 
only a month after the f irst, while in Spain it was six months later. To 
maximize comparability, the proportion strongly supporting the protests 
was recalculated for each survey as a ratio, relative to the mean for all 
respondents.
























































































The f indings for both countries support both of our expectations. The posi-
tion of individuals on the left-right dimension is associated with support for 
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the protests in both countries but substantially more in Spain than Israel. 
Furthermore, there is clear evidence of growing polarization over time.
In addition to the overall role of the left-right cleavage – the contrasts 
between the two countries and at two points in time – we are able to compare 
the impact of this political division on two different types of engagement: 
passive support and active participation. Here, differences between the 
two countries are best discerned by juxtaposing them on the same graph 
and measuring absolute rather than relative rates of engagement. It appears 
from Figure 4.2 that citizen involvement was more cross-cutting in Israel 
than in Spain. In Spain, individuals well to the left were almost as likely as 
their Israeli counterparts to support and participate in the protests – but 
the differences between the two countries become sharper when attention 
shifts to the center and right.
Figure 4.2  Two types of engagement in protest, by left-right ideology
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Table 4.2  Cross-country difference in left-right polarization
Spain Israel
Passive support 4.4 1.5
Active participation 7.7 2.0
Note: Polarization is measured as the ratio of the proportion engaged in the two most leftist 
categories in comparison with the two most rightist ones.
The cross-country difference in the left-right gradient can be conveyed by 
a simple measure of polarization: the ratio of the proportion engaged in 
the two most leftist categories in comparison with the two most rightist 
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ones (see Table 4.2). The results highlight not only the greater intensity of 
political polarization in Spain but also the fact that in both countries – but 
again, especially in Spain – the left-right division matters more for active 
than passive engagement.
It should be noted that the ultimate impact of polarization on aggregate 
support was muted in Spain by the distribution of the population along 
the left-right spectrum. Whereas in Israel fewer than 30 per cent of passive 
supporters and 15 per cent of active participants placed themselves in the 
top 4 categories of the leftism scale, in Spain the parallel proportions were 
two-thirds and three-quarters respectively. Hence, lack of enthusiasm for 
the protests on the right had less of an overall impact in Spain than in Israel.
Commitment to Redistribution
As has already been emphasized, in Israel the content of the left-right 
cleavage concerns issues of identity and foreign policy that are seemingly 
irrelevant to the 14J, framed as a movement committed to social justice. 
Indeed, we expected attitudes towards government efforts to reduce 
inequality via redistribution to be closely related to engagement in the 
Israeli protest. Since the 15M movement addressed a wider range of issues – 
including the deteriorating prospects of youth, government corruption and 
non-responsiveness, and opposition to austerity – we assumed that in the 
Spanish context, attitudes to redistribution would be less closely linked to 
protest involvement. Figure 4.3 confirms these expectations. Both forms of 
engagement in mass protest were more strongly linked in Israel to views on 
the welfare state than in Spain.9 Measuring polarization in the same manner 
as before, we f ind that in relation to both passive and active involvement it 
was about 60 per cent higher in Israel than in Spain (Table 4.3).
Thus, whereas in Israel engagement in protest was more responsive to 
redistribution than to leftism, the profound role of leftism in Spain in select-
ing protest supporters and activists was evidently due to something more 
than the tension between social democracy and free-market liberalism. 
The left-right cleavage in Spain also overlaps in part with social cleavages 
that are key drivers of political behavior – the conflict over regionalism 
9 In Israel, support for redistribution is measured by combining responses to two questions: 
one asked whether the government should reduce income inequality, the other asked respond-
ents to choose their most important policy priority from a list that included “reducing poverty 
and inequality”. In Spain, the relevant question offered an 11-point scale tapping agreement with 
the view that the government should spend more on benef its and social services even though 
this would mandate higher taxes. In both cases, we compacted responses into a 5-point scale.
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versus centralism, and the religious cleavage. Figure 4.4 shows that all three 
variables are clearly associated with left-right positions. As we shall now 
see, such overlaps play an important role in understanding the politics of 
protest involvement.


















































































Passive support Active participation
Table 4.3  Cross-country difference in polarization regarding redistribution
Spain Israel
Passive support 1.8 2.9
Active participation 2.7 4.2
Note: Polarization is measured as the ratio between the top and bottom categories.
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Politicized Social Cleavages
In both Israel and Spain, conflicts over issues of social and economic justice 
like those raised in the 15M and 14J protests are directly or indirectly linked 
to social divisions along ethnic, religious, or regional lines. The politicization 
of such social cleavages results from both group differences in culture and 
interests, and historical alliances, co-optations, and animosities between 
parties and groups. Hence, group membership not only represents a poten-
tial prior influence on individual orientations that may have influenced 
support for the protests under study here, but may also embody group-level 
interests and loyalties that are at least as relevant.
To illustrate this point concretely, consider the alienation of Israel’s ultra-
orthodox population from the 14J movement. Given the high incidence of 
poverty among ultra-orthodox Jews, the social justice movement with its 
critique of rising inequality and focus on the need to revive and enlarge 
Israel’s welfare state might have garnered considerable sympathy and sup-
port from this sector of the population. Two factors prevented this from 
happening: the deep cultural divide between the ultra-orthodox and the 
educated, secular, and Tel Aviv-based core of the protest movement, and 
the specif ic way in which the ultra-orthodox communities of Israel have 
been incorporated into institutional politics by ‘sectoral’ political parties. 
These parties routinely participate in government coalitions that enable 
them to target state-supplied or state-subsidized services and benef its 
to their constituents. Fear of jeopardizing this system of redistribution 
sowed suspicion and reluctance among both their leaders and supporters. 
At the same time, non-orthodox Israelis deeply resent the benefits won by 
ultra-orthodox politicians for their constituents.
Bearing in mind the ideological, ethnic, and religious cleavages just 
noted, we evaluate the effect of institutionalized political cleavages on 
citizen engagement in the 14J protests by distinguishing six distinct 
sociopolitical blocs or ‘tribes’. In addition to the Arab-Jewish cleavage, 
our typology relates to the only measurable ethnic division among Jews,10 
that between veterans and ‘Russians’ (immigrants from the Former Soviet 
Union, FSU), as well as to the religious and left-right cleavages. Unfortu-
nately, it is not feasible to distinguish between ‘hardcore’ ultra-orthodox 
Jews and ‘modern’ observant Jews; hence both are aggregated here under 
10 Measuring the longstanding division between Jewish immigrants (or their descendants) 
from Arab countries and those who originated in Europe requires information on the origin of 
grandparents which was not available in the survey analyzed here.
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the ‘religious’ umbrella. We also aggregated ‘traditional’ and ‘secular’ Jews 
(other than Russians) into a single ‘non-religious’ category, since in any 
event this distinction had no signif icant impact on protest support. Finally, 
note that since 75 to 80 per cent of both Russian immigrants and religious 
Jews identify with the right, other members of these two groups are not 
included in this analysis.

































The f indings in Figure 4.5 make it evident that the high rates of aggregate 
support for the Israeli protests conceal considerable divergence between 
different sociopolitical blocs, and that this divergence is especially marked 
for active participation. The strongest support and active involvement came 
from nonreligious, non-immigrant Jewish Israelis who identify with the left. 
Compared to immigrants from the FSU and observant veteran Jews – both 
of whom identify with the political right – members of this group were 
twice as likely to be strong passive supporters and three times as likely to 
have participated in a demonstration. Among the majority (57 per cent) 
who defined themselves as non-religious Jews, both types of support were 
clearly associated with the left-right division. Finally, Palestinian-Arab 
citizens exhibited a unique pattern of relatively high passive but low active 
engagement. As a marginalized minority, the Arabs in Israel could hardly 
be unsympathetic to the protestors’ call for social justice, but given the 
deep social and political gulf between Arabs and Jews (as well as a high 
degree of spatial segregation), they were less amenable to and available for 
performative political action on a broad Jewish-Arab front.
Given the prevalence of economic disadvantage among Arabs, ultra-
orthodox Jews, and part of the FSU immigrant community, it is clear that 
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collective political loyalties were capable of overriding the role of economic 
concerns in shaping the orientation of different social groups to the protests. 
This tendency notwithstanding, it is still possible that individual-level 
variation within the groups is at least partly explained by material concerns. 
To investigate this possibility, we constructed an indicator of ‘fear of future 
economic distress’ from two questions asked in the Israeli survey.11 More 
than one in six of the individuals polled indicated that they were seri-
ously in fear of future economic diff iculty. Figure 4.6 shows that, except 
among Russian immigrants, such anxiety exercised a palpable effect on 
individual-level variation in passive support for the 14J protests within 
each sociopolitical ‘tribe’.
Figure 4.6  Passive support for the Israeli protests by sociopolitical bloc and fear 
























Turning now to the impact of politicized social cleavages in Spain, the 
present section reports f indings for the effects of religion and regionalism, 
connecting them as in Israel to the left-right cleavage. On the face of it, 
the political role of religion is unlikely to be signif icant since, in line with 
the majority of Europeans, only 15 per cent of Spaniards regularly attend 
religious services (Center for Sociological Research 2009). Nevertheless, 
Calvo and colleagues have shown that religious voting can be important 
even when large sectors of the population feel indifferent to religion 
11 The indicator summed responses to the following questions: “Do you fear that you or your 
family could f ind yourself in poverty or economic distress in the next 2-3 years?” and “Do you 
or anyone in your family fear being unemployed due to layoffs or diff iculty in f inding a job?”
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(Calvo and Montero 2002; Calvo 2009; Calvo et al. 2010). During the 1980s, 
the widespread perception of Alianza Popular (AP) as an extremist and 
conservative party brought sizeable number of Catholics to vote for the 
center-leftist PSOE. However, after its transformation into the Partido 
Popular (PP) in 1989, the party allowed Catholic voters to overcome the 
obstacles that had prevented them from voting for the PP. As a conse-
quence, by the mid-1990s religious voting recovered notably, associated 
with a sharpening of the religious prof iles of the other major Spanish 
parties (Montero et al. 2008).
Religious voting peaked in the mid-2000s, tied to an unusual level of 
confrontation between the Socialist government and the Catholic Church. 
The 2004-2008 agenda of the PSOE government implied controversial and 
simultaneous changes on various fronts: the civil rights of sexual minorities, 
the role of religion in the educational curriculum, bioethics, women’s rights, 
and the recovery of the ‘historical memory’ of the Franco years. The result-
ing conflict with the moral order defended by the Spanish Catholic Church 
had a clear effect on voting in the general elections held in March of 2008. In 
this election, the religious cleavage in Spain was most salient to voters who 
did not identify ideologically with the left, and had the strongest impact on 
support for the PP (Calvo et al. 2010). This suggests the importance for our 
purposes of assessing the joint effect of the left-right and religious-secular 
cleavages on mass mobilization in the 15M protests.
It is worth noting that in the specif ic case of the 15M movement, politi-
cal conflict over religion explicitly spilled over into contentious politics. 
Among other demands, the 15M protestors called for the ‘real decoupling’ 
of the state and the Catholic Church. Coinciding with the world summit of 
Catholic Youth in Madrid and the Pope’s visit to Spain, in mid-August 2011 
the 15M Working Group on the Economy obtained consensus for a detailed 
proposal for eliminating tax collection and various state subsidies targeted 
to the Catholic Church and its allied institutions.12 This confrontational 
move presumably increased the salience of the religious cleavage for 15M 
support, especially (in light of our earlier theory) for performative (active) 
engagement.
For the purpose of our empirical analysis, we distinguish three broad cat-
egories of religious identif ication and observance in Spain. ‘Non-religious’ 
12 Sources: http://madrid.tomalaplaza.net/2011/08/17/propuesta-abierta-consensuada-por-
el-grupo-de-trabajo-de-economia-sobre-f inanciacion-de-la-iglesia/; Retrieved 3 February 2013 
from http://www.20minutos.es/noticia/1428422/0/logros-conseguidos/pendientes-ideario/
movimiento-15m.
110 iGNAciA PeruGorríA, MicHAel SHAlev AND beNjAMíN tejeriNA 
respondents (about one-quarter of the total but nearly 40 per cent of those 
aged under 35) have no stated religion or are atheists. The ‘passive religious’ 
identify as Catholics or with some other religion but hardly ever attend 
services, while ‘active religious’ attend at least several times a year (roughly 
one-third of the total and two-thirds of those over 65).
Figure 4.7  The joint effects of religiosity and leftism on support and participation 
in the Spanish 15M protests
Non- religious Passive religious Active religious
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For two reasons, it is essential to analyze the effects of religiosity and 
political ideology jointly. First, the overlap between the two variables 
implies a risk of overestimating the impact of religion analyzed alone. 
At the same time, this overlap is only partial. Some non-religious and 
actively religious respondents have the ‘wrong’ orientation (Figure 4.4). 
In fact, at least half of the members of both groups position themselves 
in intermediate categories of the left-right scale. Consequently, it is not 
surprising to f ind (Figure 4.7) that religiosity has a substantial independent 
effect on involvement in the 15M demonstrations, net of an individual’s 
placement on the left-right continuum (and also, as will be shown later 
in the multivariate analysis, net of other determinants). Both passive 
and active engagements in the 15M movement were restrained among 
those oriented towards religion. The most visible effect, except for those 
def initively loyal to the right, is the difference between secular Spaniards 
(the largest category) and all others.
A second reason for jointly analyzing the effects of the left-right and 
religious-secular cleavages is that studies of electoral behavior show that 
their effects are interactive (Calvo et al. 2010). Our results show an inter-
action that is especially pronounced for active participation in the 15M 
protests. Religiosity weakened the tendency of engagement to rise along 
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with leftism. Put differently, secular leftists were ‘free’ to be drawn into the 
protests to a degree that more religious leftists were not.13
Figure 4.8  The joint effects of regional identity and leftism on support and 
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Strong passive support Active participation
Similar f indings emerge when examining the regional cleavage in Spain, 
which we have argued has both an identity dimension (based in some cases 
on ethnicity) and a political-institutional one. Figure 4.8 shows that while 
identifying with one’s region had only a modest relationship with passive 
support, it substantially amplif ied the role of leftism in mobilizing citizens 
to actively participate in the protests.
Multivariate Analysis
The f indings reviewed provide strong indications that ideological and 
social cleavages shaped engagement in both the Spanish and Israeli pro-
tests. However, an obvious question is whether the bivariate and trivariate 
relationships analyzed would hold up in a multivariate analysis. The 
purpose of such an analysis is to evaluate net effects, not only by holding 
constant the other key explanatory variables that we have reviewed so 
far but also by adding controls for other factors that are not of particular 
interest for our theoretical agenda but could plausibly have explanatory 
power.
13 Interestingly, these are not the same interactions that Calvo and colleagues (2010, Figs 3 & 
4) found in their study of voting for the two main parties in Spain’s 2008 elections. 
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Before turning to the results, it should be emphasized that we do not 
regard the multiple regressions that follow as an empirical test of a well-
specif ied theoretical model. Rather, the purpose is to test the robustness 
of previously-examined bivariate relationships and to obtain estimates of 
the relative weight of different predictors and the extent to which they are 
similar for both the two outcomes and the two country cases. We ignore pos-
sible interaction effects, including some that have already been documented 
in the previous exploratory analysis, because this would complicate and 
overtax the model.
The key explanatory variables for both countries include the left-right 
cleavage, attitudes towards redistribution, and the social cleavage (religion) 
which is common to both countries. For Israel, the model also includes a 
dummy variable for respondents from the Former Soviet Union. For Spain, 
we add two measures of the regional cleavage, one tapping collective iden-
tity and the other the desired level of local autonomy, as well as dummy 
variables for the two most important centers of regional nationalism 
(Catalonia and the Basque Country). A third binary variable is intended 
to capture any net impact of Madrid, the Autonomous Community that 
hosts the three branches of the central government and was the epicenter 
of the 15M movement.
The control variables included in all models are: (a) age, on the grounds 
that the protests were clearly dominated by, and mainly oriented towards, 
young people and that older persons might have faced greater technical 
diff iculties and anxiety about participating in demonstrations; (b) gender, 
given the prominence of women in the leadership and activist core of the 
Israeli movement; (c) education, since students played a central role as 
activists and supporters of these movements, and complaints by the Spanish 
‘youth without a future’ were often linked to the shortage of (good) jobs 
for university graduates; and (d) variables measuring the degree to which 
respondents felt they were under economic pressure and, in Israel, dummy 
variables to represent the north and south of the country, where economic 
opportunities are generally inferior to those in the center.
For each country, separate regressions were estimated for passive and 
active engagement. The models for both were identical, except that the one 
predicting active engagement includes passive support as an independent 
variable. The reason is that in relation to active participation, our interest 
is in explaining what turns sympathy into action. The question at hand is 
therefore how any given factor (e.g. leftism) affects the propensity to take 
an active role in the protests, beyond its contribution to understanding in-
dividual differences in passive support. Note that for Israel the multivariate 
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analysis does not include Arab respondents. The political and ideological 
aff iliations of the Arab minority and its internal cleavages differ substan-
tially from those of the Jewish majority, and the size of the Arab sample is 
insuff icient to permit separate analysis.
Figure 4.9  OLS regressions predicting high passive support or active 
participation in the 15M and 14J protests
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The charts in Figure 4.9 are designed to ease the task of comparing the 
four different sets of results. To facilitate comparability within and across 
regressions, they present standardized (beta) coeff icients but only those 
that were statistically signif icant (t-statistic of at least 2). Note that since 
both dependent variables are binary, a case could be made for estimation 
using logistic regression, but we opted for the simpler and more intuitive 
OLS approach. The full results of the regressions are available on request.
We begin with the two charts for passive support. Before noting specif ic 
highlights of these results, it is worth pointing out that the set of independ-
ent variables with signif icant net effects, and the size and direction of these 
effects, are broadly similar between the two countries. In both countries 
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leftism, support for redistribution, and the religious cleavage have the most 
impact on whether individuals expressed strong sympathy for the protests. 
In Israel, consistent with the weaker connection between the meaning of 
the left-right cleavage and distributional issues than in Spain, attitudes 
towards redistribution are a stronger predictor of passive support than 
left-right position. Another noteworthy difference is that whereas both a 
direct indicator of economic distress and one of the regional indicators have 
substantial effects in Israel, the relevant variable for Spain has little impact.
So far as country-specif ic predictors are concerned, as expected Israelis 
who immigrated from the Former Soviet Union were substantially less 
sympathetic to the 14J movement. In Spain, also not surprisingly, individual 
support for regionalism plays a role, but only as measured by support for in-
stitutional separatism. However, no additional effect is found for the dummy 
variables for Catalonia and the Basque Country. Although respondents in 
Catalonia were a bit more sympathetic than the average respondent, it 
appears that the distinctiveness of these two regions is mainly accounted for 
by other individual-level variables included in the model (such as separatism 
and leftism). Lastly, only in Israel were women more likely to sympathize 
with the protests than men.
Turning to the f indings for active participation, in both countries the 
young, leftists, the secular, the educated, and egalitarians were the most 
likely to turn sympathy into active engagement. But except for the religious 
cleavage, all of these effects were notably stronger in Israel. The most obvious 
difference between the two countries is that in Spain more of the variation 
in whether individuals took to the streets is explained by their degree of 
sympathy. In addition, in Israel differences in age and ideology contributed 
much more than in Spain to the residual variation in active participation.
Only in Israel do we f ind that indicators of economic distress influenced 
protest participation. Although the observed effects are weak, it is interest-
ing to note a signif icant shift in their direction as we move from passive 
to active engagement. Net of differences in ideology and social cleavages, 
more advantaged Israelis (those with a higher education) were less likely to 
strongly support the protests – but at any given level of support, they were 
more likely to participate.
Finally, Spanish regionalism has interesting effects on active engage-
ment. Individuals expressing regional nationalism (as indicated by their 
primary identity) were somewhat more likely to participate. However, the 
net effects of the regional dummy variables show that in the nationalist 
Basque Country the propensity for active engagement in the 15M protests 
was below average. The second f inding confirms our suggestion that for 
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Basques, the pressing regional-political agenda at the onset of the 15M 
movement had the effect of crowding out their propensity to take to the 
streets on behalf of an ‘outside’ movement.
* * *
Can social movements in divided societies win broad support and inspire 
large-scale participation? Our paper has analyzed two extensive and con-
sensual protests that took place amidst the 2011-2012 international cycle of 
anti-inequality protests – the Israeli 14J and Spanish 15M movements. We 
have characterized these movements as having broad and cross-cutting 
public support and have aimed to unveil their limitations as well as success 
in breaching politicized social and ideological boundaries. Our theoretical 
claim is that, in contrast to contentious political action that rests on a 
socially and politically homogenous base, in order to explain support for 
such extensive protests it is essential to focus on the cleavage structure of 
institutional politics. While central to the study of mass electoral politics, 
the role of political cleavages has not previously been addressed as one of 
the features of the institutional political system that may either facilitate 
or impede contentious collective action.
Given the lack of prior theoretical guidance regarding the role of institu-
tionalized political cleavages in structuring engagement in non-institutional 
political action, our research is exploratory and aims to contribute to the 
development of empirically grounded and inspired theoretical insights. 
Two features of the design of the research have facilitated this endeavor: the 
contrast between two different levels of engagement (passive and active), and 
the comparison between two different national contexts. The protests occur-
ring in Israel and Spain both featured mass mobilizations and broad popular 
support (dependent variable), and the two countries also share institutional 
political systems that are rent by social and ideological cleavages dividing 
parties and voters in electoral politics (independent variable). Moreover, 
in both contexts these cleavages belong to domains that are nominally 
unrelated to the core issues of distributive justice and political accountability 
raised by the protesters. Hence, we have suggested that Spain and Israel are 
ideal showcases for uncovering the role that social and ideological divisions 
entrenched in ‘conventional’ politics may play in the patterning of group and 
individual engagement in ‘unconventional’ political action.
Our empirical f indings are based on micro-data from parallel public 
opinion polls conducted in 2011 in Spain and Israel after the protests peaked. 
We began with an analysis of the impact of the ‘master’ left-right cleavage, 
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showing that in both countries support and participation in the protests 
were considerably stronger among citizens on the left and weaker among 
those on the right, especially in relation to active engagement. However, 
there are also quantitative and qualitative differences between the two 
countries, particularly in the likelihood of respondents identifying with 
the political right or center participating actively in the protests. Consistent 
with the greater centrality of social and economic issues to the meaning of 
left and right in Spain, we f ind stronger ideological polarization of support-
ers there than in Israel. At the same time, and for the same reason, both 
passive and active forms of support were more strongly linked to views on 
redistribution in Israel than in Spain.
Although politicized social cleavages are partly embodied in the left-right 
divide, our multivariate statistical analysis confirmed that they also had 
substantial effects in their own right on the structuring of engagement in the 
15M and 14J protests. At the same time, we also found evidence of interactive 
effects of ideological and social divisions. For example, although clearly 
located on the political left, Israel’s Palestinian-Arab citizens combined 
relatively high passive support with low active participation. In Spain, we 
found that religious aff iliation and observance restrained the propensity 
of those on the left to play an active part in the 15M movement, whereas 
being secular or having a primarily regional identity had the opposite effect. 
These kinds of interactions suggest that future research would benef it 
from the use of configurational methods and that the weight of different 
determinants of engagement in protest cannot be accurately assessed by 
means of a regression model that includes only main effects. Nevertheless, 
the key f indings of our multivariate analysis are clear and important: the 
‘gross’ bivariate effects presented in the exploratory results also show up as 
‘net’ effects in a multivariate model; and in the two countries, both political 
ideology and politicized social cleavages matter.
Differences in the results of the Spanish and Israeli regressions are 
particularly interesting as far as active participants are concerned. Israeli 
protesters tended to be young (under 35), secular, university-educated, 
and living in the relatively affluent center of the country, and they were 
both left-wing (‘dovish’) and social-democratic in their ideological outlook. 
Parallel tendencies were generally found in Spain – but with the exception 
of the religious cleavage, the effects were much weaker.
What do these f indings portend for the study of Occupy-type social 
movements, and the social movement literature more generally? Our 
research moves away from the prevailing focus on the core activists of the 
recent socio-economic protests and their novel practices to the less-studied 
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hinterland of passive and active supporters. This perspective highlights the 
challenges faced by any social movement aspiring to appeal to and mobilize 
the mass public, an aspiration that was expressed in the Spanish and Israeli 
protests by framing their critique in very broad terms (‘economic injustice’, 
‘political unaccountability’), widening the boundaries of the social move-
ment community (‘the middle class’, ‘persons’, ‘the people’), and portraying 
their concerns and demands as ‘apolitical’ and even ‘commonsensical’. 
Our f indings imply that these framing efforts paid off for the 14J and 15M 
movements. Both movements, especially in Israel, attained considerable 
levels of support. However, the fact that politicized social and ideologi-
cal cleavages ostensibly unrelated to the gist of the protests nonetheless 
structured both passive and active support for them draws attention to the 
role of everyday politics in structuring engagement in these movements. 
The effects of this structuring are evident in a glass ceiling mechanism that 
was especially important for participation in performative forms of sup-
port, and also received expression in the increased polarization of passive 
support as the cycle of contention progressed. Are unconventional social 
movements irremediably tied to institutionalized political cleavages despite 
their unequivocal attempts to distance themselves from ‘divisive old-time 
politics’? Future comparisons with the similar movements that emerged 
in less-fractured societies – the Portuguese Geração à Rasca and the Greek 
‘Indignados’ mobilizations – may shed light on this important question.
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Part 2
The Practical and Spatial Dimensions of Activism

5 “We Must Register a Victory to 
Continue Fighting”
Locating the Action of the Indignados in Madrid
Héloïse Nez
The movement of the Indignados in Spain began on 15 May 2011 – hence the 
name ‘15M movement’ – following a demonstration organized by several 
collective bodies united under the Real Democracy Now platform.1 Tens of 
thousands of people took to the streets in several Spanish cities to denounce 
the social consequences of the economic crisis and the way in which their 
government was managing that crisis. What also mobilized the Indignados 
into action was their indignation over the failures of the representative 
political system and of the capitalist economic model. At the end of the 
demonstration, a group of young people stayed and camped on the Puerta 
del Sol, a symbolic square in the center of Madrid (itself the center of Spain). 
The group stayed for almost one month as a self-managed encampment 
that organized public assemblies. The movement then branched out into 
other neighborhoods of Madrid, eventually expanding to a national scale 
with encampments multiplying on the squares of numerous city centers.
This chapter is about the articulation of the different scales of action – 
local, national, and international – within that mobilization. Even if the 
Indignados’ claims mainly concerned a national framework, their critique 
was also directed at the global level: their protests often included denounce-
ments of the excesses of global f inance and neoliberal capitalism. They 
therefore rapidly sought to internationalize their action. At the same time, 
they decentralized their assemblies to the scale of the neighborhoods and 
gradually narrowed down their activities to concrete and local issues. To 
sustain their mobilization for the long term, the Indignados then developed 
decentralized forms of organization as well as territory-oriented concrete 
actions, following the example of the struggles against home foreclosures. As 
they rejected the electoral avenue to bring about political change, they had 
to f ind places of action that would allow them to beef up their mobilization 
1 I wish to thank Marcos Ancelovici, Sophie Béroud, Pascale Dufour, and Albert Ogien for 
their comments. This chapter was translated from the French by Patrice Cochet-Balmet with 
funding from CITERES.
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and to record f irst victories. The context of social emergency surrounding 
the nascent mobilization also meant that they had to achieve solid results so 
as to be credible and to continue the f ight, since “the organisations of social 
movement f ighting against precariousness must prove their usefulness to 
be able to rally the sympathy, let alone the commitment, of those whose 
cause they claim to defend” (Mathieu 2007: 248).
This process of locating collective action has often been neglected by 
sociologists studying social movements, who generally focus on the rela-
tionship between the activists and the state – in a context where its role 
was growing – or on the transnational character of contestation (Voss and 
Williams 2012). It has, however, been the subject of recent analyses regard-
ing in particular the global justice movement and the collective action in 
Latin America. Merklen and Pleyers write that “numerous local movements 
and actors have placed their hopes in transforming at the local level, seeing 
there an appropriate framework to improving their life conditions and the 
quality of the social connections” (2011: 25). Voss and Williams also look at 
“how social movements have shifted their repertoire of practices from large 
mass events aimed at marking demands on the national state to local-level 
capacity building that seeks to democratize the local state and create paral-
lel democratic spaces” (2012: 354). This renewed interest in local issues can 
be attributed to the recent shifts that have taken place in social movements, 
especially from the national scale towards more targeted action and from 
the working world towards other, more diversif ied social issues. Merklen 
(2008) has detailed how, since the 1980s and increasingly since the economic 
crisis of 2001, the neighborhood in Argentina has become a privileged loca-
tion for building solidarity and cooperation in the face of weakening union 
aff iliation and reoriented social policies. And Pleyers (2011) demonstrated 
how the failure of the indigenous movements in Mexico to negotiate with 
the government and have an alternative candidate elected prompted them, 
from 2001, to focus on the construction of alternative societies on a local 
scale. Can we see a similar evolution in the case of the Spanish Indignados 
and if so, what are the factors behind it? How do social movements actually 
shift from collective action on national and global claims towards more 
concrete and local modes of action? What debates are fuelled by that loca-
tion of mobilization among the participants, and what consequences does 
this have on their representations of policy and collective action?
My analysis is based on f ield research conducted in Madrid since the 
end of May 2011. I observed f irsthand the dynamics of the encampment, 
the general assemblies, and the committees and working groups meet-
ings set up by the Indignados in not only Puerta del Sol but also several 
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neighborhoods (more than seventy meetings in total). I also took part in 
some ten demonstrations and other activities organized by the Indignados: 
cultural events, conferences, and direct and/or symbolic actions against 
home foreclosures and in banks. I mingled with the crowd during major 
gatherings, jotting down notes and shooting the scenes I was observing. 
Some of the smaller groups sometimes enticed me to take the floor and 
commit myself as an activist. In an ethnographic approach, I integrated 
mutual knowledge networks in a Madrid neighborhood (Carabanchel) 
and a town of the south suburb of Madrid (Parla). For this chapter, I have 
relied on my observations during the movement’s activities combined with 
informal and semi-directive interviews with some f ifty Indignados. I also 
used photography as a memorization medium on a par with the f ield diary 
(Conord 2007). My analysis is f inally based on my documentation work on 
the written, photographic, and audiovisual productions of the movement.
A chronology of the Indignados movement will enable us to understand 
how the movement has transformed with the passing of time. The idea is to 
decipher the modes of action and the commitment logics underlying both 
main watchwords: ‘Toma la plaza’ (‘Take the square’) and ‘Toma los barrios’ 
(‘Take the neighborhoods’). The movement’s f irst step involved large-scale 
national demonstrations, encampments on public squares, and assemblies 
with thousands of participants in the town centers. From the beginning, 
the Indignados have demonstrated a strong will to internationalize their 
mobilization. The second step was the decentralization of the movement 
to the level of the neighborhoods and the shift towards local and concrete 
issues, which enabled the Indignados to record their f irst victories but 
which also revealed the limits of localized action. One year later, due to 
the declining participation of the neighborhood assemblies, the Indignados 
began developing new strategies at the national level which emphasized the 
complementarity between the different levels of intervention.
Encampments in the City Center and Large-Scale 
Demonstrations
The f irst phase of the Indignados movement, which received the most 
media attention, only lasted from May to June 2011. Following the exam-
ple of Puerta del Sol, encampments multiplied on the central squares of 
several Spanish cities. The Madrid encampment itself did not last more 
than one month. Established on the evening of 15 May, it was disbanded 
on the initiative of the Indignados on 12 June after f ierce debates in the 
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Puerta del Sol general assembly. In spite of their relatively short duration, 
these encampments had a considerable influence on the 15 May movement, 
more specif ically on its forms of organization and internal democracy. In 
this f irst phase of the movement, participation was the most large-scale 
and the most heterogeneous, bringing together people who were already 
militants (mainly organized young people, especially in the autonomous 
movements, who decided to set up camp on the f irst evening) and others 
belonging to older activist generations or those still not accustomed to 
collective action, who joined the encampment in massive numbers in the 
following days. To explain the different facets of the f irst phase of the 
mobilization, I f irst analyze the claims of the demonstrators and discuss 
the democratic practices set up during the encampment before turning to 
the internationalization strategy of the movement.
Demonstrating Against a Faulty Political and Economic System
The 15 May demonstration, the starting point of the Spanish Indignados, 
was not initiated by conventional organizations such as trade unions or 
political parties but rather by collective bodies formed on the Internet 
(as well as certain older groups such as Attac-Spain) and who transmitted 
the call to action through social networks. In their f irst press release on 
1 March 2011, they described themselves as “representatives and militants 
of several groups, blogs and platforms [...] united under the common 
designation ‘Platform of coordination of groups for citizen mobilisation’”.2 
The call to action emphasized the global dimension of contestation (“To be 
able to show, as in many other countries around us, social discontent on 
the increase”) and linked the claims to the national context by denouncing 
the perverse economic and political system at the origin of the crisis in 
Spain:
After several years of crisis and absolute inanity of the Spanish political 
class, [...] a multitude of movements organised by citizens f inally took 
shape with a basic point in common: to denounce the severe deficiencies 
and the injustices of the current economic and governmental system, 
and to demand a real democracy.
2 This quote and the following ones originate from http://lacomunidad.elpais.com/
ezpala/2011/3/2/-indignate-inminente-convocatoria-la-plataforma-de. Retrieved 22 January 
2013.
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The motto of the 15 May demonstration – “Real democracy NOW. We are 
not commodities in the hands of the politicians and bankers” – underlined 
the responsibility of the “political and economic powers” to address “the 
hardship befalling the citizens”. The initial claims of the movement thus 
addressed two levels – mainly national but also international – and high-
lighted the responsibilities of the political system as well as the economic 
model in the social crisis affecting Spain. At the political level and in the 
national context, the ‘they’ in the motto “They do not represent us” referred 
to several organizations. The main targets were the government and the 
party in power (the Socialist Party or PSOE), which were deemed unable 
to provide satisfactory responses to the economic crisis, as well as the 
right-wing opposition (the Popular Party or PP) which promoted the same 
austerity policies. Both these entities were generally grouped under the 
expression “mainstream parties” and contemptuously dismissed in the 
quip ‘PPSOE’. The Indignados also denounced the two-party system as 
well as the electoral laws that promote bipartism in Spain. The position 
of the Indignados as regards the smaller parties such as Izquierda Unida 
(‘the United Left’) was more ambivalent: some considered them a genuine 
alternative, whereas others failed to distinguish between these smaller 
parties’ local management and the political agreements they made with 
the mainstream parties. The parties were not the only ones to be accused; 
individual political off icials were also denounced on account of numerous 
cases of corruption linked to real estate speculation. The manifesto of 
‘Real Democracy NOW!’, which called on Spanish citizens to demonstrate 
on 15 May, denounced the role of elected off icials in the economic crisis:
In this case, most of the political class does not even listen to us. They 
should aim to carry our voice to the institutions, [...] not to get rich and 
to succeed with us, solely by obeying the dictates of the major economic 
powers and clinging to power.3
The mainstream trade unions – the Workers’ Commissions (CCOO) and the 
General Union of Workers (UGT) – were also targeted in the motto “They 
do not represent us”. Their credibility had been heavily damaged when they 
negotiated a controversial agreement on pension reform with the govern-
ment earlier that year. In the public assemblies, however, the Indignados’ 
position on the unions was far more ambiguous than their stance towards 
the political parties, since several participants were union activists (Calle 
3 Retrieved 22 January 2013 from http://www.democraciarealya.es/manif iesto-comun/.
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and Candón 2013). A differentiation was thus quickly established between 
the “basic” or “combative” unions and the mainstream unions.
The denunciation of any form of political representation also extended 
to the neighborhood associations, albeit to a lesser degree, once the move-
ment began decentralizing in Madrid. I thus observed f ierce debates in 
neighborhood assemblies regarding their role in the 15M movement and 
their alleged distance from the people (Nez 2012). These criticisms should 
be understood in historical context: having acted as strongholds of the 
political contestation under the Franco dictatorship, they became the main 
interlocutors of the local public authorities with the return of democracy, 
and their action has gradually become institutionalized (Navarro 1999; 
Alguacil 2013).
The claims of the Indignados were not only part of a political context 
specif ic to post-dictatorship Spain, they could also be placed within an 
international framework. The outbreak of the real estate crisis in September 
20084 led to social consequences that were particularly painful in Spain. By 
the f irst trimester of 2011, the unemployment rate had skyrocketed to 21 per 
cent of the labor force, which amounted to nearly f ive million people. More 
than 45 per cent of those between the ages of 16 and 25 were unemployed – 
double the average in the European Union.5 Home foreclosures multiplied: 
32,000 households were affected by foreclosure procedures between January 
and June 2011, i.e. an average of 175 per day.6 Given the brutality of this social 
crisis, the assemblies of the Indignados often denounced the responsible 
economic actors – banks, international rating agencies, f inancial markets: “I 
would like to talk about bankers, [...] they mortgaged our lives, they control 
everything, they successfully made us dependent on them. It was the most 
important problem in this country, together with the privileges of the politi-
cians, we should get rid of all that!”.7 The banks were thus targeted because 
during the years of real estate speculation they had sold overrated real 
estate and offered risky credit to numerous households who then became 
insolvent with the crisis. They also jeopardized the national economy to 
the point where the government had to step in and use taxpayers’ money 
to ‘save’ them. The bank rescue packages and the ensuing budget cuts were 
imposed or advocated by international institutions such as the European 
Union, the IMF, and the World Bank, which were also included in the motto 
4 For an analysis of the economic crisis, see Ross’s chapter in this volume.
5 Data of the National Institute of Statistics.
6 Data of the General Council of the Judicial Power.
7 Observation at the general assembly of Carabanchel, on 28 May 2011.
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“They do not represent us”. The Indignados denounced these measures, 
decrying the fact that they were adversely affected by them even though 
they had not voted for them.
In addition to the economic actors and the international institutions, 
the Indignados also focused their criticism on the capitalist model itself, 
as explained in their call to demonstrate:
The obsolete and anti-natural economic model in force blocks the social 
machine in a self-destructive spiral by enriching a few and plunging 
all the others into poverty and scarcity. [...] An ethical revolution was 
necessary. We have placed money above human beings, and we must put 
it back in our service. We are people, not market products.
The criticism against capitalism thus played a signif icant role in the 
Indignados’ discourse and in the emerging mobilization, a fact that has 
generally been neglected in the literature on social movements (Hetland 
and Goodwin 2013). However, surveys conducted in several Spanish cities 
(Calvo et al. 2011; Arellano et al. 2012; Likki 2012) demonstrated that the 
Indignados did not necessarily belong to the social categories most affected 
by the economic crisis: although students and the unemployed took part in 
the demonstrations, most participants had a job and a high level of educa-
tion.8 Nor did the majority of the demonstrators belong to the most socially 
and politically excluded: only a few Indignados were involved in social or 
political organizations, but they voted more often than the average citizen.
Camping and Getting Organized to Claim Another Democracy
The rejection of conventional forms of political representation was a defin-
ing feature of the Indignados. The manifesto of the general assembly of 
Puerta del Sol stated that they were “free and voluntary people [...]. We do 
not represent any party or association.”9 One of the f irst messages of the 
Real Democracy NOW platform, published on the Kaosenlared.net site on 
7 March 2011, already defined the movement as a group of individuals rather 
than a group of organizations: “We are calling upon all of you, as citizens, to 
take to the streets on 15 May [...]. We entice you to join us without the symbol 
of any organization”. Handwritten signs created by individuals multiplied 
on the encampment, whereas banners furnished by organizations were 
8 See the introduction of this volume.
9 Retrieved 15 January 2013 from http://madrid.tomalaplaza.net/manif iesto-2/. 
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systematically withheld. This demonstrates that an individual aggregation 
rationale rather than a network rationale was at work here (Juris 2012). Some 
of these banners made references to the Spanish Civil War (see Photo 5.1: 
“We’re doing it for you, grandfather”; “Welcome to the Independent Republic 
of our square”). These references to the recent history of Spain illustrate 
that the contestation was originally part of a national context, even if it also 
entailed a more global denunciation of capitalism and international f inance.
Photo 5.1  Memories of the Spanish Civil War
Skepticism of the representative political system went hand in hand with 
the Indignados’ claim to be implementing ‘another democracy’, a ‘real 
democracy’ based on the principles of self-management, deliberation, 
and participation open to all. The prominence given to the practices of 
internal democracy makes this movement stand out from other movements 
(Adell 2011; Nez and Ganuza Forthcoming). The idea was admittedly not 
new, since the practice of horizontality and consensus had already been 
incorporated f irst by the anarchist and libertarian movements (Graeber 
2009), then by the ‘new social movements’ of the 1960s-70s (Polletta 2002), 
before becoming one of the standard bearers of the alterglobalist movement 
in the late 1990s (Della Porta 2009). In Spain, the deliberative techniques 
used by the Indignados originated especially from the Okupa (‘squatters’) 
movement, who experienced them in the ‘self-managed occupied social 
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centers’ during the 1980s (Martínez and García 2012) and in the movement 
against the military intervention in Irak in 2003 and after (Flesher Fominaya 
2010). However, in the case of the Indignados, internal democracy was at 
the center of most debates and had acquired a new dimension: consensus 
was sought not only within relatively homogeneous activist microspheres 
or between organizations and movements that had to make compromises 
(as in social forums) but also between heterogeneous individuals seeking to 
produce common positions (Aguiton and Haeringer 2012; Nez and Ganuza 
2015). As emphasized by Romanos: “The 15M promoted the transfer of the 
deliberative practices from more or less limited enclosures (for instance, the 
encampments, social forums or self-managed centers) towards the squares, 
and it seemed to constitute a signif icant difference” (2011: 9). At Puerta del 
Sol, the decisions were made in general assemblies, since the work was 
prepared upstream in more restricted groups: the committees dealt with 
the practical problems of that self-managed space (infrastructure, food, 
health, etc.), and the working groups (on economics, politics, education, 
etc.) prepared projects and propositions to change society. Common rules 
were gradually formalized, such as horizontality among groups, rotation of 
the speakers, functions in the assembly (moderating, taking turns to talk, 
and writing minutes), and consensus-based decision process.10
The themes addressed in the assemblies of the encampment were quite 
various, as reflected in the multitude of thematic working groups. From 
the onset, the participants tried to reach a ‘consensus on the fundamentals’ 
in order to respond in particular to the media denouncing their lack of 
program and propositions. Numerous debates addressed the vital neces-
sity of such a consensus, which nonetheless eluded the movement for 
several reasons. The particularity of the movement lay in the absence of a 
program and a leader, and the internal divergences were signif icant due 
to the heterogeneity of the participants. One of the most acute conflicts 
addressed the movement’s relation to the political sphere. The working 
group on politics was from the onset split in two subgroups – one focusing 
on short-term policies and the other on long-term policies – which met 
on the same day at the same time on two different squares. The group on 
short-term policies sought to weigh in on public policies being considered 
at the national level. The members agreed on four propositions to try and 
improve the current system:
10 In addition, I have developed an ethnography of the deliberation and consensus at Puerta 
del Sol (Nez 2012). For a comparison with the practices of the North-American Occupiers, see 
Ancelovici’s chapter in this volume.
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1) Reform of the electoral law for a more representative democracy, 
really proportional and developing effective mechanisms of citizen 
participation; 2) f ighting against corruption through standards aiming 
to provide total political transparency; 3) effective separation of the three 
powers (executive, legislative, and judicial); 4) creation of citizen control 
mechanisms to demand real political responsibility.11
During this time, the group dealing with long-term policies focused on the 
mode of political organization to be achieved based on self-management 
and public assemblies as practised in the Puerta del Sol encampment. 
This group believed that there was no point in trying to inf luence the 
current political system and that to change it was the only way forward. 
Still, such a change could not involve the electoral avenue but instead 
would entail the promotion of local experimentations, such as the oc-
cupancy of buildings or the creation of cooperatives with the aim of 
developing an alternative economic model to the capitalist system. In 
an autonomous and libertarian vein, the objective was to construct a 
counter-culture opposing the dominant culture and to form ‘pockets of 
resistance’. The tension between the two groups was particularly acute 
on the issue of electoral participation: the f irst group believed it was pos-
sible to establish a series of propositions and to hold political candidates 
accountable on that basis; for the latter group, the idea was not to toe the 
line of a particular electoral program but to follow one’s own f ighting 
program. A participant in the f irst social Indignados forum on 25 July 
2011 proposed a middle way: “The 15M movement is so variegated that it 
could never become a political movement with a political program, but 
political allies can be contemplated who, using the institutions, might 
defend what the 15M stands for.” However, in the runup to the legislative 
elections of 20 November 2011, the Indignados not only refused to adopt 
a political program and to designate leaders, they also withheld from 
backing candidates or political organizations.
This rejection of the electoral path was confirmed during the general 
assembly at Puerta del Sol held on election day. The moderation and sound 
system team arrived at the square at 5.40 pm, ten minutes after the meeting 
was summoned, whereas the polling stations had not yet closed. After 
a quick negotiation with the police, the meeting was allowed to take 
place provided that no political party or candidate was mentioned by the 
11 Retrieved January 15, 2013 from http://madrid.tomalaplaza.net/2011/05/26/acampada-sol-
consensua-cuatro-lineas-de-debate/comment-page-16/.
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participants. The moderator opened the session by clarifying the position 
of the assembly: “As every Sunday, we celebrate democracy here. Today is 
election day and of course, no speaker will advocate voting for any party. We 
are taking care of our own business, as every Sunday, to change the world, 
for a fairer society” (f ield notes). The working group on the 20 November 
elections was the f irst to take the floor: “We shall continue after 20 No-
vember to give information, so that everybody understands the elections, 
the types of votes, and the electoral law. Not to tell whom to vote for, but 
to f ill this information gap” (f ield notes). This working group, which had 
been meeting regularly since the summer, was having diff iculty def ining 
the movement’s position on the elections, as one of its active members was 
telling me at an assembly of the group which, two days before the ballot took 
place, was attended by more journalists than participants. No consensus 
could be reached; the only thing that could be agreed on was an informative 
role aimed at discouraging electors from returning a blank ballot (since that 
would strengthen the mainstream parties to the detriment of the smaller 
parties) and at advising them to either abstain, cast an invalid vote, or vote 
for the minority party of their choice. Individual initiatives sent a clearer 
message to the population, with several Indignados displaying, a few days 
before the ballot in Puerta del Sol, a photo of their face showing the sign 
of silence, with the following caption: “Vote and be quiet. They lie, they 
squeeze the budget, they steal. Unfair electoral law. Invalid or minority 
vote” (Photo 5.2).
Seeking to Internationalize the Movement
During this f irst phase, the movement’s global dimension was blatant and 
was expressed in two ways. First, the Indignados gathered at Puerta del Sol 
claimed to have been inspired by external modes of mobilization, mainly 
the Arab revolutions (to start with the occupation of Tahrir Square in Cairo) 
but also the more recent protests in Greece and Iceland. The signs installed 
on the square bore witness to these international sources of inspiration: the 
word ‘revolution’ inscribed in Arabic (Photo 5.3), a comic strip recalling the 
different steps of the mobilization in Iceland, and copies of a newspaper 
article entitled “Iceland is judging the f irst political off icial in charge for 
poor management of the crisis” (Photo 5.4). In the general assemblies at 
Puerta del Sol, the participants often referred to the Tunisian and Egyptian 
revolutions, to the referendum by which the Icelanders refused to pay for 
the mistakes of the bankers, or to the demonstrations in France against 
pension reform in the autumn of 2010.
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Photo 5.2  “Vote and be quiet”
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Photos 5.3 and 5.4  International References to the Encampment
The Indignados immediately granted paramount importance to the 
international diffusion of their movement. An ‘international extension’ 
commission was set up during the f irst days of the encampment. Its role 
was to “connect Madrid with the other cities of the world”12 by diffusing the 
‘model’ of the Puerta del Sol encampment throughout the world. This was 
achieved through the Internet, social networks, and direct contacts – via 
the Spanish diaspora and activists travelling – to New York, for instance 
(Romanos 2013a). This international diffusion of the model also involved 
translating the documents prepared by the general assembly at Puerta del 
Sol into twenty languages. In the general assemblies, the ‘international 
extension’ commission systematically gave news about encampments in 
other countries, even if this meant interrupting the discussions in progress. 
At a general assembly on 29 May 2011, while debating whether to maintain 
the encampment at Puerta del Sol or not, the participants followed the 
evolution of the movement in Paris hour by hour. At the beginning of the 
assembly (8.30 pm), a spokesman joyfully announced that “the Bastille has 
been taken!” At 9.30 pm, a direct communication established by mobile 
phone indicated that the demonstrators were peacefully resisting the 
police forces’ attempts to disband them. Thousands of participants began 
singing: “Paris resist, Madrid is with you!” At 9.40 pm, a minute of silence 
was observed to support the Parisians subjected to police repression. In the 
evening, the ‘international extension’ commission also reported a large-
scale demonstration in Athens as well as several support demonstrations 
by the Spanish and Latin-American communities in Brussels and in several 
German cities.
12 Intervention of a spokeswoman of that commission at the general assembly of Puerta del 
Sol, on 28 May 2011.
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This determination to serve as a “symbol for numerous peoples in Spain 
and in Europe”13 explains why the encampment lasted close to one month 
at Puerta del Sol, even though some had suggested bringing it to an end 
after two weeks. The aim of prolonging the encampment was to support the 
other encampments that were being subject to repression, as expressed by 
one participant: “Good reasons have been put forward to lift the camp, all 
of them are reasonable. I have one only: 200,000 people in Athens, 20,000 
in the Bastille [overestimated f igures] who, at this very moment, are being 
arrested, and we should leave?!”14 After the encampment was discontinued, 
the general assembly of Puerta del Sol continued to disseminate information 
about the international dimension of the mobilization by regularly giving 
the floor to foreign activists, for example from Morocco, Tunisia, Mexico 
(‘Yo soy 132’), or the United States (Occupy).
Decentralizing and Refocusing Collective Action on Concrete 
Issues
Another strategy was conducted in parallel to the internationalization of the 
movement: the tactic of decentralizing down to the level of the neighbor-
hoods, carried out by the ‘neighborhoods’ commission. Although disagree-
ments still remained among a portion of the campers, the most precarious 
who ordinarily slept on the street or in squares, the vast majority of the 
Indignados interpreted their abandonment of the Puerta del Sol encamp-
ment on 12 June 2011 as a change of strategy. “Nos vemos en los barrios” (“Let 
us meet in the neighborhoods”) was written on the large sign displayed 
that day on the entrance to the underground at the Puerta del Sol – a clear 
reference to the expression “Nos vemos en la plaza” (“Let us meet on the 
square”) used by the Indignados during the weeks of the Puerta del Sol 
encampment. The participants thus began singing the motto “Que no nos 
vamos, nos extendemos!” (“We are not going, we are growing!”). The idea 
was to anchor the mobilization at the local level so that it did not lose its 
momentum and to ensure the continuation of the movement by cutting it off 
from the necessarily temporary future of the encampment, as recalled by the 
moderator at the general assembly on 29 May: “The object of the assembly is to 
know what we are going to do with the encampment. One thing is clear: the 
movement continues, regardless whether the encampment continues or not!”
13 Observation at the general assembly at Puerta del Sol, on 29 May 2011.
14 Ibid.
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The Movement’s Decentralization
The f irst neighborhood assemblies were organized on 28 May 2011, after 
preparation by the ‘neighborhoods’ commission. This commission was 
adamant about making the extent of the movement’s decentralization 
visible at the Puerta del Sol encampment by indicating the neighborhoods 
and cities that had held their f irst assembly on a signpost (Photo 5.5). The 
Sol general assembly had earlier provided a methodological proposition to 
the neighborhoods in order to def ine common rules: “The object will be to 
promote in all the assemblies of the movement a horizontal, transparent 
operation, enabling everybody to take part on an equal basis.” The system 
of assemblies set up at Puerta del Sol was thus transferred to the neighbor-
hoods and suburbs of Madrid. During the f irst neighborhood assemblies, 
the turnout was massive. According to the ‘Toma los barrios’ site, they were 
organized in more than 140 neighborhoods and suburb towns, drawing more 
than 28,000 participants in total.15 The f irst popular assembly in Madrid 
(APM), held on 29 May 2011, reflected these dynamics. The spokesman of 
each neighborhood was invited to sum up in two minutes the assembly 
of the previous night, but this meant that f ive hours were necessary for 
all the neighborhoods to take the f loor. These physical encounters – as 
well as the madrid.tomalaplaza.net website, a common working platform 
(https://n-1.cc/), and the Facebook or Twitter social networks – ensured that 
the actions taken by the different neighborhoods and peripheral towns were 
all coordinated and harmonized.
The f irst assemblies focused on debating about their internal organiza-
tion (setting the location, dates, and times of the meetings; defining working 
groups) and turning the global claims of the Indignados into action on the 
local scale. For instance, at the first assembly of the popular neighborhood of 
Carabanchel, in the south of the city, several lines of work emerged: housing, 
employment, immigration, education, and health. Concrete propositions 
were formulated with respect to each neighborhood’s specif ic situation: 
setting up picket lines at each redundancy scheme by a local company, op-
posing any home foreclosures, reclaiming available plots to create housing 
and social facilities, seeing to it that hospitals benefit the inhabitants of the 
neighborhood, f ighting to prevent the closure of a public school, etc. The 
process of decentralization of the assemblies was also debated. The object 
was to articulate global ideas with concrete propositions on the ground so as 
to implement the maxim ‘Think global, act local’ which had already proved 
15 Retrieved 08 October 2011 from http://madrid.tomalosbarrios.net/. 
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itself in the global justice movement. The Indignados thus found legitimacy 
for pursuing their action. Participants, however, emphasized the limits of 
that territorialized approach, for example in Carabanchel: “The problems 
we have in the neighborhoods are common to all the neighborhoods. The 
problem is the world in which we live. I believe that Spain and not only this 
neighborhood should f ind solutions to its problems in this assembly”. Many 
participants in these f irst assemblies felt there was a risk that the movement 
would be confined to the local, thereby raising the issue of the relevancy 
of a territorial organization to cope with problems whose origins are more 
global than local, even if the repercussions were being felt on all levels.
This decentralization and implementation of action at the level of 
the neighborhoods did not mean that the Indignados had given up on 
their national and global strategy. First of all, the local actions, even 
if they were specif ic to a territory, often corresponded to more global 
issues. Focusing on the local scale did not mean restricting the move-
ment’s scope to the neighborhoods. The APM, for instance, strove to 
have the neighborhood assemblies switch their actions to a larger scale. 
As noted by Merklen and Pleyers: “The local anchorage of actors and of 
mobilisations is absolutely incompatible neither with the national politi-
cal link nor with a projection of citizenship beyond the frontiers of the 
state-nation. Besides, a local mobilisation does not always target a local 
adversary” (2011: 31). Moreover, it does not exclude taking action at other 
levels. The Indignados still wanted to claim international recognition, 
as conf irmed when they convened a global demonstration on 15 October 
2011. The website dedicated to the event, translated into 18 languages, 
specif ies that the appeal was echoed in 1,040 cities in 90 countries.16 This 
globalization of the movement was proudly displayed on the square in 
the center of Madrid (Photo 5.6).
Another point is that even after the encampment was brought to an 
end, the general assemblies were still held at Puerta del Sol, even if they 
no longer took place daily but were held weekly. However, conflicts of 
legitimacy emerged as soon as July 2011 between the neighborhoods and 
the national organization of the movement, with participants’ loyalties 
being pulled towards both sides. This tension was made apparent in the 
f irst neighborhood assemblies, for example by this participant: “I cannot 
be on the street everyday! We must prevent the dispersion from reducing 
the dynamics of the movement. We still have many things to do at the 
16 Retrieved 01 November 2011 from http://15october.net/.
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local level; we should not limit ourselves to major demonstrations.”17 It 
was ref lected in the growing conflict between the general assembly of 
Puerta del Sol (originating from the encampment) and the APM (which 
co-ordinates the activities of the neighborhood assemblies). The former, 
which enjoyed signif icant media attention, continued to pass on major 
action watchwords to the neighborhoods, whereas the latter believed 
that the principle of horizontality and autonomy meant that the general 
assembly of Puerta del Sol should not be conferred more legitimacy than 
any other neighborhood assembly (Nez 2012). This conflict was also ap-
parent in spatial terms: whereas both assemblies initially met at Puerta 
del Sol at f lexible hours, the APM moved to Plaza del Carmen “because 
it was stealing the show from the general assembly of the Puerta del Sol” 
which held its assembly at the same time, according to a participant in an 
informal interview.
Photos 5.5 and 5.6  Showing the decentralization and the internationalization of 
the movement
Concrete and Local Mobilization Issues
The risk of demobilization as a result of these conflicts was partially curbed 
by the f irst victories recorded by the movement – victories that were made 
possible by decentralization. On 4 June 2011, at the end of the general as-
sembly of Carabanchel, the 200 participants who stayed to talk on the 
square were tipped off that the police were conducting ethnic profiling at 
the Oporto metro station. By showing up in large numbers at the control 
location, the Indignados in effect caused the police off icers to leave. The 
news of this ‘roundup’ of immigrants rapidly spread in the working class 
areas of Madrid, which proposed to repeat the experiment. Four days later, 
17 Observation during the general assembly of Moratalaz, on 12 June 2011.
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a press release was issued by the Alucha neighborhood entitled ‘Message 
to the 15M: A small major victory in Carabanchel’:
That time, we were not alone, isolated, and defenceless. There were many 
of us, aware of being part of something bigger, of a still-growing move-
ment, capable of large mobilizations and small gestures, such as that of 
Saturday, with a taste for victory.18
The Indignados thus put an end to several ethnic profiling practices being 
carried out in Madrid’s metro stations. The ‘effect of demonstration’ was also 
quite powerful when they prevented a home foreclosure on 15 June 2011: an 
appeal launched by the assembly of Tetuán, a working class neighborhood in 
the north of the city, was indeed echoed by Indignados from all over Madrid. 
From then on, appeals multiplied to prevent home foreclosures in every 
corner of the capital city. Connections were rapidly established between the 
different neighborhood assemblies and existing social organizations (such 
as the human rights defence brigades or the mortgage victims’ platform 
[PAH]) so as to take direct action against the main social consequences of 
the economic crisis: home foreclosures, ethnic profiling practices, closing 
of social services, layoffs, etc. Even if they did not change the political and 
economic system, these concrete actions guaranteed the continuation of 
the movement, as expressed by a sixty-year-old man at the general assembly 
of Carabanchel on 11 June 2011 in referring to the occupation of a home for 
the disabled that had recently been closed in his neighborhood: “We must 
register a victory, however small, to continue f ighting.”
In all the neighborhoods, we also found concrete practices of social 
solidarity, like the organization of soup kitchens helping destitute and 
homeless people or the creation of barter exchange networks, mutual 
assistance networks, and time banks – whose aims were to exchange 
goods or free services in the surrounding environment. As analyzed by 
Ibarra:
This tendency of the movement to convert to a self-managed commu-
nity – which rather characterises certain Latin-American social move-
ments, whereas the ‘westerners’ only focused on the claim dimension 
confronting the public authorities – started to play a vital role in the 15M 
movement. (2013: 13-14)
18 Retrieved 08  June 2011 from http://aluche.tomalosbarrios.net/2011/06/08/mensaje-al- 
movimiento-15m-una-pequena-gran-victoria-en-carabanchel/. 
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The idea was not only to offer solutions to people particularly affected by 
the economic crisis but also to show that other exchanges were possible 
outside the market economy. This was the case with the small number of 
thirty-year-olds involved in the ‘action’ Parla commission who in February 
2012 submitted their proposal of extending the barter trade network 
that they had initiated locally. They initially offered the possibility of 
participating in the barter trade network to those who were penniless or 
unemployed – in other words, to those for whom bartering was a necessity. 
Soon after, they turned this experiment into a “population awareness” 
project to demonstrate that “another type of economy” was possible. One 
of the members highlighted the problems raised by the creation of social 
money: “We must find a way of oxidizing the social money to avoid repeating 
past mistakes of the capitalist economic system. How can we prevent people 
from accumulating money, to the extent that again some would have a 
lot and others a little?” The solution selected by the group was to rule out 
the use of social money and to rely instead on a barter system that would 
not be based on the material value of each good and that would establish 
trusting relationships among participants. As in the Argentine case – which 
had, incidentally, caught the interest of the commission that was gathering 
information on different barter trade systems in the world –, analyzed by 
Merklen (2008) further to the crisis of 2001, the neighborhood became a 
privileged location for the organization of acts of solidarity and cooperative 
efforts. To borrow the terms of Auyero (2005), the decentralization of the 
15M movement was simultaneously the product of ‘the situated space’, 
whereas the collective action was part of the fabric of social connections 
and of daily pursuits, and of the ‘attribute space’. The neighborhood in Spain 
had become a symbolic location of mobilization ever since the consolidation 
of the neighborhood associations at the end of the Franco dictatorship. 
Along with other neighborhood assemblies in Madrid, the assembly of Parla 
was at the origin of the creation of an ‘urban vegetable garden’ aimed at 
promoting another model of production and consumption. The Indignados 
thus focused on local and concrete actions that produced visible results, 
without losing the meaning and the global scope of their action.
The movement also turned to more radical action such as occupying 
vacant buildings. These buildings were used to rehouse families expelled 
from their lodgings as well as to provide a place to organize the movement’s 
activities during the winter. For example, the disused premises of the ‘Madrid 
Hotel’, a stone’s throw from Puerta del Sol, were occupied after the global 
demonstration of 15 October 2011. Many similar initiatives were undertaken 
in the neighborhoods of Madrid (on a par with the Eko in Carabanchel) as 
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in other towns in Spain, giving a renewed energy to the Okupa movement 
(Martínez and García 2012). In view of these developments, some Indignados 
noted in informal discussions that “the group on long-term politics won with 
respect to the group on short-term politics”, referring to one of the main 
conflicts within the movement. The Indignados’ rejection of the electoral 
path indeed led them to seek solutions to concrete problems in order to 
show the eff iciency of their action at the local scale, due to their inability 
to influence policies at the national and international level. Looking at 
the indigenous movements in Mexico (Pleyers 2011), we can identify two 
factors at work in the location strategy of their collective action: the failure 
of the government to take the movements’ claims into account and the 
redeployment of a political culture that sought to bring about social change 
at the local level. A similar attitude can indeed be found in the Indignados 
group ‘on long-term politics’, which believed that strengthening social 
connections anchored in daily life would not only improve social conditions 
but also offer alternatives to the dominant way of doing things (Pleyers 
2010).
On National and Transversal Actions
However, these dynamics at the neighborhood level gradually petered out 
as the months went by, and participation in local assemblies plummeted.19 
In Carabanchel, more than 500 people had occupied the Oporto square 
on 28 May 2011, but two weeks later this number was halved. By July, the 
number of participants had dropped to fewer than one hundred and then to 
just a few. Home foreclosures continued to mobilize the population to take 
action, and certain workgroups that were focused on very concrete issues 
such as housing attracted more participants than general assemblies in 
the neighborhoods. But demonstrators asked to join the movement rarely 
embarked on a long-term commitment. This can be explained by their 
precarious everyday lives, which made it diff icult for them to commit to 
regular participation (Mathieu 2007). In addition, the way in which the 
assemblies operated – on the basis of consensus, which involves debating 
and speaking in public – tended to exclude those individuals least accus-
tomed to collective action (Nez 2012). Paradoxically, and counter to the 
movement’s intentions, the assemblies of the Indignados gradually turned 
19 The local dimension is not necessarily the main source of the demobilization in the neighbor-
hood assemblies, which can also be explained by militant fatigue and the form of commitment 
in this type of activism, more pregnant than in an organization with relays and supports.
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into ‘assemblies of activists’, to borrow the term of Castells.20 This issue was 
discussed by the commission on ‘international extension’ of the Puerta del 
Sol general assembly, which decided in mid-December 2011 to call a ‘strike on 
activism’. By repeating the motto of Occupy Wall Street (“We are the 99%”), 
this commission blew the whistle on the activist drift of the movement:
Perhaps that in addition [...] to calling structure on what is bureaucracy, 
associating the sovereignty of the assembly to what is dispersion and 
division; instead of all that, we might wonder why we are more invisible 
each time, why we are each time more disconnected from the people.21
One year after the encampment at Puerta del Sol and the decentralization 
of the movement to the neighborhoods, initiatives on the national scale 
were springing up regularly. Since the announcement of the bank rescue 
packages in the spring of 2012, many demonstrations against the banks and 
bankers were organized. On 14 June 2012, the Indignados f iled a lawsuit 
against Bankia’s board of directors in the name of thirteen small stockhold-
ers who had lost their savings, claiming falsif ied accounts and other fraud 
charges. The people incriminated included the former president of Bankia, 
Rodrigo Rato, who had also held the positions of economics minister and 
IMF managing director in the past. The Indignados thus sought to denounce 
corruption, the lack of transparency, and the collusion between economic and 
political elites during the years of real estate speculation. They drew on the 
example of Iceland, where the former prime minister was put on trial for his 
responsibility in the f inancial crisis. The movement’s aim was to go beyond 
claims directed at banks and international financial institutions and directly 
target national off icials responsible for the crisis. It was also the strategy 
followed in 2013 by the Mortgage Victims’ Platform (Plataforma de Afectados 
por la Hipoteca, PAH) and the assemblies ‘on housing’. The ‘escraches’22 aimed 
to put pressure on members of parliament to support their ‘popular legislative 
initiative’ for alternative policies on housing (Romanos 2013b).
The actions and demonstrations were hence not limited to the scale 
of the neighborhoods but also continued on a national scale. The ‘Rodea 
el Congreso’ (‘Surround the Congress’) demonstration on 25 September 
20 ‘¿Adónde van los “indignados”?’, La Vanguardia, 21 January 2012.
21 Retrieved December 19, 2011 from http://madrid.tomalaplaza.net/2011/12/19/
extension-internacional-de-sol-se-declara-en-huelga-%C2%BFsomos-el-99/.
22 This form of demonstration, which emerged in Argentina, aimed to publicly condemn those 
responsible for an injustice by confronting them at their place of abode or their workplace.
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2012 to protest against the government’s austerity policies attracted many 
people and unleashed unprecedented police repression. The Indignados 
also contributed to the emergence of movements beyond the local scale 
by organizing across sectors of public services affected by budget cuts. 
These were the ‘waves’ whose color referred to the T-shirts worn by the 
demonstrators – like the green wave for education or the white wave for 
public health – and whose mode of organization and internal democracy 
were inspired by the Indignados (Calle and Candón 2013). Thus, a transversal 
rationale governed the location strategy of collective action. This meant that 
more local action did not always displace national or global action – these 
different scales of action could also be complementary.
* * *
Since embarking on a decentralization of their movement (just two weeks 
after the emergence of the 15M movement), the Indignados in Madrid have 
articulated their actions at the local, national, and international levels. 
There was a certain tension in determining which level would be the most 
effective in asserting their claims. The movement’s decentralization to 
the neighborhood level, which asserted itself as a strategic choice after 
the period of encampments, massive assemblies, and demonstrations of a 
national scope, can be explained by the search for a capacity of action. But 
what quickly became apparent was the limits of local action in the face of 
political, economic, and social policies, which arose on the national and 
international scales. Does the location strategy of collective action not boil 
down to a confession of helplessness from a social movement that refused to 
turn to the political arena to effect change? We agree with Pleyers’ assess-
ment of the location strategy of autonomous movements: “By shifting the 
f ight from the political sphere towards that of the local space of the daily 
life, did these movements not leave the f ield to their adversaries as regards 
the influence they exerted on the government authorities and resorting to 
the institutions?” (2011: 51). The general elections of November 2011 thus 
resulted in the right-wing party winning an absolute majority in Congress. 
It was able to do so without signif icantly widening its electoral base, for the 
voters’ rejection of the PSOE benefited the smaller parties, and abstention 
as well as spoiled or blank ballots increased.23 These results in part reflect 
23 See, for example, the electoral analysis of the NGO Ecologistas en Acción, which puts into 
perspective the idea of a ‘tsunami’ of the right-wing party. Retrieved 4 December 2013 from 
http://www.ecologistasenaccion.org/article21804.html. 
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the discourse used by the Indignados during the campaign, which called 
on voters to abstain, to submit invalid votes, or to vote for smaller parties. 
The ‘Partido X’ was launched in January 2013 with the aim of creating “a 15M 
in the electoral space”.24 Podemos (which translates as “We can”) is another 
political party that emerged as part of a continuation of the 15M movement 
in the political sphere, even if these initiatives came far short of encapsulat-
ing such a heterogeneous movement (Nez 2015). Podemos candidates won 
f ive seats in the European Parliament elections of 25 May 2014. Since the 
2015 municipal, regional and legislative elections, Podemos is well estab-
lished in the political game.
The location strategy of collective action highlights the diff iculties 
encountered by present-day social movements in identifying ‘the enemy’ 
that people must f ight against. Hessel writes: “Truly so, the reasons for 
outrage may seem today less clear or the world too complex. Who controls, 
who decides? It is not always easy to distinguish among all the currents 
who govern us” (2011: 14). This elusive feature of the enemy, which is an 
essential component of a social movement (Neveu 2002), highlights one of 
the keys to understanding why the Indignados swung between different 
scales of action. This evolution is probably similar to other mobilizations 
emerging in the wake of the Indignados, such as the Occupy movement in 
the United States. Aguiton and Haeringer have noted that “In New York, the 
occupiers recently struck an alliance with Occupy Our Homes, a collective 
for the right to housing and opened habitation squats for the poorly housed, 
reminding one of the practices of the Spanish activists” (2012: 9). Voss and 
Williams (2012) demonstrate that the focus of such movements came to lie 
in the construction of new collective capacities through the democratic 
practices implemented at the local scale rather than obtaining concessions 
from the state.
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6 The Spatial Dimensions of the Greek 
Protest Campaign against the Troika’s 
Memoranda and Austerity, 2010-2013
Maria Kousis
A new economic and political landscape of contention has surfaced across 
local, national, and transnational spaces in the 21st century in reaction to 
the impact of hard economic times on national populations (Diani and 
Kousis 2014). Lucid examples include the movements of real democracy, 
Occupy, and the Indignados participating in urban spaces both as national 
and transnational contentious publics (see chapter 5 in this volume; Fuster 
2014: 237-242). This contention is especially visible in the southern part 
of the Eurozone and in particular Greece. In order to maintain global 
economic flows, enormous pressure was placed by international lenders 
and the Troika – the European Commission (EC), the International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF), and the European Central Bank (ECB) – on southern 
European governments to implement harsh austerity measures and related 
neoliberal reforms (see chapter 2 in this volume; Diani and Kousis 2014). 
Given the sweeping and dramatic impact these measures had on national 
populations, the legislative decisions included in the Troika’s Memoranda 
of Understanding (MoU) and the ensuing austerity policies led to intensive 
waves of multi-scalar mobilizations across an array of old and new spaces 
on Eurozone’s periphery, and especially Greece.
Since 2010, protests spread across the Eurozone’s more exposed old 
periphery regions (including Ireland), which are more susceptible to the 
global f inancial crisis (Lapavitsas et al. 2010). The 2007 crisis, however, also 
sparked demonstrations in northern as well as eastern European countries 
on labor rights and social welfare issues, unemployment, health, migration, 
violence, democracy, and extremist phenomena (Kriesi 2011; Beissinger and 
Sasse 2012). The new wave of Occupy, Indignados, anti-austerity, square/
piazza street politics has led to an abundance of literature, most of which 
do not systematically apply the conceptual and methodological toolkit of 
the social movement approach (see chapters 1 and 12 in this volume).
This vast array of multi-scalar contention within and beyond nation-
states calls for the study of “spatial agency – the ways that spatial constraints 
are turned to advantage in political and social struggles and the ways that 
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such struggles can restructure the meanings, uses, and strategic valence 
of space” (Sewell 2001: 52-55). Research in this area has focused on under-
standing spatial contexts as both resource and constraint (Ó Dochartaigh 
and Bosi 2010). More than two decades ago, scholars began examining the 
spatial dimension of social movements, with geographers such as Lefebvre 
(1991), Pile and Keith (1997), and Miller (2000) leading the way. The past 
decade also witnessed an increasing collaboration between geographers 
and social movement experts addressing spatiality and contention in 
the 21st century (e.g. Martin and Miller 2003; Nicholls et al. 2013). Martin 
and Miller (2003) investigate how space is involved in the operation of 
the mechanisms identif ied by McAdam, Tilly, and Tarrow (2001); more 
recent followers include Sbicca and Perdue (2013). Nevertheless, it is still 
rare to f ind studies (e.g. Thornton 2012) with a systematic socio-historical 
empirical analysis illustrating how protests spread across space over time 
using geography tools such as ArcGIS.
Social movement scholars have examined space in relation to contention 
only since the early 2000s, with pioneer works by McAdam, Tilly, and Tarrow 
(2001); Tilly (2000, 2003); Sewell (2001); and Auyero (2003, 2006). McAdam, 
Tilly, and Tarrow (2001) offer opportunities for a more situated and context-
oriented study of the mechanisms and processes of contentious politics 
– even though they do not specify how space and place can be analyzed (but 
see Tilly 2003). Without explicitly linking to these mechanisms, Tilly (2000) 
offers f ive arguments on spatial aspects of contention illustrated through 
the geography of policing, safe places, spatial claim-making, and the control 
of places as stakes of contention (Tilly 2003: 221). Subsequent research has 
corroborated this view. By focusing on the itinerary, selection of targets, 
and geography of policing involved in the 1993 public employee protests in 
Argentina, Auyero (2003) examines how both physical and symbolic space 
structure influence protest. Bosi (2013) studies how the concept of safe terri-
tory can shed light on the persistence of, and disengagement from, violence 
by violent political organizations. Further developing his analytic tools on a 
spatial approach to contentious politics, Tilly proposes a two-dimensional 
view of spatial variation – proximity and mobility – which leads to four 
extreme types of mobilization: local f ixed, large-scale f ixed, local mobile, 
and large-scale mobile (2003: 222).
According to Auyero (2006), the literature on space and contention 
focuses on issues pointed out by Sewell (2001) and other scholars: space 
as a repository of social relations; built environment as opportunity 
and constraint in contentious politics; spatial routines; and meaningful 
spaces. Recent works on contentious politics in the 21st century have 
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illustrated a multi-scalar reorganization of movements from the local, 
regional, and national to the supra-national, which use new technologies 
and the emergence of global publics; they respond to similar multi-scalar 
spatial arenas where contested decision-making occurs (Mayer 2013). The 
development of electronic communications has contributed to the speed 
with which not only social movements (McAdam et al. 2001; Rucht 2005; 
Della Porta and Tarrow 2005) but also the global economic crisis have 
spread (Hassan 2011). Studies of this period have not only pointed out 
the rising importance of IT and social media in spreading protest (Rucht 
2005) but also the increase in networking (Diani 2011) and the emergence 
of ‘mega-networks’ (Goldstone 2011). The waves of defensive protests in 
Mediterranean regions were carried out by ‘mega-networks’ comprised of 
very broad cross-class coalitions which “facilitate further mobilization by 
creating and linking prior, tightly-linked within-group networks to each 
other” (Goldstone 2011: 457). These post-2010 mobilizations may be a new, 
broader family of anti-austerity protests with claims to representative 
democracy, but there are notable divergences. It is, moreover, too early to 
see a signif icant expansion of their actions unfolding, except in the case 
of Greece (see chapter 12 in this volume).
Given the rarity of studies that strive to understand the dynamics of space 
and protests in multi-scalar arenas, this chapter offers new evidence on the 
spatial dimensions of the Greek campaign against the Troika memoranda 
and austerity measures. It simultaneously aims to contribute to the wider 
debate on economic and political contention, which is also spreading, and 
to adopt an approach used by social movements. The analysis is guided by 
Auyero’s suggestion (2006) that future research shed light on the ways in 
which: a) physical space affects the origins and course of joint action, and 
b) particular forms of making claims and/or expressing grievances are 
likely to recur over time.
The section that follows offers a more focused review of the literature 
relevant to this chapter, which centers on the spatial features of anti-
austerity contention, the space-specif ic contention of parliamentarization 
(Tilly 1997), and the contention in squares and streets at the national and 
transnational scales. The method, analysis, and concluding sections offer a 
Tillian approach to the spatial and diachronic profile of the three-year-long 
Greek protest campaign. Special attention is given to its multi-scalar (local, 
national, transnational) character and its persistent use of the parliament as 
the key space of contention. Relying also on secondary sources, it also makes 
references to the safety of spaces of contention and the new meanings/
routines created in old spaces by activists of the ‘movement of the squares’.
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Spatial Dimensions of Economic and Political Contention
In the last decade, we have witnessed the increasingly deep and pervasive 
impact of globalization in the economic, political, social, and cultural 
spheres, reaff irming the critical importance of structural transformations 
and dynamics for social movement development (Kousis and Tilly 2005; 
Johnston and Almeida 2006; Almeida 2008, 2010). Multi-scalar contention 
reflects neoliberalism’s failure to deliver social protection and collective 
goods (Mayer 2013) on a variety of fronts ranging from the provision of 
health care to employment, as also seen in the more recent shift of the 
burden from governments and corporations to individuals far less capable 
of bearing them. Furthermore, regulations on businesses are being relaxed, 
while state power has been shifting to the private sector and transnational 
bodies (Sbicca and Perdue 2013).
Most of the studies on anti-austerity campaigns involving wider popula-
tions have focused on Latin American countries such as El Salvador and 
Costa Rica (Almeida 2010, 2012). A campaign comprises a higher level 
of contention involving whole populations engaged in wider struggles 
and is def ined as sustained, organized public efforts making collective 
claims on target authorities, constituting one element (of three) of a social 
movement:
Unlike a one-time petition, declaration, or mass meeting, a campaign 
extends beyond any single event – although social movements often 
include petitions, declarations, and mass meetings. A campaign always 
links at least three parties: a group of self-designated claimants, some 
object(s) of claims, and a public of some kind. The claims may target 
governmental off icials, but the ‘authorities’ in question can also include 
owners of property, religious functionaries, and others whose actions 
(or failures to act) signif icantly affect the welfare of many people. (Tilly 
2004: 3-4)
Campaigns involving the population are a notable part of the new economic 
and political multi-scalar contention of the 21st century. Protesters use old 
as well as new spaces of resistance and repertoires of action. The parlia-
mentarization of contention, the urban but simultaneously national scale 
of square protests and street contention, as well as the transnationalization 
of national campaigns are all illustrated in the recent post-f inancial-crisis 
protests, especially in the case of Greece.
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The Parliamentarization of Contention
Parliament is a perennial space of contention, as seen in previous periods 
(Tilly 1997) as well as in more recent times (Vradis 2011; Dalakoglou 2011; 
Leontidou 2012; Kousis 2014). Based on the analysis of large data sets on 
contentious events for long periods, Tilly’s initial description of the par-
liamentarization of British contention from 1750 to the 1830s (1997: 249) 
offers insights on major elements that trigger a new period of parliamentary 
reforms, such as those seen since 2010 in Greece:
1 parliament became the object of ordinary people’s contention;
2 parliamentary action incited ordinary people’s claim-making, whether 
directed to parliament or elsewhere;
3 issues currently being considered by parliament became more central 
to popular contention;
4 connections with parliament became more central in a wide range of 
claim-making.
Even when powerful global economic and political actors, such as the Troika 
with Greece, exercise overwhelming pressure on the state, the persistence 
of parliament-directed protest (Dalakoglou 2012; Korizi and Vradis 2012; 
Leontidou 2012) attests to the high signif icance and durability of national-
level institutions (Della Porta and Mattoni 2014). Protesters have targeted 
the Greek Parliament as the most accountable national institution for 
securing the social welfare of the country’s population.
Square Camps and Street Politics in Urban and National Spaces
A great deal of square camp and street contention occurs at the national 
level, forming national campaigns against neoliberal reforms and austerity 
policies. These protests appeared f irst in Latin America (Strawn 2005; John-
ston and Almeida 2006; Almeida 2010b; Bellinger and Arce 2011) and Asia 
(Arce 2010; Arce and Kim 2011). Few are the systematic studies documenting 
the regional prof ile of such campaigns (Almeida 2012). With evidence on 
community mobilizations from El Salvador and Costa Rica, Almeida shows 
that “localities with greater levels of state and com munity infrastructure 
(highways, administrative off ices, universities, NGOs and local chapters 
of oppositional parties) were associated with heightened collective action 
oppos ing the privatization of health care and public utilities” (Almeida, 
2012: 1061). These instances of social infra structure were the products of 
state-led development before the era of accelerated neoliberal globalization.
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The global f inancial crisis of 2007 has led to a new set of opportunities 
and threats for the expression of public demands in democratic as well as 
authoritarian contexts (Smith 2011). Since 2008, square and street politics 
have been rejuvenated – initially in the Arab region, the EU, and North 
America, with more recent manifestations in Turkey and Brazil. This is 
especially visible in economic and political contention under neoliberal 
restructuring. The influence of a Mediterranean, urban ‘movement of the 
piazzas’ at the local and global level is undeniable (Leontidou 2012). Street 
politics since the Arab protests reflect the important role of the regional 
landscape across and beyond the Mediterranean. This is reflected in activist 
discourse (Leontidou 2012), which mirrors the importance of spatial agency 
and the ways in which resistance can reshape the meanings and uses of 
space (Sewell 2001).
In recent years, scholars have published systematic studies on street 
politics in the context of the f inancial crisis in France (Ancelovici 2011), 
Greece (Diani and Kousis 2014; Kousis and Kanellopoulos 2015), EU coun-
tries (Kriesi 2011), and Eastern European countries (Beissinger and Sasse 
2012). Recent work on crisis-related contention in southern Europe offers 
fresh evidence of square protest camp mobilizations in Spain and Portugal 
(‘12M’, ‘15M’, and ‘15O’) as well as an analysis of the composition of 15M 
mobilizations in Spain (Baumgarten 2013; Fuster 2012; see chapter 5 in this 
volume). Qualitative studies focus on the urban character of 21st century 
protests, pointing to a revitalization of politics with a lasting impact and 
the engagement of high numbers of participants imagining a different world 
(Madden and Vradis 2012: 235-236). In their spatial ethnographic analysis 
of the Indignados’ protests in upper and lower Syntagma Square in June 
2011, Kaika and Karaliotis (2014) point to the signif icance and limitations 
of using indignation to establish a wider democratic politics.
Transnational Spaces of Contention
The globalization of resistance was initially marked by events such as the 
Seattle mobilizations against the WTO, the G-8, the IMF, the World Bank, 
the EU, and the World Economic Forum1. This was followed by transna-
tional activist networks of the World Social Forum and the European Social 
1 Other such events include the 1988 anti-IMF and World Bank counter summit in Berlin, the 
1994 Zapatista uprisings, or the protest by the People Global Action network [I thank Marcos 
Ancelovici for this point].
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Forum (Della Porta 2009), which focused on global justice against neoliberal 
globalization and neoliberal restructuring (Bringel and Munoz 2010).
Following the multi-scalar 2007 f inancial crisis that was triggered in 
the US and the spiralling banking sector or sovereign debt crises affecting 
populations across the US, Europe, and other regions, both transnational 
and national contention has risen (Goldstone 2011; Kriesi 2011; Smith 2011; 
Beissinger and Sasse 2012; Fuster 2012; Shepard 2012). Contenders across 
transnational urban spaces are against f inancial, economic, and political 
institutions at both the transnational and national level. The most recent 
literature focuses on signif icant issues related to this new phase of transna-
tional contention visible in Occupy and real democracy movements, such 
as democracy and new technologies (Flesher Fominaya and Cox 2013; Della 
Porta and Mattoni 2014).
The sections that follow offer a systematic protest event analysis ap-
proach that highlights the spatial features of the Greek campaign against 
the Troika memoranda and austerity measures: its parliamentarization as 
well as its urban, national, and transnational topographies and the ways in 
which they influence, and are influenced by, the protesters.
Research Approach: Large Protest Events and the Greek 
Campaign against the Troika Memoranda and Austerity
The study of contentious events is especially significant for periods of ‘thick-
ened history’ when “the pace of challenging events quickens to the point 
that it becomes practically impossible to comprehend them and they come 
to constitute an increasingly signif icant part of their own causal structure” 
(Beissinger 2002: 27). It allows for the study of compact defensive actions 
and frames of a mobilized public confronting austerity and memorandum 
policies of devastating impact imposed by a delegitimized Greek state 
and powerful economic and political transnational agencies during the 
turbulent period of 2010 to 2013.
During this ‘thickened’ period, thousands of protests2 took place mostly 
at the local and national level but also on a transnational scale. Choos-
ing the Large Protest Events (LPEs) as the unit of analysis facilitates the 
2 In response to inquiries by Syriza MPs, the Minister of Public Order and Citizen Protection 
announced that from May 2010 to April 2014, 20,210 protests occurred across the country, 6,266 
of which took place in the Attica Region which includes Athens, based on police reports. See 
also, http://www.apergia.gr/ for a day-to-day calendar of protests in Greece.
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systematic tracing of all key events and synchronized actions at the national 
level. These LPEs of the f irst three years of the Greek crisis were organized 
against the Troika’s MoU and the government’s related austerity policies. 
They constitute a national anti-austerity campaign sparked by neoliberal 
adjustment and austerity policies in Southern European countries. Mostly 
involving demonstration-marches and national strikes between January 
2010 and January 2013 with claims against austerity and/or neoliberal poli-
cies, the 32 LPEs I look at in this chapter share the following features:
1 a high number of participants (minimum 5,000 – maximum 500,000);
2 a high number of parallel and synchronized events;
3 national-level claims challenging the Troika’s MoU and government 
austerity policies;
4 broad, cross-class coalitions involving a large number of groups and 
the general public;
5 based in Athens’ Syntagma (Constitution) Square, addressing the 
parliament;
6 accompanied by parallel protests in cities and towns across the country 
with the same claims.
Due to their potential impact, these LPEs were widely covered by national 
and transnational media. Thus, as with previous periods of “thickened 
history” (Beissinger 2002),3 the best strategy of analysis is a “blanketing 
strategy” (Beissinger 1998: 290-300) utilizing multiple available sources 
in order to enrich the data set of more than 450 articles.4 Therefore, f ive 
major sources were selected: Eleftherotypia,5 the leftist Rizospastis,6 and 
Avgi7 as well as Indymedia and real-democracy.gr. They were supplemented 
3 The crisis period in Greece witnessed a rapid rise in independent electronic news and media 
sites. This may be compared to the transitional period witnessing the rapid development of 
independent newspaper sources (Beissinger 2002).
4 This chapter draws on primary data produced in part under ‘Mediterranean Environment, 
Networks and Actions’ (coordinator: M. Kousis), a project stemming from ‘Mediterranean Voices: 
Oral History and Cultural Practices in Mediterranean Cities’ with 80 per cent funding by the 
European Commission (DG EuropeAid, contract no. E8/AIDCO/2000/2095-05) and 20 per cent 
through matched funding by the University of Crete and other sources. The work by Kostas 
Kanellopoulos (locating media mentions and coding), Marina Papadaki (technical assistance), 
and Sara Karavasili (data entry) is gratefully acknowledged.
5  Over a period of more than forty years, Eleftherotypia, an independent center-left, multi-
thematic newspaper with high circulation rates offered continuous and detailed coverage on 
contentious issues and social mobilizations. Unfortunately, the paper stopped operating from 
December 2011 to mid-January 2013 due to f inancial problems.
6 The off icial newspaper of the Greek Communist Party.
7 Newspaper supporting Syriza. 
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by other Greek national news sources, e.g. To Vima, Ta Nea, Kathimerini, 
Epohi, tvxs, international news sources (The Guardian, Reuters, BBC), and 
blogs such as iskra.gr.
A Multi-Scalar Anti-Austerity Campaign: From Athens’ Syntagma 
Square to Urban Squares Within and Beyond Greece
Three major phases stand out in the campaign (Diani and Kousis 2014). The 
f irst anti-austerity year, from February 2010 to February 2011, constitutes 
the starting period and was marked by waves of protest against not only 
the Greek government’s ‘stability measures’ but more importantly the 
Troika’s f irst memorandum and its accompanying measures, which gave 
rise to an escalation of strikes and intense resistance. The second period, 
from March 2011 to February 2012, witnessed the Multi-Purpose Act and 
the second memorandum. During this period, parliament approved its Mid-
Term Fiscal Strategy (2012-2015), which included privatizing public assets, 
public sector restructuring and downsizing, and more wage, personnel, 
and pension cuts (Markantonatou 2013). The third period took place from 
March 2012 to December 2012 and can be separated into two periods – one 
in which there were no LPEs and another in which a kind of rejuvenation 
of LPEs materialized. Whether the January 2013 LPE belongs to the third 
phase or to a new one remains to be studied based on how future protests 
develop.
Action and Claim Repertoires across the Country and Beyond
New networks of protesting groups were formed in Greece in reaction to 
harsh measures and agreements between transnational and national bod-
ies, as illustrated in the massive protests that were organized in Syntagma 
Square and other squares across the country. The diachronic spread of 
action forms, claim-making, and new social movement actors are reflected 
below. Specif ically, Graph 6.1 depicts the main types of action used in each 
LPE. These direct democratic, demonstrative, confrontational, and violent 
action forms escalate in the second period, that of the Greek Indignados (or 
the movement of the squares), from April 2011 to February 2012. It is during 
this period that the most notable increase took place in terms of direct 
democratic actions. These were carried out by very diverse groups of partici-
pants who did not claim any aff iliation to political parties or other political 
groups. Less drastic were the changes in the pattern of demonstrative and 
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confrontational actions (mostly general national strikes). Police repression 
and violence subsided by early June.





























































































































































































Violent Confrontational Demonstrative Petitioning Direct Democratic
Protest claims against the Troika’s MoU and the austerity policies appeared 
across the entire country. The protesters opposed the drastic nationwide 
socio-economic impact of these policies, the aim of which was to save the 
Eurozone and leave the global economic arena and its f inancial centers 
unharmed. Overall, the protest claims’ primary targets were the Greek 
government (including the parliament and the police force), followed by 
the European Commission, the Troika, and foreign banks. Other groups 
that were challenged included f inancial institutions and credit agencies, 
the rich, and local government agencies. The least mentioned were capital-
ist markets and the G20/G8. At some events, Germany was considered a 
targeted state, especially since June 2011 (Kousis 2013).
The protestors’ main grievances were the unprecedented neoliberal, 
structural adjustment laws and measures that led to dramatic cuts in wages 
and pensions; tax increases; the privatization of public enterprises, health, 
and education; and other cuts to social expenditure. These grievances re-
flected the protestors’ serious concerns about the impact of these austerity 
measures on the economy, the society, and the country’s sovereignty and 
democracy (Diani and Kousis 2014).
GreeK ProteSt cAMPAiGN AGAiNSt tHe troiK A’S MeMorANDA AND AuSterit y 157
Campaign protesters demanded “Taxing the Rich”, job creation, and 
the provision of social welfare (health and education). They also called for 
the resignation of responsible politicians, an immediate halt to privatiza-
tions, and the annulment of the externally imposed austerity policies. Less 
frequently heard were demands concerning reforms to the Eurozone and 
EU f iscal strategies as well as elections (Kousis 2013).8
Mobilizing Actors and Means of Communication
Participation in the LPEs was initiated and organized by major conven-
tional actors such as political parties and unions as well as new actors: the 
aganaktismenoi (the Greek Indignados), also known as the movement of 
the squares/piazzas.
The most frequently mentioned groups of protesters are presented in 
Table 6.1 below. Highest in frequency were the political parties of the left, 
with Syriza participating more frequently (in 24 of the 32 LPEs), followed 
by Antarsya, the Greek Communist party (KKE), the public and private-
sector union confederations, anarchist/anti-authoritarian groups, as well 
as students and/or their parents. Groups that participated less frequently 
include economic or professional associations, civil society groups, and 
the general public. The categories with the lowest frequency were the 
self-employed, pensioners, artist groups, immigrant groups, soccer fan 
clubs, ultra-right groups, European labor unions, communities engaged 
in environmental conflicts against the state (e.g. Keratea), Spitha, the po-
litical movement initiated by the internationally known composer Mikis 
Theodorakis, the Action Group for German remunerations, Facebook 
groups, and others.
There was a steady increase in the types of groups and organizations 
participating especially in the second pre-election period, with noticeable 
peaks in the May-June 2011 period (the Greek Indignados), and February 2012 
(Kousis 2014). While the anti-austerity campaign began with conventional/
traditional protest groups such as unions, political parties, teachers, and 
students, within a year, new justice-oriented groups (e.g. which had been 
formed in previous years to protest against paying new taxes) signif icantly 
fortif ied the broad coalitions of anti-austerity contention. It was also in the 
second year that the general public began making a stronger appearance 
8 Ongoing research focuses on attributions of responsibility related to the Euro-zone crisis by 
all actors in the public sphere, including claims by protestors, in Greek and German newspapers 
as well as Reuters: http://www.ggcrisi.info/
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in the protests (Kousis 2014). Researchers have recently just begun to study 
the networking and linkages among major groups that played a key role 
in initiating and organizing the LPEs. Most of these are political parties 
of the left, political networks, and union organizers (Kanellopoulos et al. 
2013; Kanellopoulos 2015).
What is striking is the vital role which IT, virtual communication, and 
social media played in the organizing, supporting, and spreading of anti-
austerity protests in Greece in the past three years (Kaika and Karaliotas 
2014; Leontidou 2012; Tsaliki 2012). This is especially discernible when 
examining the scale shift, the synchronized parallel actions, and also the 
interactions between the local, national, and transnational arenas of the 
anti-austerity campaign.
Table 6.1  Participating Protest Groups, January 2010-January 2013
Type of Participating Group Participation in LPEs No. of Percent
Political Parties 24  75,00%
  ANtArSyA 23  71,90%
  DiMAr  4  12,50%
  ecologist Greens  2   6,30%
  KKe 22  68,80%
  SyrizA 24  75,00%
GSee/ADeDy (private & public sector unions 19  59,40%
  other union and employees 25  78,10%
  other associations 17  53,10%
  olMe PoSDeP 20  62,50%
anti-autoritarian AK 20  62,50%
anarchist groups 17  53,10%
justice oriented groups & networks 15  46,90%
indignados 12  37,50%
occupy  6  18,80%
students, pupils and/or their parents 22  68,80%
technical/commerce chambers  9  28,10%
professional org/s & groups (doctors, 
lawyers,  engineers
11  34,40%
economic interest groups (small/medium 
scale)
 9  28,10%
farmers and agricultural organizations  7  21,90%
feminist organizations and groups  7  21,90%
other civil society organizations and groups 10  31,30%
the general public (citizens, the population, 
the Greeks, etc)
18  56,30%
total N of lPes 32 100.00 %
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A Perennial Space of Contention: The Parliament and Syntagma 
Square9
Situated in the center of Athens, the Greek Parliament is a collection of 
former palace buildings that oversees Syntagma Square, which may be 
seen as an extension of its courtyard. It constitutes a heavily guarded 
environment that hosted four decades of decision-making bodies that led 
to huge state debts. Syntagma is a most suitable example of space as a 
semantically complex concept in contentious politics (Sewell 2001), as it 
has routinely been the square where mass demonstrations and rallies gave 
voice to protestors’ claims and where attempts were made to influence 
Greek political decision-makers.
Southern European urban squares or piazzas are the product of mixed 
land use, informality, and street life which are similar to the agora, a public 
space between the private house and the public parliament, the individual 
and the state (Leontidou 2012). The agora as a public space of contention has 
deep roots. In Athens, today’s Syntagma goes back to 1843, when the Greek 
public revolted and succeeded in forcing King Otto10 to grant them a new 
constitution. Since then, it has been a space of contention and negotiation 
between the public and the modern Greek state (Madden and Vradis 2012: 
236). Some of the most signif icant contestations which occurred there 
include the ‘bloody December’ of 1944, which witnessed the killings of 
many communists and ignited the Greek civil war; the massive protests 
in 2007 against the catastrophic forest f ires, which cost the lives of more 
than 80 people; the December 2008 protests against police violence and 
neoliberalism’s effects on the younger generation, which started in the 
neighborhood of Exarheia as a reaction to the fatal shooting of 16-year-old 
Alexis Grigoropoulos; and, of course, the large and intense anti-austerity 
protests, including those by the Greek movement of the squares, which 
followed in the footsteps of the Spanish Indignados (Leontidou 2012; Kousis 
2014).
As the mediating agency, the Greek Parliament has been responsible for 
implementing and facilitating structural adjustment and austerity policies 
imposed by national and transnational actors through drastic changes of 
the related legal and institutional arrangements. It has also served as the 
9 Leontidou (2012: 302) proposes the use of ‘piazzas’ instead of ‘squares’ to emphasize “the 
open and the nodal centre of material and virtual communication rather than an enclosed 
square and its def ined landscape”.
10 Son of King Louis I of Bavaria.
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political arena for all major governing parties whose policies and reforms 
shaped the national conditions directly or indirectly responsible for the 
crisis.
Although all of the LPEs against the MoU, austerity, and liberal restruc-
turing include demonstrations and/or Indignados events which took place 
on Syntagma Square, three spatial routines can be distinguished which took 
place in the center of Athens. The thirteen general strikes usually began 
their marches at different times, from three different sites connected to 
their organizers, but all ended up on Syntagma Square. Participants from the 
General Confederation of Greek Workers (GSEE) started from Alexandras 
and Patision Avenue, the location of GSEE’s headquarters. The coordinating 
committee of the primary level unions (involving the non-parliamentary 
left) began from the Museum further down Patision Avenue. Finally, the 
communist party unions (PAME) started from Omonoia Square at the end 
of Patision Avenue – they adopted tight tactics that did not allow intruders 
to disrupt their nonviolent march. Other than the Indignados LPEs, the 
starting point for the rest of the LPEs was Propylaia, i.e. the entrance of 
the old building of the University of Athens which used to be protected by 
university asylum laws and which was established as the starting point of 
protests in the contentious decade of the 1960s and has continued to be so 
up to this day.11 The two main opposite routes of the marches (from Patision 
and Propylaia) led to the Syntagma Square demonstrations.12
New Meaningful Practices in Old Spaces: The Movement of the Square 
(Greek Indignados)
The f irst call for a meeting of Greek Indignados was uploaded on Facebook 
on 20 May 2011 at the White Tower in Thessaloniki. This was followed by 
many calls leading to meetings in 38 Greek cities on 25 May (Giovanopoulos 
2011; Gazakis and Spathas 2011). It is estimated that between 25 May and 
30 July 2011, the number of people visiting Syntagma Square13 may have 
reached 2.6 million (Leontidou 2012). It had been decades since so many 
Greek citizens had taken to the streets and made their views known in public 
11 I would like to thank Kostas Kanellopoulos for his input on these old and new protest 
routines.
12 See illustration of Syntagma Square march and demonstration of 19 October 2011 in http://
alepouda.blogspot.gr/2011/10/19-2011.html; it offers the estimated number of participants of the 
LPE of 19 October 2011 by comparing it to the capacity of the OAKA stadium.
13 In http://xilapetres.blogspot.gr/2011_06_01_archive.html, see a panopticon view of Syntagma 
Square’s related LPE of 29 May 2011.
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spaces, surpassing old political party identities (Stavrou 2011). Although 
innovative alternative actions intertwining culture and direct democratic 
politics were put forth during this period, a duality emerged. From May to 
June 2011, through Facebook and other social media calls, a new type of 
group began to appear in Syntagma and central squares or landmarks of 
most Greek cities. Known as the aganaktismenoi, this group was heavily 
influenced by the Spanish Indignados (Giovanopoulos and Mitropoulos 
2011; Korizi and Vradis 2012; Leontidou 2012). Blaming political parties 
for the country’s critical condition and at the same time demonstrating 
their contempt for the parliament (Tzanelli 2011), they rejected political 
party aff iliations and opted instead for peaceful events and actions. This 
prompted thousands of citizens across different classes, age groups, and 
political beliefs to join the two-month-long protest camp set up in front 
of the Greek Parliament. Similar protest camps were soon being set up 
across many Greek cities (Kousis 2014). Their views were reflected in the 
banners, posters, and placards displayed on the upper and lower parts of 
Syntagma Square. A related content analysis (N=178) of these views between 
25 May 2011 and 30 July 2011 reveals that one-f ifth (21.3 per cent) targeted 
the Troika (e.g. “we don’t owe, we won’t pay”, “no to world government, 
national independence”, “we support Syntagma Square, won’t leave until 
the government, Troika and the debt go” (Petropoulos 2014). This was fol-
lowed by 16.2 per cent targeting the prime minister, the vice president, and 
governing parties, and 11.8 per cent targeting all (or almost all) MPs and 
parliamentary parties or party leaders (Petropoulos 2014). The remaining 
42.7 per cent of the banners, posters, and placards referred to mobilization 
calls, platforms, tactics, links, needs, and activities of the movement of 
Syntagma Square (Petropoulos 2014).
Ethnographic research on Athens’ Syntagma Square camp reveals “a 
consensual and deeply spatialized staging of dissent … with internally 
conflicting and often radically opposing political imaginaries” (Kaika and 
Karaliotas 2014: 2). Syntagma’s more ethnocentric, conservative and right-
oriented but angrier upper square was notably different from the more 
progressive, left-oriented, and alternative lower square. While the upper 
part attracted demonstrators with more patriotic, nationalist, xenophobic, 
religious, and populist claims, the lower part – besides hosting the camp 
– established a direct-democratic-oriented agora of highly committed 
activists, many of whom derive from radical parties of the left (Stavrou 
2011; Petropoulos 2014; Kaika and Karaliotas 2014; Leontidou 2012; Tsaliki 
2012). The activities of the upper and lower square accordingly varied widely. 
The upper part hosted groups such as ‘The Greek Mothers’, the ‘300 Greeks’, 
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and priests. By contrast, the lower part of Syntagma was used by activists 
to project f ilms/documentaries, host a f irst aid medical unit of volunteer 
doctors, connect with activists outside of Greece through the internet, 
distribute food offered by restaurants, and act as information point for 
those in need of services (Petropoulos 2014). Other collective self-organizing 
practices included clothes exchanges, garbage collection, and performing 
arts events (Kaika and Karaliotas 2014).
More importantly, lower square groups organized Open Popular As-
semblies every evening with procedures that allowed an equal voice to all, 
aiming towards real and direct democracy (Kaika and Karaliotas 2014: 9). 
As a result of the above, the movement of Syntagma Square and its satellites 
across the country succeeded in offering a space for voicing one’s views 
as well as for imagining and materializing alternative ways of existing 
together.14 Furthermore, it transcended its spatial boundaries through 
steady (internet) connections with similar movements across the globe 
(Kaika and Karaliotas 2014; Petropoulos 2014).
The (Non-)Safety of Syntagma Square
Although Syntagma Square has been a perennial space of resistance that 
has for the most part been peaceful, it has not always been a safe place 
for protesters. Given its key location in front of the parliament and the 
very high numbers of protesters, it was between 2010 and 2013 the space 
that witnessed the highest levels of violence in the Greek anti-austerity 
campaign in comparison to its other spaces of contention.
This was particularly true on 28 and 29 June 2011 following the seventh 
national strike. Expressing their strong opposition to the Troika’s second 
bailout package of 21 June 2011 and the measures associated with it, the large 
union confederations united with the square movement and blockaded 
parliament using nonviolent tactics to prevent MPs from passing austerity 
and bailout-related legislative measures. After peaceful protests, violence 
erupted and mass violent confrontations occurred (Sotirakopoulos and 
Sotiropoulos 2013; Petropoulos 2014) in which protesters faced high levels of 
police repression and tear gas.15 Amnesty International (2011) as well as the 
14 Current research focuses on alternative solidarity initiatives that have surfaced especially 
since 2011 across the country; to some extent they have been influenced by these protests http://
www.livewhat.unige.ch/?p=152.
15 A related inquiry, “The four-year chemical war against protesters”, was submitted in parlia-
ment by Syriza MPs in March 2013.
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medical and hospital associations called on the Greek state to restrain police 
repression. Parliament’s subsequent approval of the austerity measures 
led to signif icant reductions in the number of people participating in the 
demonstrations (Leontidou 2012).
Similar but somewhat lower peaks in violence and types of major actions 
followed in the LPEs in October 2011 and February 2012 in reaction to later 
Troika mandates and government measures. Although fewer in number, 
these major protest events were very intense and well-attended, including 
the tenth national 48-hour strike. The February 2012 LPE resulted in an 
unprecedented level of intensity of action and signif icant property damage 
in the area surrounding Syntagma Square (Kousis 2014).
Throughout this period, parliament was heavily protected by the police. 
Indeed, since 2011 – the second phase of the campaign of the Greek Indigna-
dos – the parliament buildings were equipped with permanent protective 
iron railings to prevent protesters from reaching them. The railings were 
removed a few days after the new Syriza government took off ice at the end 
of January 2015.
Invigorating National Spaces of Contention: Squares and Streets 
of Cities and Towns Across the Country
Even though Syntagma Square constitutes a central and exceptional politi-
cal space, synchronized, parallel, and sustained protest events were carried 
out across a large number of cities and towns throughout the entire country, 
usually in front of the city’s municipal hall and/or central square.
As depicted in Graph 6.2, for each of the 32 LPEs that took place in Athens, 
the protest campaign was also carried out across a majority of Greek towns 
and cities.
Thus the 32 major events, most of which ended in demonstrations facing 
the Greek Parliament in Athens’ Syntagma Square, were accompanied by a 
total number of 1,069 parallel protest events across the country, all with the 
same repertoire of claims. The graph illustrates the national character of an 
anti-austerity campaign linked to the 32 LPEs over the three-year period.
How protest events spread across space over time is a subject that has not 
been studied using geographic information system maps, as evidenced by 
the few works on this subject matter (Thornton 2012). The map that follows 
is constructed with the dataset of LPEs from January 2010 to December 2012.
Map 6.1 below illustrates the participation of Greek cities and towns 
across the three major phases of the campaign. It should be noted that the 
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map only depicts the minority of cases for which the articles mentioned the 
names of the cities or towns. It does not include the majority, i.e. the un-
named cities and towns which were only mentioned in numbers. Although 
local level data were not available for this analysis, according to police 
records, some 20,210 protests were carried out in Greece from May 2010 to 
April 2014.
The f irst phase of protests, from February 2010 to February 2011, was 
sparked across the country following the Troika’s f irst MoU and the ac-
companying measures. These began as general strikes and rallies against 
the Greek government’s stability measures carried out in Athens and other 
cities. The protestors were initially public sector employees but in March 
they were joined by trade union confederations of both private and public 
sector employees. A third national strike and demonstrations across the 
country took place on 5 May 2010 following the downgrading of Greece’s 
main debt rating to junk status (BB+) by Standard and Poor’s and the f irst 
Greek bailout package (110 billion euros, the highest ever given to a country). 
The protesters demonstrated against the Greek government’s pledges to 
implement the Troika’s f irst MoU. This day was marked by the death of three 
employees of a bank when petrol bombs were thrown into the building they 
were working in. Politicians were harshly criticized in public. Violence was 
clearly escalating.
The second phase witnessed the most important increase in the partici-
pation of towns and cities across the country. This was in reaction to the 
Multi-Purpose Act and the second Troika MoU that included privatizing 
public assets, public sector restructuring and downsizing, and more cuts 
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in wages, personnel and pensions (Markantonatou 2012). Following the 
Facebook call of 20 May 2011, squares in 38 cities took on a new function 
– that of a protest camp. Tens of thousands signed to attend protests in 
the squares of Greek cities. Protesters also organized events in Athenian 
neighborhood squares (Mpresta 2011: 91-93). During the second phase in 
the summer of 2011, square protests reached a peak, especially on 28 and 
29 June. A similar peak was reached at LPEs that took place on 5, 19, and 
20 October 2011 in protest against the Troika’s third Greek bailout package 
of ‘hard restructuring’ (27 October 2011).
Greek cities and towns continued to participate in the campaign in the 
winter of 2011 (see also Graph 6.3) following more austerity conditions set 
by the Eurogroup and the Troika. As Map 6.1 illustrates, there was a notable 
decrease in the participation of Greek cities and towns in the third phase 
(in green), i.e. from March 2012 to December 2012. This is in part due to a 
drop in the number of protest events surrounding the first national elections 
Map 6.1  Total Number of LPEs by Phase of the Anti-Austerity Campaign in Greek 
Cities and Towns, January 2010-December 2012
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held since the outbreak of the economic crisis. In these elections, the two 
ruling parties that had dominated Greece’s postdictatorial period suffered 
signif icant losses, especially the incumbent Pasok, with many votes going 
to new parties such as Syriza (Coalition of the Left) and the extreme-right 
Golden Dawn (Kousis and Kanellopoulos 2014).
Cities and towns across the country continued to participate in parallel 
LPEs against further austerity and neoliberal packages in September and 
in October against measures related to the release of funds by creditors 
under the second bailout agreement (Monastiriotis 2013). The new measures 
included more cuts to social benef its, pensions, and salaries as well as 
further increases in fuel taxes and new taxes for all income categories 
(immensely impairing the poor and the self-employed) including businesses 
(Monastiriotis 2013). In response to the above, seven large protest events 
took place: three national general strikes by public and private sector work-
ers, one workers’ rally, two national general work stoppages (one of which 
was part of the European Trade Union Confederation’s f irst strike against 
austerity) and one march commemoratimg the university student uprising 
against the military junta.
For the first time in Greece’s postwar history, individual citizens who were 
not linked to the major organizations leading the protests (e.g. trade unions 
or left-wing political parties) were heavily represented in the ‘occupation’ of 
squares across the country. In most of these squares, coordinating groups 
were formed that met on a daily or weekly basis, discussing local issues of 
grave concern such as the selling of ports or gold mines, or the degradation of 
health services. Minutes were taken at such meetings. Musical and cultural 
events took place, following the blueprints of happenings and the operating 
style of Syntagma’s groups. Syntagma’s websites (real-democracy.gr and 
amesi-dimokratia.org) were linked to the public assemblies of Greek cities 
and towns via Facebook and blogs. On occasion, non-Athenian activists 
visited Syntagma (Mpresta 2011: 94-100). Older memories were revived, as 
reflected in the slogan ‘bread, education, liberty: the [military] junta did 
not end in 1973’ (Axelos 2011: 203).
New Global Cities of Contention: Transnationalizing the Greek 
Campaign
The campaign against the Troika’s MoU and neoliberal policies eventually 
moved beyond Greece’s borders (Tsomou 2011; Kousis 2013). Five of the 
32 LPEs examined here were part of mega-transnational protest events 
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carried out in cities across Europe, North America and other regions. This 
transnationalization began in the second phase of the campaign in 2011, 
when Greek protesters joined the European Revolution of 29 May across 
numerous European cities and the ‘United for Global Change’ event by 
Occupy movements across 951 cities on 15 October (Kousis 2014). This was 
followed by a day of transnational solidarity for Greece on 18 February 
2012, with 19 European and North American cities participating. Solidarity 
actions targeted Greek embassies and IMF off ices (Kousis 2014). And on 
14 November, Greek protesters on Syntagma Square and in 25 Greek cit-
ies participated in the European Trade Union Confederation’s f irst strike 
against austerity, which took place across 250 cities.
At the end of the third phase of the campaign, economic contention 
took a new twist. The largest anti-fascist protest event in recent decades in 
Greece was organized on 19 January 2013, two days following the killing of 
a Pakistani immigrant. The protest spread to 26 non-Greek cities. Another 
very signif icant transnational event took place on 14 June 2013 after the 
prime minister announced that the government would be shutting down 
the historical public broadcasting service (ERT) as a direct result of the 
Troika’s MoU and the government’s austerity policies.
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Note: the 15 october 2011 lPe is not depicted here, given the very large number of participating 
cities (951).
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According to the data at hand, there was only one transnational event 
(in London) during the f irst phase of the campaign, as can be seen in 
Graph 6.3. In the second and third phases, however, there was an increase 
in the number of participating cities in southern Europe (Rome, Bologna, 
Milan, Genoa, Madrid, Barcelona, Lisbon, and Nicosia), northern Europe 
(Paris, Bastille, Lyon, La Roche, Marseille, Berlin, Brussels, Amsterdam, 
Copenhagen, London, and Edinburgh) and other cities (Bangkok, New York, 
Chicago, Los Angeles) (Kousis 2014).
* * *
This chapter has applied a social movement’s approach to examining the 
spatial dimension of the Greek campaign that surfaced following multi-
scalar decision-making on the Greek crisis in the Eurozone. The analysis of 
large protest events, or LPEs, documents a nationwide, multi-scalar struggle 
(Mayer 2013) against the harsh neoliberal reforms and austerity measures, 
which eventually led to transnational protests. The data examined in 
this chapter feature the three-year-long anti-austerity campaign involv-
ing higher levels of contention and whole populations engaged in wider 
struggles by very diverse protest groups making collective claims on target 
authorities (Tilly 2004).
The analysis offers a preliminary exploration of space as ‘a semanti-
cally complex concept’ (Sewell 2001). It does so by highlighting: a) the 
parliamentarization of contention (Tilly 1997); b) the new meanings and 
practices attached to Syntagma Square and its satellites across the country; 
c) the (non-)safety of spaces of contention (Tilly 2003; Bosi 2013); and d) 
the multi-scalar character (Mayer 2013) of the campaign against austerity-
inducing economic policies by the European Commission, the European 
Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund as well as by three 
consecutive Greek governments creating and implementing the related 
policy instruments.
Following Auyero’s suggestion for future research (2006), the analysis at 
hand addressed ways in which physical space affects the origins and course 
of joint action, especially through the parliamentarization of anti-austerity 
contention. As a space where protesters can directly address the parliament, 
Syntagma Square is an exemplary and durable space of resistance that 
offers opportunities for peaceful protests and the creation of new meanings 
and new spatial routines. Yet it is also transformed into a constraint for 
resistance, decreasing protest participation due to high levels of police 
repression and tear gas on dates of critical parliamentary decisions.
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The data illustrates a three-tier spatial arena: 1) a perennial arena at 
Syntagma Square documenting a sustained yet continuously adjusting 
parliamentarization of contention (Tilly 1997); 2) a nationwide spatial arena 
visible in cities and towns across the country’s regions; and 3) a transna-
tional arena across the European Union and, eventually, across the globe. 
In the f irst two spatial arenas, resource-poor protesters offered alternative 
meanings and strategic uses of spaces available to them. In this manner, 
they produced new meanings of space (Sewell 2001; Auyero 2006) across 
the nation’s streets and squares, as best illustrated in the second phase of 
the campaign with the movement of the squares visible across urban and 
rural regions. The urban character of the 21st century protests is apparent 
in all three spatial arenas, attesting to a revitalization of politics and the 
engagement of greater numbers of participants with different visions of how 
the world should be (Leontidou 2012; Madden and Vradis 2012).
The multi-scalar protests have been facilitated by communication 
through IT and social media technologies, which may affect the centrality 
of proximity (Tilly 2003) to a much greater extent than in the past. They 
were also enhanced through ‘mega-networks’, comprised of very broad 
cross-class coalitions facilitating, creating, and linking groups and networks 
(Goldstone 2011) not only across Greek cities and towns but also beyond 
national borders. More importantly, however, the nationwide protests were 
supported by social linking and networking of political groups acting at 
the national level, especially political parties of the left and trade unions. 
This was evident in Syriza’s steady participation in 24 of the 32 LPEs (75 per 
cent), its rising importance in the 2012 elections, and its electoral victory 
in January 2015. As Dufour, Nez, and Ancelovici posit in this volume, as in 
other crisis-related protest waves, the political is no longer autonomous from 
the economy, and economic policy is a signif icant factor influencing social 
movements. Further study is needed, however, on the relationship between 
space, the Greek economy, and contention. While economic conditions for 
the general population are worsening, since February 2013, the multi-scalar 
campaign has subsided, while smaller and more specialized protests are 
carried out with considerably fewer participants in local spaces.
The economic and political contention in Greece may be considered as 
belonging to the family of national anti-austerity protests (see chapters 1 and 
12 in this volume) which took place in Latin America (Auyero 2003; Johnston 
and Almeida 2006; Almeida 2007, 2010, 2012; Arce 2010; Arce and Kim 2011). 
However, in contrast to these, the contention arising in the Greek case and 
the global political attention it has received move above and beyond the 
EU as a transnational space of opportunities and threats which has mostly 
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referred to liberalization policies (Imig and Tarrow 2001). It illustrates a 
shift towards the importance of the f inancial sector and the impacts of 
the f inancial crisis of an ever more interdependent multi-scalar global 
economic and political arena, eventually involving most economies of the 
globe. The signif icance of national and regional spaces as durable spaces 
of contention due to multi-scalar policies affecting whole populations is 
therefore enhanced. Whether these spaces will maintain their contentious 
features vis-à-vis an increasingly empowered transnational spatial arena 
remains a question for future research (Tilly 2004).
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7 Occupy Montreal and the Politics of 
Horizontalism
Marcos Ancelovici
Direct democracy and non-hierarchical modes of organization – in a nut-
shell, horizontalism – are among the defining features of the anti-austerity 
protests that many countries have experienced in the last few years (Castells 
2012; Cruells and Ibarra 2013; Fernández et al. 2012; Glasius and Pleyers 2013).1 
Some authors even claim that these features, as embodied in the model of 
the assembly, pref igure “the possible infrastructure of the common” and 
represent a point of convergence for left-wing forces (Thorburn 2012: 256). 
Why do activists adopt such horizontal and participatory organizational 
forms rather than another? And how do they settle on a particular form of 
horizontalism rather than another?
This chapter addresses these questions by looking at the case of Oc-
cupy Montreal. The latter involved the occupation of Victoria Square, in 
the f inancial district of Montreal, from 15 October to 25 November 2011. 
Instead of assuming that the horizontalism of Occupy Montreal is simply the 
product of an alleged crisis of representative democracy or a spontaneous 
diffusion effect of the Spanish Indignados or Occupy Wall Street (which 
had begun a month earlier, on 17 September), this chapter argues that 
we need to problematize horizontalism and treat it as the uncertain and 
temporary outcome of a political process. Participants in Occupy Montreal 
permanently improvized and gradually defined the organizational form of 
the occupation through trial and error. Furthermore, their understanding of 
the assembly evolved as the occupation unfolded, to the extent that many 
of them ended up having mixed feelings and holding preferences different 
from the ones they held initially.
In order to substantiate this argument, this chapter f irst presents Occupy 
Montreal, highlighting particular events and some basic characteristics 
of the occupiers. Second, it briefly discusses two ways of accounting for 
horizontalism – the continuity hypothesis and the diffusion hypothesis 
– and then introduces a third hypothesis that focuses on the politics of 
1 This research was supported by funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research 
Council (SSHRC) of Canada. I wish to thank Francis Dupuis-Déri for comments and suggestions 
on a previous version.
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horizontalism. Finally, it analyzes the case of Occupy Montreal from the 
standpoint of this last hypothesis and elaborates on the practical and 
contingent nature of horizontalism.
This chapter is partly based on ethnographic and participant observa-
tion during the entire length of the occupation of Victoria Square, in the 
f inancial district Montreal, from 15 October to 25 November 2011, and a few 
assemblies that followed the eviction. Although I never spent the night at 
the encampment, I spent between 10 and 15 hours a week at the occupa-
tion and attended many general assemblies. On 29 October 2011, I also 
conducted a survey on the site of the occupation with the help of 12 other 
interviewers, mostly graduate sociology students from McGill University 
(where I was teaching at the time).2 Our two-page survey questionnaire 
combined multiple-choice and open-ended questions. We interviewed 74 
persons out of approximately 250 occupiers present that day.3 We tried to 
select interviewees randomly while wandering around the site but faced 
obvious sampling problems. Insofar as urban occupations are open and 
public spaces, people are free to come and go throughout the day and night. 
It follows that the people wandering around the site, attending general 
assemblies, and/or spending the night can vary continuously. Sampled 
interviewees could have been regularly attending general assemblies 
or spending the night on the site, but they may have stopped doing so 
right after the interview. Inversely, some participants may have joined 
the occupation after we conducted the survey and thereby changed its 
demographics. There are no clear boundaries and f ixed qualities that can 
be used to identify the population to sample from. There is thus no way of 
knowing for sure whether our sample of 74 is representative of the larger 
population. Our sample should only be seen as a snapshot of a signif icant 
segment (about 30 per cent) of the population present on 29 October, exactly 
two weeks after the beginning of the occupation.
After the occupation ended, I conducted 12 semi-structured interviews 
between December 2011 and February 2012 in French and English with 
key informants who had played a central role in different dimensions of 
2 We built on the method developed by Mayer, Favre, and Fillieule (1997). I wish to thank the 
following people for helping me design and conduct the survey: Jason Carmichael, Leslie Cheung, 
James Falconer, Katy Fallon, Sara Hall, Ilju Kim, Alex Mochnacki, Anahi Morales Hudon, José 
Ignacio Nazif Muñoz, Alessandro Olsaretti, Pablo A. Quintanilla Bedregal, Marie-France René, 
and Kalyani Thurairajah. Special additional thanks to Leslie Cheung for producing the Excel 
spreadsheet. 
3 Participation/attendance varied from about 3,000 people during the f irst weekend (15-
16 October 2011) to about 75-100 in the last days preceding the eviction of 25 November 2011.
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the occupation: in the facilitation of assemblies, in the media committee, 
in maintenance or infrastructure operations, etc. Each interview lasted 
between one hour and a half and six hours and were transcribed and 
coded4. I focused primarily on the occupiers’ background and trajectory 
as well as experience and understanding of the occupation. Although a 
few occupiers I interviewed had a little activist background, most of them 
were complete beginners and experienced the occupation as a life-altering 
event.
Introducing Occupy Montreal
On 15 October, 2011, in response to a call to action from the Spanish Indig-
nados, people took to the streets and occupied public squares in more than 
a thousand cities throughout the world.5 It was almost a month after the 
beginning of the occupation of Zuccotti Park next to Wall Street, and exactly 
f ive months after the occupation of the Puerta del Sol in Madrid, which 
initiated the mobilization of the Indignados in Spain (or 15M, for 15 May). 
In Montreal, activists started to plan the occupation in late September. A 
Facebook page that called for a brainstorming and planif ication assembly 
was created, and there were f ive assemblies prior to the occupation.6 The 
main topics addressed were initially the logistics of the camp/occupation,7 
the ‘diversity of tactics’ – an old issue that had been at the center of the 
global justice movement since the late 1990s and early 2000s – and the 
decision-making process of the assembly itself.
From the very beginning, people participated essentially as individuals 
rather than members of organizations. In this respect, the dynamic of the 
movement f it what Juris has called a logic of aggregation rather than one 
of networking:
4 I wish to thank Marc-André Cyr and Sean Waite for transcribing the interviews.
5 However, a map of these occupations indicates that the bulk of occupations took place in 
Western, developed countries. See http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2011/oct/17/
occupy-protests-world-list-map.
6 The assemblies took place at the agora of the Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM) 
in downtown Montreal and in the surrounding area (at Émilie-Gamelin Square and the café 
L’Escalier).
7 Throughout this chapter, I use the words ‘occupation’ and ‘camp’ interchangeably. ‘Camp’ 
refers to a ‘protest camp’ as def ined by Feigenbaum, Frenzel, and McCurdy: “a place-based social 
movement strategy that involves both acts of ongoing protest and acts of social reproduction needed 
to sustain daily life” (2013: 12; italic in original).
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Whereas networking logics entail a praxis of communication and co-
ordination on the part of collective actors that are already constituted 
– including particular organizations, networks, and coalitions (cf. Fox 
2009) – logics of aggregation involve the coming together of actors qua 
individuals. These individuals may subsequently forge a collective subjec-
tivity through the process of struggle, but it is a subjectivity that is under 
the constant pressure of disaggregation into its individual components. 
(2012: 266)
This feature was pervasive throughout the occupation. It fostered an inclu-
sive dynamic that brought together people that were not part of militant 
organizations and were thus not mobilized through pre-existing and more 
institutional channels. As Juris has pointed out, the use of social media 
like Facebook and Twitter8 before and during the occupation was critical 
in this respect:
Rather than generating organizational networks, [social networking] 
tools primarily link and help to stitch together interpersonal networks, 
facilitating the mass aggregation of individuals within concrete locales 
through viral communication flows. In this sense, rather than mobilizing 
‘networks of networks’, the use of Twitter and Facebook within social 
movements tends to generate ‘crowds of individuals.’ At the same time, 
(…) social networking sites (…) have lower barriers to access and participa-
tion, and thus penetrate wider social networks, helping to explain the 
broader degree of participation in the #Occupy movements beyond the 
traditional activist communities involved in movements of the recent 
past. (ibid: 267)
Following this logic, Occupy Montreal was more diverse and inclusive than 
previous activist protest events but also more subject to fragmentation or 
dissolution. Sustainability was thus a critical challenge, even more than in 
other types of mobilizations and social movements.
The f irst weekend of the occupation was dominated by an ecstatic 
aura. On the f irst day, about 3,000 people showed up at Victoria Square9 
8 In Occupy Montreal, Facebook was signif icantly more important than Twitter (see Table 7.1).
9 Victoria Square is located at the intersection of Beaver Hall Hill and McGill Street, across the 
street from the old stock exchange (Montreal no longer has a stock exchange), the headquarters 
of the media multinational Québecor, and the World Trade Center. It is made of two strips, one 
with a long, rectangular fountain and the other with many trees. It is in this latter strip that the 
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to participate in a chaotic general assembly (GA), which made only two 
decisions that day: renaming Victoria Square as ‘People’s Square’ (Place des 
peuples) and interrupting the assembly to join a demonstration that was 
starting from the square. The second day, fewer people showed up but the 
number of tents began to increase signif icantly while the assembly got to 
business and engaged in a lengthy and tortuous process of meta-deliberation 
(deliberating on the rules of deliberation) that lasted more than a week. Dur-
ing the f irst ten days, occupiers held a GA on a daily basis. These assemblies 
lasted several hours and had the effect of attracting passersby as well as 
consolidating the core group of participants. GAs would begin at 6pm so 
that full-time workers and employees could attend and participate in the 
decisions. By late October, the GA decided to meet only thrice a week: on 
Tuesday, Thursday, and Saturday.
It would be impossible to summarize all the events and everyday strug-
gles that shaped the evolution of the occupation. The practical management 
and logistics of the camp were a central issue from the beginning, but their 
importance kept growing over time as occupiers had to deal with homeless 
people looking for food and shelter, pressure from the police and the City 
of Montreal, cold weather, etc. The main management issues were the food 
supply, sanitation, and security. During the entire occupation, there were 
activities and actions organized in or initiated from the camp: workshops 
and training sessions, protest actions in the surrounding f inancial district, 
demonstrations starting from or passing by the camp, etc. Although there 
was a demonstration on the very f irst day of the occupation and many 
occupiers participated in the 3 November protest against the G20 Sum-
mit in France, the most important protest event was arguably the student 
march on 10 November. Heralding the intense mobilization that would 
take place only a few months later during the so-called ‘Maple Spring’ (see 
Ancelovici and Dupuis-Déri 2014), between 15,000 and 30,000 students on 
strike stopped by the People’s Square to celebrate the occupation and invite 
the crowd to join the march. The latter then ended up at neighboring McGill 
University, where a group of students occupied an administrative building, 
leading the University to eventually call in the riot police.
A few days after this demonstration, on 15 November, the Occupy Wall 
Street (OWS) camp in New York City was evicted, and a coordinated wave 
of camp evictions began throughout North America (in the United States 
as well as Canada). The Montreal police increased the pressure on local 
kitchen was located and most general assemblies were held, at the bottom of Queen Victoria 
statue. 
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occupiers, and rumors of an imminent eviction began to circulate. On 
21 November, some occupiers decided to take the lead. In the early after-
noon, members of the media committee of Occupy Montreal held a press 
conference and announced that they were leaving the camp. The statement 
had not been discussed at the GA, but the media immediately announced 
the end of the occupation. This situation fostered even more tension and 
conflict in the GA. The media committee was asked to attend the GA the 
next day to explain its statement, and the GA decided to continue the 
occupation regardless of the media committee or pressure from public 
authorities. But on Friday 25 November at 8am, approximately 300 police 
carried out the eviction of the camp. A few hours later, there had been 14 
arrests and the occupation was over.
As in all protest camps associated with Occupy and the Indignados, 
Occupy Montreal was organized around the GA and a series of working 
committees that functioned like horizontal aff inity groups accountable to 
the GA. There was a facilitation committee, a media committee, a kitchen 
committee, a philosophy committee, a security committee, an alliance 
committee, and so on. Each committee was relatively autonomous, but 
information tended to circulate between the GA and committees rather 
than across committees. It follows that each committee was not neces-
sarily aware of what other committees were doing – thereby undermining 
the overall coherence of the occupation and potential synergies – and 
that the GA was the ultimate instance of legitimate power and decisions. 
Nonetheless, the structure and governance of the occupation represented 
a genuine effort at building a non-hierarchical, horizontal, and democratic 
micro-society according to a pref igurative logic.10 It involved not only a 
particular, inclusive decision-making process but also egalitarian social 
relations. Hence the reference to ‘horizontalism,’ as opposed to simply ‘direct 
democracy.’ The other potential reference could be anarchism, but I will 
not use it here because it implies a radical anti-capitalist stance that was 
not present in the discourse of the Occupy movement.11
10 Pref iguration refers to a desire to practise and experience one’s values and principles in the 
struggle. It implies that the means and the ends are mutually constitutive and that one cannot 
build an egalitarian and democratic society through hierarchical and authoritarian means. On 
pref iguration, see Breines (1989 [1982]), Maeckelbergh (2011), and Polletta (2002).
11 The reference to ‘horizontalism’ is inspired by the experience of neighborhood assemblies in 
Argentina (see Sitrin 2006, 2012). For a discussion of anarchism in Occupy, see Aragorn! (2012b) 
and Graeber (2013).
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Finally, Occupy Montreal shared some demographic characteristics (see 
Table 7.1 below) with other instances of Occupy in North America.12 For 
example, as in OWS, most participants in Occupy Montreal were male, 
white, and under the age of 30. More specif ically, 75.6 per cent of surveyed 
occupiers were male, and 58.8 per cent were under 30.13 As in OWS, there 
was a strong orientation toward center and center-left political parties: while 
in New York City 33.8 per cent of occupiers identif ied with the Democratic 
Party (Milkman et al. 2013: 16), in Montreal 39.4 per cent of occupiers identi-
f ied with Québec Solidaire at the provincial level and at the federal level 
29.4 per cent identified with the New Democratic Party and 11.7 per cent with 
the Greens.14 However, non-identif ication was much stronger in Montreal 
than in New York: while in the latter 20.6 per cent of respondents did not 
identify with any party, in the former this number reached 47 per cent at the 
federal level and 51.5 per cent at the provincial level. But the main difference 
between Occupy Montreal and OWS was socio-economic. In New York City, 
80 per cent of occupiers had a bachelor’s degree or higher and 37 per cent 
had an annual household income above US$100,000 (ibid: 10). In Montreal, 
only 25 per cent had a bachelor’s degree or higher and only 2.1 per cent had 
an annual personal income above CAN$50,000 (66.6 per cent had an annual 
12 All the data about Occupy Montreal cited here is based on the survey that my students 
and I conducted on 29 October 2011 (n = 74). For demographic data on Occupy Wall Street 
(OWS) in New York City, see Milkman, Luce, and Lewis (2013). Milkman, Luce, and Lewis’s data 
is based on a survey conducted on 1 May 2012, nearly six months after the eviction of OWS: 
“We surveyed a total of 729 people who took the time to attend the May 1 rally and/or march, 
more than half of whom were ‘actively involved’ in OWS. The results include a demographic 
prof ile of New York City Occupy participants and supporters, along with data on their political 
identities, organizational aff iliations, and previous activism, and on the specif ic concerns that 
led them to support OWS. Although some participants in the march attended because of their 
aff iliations with unions and immigrant rights groups, nearly all of survey respondents (97 per 
cent) responded aff irmatively when asked, ‘Do you consider yourself a supporter of the Occupy 
movement?’” (Milkman et al. 2013: 3). In order to make Milkman, Luce, and Lewis’s data relatively 
comparable to mine, here I refer to the category “Actively involved respondents” of their survey 
rather than to “all respondents” because the latter includes outside supporters whereas my own 
data only looks at people on the site of the occupation.
13 The contrast between male and female activists was not as high in New York City, where 
male activists made up 54.8 per cent (Milkman et al. 2013: 47). As I mentioned earlier, my survey 
data is to be treated with caution, as it suffers from several sampling problems. However, it 
does give us a relative sense of the crowd present on the site of the occupation on the day of 
the survey insofar as we interviewed 74 people out of approximately 250 (that is 30 per cent of 
the population). Most people surveyed did not provide information on their ethnic or racial 
identif ication. My claim that most participants were white is only based on observation during 
assemblies and actions throughout the occupation and I cannot provide a specif ic number.
14 The provincial and federal levels were treated as two distinct questions. 
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income below CAN$15,000).15 Similarly, while in New York City only 8 per cent 
of occupiers were unemployed (ibid: 47), this number reached 40.7 per cent 
in Montreal. Accordingly, participants in Occupy Montreal were on average 
signif icantly less educated, less employed, and poorer than the protestors 
in OWS. Finally, it is worth pointing out that in Montreal, 23.5 per cent of 
15 Milkman, Luce, and Lewis’s study (2013) mentions household income but does not include 
any information about household composition and whether all adults in the household work. 
In contrast, my data refers to individual income and does not include any information about 
household income.







Provincial level (n = 66)
female 24.4 Québec solidaire 39.4
Age
(n = 68)
< 30 58.8 Parti québécois  4.5
31-50 27.9 other  4.5
> 50 13.2 None 51.5
language
(n = 74)
french 70.2 Federal level (n = 68)
english 18.9 New Democratic Party 29.4
bilingual  5.4 Green Party 11.7















Master  5.9 voted in elections 21.7






employed 59.3 Participated in strike 13.5






0-15,000 66.6 other  5.2
15,001-30,000 14.6 None  3.4




50,001 +  2.1 twitter 21.6
Source: Non representative survey conducted on the site of the occupation, 29 october 2011. the 
n varies because not all respondents answered all the questions. a the n is higher than for other 
questions because people could check several answers at once.
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surveyed occupiers had participated in a demonstration or rally, 9.1 per 
cent had organized one, 13.5 per cent had participated in a strike, 21.7 per 
cent had voted in political elections, and 23.5 per cent had signed a petition. 
Thus, the great majority of participants had limited or no prior experience 
of activism. This is another indicator of Occupy’s capacity to attract people 
beyond pre-existing activist networks and institutional channels.
Accounting for Horizontalism
In the Occupy movement, the occupation of public squares was not merely 
a tactic; it was also a claim about the virtues of civic participation and a 
demand for more democracy. Workers occupy workplaces, students occupy 
universities, citizens occupy public places.16 Furthermore, the word ‘occupy’ 
was applied to a great variety of objects – Occupy the Hood, Occupy Our 
Homes, Occupy Theory, etc. – to refer to the desire to regain control over 
something through active, grassroots participation. In Europe, although the 
language was slightly different, similar practices and organizational forms 
seemed to be at play. How did activists settle on a given organizational form 
and set of practices rather than another? And did activists actually settle 
on something, or were these practices and form simply transient equilibria?
Although a systematic comparative analysis of the practice of horizontal-
ism in different settings would be necessary to address these questions, we 
can nonetheless problematize horizontalism and treat it as an outcome to 
be explained rather than a given or spontaneous feature. Unfortunately, 
social movement studies do not provide many leads in this respect. As Della 
Porta and Rucht (2013: 2) have pointed out, “what is actually happening 
‘on the ground’ is rarely studied – namely, what the internal and mostly 
unspectacular life of social movements looks like, what movement groups 
do in their routine meetings, what they discuss and how, and the ways in 
which they take decisions. (…) social movement studies have devoted little 
attention to democracy within movements themselves”. This being said, the 
practice of horizontalism can be treated as the expression of a movement 
culture, that is, a shared set of understandings and modes of action. Put 
this way, it is possible to formulate two non-exclusive hypotheses that I call 
the continuity hypothesis and the diffusion hypothesis.
16 When they engage in street protests, workers and students also occupy public spaces. 
However, as soon as they step out of their workplaces and universities, they intervene also (and 
perhaps primarily) as citizens.
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The Continuity Hypothesis
The continuity hypothesis questions the ‘newness’ of movements and 
stresses continuity with prior waves of mobilization. As several scholars (e.g., 
McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly) have noted, social movement do not come out 
of nowhere. They build on pre-existing social networks, organizations, and 
know-how generated during previous contentious episodes and sustained 
over time. Furthermore, the particular ways in which people act together are 
both constrained and enabled by the existing repertoire of collective action, 
that is, the historically specif ic set of available routines to which people 
turn when acting collectively (cf. Tilly 1995). These particular ways of acting 
together also include an organizational dimension, as people fall back on what 
they see as legitimate forms and models that they adapt to circumstances 
and to the reactions of adversaries and allies (cf. Clemens 1996).
If we follow this logic, the practice of horizontalism in the Occupy move-
ment represents the actualization of legitimate pre-existing routines and 
organizational forms. Several scholars have argued that the global justice, 
anarchist, and other radical movements have thus shaped the Indignados 
and Occupy movements. For example, the anarchist collective Aragorn! 
(2012a, p.i) stresses the continuity with anarchism: “Anarchists have been 
involved in every aspect of this phase of the movement. (…) We have 
brought people, ideas, and methodologies that have infused the Occupy 
Movement with a potent energy.” According to Romanos (2013), the 15M 
(that is, the Spanish Indignados) was not a spontaneous movement but 
built instead, through a learning process, on the discourse, structures, 
and work of previous mobilizations against precariousness and austerity 
as well as on the global justice movement (GJM). Similarly, Graeber (2013: 
23), an anthropologist and anarchist activist who participated in the GJM 
and OWS, presents the Occupy movement as an extension of horizontal 
practices that had become commonplace during the GJM: “We’d had 
enormous success transforming activist culture itself. After the Global 
Justice Movement, the old days of steering committees and the like were 
basically over. Pretty much everyone in the activist community had come 
around to the idea of pref igurative politics.” As Graeber acknowledges, 
however, these practices have to be adapted to local circumstances and 
can, therefore, include an idiosyncratic dimension. For example, Razsa and 
Kurnik (2012: 240) argue that the practices and particular organizational 
form of Occupy Slovenia, in Ljubljana – based not as much on the GA or 
consensus model as on decentralized workshops that can develop initiatives 
that the GA would not necessarily support – were inspired by the GJM but 
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also, and more importantly, by local struggles for minority and migrant 
rights during the 2000s.
The continuity hypothesis suggests that the horizontalism of Occupy 
Montreal – and that of other occupations in North America and Europe – is 
not really puzzling. It was actually to be expected, for it had already been 
practiced for many years in radical activist networks (anarchist, feminist, 
and others) in Quebec before the wave of occupations began.17 This perspec-
tive has a lot of traction and is a welcome note of caution for observers and 
commentators who see novelty in every wave of protest. Moreover, it does 
not close the door to innovation. As Tilly (1995) and Tarrow (1995) have 
emphasized, the concept of repertoire does not imply that nothing changes 
but rather that change takes place primarily during contentious episodes 
and that innovation is bounded. The continuity hypothesis can thus ac-
commodate what was one of the most visible novelties of Occupy and the 
Indignados, namely the occupation of public squares. It is not that activists 
had never engaged in horizontal practices before; it is that they had almost 
never engaged in such practices in public squares.18 According to Romanos,
One of the novel aspects of the 15M movement was the way it placed 
experiments with new forms of democracy in the centre of public space. 
In this way, the movement brought practices of deliberative democracy – 
previously confined to more or less limited spaces such as social forums, 
social movement headquarters, peace camps and social centres – out into 
public squares, where passers-by were invited to join in. This seems to 
be an important difference from the practices of previous movements 
and mobilizations. (2013: 211)
Therefore, one could make the claim that Occupy Montreal embodies a form 
of bounded innovation within the limits of a particular activist culture that 
made such developments relatively predictable.
17 On the anti-authoritarian and anarchist political culture in Quebec, see Sarrasin et al. (2012). 
On the anarchist movement in Quebec, see Bellemare-Caron et al. (2013). On the pref igurative 
practices of the radical feminist group Nemesis, see Kruzynski (2004). 
18 It should be noted, however, that there were a few instances of horizontal occupations before 
the Occupy movement. In New York City, there was such an occupation in July 2011; it was called 
‘Bloombergville’ and denounced the austerity budget of Mayor Bloomberg. According to Graeber 
(2013), several participants in Bloombergville participated in the f irst organizing meetings of 
Occupy Wall Street. In Canada, although there had not been occupations of public squares as 
such, there had been instances of camping in front of the parliament to make demands. Thanks 
to Francis Dupuis-Déri for bringing this last point to my attention.
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Although such an account is intuitively appealing and cogent, it faces an 
empirical problem. As my survey indicates (see Table 7.1), the great major-
ity of participants in Occupy Montreal had no prior activist experience. 
Only 23.5 per cent had attended a march or rally, and only 13.5 per cent 
had organized one before the occupation. Put differently, almost 80 per 
cent of the occupiers had absolutely no prior activist experience. The same 
pattern shows up in the semi-structured interviews that I conducted with 
key players in the occupation. This raises the question of how exactly the 
pre-existing activist know-how and culture were transmitted from one wave 
of mobilization to the next. In this respect, Occupy Montreal was different 
from, say, OWS and the Spanish Indignados, where key players had been 
active in prior movements and a particular know-how was sustained in 
social centers (cf. Romanos 2013). Moreover, more experienced global justice 
and anarchist militants who could have infused Occupy Montreal with 
ideas and know-how, as Aragorn! (2012a) argues, did not play a signif icant 
role. Indeed, many simply looked down on the occupation. For example, 
members of the Convergence of Anti-Capitalist Struggles (CLAC) – one 
of the main anarchist groups of Montreal and active in the global justice 
movement, among others19 – attended some meetings and GAs of Occupy 
Montreal but were put off by the latter’s relatively positive stance toward the 
police. Moreover, the CLAC did not seem to see the point of the occupation 
and believed it was an end in itself rather than part of a broader strategy. As 
a result, CLAC activists did not participate in Occupy Montreal.20
But even if anarchists had participated in the occupation, it is not clear 
that they would have supported the particular form of horizontalism that 
came to be in Occupy Montreal. The latter was heavily structured around 
the GA, and the ability of the different committees to make decisions 
autonomously – that is, without requiring the approval of the GA – was 
a constant object of endless debates. Anarchists and radicals sometimes 
favor a different, more decentralized and informal form of horizontalism. 
For example, Graeber argues that:
Consensus process only works if it is combined with a principle of radical 
decentralization. […] It’s always better, if possible, to make decisions in 
19 The CLAC (Convergence des luttes anticapitalistes) was created in 2000 to coordinate the 
mobilization against the Summit of the Americas in Quebec City in April 2001 and, after a few 
idle years in the second half of the 2000s, re-assembled in 2010 to mobilize against the G20 in 
Toronto. It was still active in 2016. See http://www.clac-montreal.net/. 
20 Interview with a CLAC long-time activist, 27 April 2012.
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smaller groups: working groups, aff inity groups, collectives. […] One 
should not feel one needs authorization from anyone, even the General 
Assembly (which is everyone), unless it would be in some way harmful 
to proceed without. […] As a general rule of thumb: decisions should 
be made on the smallest scale, the lowest level, possible. Do not ask for 
higher approval unless there’s a pressing need to. […] what the GA is doing 
when it approves a working group is empowering it to act in the name 
of the GA. It’s basically a form of delegation. […] once the work has been 
divvied up, or once an existing group has been authorized to pursue some 
project, there comes the question of how often one needs to check back 
for approval. The general rule really ought to be: only when it’s obvious 
it would be wrong to do otherwise. (2013: 227, 229, 232)
Similarly, Leach (2013: 184) has pointed out that OWS had such a particularly 
complex structure that some activists talked about the “bureaucracies of 
anarchy”. She notes that some social movements engaging in horizontal 
practices are structured differently – for example, the radical Autonomen 
movement in Germany:
Whatever collective decisions need to be made during actions are made 
by consensus, either in ‘full gatherings’ (Vollversammlungen [VV]) or in 
‘delegate councils.’ As camps usually have no more than a few hundred 
people in them, the default form is the VV. […] Importantly, however, 
very few decisions are made collectively during actions because there is 
less of an assumption that everyone needs to act together. Rather, each 
Affinity Group is free to act autonomously, as long as it does not endanger 
anyone else. (Ibid: 188)21
Anarchist activists that participated in the 2011 occupation of Plaça de 
Catalunya in Barcelona go even further and denounce the GA as a mecha-
nism fostering the homogenization of the occupation as well as new forms 
of hierarchy and domination:
21 Leach (2013: 187-88) presents the German Autonomen as “a militant, antiauthoritarian 
leftist movement that opposes all systems of domination (especially capitalism, fascism, and 
sexism) and practices what they call a ‘politics of the f irst person,’ which entails a commitment 
to nonhierarchical forms of organization and a rejection of the representational politics and 
vanguardist strategies of the traditional Marxist left. The Autonomen have been active in a 
broad range of leftist causes, most notably in the antinuclear, women’s, squatters, antifascist, and 
alter-globalization movements.” The Autonomen are part of the broader European autonomous 
movement. See Katsiaf icas (2006).
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The beautiful thing about the encampment in the plaza was that it had 
multiple centers for creation and initiative-taking. The central assembly 
functioned to suppress this […] The central assembly did not give rise 
to one single initiative. What it did, rather, was to grant legitimacy to 
initiatives worked out in the commissions; but this process must not 
be portrayed in positive terms. This granting of legitimacy was in fact a 
robbing of the legitimacy of all the decisions made in the multiple spaces 
throughout the plaza not incorporated into an off icial commission. 
(anonymous 2012: 24-25)
As the above examples clearly indicate, even among ‘horizontalists’ there 
is no consensus on the appropriate manner to organize and mobilize col-
lectively.22 The mere presence of experienced radical or anarchist activists 
in Occupy Montreal would thus not have been enough to account for the 
particular form of horizontalism that emerged during the occupation of 
Victoria Square.
The Diffusion Hypothesis
The diffusion hypothesis sheds light on a distinct and yet potentially 
complementary dimension. According to Givan, Roberts, and Soule (2010: 
10-12) as well as Tarrow (2011: 192), there are three forms of diffusion: direct 
(relational, that is through social ties and networks, multiple membership 
in organizations, etc.), indirect (nonrelational, that is through “attribution 
of similarity” via global communications and the Internet), and mediated 
(brokered, that is via a third party).
While direct diffusion was clearly at play in the case of OWS, as Spanish 
activists traveled to New York City in the summer of 2011 and met with 
local activists (see chapter 9 in this volume), it does not really f it Occupy 
Montreal. Before 15 October 2011, when the Montreal occupation began, 
there were no direct contacts between the Indignados or OWS on the 
one hand, and Occupy Montreal on the other. And even after 15 October 
2011, direct contacts between Occupy Montreal and occupations in other 
cities were minimal. Mediated diffusion does not really apply either, as 
no particular actor played the role of broker between Occupy Montreal 
and other occupations. The form of diffusion that is most relevant to ac-
counting for the practices and organizational form of Occupy Montreal is 
22 For example, Leach (2013) compares three different models of “collectivist democracy”, 
including OWS.
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indirect diffusion. All the Occupy Montreal activists that I interviewed 
mentioned that they were following on the Internet what was happening 
in Egypt, Spain, Greece, and New York City, and were waiting and hoping 
for something similar to take place in Montreal. This is where the idea of 
occupying Victoria Square came from.
However, beyond the idea of occupying a public square, the extent to 
which the practices and organizational form of horizontalism were also dif-
fused through indirect channels is not clear. Although decisions were made 
in assemblies from the very beginning – there were f ive meetings before 
the occupation, after which the GA became the central decision-making 
body – activists started to look more closely at how the New York GA was 
organized and functioned after the beginning of the occupation, during the 
f irst and second weeks.23 Furthermore, even though some participants had 
studied the experience of the Spanish and Greek Indignados, the Montreal 
GA rejected a proposition to build on a practical guide that the Spanish 
Indignados had produced on grounds that they should not implement a 
universal template but rather come up with a design suited to local needs 
and circumstances.24
Therefore, it seems that indirect diffusion may have potentially shaped 
the practices and organizational form of Occupy Montreal by contributing 
not as much to the transnational transfer of a model as to the actualization 
of latent ‘endogenous potentialities for mobilization,’ as Oikonomakis and 
Roos put it in chapter 9 of this volume. In this respect, the continuity and 
diffusion hypotheses are compatible. However, how this process of actual-
ization took place is not clear, for, as I have pointed out above, pre-existing 
activist networks did not really play a role in Occupy Montreal. Claims 
about the effect of a crisis of representation suffer from the same problem. 
On the one hand, it seems plausible that this crisis may have contributed 
to structural conditions fostering indignation and horizontalism, as Oikon-
omakis and Roos argue. Although the last wave of the World Value Survey 
23 Interview with Occupier 1 on 7 December 2011 and with Occupier 11 on 22 December 2011, 
both from the facilitation committee. In order to preserve the anonymity of activists and to avoid 
personalizing roles and positions, I do not mention any names. I only refer to the occupier’s role 
in the camp and give them numbers (occupier 1, occupier 2, etc.). I also try as much as possible 
to omit details that could allow readers to identify them.
24 The guide was entitled ‘How to cook a peaceful revolution’ and was produced by Spanish 
rEvolution. It is available online and in several languages on the website of ‘Take the Square’: 
http://takethesquare.net/2011/07/15/how-to-cook-a-pacif ic-revolution/. There is also a how-to 
practical website centralizing different guides that were produced during occupations in several 
cities: http://howtocamp.takethesquare.net/. 
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(2010-2014) did not include Canada, data from prior waves (1999-2004 and 
2005-2009) suggests that the level of distrust toward political parties and 
the parliament is relatively comparable in Canada, Spain, and the United 
States.25 On the other hand, though, low levels of trust could very well fuel 
a rise in authoritarian, far-right militancy. There is nothing self-evident in 
the preference for egalitarian, non-hierarchical organizational forms and 
inclusive and deliberative decision-making processes.
Hence the need to problematize horizontalism. Instead of attempting to 
falsify the continuity and diffusion hypotheses, I propose to posit continuity 
and diffusion as the cultural context in which Occupy activists defined their 
preferences as they faced concrete and practical challenges and engaged in 
problem-solving strategies and internal struggles. This perspective implies 
stressing the constructed and dynamic character of horizontalism and 
treating it as the uncertain outcome of a political process.
Horizontalism as the Uncertain Outcome of a Political Process
The influence of the local repertoire and of the mobilizations taking place 
abroad seems apparent in the fact that the would-be occupiers made deci-
sions through horizontal deliberation from the very beginning. However, the 
specific way in which the decision-making should be structured was neither 
clear nor static. It was constantly being redefined as occupiers interacted 
with one another and with their environment and as events unfolded. This 
dynamic was essentially characterized by a very high level of improvization 
and reflected the division of labor among activists. In many respects, it f it 
Szolucha’s depiction of horizontalism in several Occupy camps: “Democracy 
– as practised in many aspects of Occupy – was not an ideal form of society. It 
was a real democracy characterised by a degree of messiness and uncertainty 
that is connected to the realities of all political action” (2013: 22).
Improvization and Trial-and-Error
The occupiers were following neither a plan nor a strategy. Instead, they 
were trying to implement abstract principles and models and f iguring out 
25 Although Canada was not as affected by the f inancial crisis as Spain and the United States, 
it is reasonable to believe that the level of conf idence towards parties and the parliament did 
not increase in the last few years. If anything, it is more likely to have decreased because of the 
multiplication of corruption scandals since 2012.
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on a daily basis what the construction and sustainability of a democratic and 
egalitarian camp required. As a member of the media committee explains:
We lacked resources to prepare the occupation. I must say, though, that 
we prepared everything in a couple of weeks and we were even wondering 
whether we would be able to spend the f irst night there, whether the 
police was going to let us camp. […] the organizational and decisional 
structures as well as the logistics were not ready to welcome so many 
people on the f irst days.26
Similarly, a member of the facilitation27 committee remarks:
We were full of good intentions but we didn’t really know where we were 
going. […] It was a complete improvisation, yes I think improvisation 
was the leitmotiv of the whole story. Improvisation because, concretely, 
we were refusing […] pre-established structures. […] It allowed us to 
experiment but at the same time it cut us off from the experience of 
many people.28
Improvization applied to all dimensions, not just the set-up and logistics of 
the camp. The particular way in which to run assemblies and the decision-
making process were gradually def ined and redefined through trial and 
error. Participants began with the Morin Code, a very formal model used 
to make decisions and manage assemblies in Quebec trade and student 
unions.29 Since very few participants had prior activist experience, the 
Morin Code was probably the only common frame of reference, as it is 
generally used to run student assemblies. It was part of the local repertoire 
of action. Nonetheless, they quickly abandoned it and began experimenting. 
According to a member of the facilitation committee:
We didn’t have any clear functioning. At the 2nd assembly [before the 
beginning of the occupation], we tried the Morin Code […] but we realized 
that it didn’t work. […] It was too procedural and didn’t f it the needs 
of this assembly. […] At the 3rd assembly [before the beginning of the 
26 Interview with Occupier 3 on 16 December 2011 (conducted in French; my translation).
27 Here, “facilitation” refers to a series of techniques and responsibilities to facilitate the 
inclusion and equality of participants in a given assembly. 
28 Interview with Occupier 1 on 7 December 2011 (conducted in French; my translation).
29 The Code Morin involves formal motions, amendment procedures, etc., and decisions are 
made with a majority vote.
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occupation], a team was given the mandate of working on the structure of 
the assembly; they came up with a formula in which there were no votes 
and the goal was consensus. People were expected to make propositions; 
if you didn’t agree with proposition A, the facilitation team had to make a 
proposition B and then we would assess the assembly’s feelings, whether 
it was leaning toward A or B; if it leant toward neither, the proposition 
had to be reformulated. […] It was complex and didn’t really work because 
everybody wanted to talk and we were overwhelmed. […] During the 2nd 
week of the occupation, some people started to focus 200 percent on the 
best way to manage the assembly and turned to the signs and symbols 
used in New York.30
It was eventually decided that a quorum of 75 people was necessary to 
make binding decisions in the name of the GA. However, it turned out to 
be problematic because the GA would begin at 6 pm and last several hours, 
which increasingly meant that by 10 or 11 pm the quorum would not be met. 
The facilitation team also introduced a ‘progressive’ stack and a ‘step-up/
step-back’ principle that gave priority to minorities and people who had 
not talked yet. If consensus was not reached through deliberation, a vote 
was taken but decisions still required a 90 per cent majority.
Varieties of Tasks and Perspectives
Many participants disagreed over the best way to structure the GA and 
run the occupation. Nonetheless, as the occupation began, the conflict 
was not as ideologically driven as some depictions might suggest. In his 
account of OWS, Graeber (2013: 23-33) emphasizes the conflict between the 
‘verticals’ (the ‘Stalinists’ of the Workers World Party) and the ‘horizontals’ 
(anarchists and sympathizers of the Industrial Workers of the World and the 
Zapatistas), with the Trotskyists of the International Socialist Organization 
in the middle. Insofar as experienced activists and militant organizations 
were marginal in Occupy Montreal, the conflict was not as ideological. 
30 Interview with Occupier 1 on 7 December 2011 (conducted in French; my translation). It is 
worth pointing out, however, that the ‘human mic’ or ‘people’s microphone,’ which requires the 
audience to repeat in concentric circles what the speaker is saying, started to be used on the 
very f irst day of the occupation even though the Montreal police had not forbidden megaphones 
like in New York. This reveals an ‘attribution of similarity,’ one of the mechanisms underlying 
the process of indirect diffusion mentioned above. However, it can also ref lect the existing 
repertoire of action, for according to Graeber (2013: 50-51), this practice was already familiar to 
many California activists by the time of the Seattle anti-WTO protests in 1999.
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The varieties of preferences relative to the GA and the management of the 
occupation primarily reflected what tasks people were involved in. These 
tasks led them to focus on particular issues and problems that had to be 
addressed and, as a result, induced them to hold some preferences rather 
than others.
In order to outline a variety of perspectives and preferences, here I focus 
on a set of ‘leading tasks,’ that is, tasks such as articulating a vision, making 
tactical and strategic decisions, managing internal or external relations, 
etc., generally associated with leadership in social movements (cf. Earl 
2007). Thinking in terms of ‘leading tasks’ allows us to discuss the critical 
role of particular individuals even when they do not identify themselves, 
or are not identif ied by others, as leaders (ibid: 1328). This is all the more 
relevant when studying a mobilization that claims to be horizontal and 
leaderless like Occupy. Three sets of leading tasks stand out: assembly 
facilitation (intra-politics), communication/media (extra-politics), and 
camp maintenance (infrastructure).31 Each set of tasks entailed different 
perspectives and preferences because of the particular issues and problems 
with which it was confronted.
In contrast to the maintenance and communication tasks, facilitation 
was required even before the occupation began. Moreover, insofar as there 
was a very high level of uncertainty as to the occupation’s capacity to last 
more than a day, the main focus of attention was a rally that would include 
a GA as it had been seen in New York City and other places. People involved 
in facilitation tasks were the most forceful advocates of the GA, and the 
individuals who joined them tended to (initially) idealize assemblies. Ac-
cording to a participant who joined the facilitation committee during the 
f irst weekend of the occupation:
The myth of the General Assembly is… epic I think and integral to the 
icons of the Occupy movement. […] assemblies of people are just iconic 
and inspiring. So I think there was a lot of anticipation and probably 
pressure on what that General Assembly was going to be because it was 
both a tribute to what that day had become a global movement and to 
recognize what had come before.32
31 Although I lack systematic data on the gendered division of labor during the occupation, 
bits and fragments of information collected in interviews suggest that facilitation was primarily 
female, communication/media was primarily male, and maintenance was mixed. 
32 Interview with Occupier 11 on 22 December 2011 (in English).
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Another participant who joined the facilitation committee explains:
I remember seeing this group of people working out the actual procedure 
for a facilitation and then watching the General Assembly, and I’m like 
‘This is so important!’. […] I was really in love with the General Assembly. 
For me, it was the most important thing of the movement. It was what 
validated the movement, it was the central authority, and I put all my 
time into it.33
In contrast, the communication and maintenance tasks had other pri-
orities. People involved in communication tasks were mainly concerned 
with setting up digital communication platforms. Although they may have 
valued horizontalism and had a say in discussions about the appropriate 
decision-making process prior to the occupation, as soon as the latter began 
they focused on practical issues related to their tasks and did not have much 
time left, if any, to attend the GA.34 One of the main persons involved in 
maintenance tasks is even more categorical. Although he had prior experi-
ence in the global justice movement – he claims that participating in the 
2001 protests against the Summit of the Americas, in Quebec City, was a 
formative experience – and had participated in different urban mobiliza-
tions, the tasks in which he was involved meant he had no time left for 
anything else.35 According to him, on the f irst day of the occupation,
nobody was actually doing anything. I mean, there was no work or any-
thing going on and I’m thinking, you know, it’s noon, we’re planning on 
staying the night. There’s tents set up and little else. And these two girls 
arrived with a tarp which they laid down and they put two baguettes on 
it. They said: ‘Okay guys, all food donations can go here.’ And I went up to 
these two girls and said: ‘Hey, can I help?’ And they’re like: ‘Yeah, we need 
to get a kitchen set up.’ And so the f irst thing I did was to suggest moving 
it from there to where it eventually ended up. And basically me and these 
two girls and gradually a few other people joined, we went to work and 
worked like non-stop for the next 24 hours building that kitchen.36
33 Interview with Occupier 8 on 9 February 2012 (in English).
34 Interview with Occupier 3, from the media committee, on 16 December 2011.
35 However, horizontalism also includes the initiatives and efforts of small aff inity groups 
active during the occupation. In this respect, if maintenance tasks were conducted on the basis 
of egalitarian and inclusive principles, they can be said to contribute to the overall horizontalism 
of the occupation.
36 Interview with Occupier 6 on 20 January 2012 (in English). 
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As a result, he did not attend the GA for the f irst few weeks. But instead of 
seeing this as problematic, he despised what he considered to be an obvious 
lack of pragmatism:
I never went to a GA or any kind of political discussion until, like, my 
third week there. We were so busy. […] For the f irst few weeks I was there, 
myself and the other people, we just rubbished the general assemblies. 
It was […] a waste of time. I mean, they had assemblies every single day 
that would go on for hours and hours and hours, wasting all of these 
man-hours while stuff needed to get done. And, taking all these people 
that we could have been using for useful things that had to get done. Like, 
I understand we’re trying to create an alternative form of democracy 
here, but at the same time, there’s garbage that has to be picked up, you 
know?!37
As this participant makes very clear, his focus on maintenance tasks led 
him to consider a particular set of issues and ignore others. It is in doing so 
that he articulated his preferences. The preferences that participants held 
before joining the occupation were gradually redefined as they got involved 
in specif ic tasks.
Shifting Preferences
The def inition of preferences was a dynamic process rather than some-
thing that was determined once and for all. As the occupation unfolded, 
participants kept revising their preferences but in a way that was directly 
related to their tasks and particular involvement in the occupation. Over 
the weeks, while formally the GA was still the main locus of deliberation 
and decision-making, the occupation started to be increasingly segmented 
into several parallel circuits. One of the main lines of divide was between 
people actually sleeping in the camp, including several people involved in 
communication tasks, and others involved in maintenance and facilitation 
tasks just coming in during the day.38 The experience of these two segments 
became incommensurable, as the former criticized the latter for making, 
in the GA, binding decisions that affected the camp without actually being 
37 Interview with Occupier 6 on 20 January 2012 (in English).
38 Participants spending the night at the camp enjoyed a higher status, a sort of symbolic 
capital, as they were seen as being more invested in the struggle and willing to sacrif ice their 
comfort for the cause.
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aware of what was happening in the camp. What made things worse was 
the fact that many people who attended the GA – and thus participated 
in the decisions – were not involved in any tasks. This had the effect of 
undermining the legitimacy of the GA.39
Thus, a central participant in the media committee who spent many 
nights on the site of the occupation argues that the GA and the camp should 
have been two distinct entities:
The GA confused the assembly of the movement with the assembly of 
the camp. Anyone could attend the GA and participate in decisions 
about the management of the camp while they were not aware of what 
was happening, they lacked the right information to make appropriate 
decisions. As a result, people in the camp had to implement decisions 
that were made by the GA but that did not make any sense. After a while, 
people in the camp considered that the GA was more or less legitimate 
because it imposed decisions on them.40
This perspective is reminiscent of the point that Graeber makes about the 
necessity, from an anarchist standpoint, of making decisions in a radically 
decentralized manner and on the smallest possible scale. But participants 
involved in communication tasks were not anarchists. They came to hold 
this understanding as a result of their experience of the occupation. Nobody 
had anticipated this problem. It became apparent only after several weeks 
of occupation. It raises challenging questions about the boundaries of a 
public occupation and about the category of people who can legitimately 
be included in decisions. One of the core principles of horizontalism and 
direct democracy is that of inclusiveness: not only should there not be any 
form of discrimination, but any one affected by a decision should be able to 
participate in it. The problem here was that the GA included in the decisions 
many people not directly affected by them while others who were affected 
did not always attend the GA.
39 For example, during the last week of the occupation, there were several debates in the GA 
about whether or not occupiers should leave the square by themselves or wait to be forcefully 
evicted by the police. It was troubling that most people participating in these discussions and 
making decisions did not themselves spend the night at the camp and were thus not directly 
affected by the decision. The GA decided against leaving the square but then very few people 
showed up on Friday, 25 November 2011, when the police evicted the last campers.
40 Interview with Occupier 3 on 16 December 2011 (conducted in French; my translation). More 
or less three weeks into the occupation, the media committee imploded and henceforth two 
committees co-existed, one called excom and the 99%Quebec. Occupier 3 was in 99%Quebec. 
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This gap between the camp and the GA led a group of participants in-
volved in communication tasks to bypass the GA, call for a press conference 
on Monday 21 November 2011, and announce that they were leaving the 
camp. According to Occupier 3, who played a central role in this process, the 
press communiqué “had not necessarily been prepared in a democratic way, 
through the GA, but at the same time the GA, as it [stood], [was] not eff i-
cient. It [was] not solid enough and we [could not] grant it any legitimacy.”41 
Insofar as it took place while the City of Montreal was pressuring occupiers 
to end the occupation and not even a week after the eviction of OWS in New 
York City, this ‘non-approved’ press conference triggered intense debates 
within Occupy Montreal and reinforced the impression that the occupation 
was coming to an end.
But participants involved in communication tasks were not the only ones 
who came to express doubts and criticisms about the functioning of the GA. 
Even some participants in facilitation tasks, some of whom were the most 
enthusiastic at the beginning of the occupation, ended up gradually revising 
their preferences. They were exhausted and found the entire process both 
very taxing and frustrating. During the f irst week, they would meet daily 
at 1 pm for four to f ive hours, then facilitate the GA at 6 pm for another four 
or f ive hours, and, f inally, hold a debrief ing meeting. Throughout, they 
would be interrupted by people who wanted to complain about facilitation 
and the GA. They were constantly being attacked.42 As a member of the 
facilitation committee explains: “Facilitators always got a lot of f lak for 
their work. They were underappreciated. People would think that they’re 
letting their friends’ propositions pass, which was sometimes the case, but 
most of the time it was not. They’re just following the procedure, and a lot 
of people didn’t like that.”43 Although they did not necessarily reject the 
GA and horizontalism, some participants involved in facilitation tasks did 
come out of the occupation less enthusiastic. As one facilitator puts it: “At 
some point, I could no longer stand assemblies, it was just too much. […] 
We’re talking about an assembly of 100 people, 150 at most. […] And we live 
in a world of 7 billion people. […] That’s why I increasingly think that this 
system is not viable.”44
However, the shift in preferences was not unidirectional, and some par-
ticipants did come out of the occupation with a more positive understanding 
41 Interview with Occupier 3 on 16 December 2011 (conducted in French; my translation). 
42 Interview with Occupier 11, from the facilitation committee, on 22 December 2011.
43 Interview with Occupier 8 on 9 February 2012 (in English).
44 Interview with Occupier 1 on 7 December 2011 (conducted in French; my translation).
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of direct democracy and horizontalism than they had at the beginning. 
This shift was the result of experience rather than theoretical discussions. 
This dynamic is well illustrated by an anecdote that a person involved in 
maintenance tasks told me. It is worth quoting at length:
I was very sceptical when they told me you needed a 90 percent vote to 
pass something, I was like ‘There’s no way that’s going to work!’ I sort 
of tolerate democracy in general, you know, like, direct democracy, I’m 
very sceptical about that idea. But now, I f igured out how to make them 
work […]. The example of the wooden habitations is the perfect example 
[…]. So we came [to the GA] that night [and said]: ‘We got to take down 
the wooden habitations.’ ‘Boo, no!’ A majority were against that idea. 
We spent the next 24 hours listening to people, having a lot of meetings, 
talking, listening, incorporating different ideas, and 24 hours after that 
failed vote, we brought back essentially the exact same thing, and it 
passed unanimously. And I f igured out the trick to making this thing 
work is that you have to make people feel that their concerns are being 
heard, and that they are truly participating in the f inal decision. And, 
once you achieve that, then people will vote against their own interests for 
the benefit of the community. […] As long as they’re feeling like they’re in 
that, you know? And that’s when I started to realize this direct democracy 
thing maybe might work after all.45
With the eviction on 25 November 2011, the occupation came to an end and 
participants in Occupy Montreal looked for a new place to assemble. After 
a couple of meetings in different small venues in December 2011, the GA 
started to meet at the Darling Foundry, a visual arts center located a few 
blocks away from Victoria Square, in January 2012. But the experience was 
short-lived, as the beginning of the student strike in February and then what 
would be called the ‘Maple Spring’ sucked in all the activists of Montreal.
* * *
In this chapter, I have argued that we should not assume that direct 
democracy and horizontalism are obvious practices and organizational 
forms that activists adopt simply because they are imitating another 
mobilization, whether in Madrid or New York City, or because there is a 
crisis of representation. Similarly, the mere fact that other mobilizations 
45 Interview with Occupier 6 on 20 January 2012 (in English).
occuPy MoNtreAl AND tHe PoliticS of HorizoNtAliSM 199
engaged in relatively similar practices in the past does not explain much 
by itself unless we are able to show that particular pre-existing networks 
and organizations allow for the reproduction and transmission of a given 
know-how. Repertoires do not f loat freely; they need to be anchored in 
social carriers and interactions to generate effects.
We need thus to problematize the practices and organizational forms of 
mobilizations, be they horizontal or not. I contend that in the case of Occupy 
Montreal, although the practices and organizational form were indirectly 
shaped by the existing repertoire of action and by diffusion, they stemmed 
primarily from an open-ended political process in which activists involved 
in specif ic tasks were improvizing as they attempted to solve practical 
problems. This process was political insofar as it implied a struggle and it 
was open-ended insofar as it could have led to other practices and forms. 
As I have shown in the last section of this chapter, the activists’ preferences 
were dynamic and kept evolving as interactions and events unfolded.
Finally, one may wonder whether it is really important to pay attention to 
the particular organizational form and practices of mobilizations. Perhaps 
it is enough to highlight that activists were critical of hierarchy and were 
trying to make decisions in egalitarian ways. However, if we stay at such a 
level of generality and abstraction, we are not saying much. It would be like 
saying that citizens vote without looking at electoral systems and electoral 
behavior. Furthermore, in the case of movements engaged in pref igurative 
politics like Occupy, the process is the demand, the means are the end, and 
vice versa. It follows that we need to have a precise understanding of the 
specif ic process and means used by activists in order to understand their 
demands and ends and thus what the movement is about.
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Part 3
Complex Diffusion, from the Global Justice Movement to 
Indignados to Occupy

8 Social Movements and Political 
Moments
Reflections on the Intersections of Global Justice 
Movements & Occupy Wall Street
Jackie Smith
In January 2012, activists who were part of the United States Social Forum’s 
(USSF) National Planning Committee (NPC)1 met in Detroit, Michigan 
to discuss responses to the recent upsurge in anti-authoritarian and 
anti-austerity activism in the United States and around the world. They 
considered why previous work to build movements in the United States 
hadn’t allowed them to respond more effectively to this upsurge and bring 
more activists into the US Social Forums. The USSF – and the larger World 
Social Forum (WSF) process of which it is a part – was, after all, the most 
important focal point for anti-capitalist organizing around the world since 
its emergence in 2001. It is a space and a movement that organizers have 
consciously built to help bring together forces seeking to unite around the 
slogan, “another world is possible.” Why wasn’t this new upsurge connect-
ing to the process? Organizers at that Detroit meeting asked whether and 
how the social forums had to be adapted in order to be more effective and 
responsive. Yet, the conversation revealed a general ambivalence about the 
latest upsurge of protest (NPC 2012). I attended this meeting as a delegate 
from Sociologists without Borders,2 a role I have served since 2008.
1 The NPC is the coordinating body for the USSF process, made up of organizations that agree 
to support the work of organizing the social forums (see https://www.ussocialforum.net/about).
2 In 2012, the International Network of Scholar Activists was recognized as the NPC delegate, 
replacing and encompassing Sociologists Without Borders and other scholar-activists and their 
networks. I helped found INoSA in response to what I learned in the social forum process, 
recognizing that we needed a structure that could activate and engage more participation from 
scholars over the long term. My role has been more of an ‘observant participant’ than ‘participant 
observer’ as conventionally understood by researchers. I have been involved f irst as a member 
of the communications working group (for the 2010 USSF) and, following Detroit, as a co-chair 
of the Communications and Technology working group and as an organizer/editor of the USSF 
Newsletter. Between November of 2012 and May of 2014, I served on the USSF’s coordination 
team – the executive body helping carry out decisions of the NPC. Thus, my relationship with 
other leaders in the USSF and therefore my understanding of the process have evolved over the 
years. My roles and responsibilities have deepended as I have taken responsibility for working 
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According to Maureen Taylor, long-time veteran organizer from the 
Michigan Welfare Rights Organization, “without some level of structure, 
[OWS] will only wallow and burn-out both the resources and the energies 
of those involved. It is a ‘f lash in the pan’ without direction” (Author f ield 
notes, January 2012; see also US Social Forum 2012). Along with others 
attending the meeting, she noted that, while OWS activists were responding 
to the same economic and political pressures that motivate the movements 
in the US and World Social Forums, the participants in these protests lacked 
a sense of history and a connection to existing movements. They had failed 
to generate an analysis of the global causes of inequality that could guide 
and sustain activism over time. And most importantly, this lack of historical 
and global perspective made it hard for OWS to bridge racial and class 
hierarchies that divide people and movements in the United States.
Despite the NPC’s ambivalence about some of the manifestations of OWS, 
organizers in the USSF recognized the need to f ind ways to connect with 
those newly activated by worsening social conditions and the protest wave 
they helped fuel. Discussions within the USSF continue to treat contemporary 
protests as important and relevant. Indeed, how could the forums be effec-
tive at challenging global capitalism if they could not attract the energy and 
creativity of newly engaged activists, and help them deepen their analyses to 
connect their personal grievances to the capitalist world-system?3 Maureen 
Taylor argued that “[a] sustained, engaged social movement building process 
can be achieved if USSF/WSF attendees take the time to communicate with 
folks from the Occupy Movement” (US Social Forum 2012). Both the NPC and 
the World Social Forum’s International Council have, in months following 
this gathering in Detroit, worked to include activists from the Arab Spring, 
the European anti-austerity movement, and the OWS movements in their 
deliberations.4 Also, a number of members of the NPC have continued to 
work locally and nationally to engage with activists in OWS,5 and OWS 
organizers have been invited to NPC meetings and USSF working groups.
groups, helped build the USSF’s newsletter, and been elected to the leadership committee of 
May First/People Link, the technology activist coalition providing technology infrastructure 
for the Forums. 
3 In their critiques, organizers referred not only to the most recent wave of OWS activists but 
also to earlier upsurges in 2011 to defend attacks on the labor movement in states like Wisconsin, 
Ohio, and Indiana (author’s f ieldnotes).
4 Report of the Preparatory Assembly to the World Social Forum (2012).
5 For instance, May First/People Link, a key player on the USSF NPC and in the WSFs, provides 
free internet hosting and support for local OWS groups. Edge Funders, which has a connection 
to the USSF NPC, helped bring several OWS members to the International Council meeting of 
the WSF in Monastir in July 2012 (http://www.edgefunders.org/).
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This outreach from more established movements is leading to some 
engagement by activists who have been inspired and activated through 
the more recent wave of anti-austerity protests in the WSF process and 
who are looking to sustain their activism as these street manifestations 
recede. Most notably, the World Social Forum in Tunis in 2013 represents a 
convergence of these streams of activism. As with other WSF events, the 2013 
forum attracted more youthful, anarchist tendencies that sought to present 
a more radical/oppositional position in the space of the WSF. This tendency 
was ref lected in the work of ‘interoccupy’ to mobilize an international 
convergence at the WSF in Tunis in 2013. Interoccupy grew out of meetings 
of European and Mediterranean activists who were active in the Spanish 
15 May mobilizations, Occupy, and other grassroots groups and movements. 
Two networks, ‘Agora99’ and ‘Firenze10+10’, helped launch interoccupy 
discussions about organizing for the WSF in Tunisia, “recognizing this can 
be the right time and place to come together and share our experiences 
and practices”. Agora99 and the European Meeting on Debt, Rights, and 
Democracy organized a meeting in November 2012 in Madrid to discuss 
shared concerns around debt, human rights, and democracy. This meeting, 
in turn, grew out of a proposal made at the ‘Blockupy’ meeting in Frankfurt, 
Germany in May 2012.6
As a result of these efforts, ‘Occupy the Square’ took place alongside the 
2013 WSF in Tunis, engaging with some elements of the Tunisian and other 
Arab Spring movements.7 The organizing rationale behind Inter-Occupy’s 
effort to organize around the WSF Process was stated in their outreach call:
Tunis has become a symbolic place for the global movement, as the Arab 
Spring was born there. March would be a proper time to gather and ex-
change with all movements and networks flourished in the North African 
regions, in the Arab World, in Europe and all over the world. This forum 
could serve as a meeting place for those involved in Occupy/15M/and 
all horizontal assembleary social movements. […] We can practice our 
methodologies, as we did in the assembly we organized in Florence during 
Firenze 10+10 (http://occupyf irenze99.wordpress.com/), communicate 
and share our new knowledge and tool kits. We can build and strengthen 
6 http://99agora.net/2012/07/euro-mediterranean-meeting-debt-rights-democracy/.
7 Tunisian activists invited the WSF to Tunisia to help them build and solidify their resistance. 
Many Tunisian organizers worked closely with the WSF International Council to organize the 
WSF meeting. Occupy the Square attracted more anarchist tendencies, many of whom were 
supported by international funding aimed at bringing OWS and other anti-austerity activists 
to the WSF.
208 jAcKie SMitH 
the links between existing networks around the Mediterranean region 
and globally.8
Moreover, this statement from the initial call for participation signals how 
activists understood the WSF process as a space or opportunity for helping 
generate new energy and for focusing on the issues being raised by the 
Indignados, OWS, and Arab Spring movements:
Do we need to Occupy World Social Forum, in order to come together at 
the global level, for the f irst time since 15M or Tahrir moments? Can we 
create new synergies that would contribute our transnational and trans-
local struggles to build egalitarian and genuine democracies globally?9
These observations illustrate how the activists who have been mobilized 
by these new protest surges are relating to pre-existing social movement 
actors and vice-versa. The WSF provided a focal point and a space that 
enabled new activists to sustain their activities. Yet, more newly engaged 
activists tended to take a confrontational stance in relation to the WSF that 
revealed some important differences and limitations in both movement 
streams.
Studying these connections and the factors that shape them can help 
us better understand how movements develop and build knowledge and 
networks over time. It can also show how movements adapt their analyses, 
organizations, and models of action in response to a changing environment. 
By tracing the relationships between actors in the USSF and contemporary 
anti-austerity movements, we can uncover the activist projects that help 
engage newly mobilized activists over the long term and connect them 
to pre-existing movements. In addition, we can identify practices in the 
USSF and WSF process that are most effective at attracting new energy 
and participation.
Today’s global wave of protest has origins in the resistance to neoliberal 
globalization that began with anti-IMF protests in the global South in the 
1980s and 1990s (see Walton and Seddon 1994). This steadily rising wave of 
protest helped form the global justice movement that f irst drew attention 
in the late 1990s and remains active in the World Social Forum process and 
elsewhere. Since the f inancial crisis of 2008, we have seen a new surge in 
8 http://titanpad.com/agora99f irezneWSF. 
9 Ibid. 
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this long-term expansion of resistance to global neoliberalism.10 Many in 
this new protest wave are young and newly politicized activists with few 
ties to pre-existing movements and organizations. Yet, we should consider 
whether and how earlier protest waves have shaped the opportunities for 
these newly activated individuals and groups. Have activists been able 
to forge connections across movement generations and build upon past 
experience? Through what paths are such connections being made, and 
what factors facilitate or obstruct cooperation?
To address these questions, I examine how activists in the World Social 
Forum process have sought to engage with and respond to mobilizing 
opportunities created by the more recent rise of anti-austerity protests. I 
consider how models for collaboration that have been used and developed 
within the WSFs shape the efforts to integrate newly mobilized activists and 
groups into the WSFs. Of particular interest is the USSF’s specif ic attention 
to ‘movement building’, and how this is manifested in response to these 
new openings for engagement.
The Global Justice Movement Meets Occupy Wall Street
The rise of anti-austerity protests created openings that helped spread 
movement ideas and analyses to a broader population (cf. Staggenborg 1998). 
Such openings can alter the space in which a variety of oppressed groups 
can resist, creating the potential for a further expansion of protests, the 
re-articulation of movement ideas, and for the bridging of social divisions. 
For instance, the global justice movement’s success at articulating and 
disseminating critical analyses of globalization helped encourage more 
cooperative relations between activists in the north and south. Similarly, for 
George Friday, US Social Forum organizer, anti-austerity protests and OWS:
helped pave the way for people who have long been ready to resist – that 
is, low-income people, people of color, those who have long suffered 
the consequences of capitalism gone wild and corporate greed. Those 
folks are the most vulnerable, so when they see white people enraged 
and mobilized despite their privilege, there is hope that it will create 
some more space or breathing room for these folks to escalate the 
struggle. (Friday 2012)
10 This conceptualization differs from that put forward in the introduction to this volume in 
its attempt to bring a world-historical perspective to the protests. 
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The wave of protests following the 2008 f inancial crisis has also helped 
activists in different countries understand their struggles in more global 
terms. The f inancial crisis demonstrates the cross-national similarities 
in people’s everyday experiences, and as people observe protests happen-
ing in different places simultaneously, they are likely to think differently 
about their situations.11 While established movements and the communities 
that sustain them (such as the WSF process) help articulate and incubate 
analyses and ideas about social change, moments like the economic crisis 
of 2008 help disrupt and delegitimate dominant discourses and create 
openings in which new publics emerge.
By thinking in terms of the intersections of movements and moments, we 
can better understand how the knowledge and insights of past organizing 
can shape the leadership and initiatives that emerge later on. In her research 
on autonomous groups, Flesher Fominaya has observed that the negative 
experiences activists confronted in their work to advance participatory and 
autonomous forms of politics, even when they failed,
created a shared history and a bond between activists that lasted even 
as they moved into other projects. They also carried the lessons of their 
failed experiments into new groups: much of the success of [a newer 
organization formed by experienced activists] rested on this shared 
commitment to not repeating past mistakes. (2010: 399)
Similarly, the work of Juris (2008) and Pleyers (2011) reveals how activists 
who participated in the late 1990s and early 2000s protests against the World 
Trade Organization and other sites of international f inancial and trade 
negotiations have shifted their energies and attention to more localized 
projects as a result of both lessons from past organizing experience and life 
changes such as marriage and parenthood. Thus, we see how knowledge 
from transnational organizing has diffused into local communities through 
activist networks. Also important in these examples are the life-course 
impacts on activists’ strategic choices.
Spaces such as the World Social Forums provide opportunities for learning 
across different networks and generations of activists that might not other-
wise converge. Reitan and Gibson (2012) and von Bülow (2010), for instance, 
show how the inter-organizational relationships developed through the 
WSF and through trade-related civil society forums helped break down rigid 
11 This tendency of cycles of protest to be international is not new (Tarrow 1988, 1995; Markoff 
1996).
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divides between policy-oriented and direct action activists and created new 
constellations of forces that developed alongside changing policy debates. 
Hadden (2011) further demonstrates how global justice networks contributed 
to the emergence of a more radical ‘climate justice’ network that challenged 
existing strategies in UN climate debates. Juris (2008) shows how radical 
anarchist networks developed over the course of early anti-neoliberal glo-
balization protests and through participation in early World Social Forums. 
Autonomous activists pushed the World Social Forum towards more radical 
and participatory practices by, for instance, resisting the VIP room at the first 
WSF, opposing celebrity panels and appearances by party and government 
off icials, and by pressing for the democratization of the forum agendas.
In light of this, we might see the rise of anti-austerity protests as WSF 
founding member Gustave Massiah does:12 as a “new phase in the alterglo-
balisation movement”. He observes that:
the new movements testify to a new phase. And a new phase does not 
cancel out the previous ones. Each new phase extends, adds to and renews 
the form of previous phases. It forces them to transform. […] the two group-
ings will mutate, leading to the birth of a new era of movements. […] 
Older alterglobalisation movements should learn the lessons of their 
achievements and limitations. (2012b: 5, emphasis added)
Many participants in the most recent protest wave, and perhaps especially 
those in the United States, have lacked a global and systemic analysis and a 
commitment to long-term movement building. Thus, we see that in many 
places the movement quickly dissipated after its initially vibrant f irst few 
months. Nevertheless, this wave contributes to the work of other movement 
streams by advancing new technologies for communication and exchange 
that help ‘redefine politics’ by testing more democratic practices and helping 
“link the individual to the collective” (ibid.). Thus, we see in this conver-
gence of different streams of activism a potential for the merging of ideas, 
experiences, perspectives, and knowledge that contribute to the continuous 
evolution and reinvention of the practices of contentious politics. In the 
following section I explore some of the differences in the logics guiding 
the WSF process and the anti-austerity protest wave and their implica-
tions for social movement theory. Again, I do this from the standpoint of 
doing observant participation in the organizing work at the national and 
12 Massiah is a co-founder and has played a leading role in the French section of ATTAC, which 
was instrumental in helping launch the World Social Forums. 
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international levels with the USSF and locally with OWS activists (see e.g. 
Juris and Khasnabish 2013).
The Logics of Social Movement Action and the WSF Process
The tensions seen between USSF and WSF organizers and newer mobi-
lizations are partly a result of different practices and assumptions about 
activism and organizing work. Bennett and Segerberg (2012) describe these 
as differences in logics of activism. More established activist groups tend 
to emphasize a logic of collective action, while newer groups reflect a logic 
of connective action. The former stresses the role of more formal organiza-
tions and ideological identity formations, and the latter emphasizes the 
self-motivated use of digital media and the sharing of personalized content 
through social media networks:
In place of content that is distributed and relationships that are brokered 
by hierarchical organizations, social networking involves co-production 
and co-distribution, revealing a different economic and psychological 
logic: co-production and sharing based on personalized expression […] 
the starting point of connective action is the self-motivated (though not 
necessarily self-centered) sharing of already internalized or personalized 
ideas, plans, images, and resources with networks of others. (Bennett and 
Segerberg 2012 752-753)
The emphasis is thus on personal identity and autonomy, with fluid com-
mitments to groups and a rejection of formal organizations and ideological 
rigidity. Figure 8.1 illustrates these logics and their implications for organi-
zational strategies.
Reinforcing the claim about the distinctive tendencies in the newer protest 
upsurge versus established forms of activism, Massiah (2012a) observes 
that “[t]he new movements place stronger emphasis on individual liberties 
rather than on social justice and equality, on ‘libertarian’ approaches to 
government regulation and on spectacular direct action rather than long-
term collective action”. And Flesher Fominaya (2010: 382) concludes that 
“[o]ne of the features of contemporary autonomous politics is the weakening 
of personal and social identity requirements for participation”. She observes, 
moreover, that this tendency is “not merely a ‘natural’ evolution, but is a 
result of the active application of the diversity principle within the movement 
itself” (ibid: 382-383, emphasis added).
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Other observers of the contemporary global justice movement have docu-
mented the presence of “flexible identities and multiple belongings” (Della 
Porta et al. 2006), attributing such identities to activists’ commitments to 
inclusion and a celebration of ‘unity in diversity’ rather than an aversion 
to developing commitments to a group. Similarly, Paul Lichterman’s study 
of political commitment in contemporary US environmental movements 
revealed a tendency of what he refers to as personalism, or a “cultural 
form that enables shared commitment to a public good and a dedication 
to individual autonomy and empowerment” (Lichterman 1996: 19). Per-
sonalism leads individuals to develop strong personal commitments to 
particular movement(s) but not to a particular organization or strategy. 
It is thus accompanied by a respect for the diverse choices other activists 
make about their participation in movements. The rise of personalism is 
linked to the spread of professional norms and skills accompanying wider 
changes in the economy and labor force. It may also reflect the increased 
demands that the contemporary labor market places on workers’ personal 
time. Such demands limit people’s abilities to attend regular meetings and 
make long-term commitments to organizations. These shared features of 
people’s experiences where they live and in the workplace and the values 
that stem in part from these everyday practices are a source of unity among 
individuals who lack other connections. Since contemporary activism tends 
to be less embedded in particular religious traditions or shared identity 
groups, personalist forms of politics provide a basis for unity by enabling 
activists to “[carry] their commitments as radicalized selves to create a new 
community” (ibid: 192).
Figure 8.1  Logics of action and their organizational implications
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Such individualized political activism is linked to broader changes in 
society. Bennett presents the rise of ‘lifestyle politics’ as a logical response 
to changes in the labor force, including dual-worker households and longer 
work hours. Busy people juggling work and activist responsibilities are less 
likely to commit to organizational meeting structures and more likely to 
engage in forms of activism that allow them greater flexibility. Wuthnow 
(1998) similarly attributes changes in forms of activist commitment to 
broader shifts in social institutions that reduce people’s sense of security 
and stability, increase demands on their time and energies, but often leave 
them wanting to f ind ways to connect with their communities. He sees 
the emergence of networks as a response to these institutional and labor 
market changes. Similarly, López (2007) argues that the prolif ic growth of 
the Internet is a response to the alienation that is endemic to globalized 
capitalism.
While such personalist, individually empowered networks can enable 
certain kinds of mobilization and activism, the changes in people’s everyday 
lives that result from shifts in the labor markets and broad structures of 
social organization make conventional forms of political mobilization 
less effective than they may have been in the past. More fragmented and 
individualized populations are “hard to reach and even harder to induce to 
share personally transforming collective identities” (Bennett and Segerberg 
2012: 751-752). As a result,
many organizations are f inding they must engage people differently: they 
are developing relationships to publics as aff iliates rather than mem-
bers, and offering them personal options in ways to engage and express 
themselves. This includes greater choice over contributing content, and 
introduces micro-organizational resources in terms of personal networks, 
content creation, and technology development skills. (ibid: 760)
Reflecting these changes, organizers in the WSF process are calling for a 
‘social forum of a new type’. Despite its dynamism and size, the WSF has 
been limited in its ability to build movement power. This may be due in 
part to this technological and social-structural context.
Digital technology and social media alter the landscape of social 
movement organizing in important ways, just as they contribute to the 
other shifts noted above such as transformations in the workplace. Earl 
and Kimport’s study of electronic activism (2011) concludes with a call 
to re-think social movement theory to ref lect how technology empow-
ers individual activists, reduces organizing costs, and alters the role of 
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organizations in social movements. Reflecting these developments, there 
have been discussions in both the US and World Social Forums about the 
role of formal organizations. Whereas in the past, only organizations had 
been allowed to participate in the main decision-making bodies or submit 
proposals for workshops and panels (Sen 2003), there have been efforts 
to relax these requirements. Organizers acknowledge that many of those 
exercising important forms of leadership in the WSF process do so more as 
individuals than as representative of organizations – even when they can 
claim an organizational aff iliation.13 Individual participation is certainly 
valued and possible in the forums, and individuals participate directly 
in working groups that have important roles in shaping how the forums 
develop. As Juris’s work shows, activists working from personalist orienta-
tions and from decentralized network-based structures rather than formally 
organized groups have been able to have important influences in the WSF 
process, often through collective efforts to challenge or “contaminate” these 
spaces (Juris 2008: 258; see also Juris 2005).
Juris’s work lends insights into how these overlapping and competing 
logics are manifested in the work of the social forums and perhaps other 
contemporary movements. He develops the idea that elements of the earlier 
global justice movement incorporated a ‘logic of networking’ that is clearly 
a key force driving the WSF process. This logic of networking might be seen 
as an intermediary between Bennett and Segerberg’s logic of collective 
action and their logic of connective action:
[N]etworking logics specif ically entail an embedded and embodied set of 
social and cultural dispositions that orient actors toward 1) the building 
of horizontal ties and connections among diverse autonomous elements, 
2) the free and open circulation of information, 3) collaboration through 
decentralized coordination and consensus-based decision making, and 
4) self-directed networking. (Juris 2008: 11)
The World Social Forums have been important sites where activists could 
come together to “perform their networks, create affective solidarity, and 
communicate oppositional messages” (ibid: 238). The movement rather than 
the government-centered logic of the forums helps them contribute more to 
the work of building the networks than other protest sites such as anti-WTO 
13 USSF National Planning Committee Accountability and Coordination Team conference 
call held on 6 January 2012.
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or anti-G8 protests.14 Their transnational character, moreover, has allowed 
groups to test forms of activism developed in national and local spaces on a 
wider scale while articulating and strengthening broader identities (global, 
regional, etc.). Activists in the forum have also been developing uses of 
technology that expand participation in forum activities from outside the 
forums’ host cities. According to Juris (ibid: 262-263), “forum events are 
critical sites for technological and organizational experimentation, while 
forum architectures incorporate a horizontal networking logic within their 
organizational designs expressed through the discourse and practice of 
open space”.
This networking logic that predominated in the earlier wave of global 
justice activism has, according to Juris, been overshadowed by new forms 
of engagement in the most recent anti-austerity uprisings. The latter is 
characterized by a “logic of aggregation” that “continued to exist alongside 
rather than entirely displacing logics of networking” (Juris 2012: 260-261). 
Consistent with Bennett and Segerberg’s notion of the logic of connective 
action and the above discussion of how this connects with larger social 
structures and everyday practices, the logic of aggregation:
is an alternative cultural framework that is shaped by our interactions 
with social media and generates particular patterns of social and political 
interaction that involve the viral f low of information and subsequent 
aggregations of large numbers of individuals in concrete physical spaces 
(ibid: 266).
Juris’s comparison of these two logics is instructive for our understandings 
of contemporary efforts to mobilize and coordinate large groups. He notes 
that:
Whereas networking logics entail a praxis of communication and co-
ordination on the part of collective actors that are already constituted 
– including particular organizations, networks, and coalitions […] – logics 
of aggregation involve the coming together of actors qua individuals. 
These individuals may subsequently forge a collective subjectivity through 
the process of struggle, but it is a subjectivity that is under the constant 
pressure of disaggregation into its individual components – hence, the 
14 During confrontational protests at inter-governmental meetings, activists organized spaces 
similar to the WFs. However, such sites were often framed around inter-governmental meetings 
rather than movement-building. 
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importance of interaction and community building within physical spaces. 
Whereas networks are also given to fragmentation, the collective actors 
that compose them are more lasting (ibid: 266, emphasis added).
In addition to the logics of connective and collective action outlined above, 
Bennett and Segerberg’s work also identif ies the presence of this third, 
network logic of organizing, subsuming it within the logic of connective 
action. They note (see Figure 8.1) that the traditional logic of collective 
action stresses the role of formal organizations in coordinating and facilitat-
ing action, generating “organizationally brokered networks”. The logic of 
connectivity governs two other ideal types of organizing, which they see as 
including both the self-organizing networks of autonomous activists who 
often reject formal organization and a hybrid form of “organizationally 
enabled networks”, where formal organizations play key roles in supporting 
network activity but remain in the background.
Referring again to Figure 8.1, the World Social Forum process most clearly 
reflects “organizationally enabled networks”, since it helps create spaces 
for diverse groups and individuals to converge over different time points 
and develop network ties (see Byrd and Jasny 2010). By bringing organiza-
tions and activists together to construct and participate in social forums, 
the WSF process and the organizations helping sustain it provide critical 
resources and spaces that facilitate networking while backgrounding the 
organizational work typical of the collective action’s logic of organization-
ally brokered networks.15 At the same time, participants in the process may 
emphasize any one or a combination of these three tendencies. Thus, it is 
important to keep in mind that these ideal types are, in practice, quite fluid, 
and different groups and individuals can manifest multiple tendencies or 
stress one or another at different times.
Interestingly, a look at very recent discussions in the US and World Social 
Forums suggests that activists are uncomfortable with the limits of the 
logic of connective action and more personalized action frames and com-
mitments, even as they resist forming a unif ied platform or voice within 
the WSF. Ongoing discussions seem to point to a recognition of a need to 
15 Such backgrounding can in fact be problematic, as social forum participants may tend to 
either criticize (sometimes unfairly) f inancial and other decisions taken by organizers, and 
take for granted the time-consuming organizing work done by volunteers. It also can make it 
hard for newcomers to get involved, which can lead to burnout among those most central to 
the leadership work. Both USSFs ended with many groups stepping back from the process due 
to burnout (author’s f ieldnotes).
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adopt practices that better support concerted if not collective action.16 The 
crisis has made it more urgent that those coming together around a critique 
of capitalism f ind a way to have more influence on global transformation.
The WSF’s inherent logic of open space and the ideology of horizontality 
and autonomous action that permeates these spaces mitigates against a 
predominance of conventional “organizationally brokered networks”. But 
because all of these logics are in play in the open spaces of the WSF, we 
see the tensions among them. For instance, the USSF National Planning 
Committee sees a need to play a strong organizational role in defining NPC 
membership in order to avoid reproducing prevailing hierarchies, and it 
currently is working to provide greater central coordination of the content 
of the USSF program in order to ensure that the forums better advance 
movement-building goals. However, this goal is in tension with the radical 
democratic premises of the movements themselves and may complicate 
efforts to create openings for new and historically oppressed groups to 
actually emerge and help lead the process. On the WSF’s International 
Council, there is a recognition of the need to provide greater space for the 
development of collective action within the forums, in addition to calls 
for greater transparency and participation. This suggests a move towards 
more elaborated organizational structures, but how this will unfold within 
the forum’s culture of radical democracy and opposition to hierarchy is 
uncertain.
In light of this theorizing about the logics orienting different streams of 
activism, it is instructive to examine experiences in the US Social Forum 
and in a local site of OWS activism to explore the possibilities for bridging 
different modes of thought and action.
Logics and Tensions in Contemporary WSF and OWS Activism
In both the USSF process and in the WSF International Council, there have 
been recent moves to formally recognize individuals as participants on 
decision-making bodies (author’s f ield notes; Whitaker 2012). These develop-
ments are a response to the actual experiences of organizers working within 
the WSF framework who have recognized the need to acknowledge and 
create space for individual leadership, as well as a result of WSF activists’ 
reflections on the similarities and differences between the new upsurge in 
16 USSF organizers speak of the third US Social Forum as moving “from convergence to cohe-
sion” (author’s f ieldnotes).
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protest and the practices in the Social Forums. They reflect a recognition 
of the changing nature of individual activism and its relationship to formal 
organizations. They also present a challenge for activists seeking to ensure 
that open spaces do not privilege particular groups in ways that reproduce 
race, class, gender, or other oppressions. The discussions and debates within 
the WSF process nevertheless reflect the ways this process draws activists’ 
attention to the operation of power within movements (see e.g. Teivainen 
2007). Such attention has been absent in most (though certainly not all) 
spaces of OWS activism (Pickerill and Krinsky 2012; Whitaker 2012).
The question of the role of individuals has emerged in the context of the 
US Social Forum’s work to expand and revitalize the National Planning 
Committee during the fall of 2012, as activists grappled with the question 
of how to better engage the new wave of protests. These conversations have 
helped organizers confront the reality that many of the organizational 
‘representatives’ on the NPC are really committed individuals working 
as liaisons between particular organizations and the USSF process, in 
addition to their other organizational work. In addition, some individuals 
who played important leadership roles on the NPC but who have left the 
organization they were representing were not able to f ind an obvious way 
to sustain their activism in the USSF. Active participants in local organizing 
committees who became deeply involved in the national organizing work 
of the NPC thus found it hard to f it within the existing organizationally 
def ined membership structure of the NPC. At the same time as passionate 
and experienced leaders were unclear about how to remain involved in NPC 
work, the NPC has struggled with a need for more committed participants 
to carry the workload over the long term. A rather small number of core 
leaders have been critical to helping sustain the process. Recognizing this, 
organizers in both the US and World Social Forums are calling for a “social 
forum of a new type” and moving to formally def ine new categories of 
membership to include more space for individual activists.17
The networking logic has helped the USSF mobilize people with 
established organizational and movement/activist identities. However, 
experience in the forums has shown that prevailing organizational logics 
and demands often prevent organizations from maintaining long-term com-
mitments to and support for the social forum in between forum meetings. 
Individual activists, however, have demonstrated sustained commitments 
to the work of coalition and movement-building over the WSF’s more than 
17 Notes from NPC meeting in Chicago held on 9-11 November 2012. Discussion of this item 
was on Sunday, 11 November.
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ten year history. Despite a lack of a strong organizational base of support, 
they have nevertheless been able to channel important resources and skills 
into the WSF process and to help build and sustain a network of activist-
organizers with varying levels of organizational support. It is this somewhat 
fluid network of organizers and organizations that has helped sustain the 
WSF process and deepen understandings of its place in contemporary social 
movement work. The work of organizing social forums, in turn, has helped 
reinforce the unity and collective identities of participants in the process.
In the WSF and USSF, then, a logic of networking has drawn together a 
variety of individuals and organizations with varying degrees of centraliza-
tion and formalization. Although individuals lack formal decision-making 
authority – that is reserved for organizations – the lived experience of the 
forums indicated that individual leadership has been key to the development 
of the WSFs, and the working group structure allows individuals to raise 
proposals and launch initiatives. Individuals have been able to be involved 
in the process as attendees of WSFs, working group participants, and as 
participants or organizers of social forums at local, national and regional 
scales. It is thus noteworthy that concurrent discussions have emerged in 
the USSF and in the International Council about how to integrate individual 
participants in a more formal way, and that this discussion is happening in 
the midst of the new wave of anti-austerity protests.18 The explicit ‘process’ 
that embeds the WSFs provides an ongoing framework wherein activists 
come together repeatedly over time and across space. Sequential iterations 
of forums have allowed activists to critique shortcomings of past forums, 
compare experiences across place and time, and articulate new practices 
and principles to remedy exclusions and omissions. Through this reflexive 
and dialogic process, participants develop a collective identity from these 
diverse entities and deepen commitments to the social forums and the 
people and movements that comprise them.
Occupy Pittsburgh and the Logic of Aggregation
In contrast to the social forum’s logic of networking, the logic of aggregation 
or connectivity that is more characteristic of the OWS and anti-austerity 
protests starts with individual participants whose main motivation is com-
municating and engaging personal action frames. But in many places this 
action has been rather short-lived, even in locations with histories of labor 
18 NPC and WSF IC Meeting notes, late 2012-spring 2013.
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and progressive activism. The temporary and geographically defined spaces 
in which these protests have emerged have complicated efforts to expand 
conversations across different social groups and locales.
Occupy Pittsburgh’s camp was situated in the middle of downtown 
Pittsburgh, surrounded by high-rise buildings owned by the likes of BNY 
Mellon, a f inancial services company. The camp attracted many youth and 
older unemployed people, Iraq war veterans, young people with signif icant 
student debt, and residents from other parts of the state and country. 
Although the city has several universities, relatively small numbers of 
students were active. The camp was supported by strong local networks of 
activists, including both labor unions and various progressive groups which 
provided signif icant f inancial and legal support. Pittsburgh occupiers held 
general assemblies during the encampment and even for a short period 
after the camp disbanded, but participation was mainly by activists who 
were part of the camp. Although some non-campers attended the general 
assemblies, many grew frustrated with these and either focused on working 
group activities or left the movement.19 The camp lasted for nearly six weeks 
before it was closed by the police. During the encampment, activists staged 
regular protests at downtown corporate headquarters or at the off ices of 
public off icials. Many of these protests were led by activists tied to local 
trade unions and linked to ongoing campaigns. In addition, teach-ins and 
opportunities for political education and dialogue, including a monthly 
‘Occupy Your Mind’ series, helped sustain participation by a diverse range 
of participants and nurtured connections among activists. Early in 2012, 
Pennsylvania’s governor helped revive activists’ energy and momentum 
by threatening major cuts to public transit budgets, thereby providing a 
focal point for Occupy Pittsburgh through the winter and spring. But by 
June of 2012, most participants had faded away, and those remaining grew 
frustrated with the group’s inability to generate any effective structure to 
coordinate Occupy Pittsburgh’s activities and expand its outreach to diverse 
residents of the city (Smith and Glidden 2012).
The operation of the logic of aggregation/connective action in Occupy 
Pittsburgh complicated efforts to build a cohesive organizing framework. 
As was also seen in Desbos and Royall’s chapter in this volume, activists 
19 I participated in Occupy Pittsburgh as a (non-camping) co-convener (‘bottom-liner’) of 
the outreach working group for its entire existence, from October 2011 through October 2012. 
I attended several general assemblies and other meetings of working-group leaders. I also 
worked to plan events that involved multiple working groups, including a rally and march for 
International Human Rights Day (10 December 2011), which was the f irst and only major Occupy 
Pittsburgh action in a gentrifying, primarily black neighborhood. 
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who had participated in the camp and who remained active over time 
resisted the idea that people who were not staying at the camp could be full 
participants in the movement. Yet, the location of the camp, the physical 
and time demands associated with camping, and the operation of race, 
class, age, and gender-based tensions in the camps meant that many people 
could not participate in this way. Nevertheless, many people joined work-
ing groups and participated in Occupy Pittsburgh demonstrations and 
other events. Regardless of how active they were, many were still unsure 
of whether they could claim to be ‘Occupiers’ (author’s f ield notes). This 
exclusionary view of what constituted membership persisted even after 
the camp was disbanded, preventing the renewal of activism and energy 
and further demobilizing activists. Dysfunctions in the camp – such as 
inter-personal conflicts and disagreements over safety and drug use – as 
well as a lack of clarity and unity around goals contributed to the decline 
of participation in Occupy Pittsburgh activities.
General assemblies (both in Pittsburgh and elsewhere) proved incapa-
ble of providing space for coordination and cooperation among working 
groups,20 and efforts to create a more formal process for such coordination 
failed, mainly due to attrition (author’s f ield notes). And while social media 
were helpful for turning out activists and providing an easy way for OWS 
activists to establish broad communication networks, as with the general 
assemblies, the absence of a process for ensuring mutually respectful and 
equitable participation and for holding individual participants accountable 
to shared norms led many to abandon the movement in disgust. Moreover, 
many of the active participants in the social media sites were not involved 
in the working groups or public activities of Occupy Pittsburgh, creating a 
disconnect between real-time practices and online discourses (author’s f ield 
notes). Beyond Pittsburgh, the limitations of the anti-organizational logic 
of connective action behind the OWS protests is evident in the diff iculties 
national USSF leaders had in even identifying individual OWS activists 
whom they could invite to movement-building strategy meetings.21 Desbos 
and Royall point to similar organizational challenges in their analysis.
The experience of both the USSF process and OWS shows that collective 
movement identity is not a prerequisite for mass mobilization in an age 
20 Their timing and the absence of pre-announced agendas and end-times made it diff icult 
for those with regular work schedules to attend. As a middle-aged woman and a newcomer to 
Pittsburgh, I also found the sessions I attended to be uninviting if not hostile (see also Anony-
mous, 2012).
21 Notes from NPC planning call held in October 2012.
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where social media and other forms of communication technology abound, 
and where economic globalization and crisis have generated greater com-
monality in people’s experiences of capitalist exploitation and marginaliza-
tion. However, the work of developing individual activists’ commitment to 
a collective political project remains important to sustaining large-scale 
action over time. The physical spaces in which the contemporary anti-
austerity mobilizations have taken place have enabled participants to have 
inspiring but brief experiences of community and radical democracy. But 
the socially and geographically situated confrontational and temporary 
nature of these spaces has limited the ability of activists to sustain their 
engagement over the long term. It has also inhibited a diversity of social 
groups participating in these protests. On the other hand, the WSF process 
has been able to articulate a process that has at least created a structure 
within which activists can work to build unity among diverse movements 
and identity groups. However, it continues to struggle to sustain a sense of 
community, mutual solidarity, and long-term commitment that is essential 
to overcome the constant pressure – created by the logic of capitalism it 
confronts – “of disaggregation into its individual components” (Juris 2012: 
266).
* * *
Movements for global economic and ecological justice are seeking to engage 
opportunities created by the political moment of deepening crisis and 
popular uprising. It is useful to know what accomplishments and strengths 
established movements can bring to the new or re-engaged activists who 
have emerged in the recent wave of anti-austerity protests. However, it is 
also important to note how the logics and modes of action characteristic 
of earlier struggles might be limited for engaging activists who are part of a 
culture that emphasizes logics of connectivity and digital communications.
The global justice movement and World Social Forums can inform an 
emancipatory project that connects activists and groups across different 
generations and logics of political action. First, the global justice move-
ment’s work in mobilizing resistance to economic globalization can inform 
a deeper analysis among contemporary activists that connects local griev-
ances with global structures and institutions. Second, global justice activists 
have long been articulating and practicing alternatives to capitalism, and 
a good deal of space in the WSFs is devoted to sharing experiences and 
supporting these alternatives. The opportunities to experience these alter-
natives helped motivate and inspire many OWS and other anti-austerity 
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activists, but the context meant that these were often short-lived. Without 
connections to community groups or other established sources of support, 
the projects could not be sustained once the encampments ended. In the 
social forums, such foundations are intact. Third, the WSF process has 
stressed the importance of long-range work of movement-building, which 
was missing at least in the early waves of OWS and anti-austerity protests 
(see Smith 2012). However, the more recent efforts of USSF organizers to 
engage with some of the enduring OWS networks, and the participation of 
OWS and anti-austerity activist networks in the 2013 WSF in Tunis, show 
how the form and process of the WSF can help give this new wave of activists 
a focal point that can sustain their collective energies and visions.
This look at the ongoing work of activists in the US and WSF process 
to respond to the recent surge of anti-austerity protests suggests that the 
networking logic that has characterized the global justice movement, ar-
ticulated through the concretized practices developed in the WSF process, 
may be important for connecting the knowledge and experience of past 
movement with the new energy, cultures, and technologies reflected in 
contemporary protests. One key factor that must be resolved, however, is 
the integration of individual activists into a long term movement-building 
process. This will require the development of shared identities and com-
mitments that, in turn, will need to be developed from the integration of 
the diverse experiences and values of participants rather than from some 
existing model. More activists are recognizing the need to move beyond 
familiar templates of action and modes of commitment as they articulate 
a need for “social forums of a new type”. Such work to develop new organ-
izing and identity forms is cultural work, and it seems that the cultural 
challenge posed by OWS and other recent protests was most appealing to 
a larger, non-activist public. While this recognition of the importance of 
culture permeates most movements of the past and indeed has always been 
important in the WSFs, the struggle to make cultural work more central to 
social movements remains.
We might revisit the puzzle of the disconnect in the diverse streams of ac-
tivism between the logics of collective and connective action, including how 
larger structural changes in society have shaped these logics. To survive and 
succeed, movements must mobilize new generations of activists and unite 
them in common struggles. In light of the relationships between collective, 
organizational actors and individuals outlined in the f igure reproduced 
from Bennett and Segerberg, we might ask whether there is a need for a 
self-conscious attempt to develop more organizationally brokered networks 
that can translate between the logics of connective and collective action 
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and help link global justice movements with the generation of activists 
more accustomed to using digital technology and online communications. 
The mutual engagement and learning that is possible at the intersections of 
movements and moments can lead to innovative practices that will radically 
transform political activism and the societies that shape it. In any case, it is 
clear that an appreciation of the different organizational and cultural logics 
shaping World Social Forum and anti-austerity activism can help address 
some of the tensions that have inhibited greater convergence among these 
parallel emancipatory initiatives.
Bibliography
Anonymous. 2012. ‘Occupy – The End of the Affair’, Social Movement Studies, 11 (3-4): 441-445.
Bennett W. Lance, Segerberg Alexandra. 2012. ‘The Logic of Connective Action: Digital Media 
and the Personalization of Contentious Politics’, Information, Communication & Society, 
15: 739-768.
Byrd C. Scott, Jasny Lorien. 2010. ‘Transnational Movement Innovation and Collaboration: An 
Analysis of World Social Forum Networks’, Social Movement Studies, 9 (4): 355-372.
Della Porta Donatella et al. 2006. Globalization from Below: Transnational Activists and Protest 
Networks. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Earl Jennifer, Kimport Katrina. 2011. Digitally Enabled Social Change: Activism in the Internet 
Age. Boston: MIT Press.
Flesher Fomiyana Cristina. 2010. ‘Creating Cohesion from Diversity: The Challenge of Collective 
Identity Formation in the Global Justice Movement’, Sociological Inquiry, 80: 377-404.
Friday George. 2012. ‘Occupy Wall Street and the U.S. Social Forum Movement: Local and 
National Perspectives’, in USSF Updates. Retrieved 6 January 2013 from http://www.us-
socialforum.net/node/372.
Hadden Jennifer. 2011. ‘Pathways to Participation in Transnational Politics at the Copenhagen 
Climate Summit’, International Studies Association Annual Conference, Montreal.
Juris Jeffrey S. 2005. ‘Social Forums and their Margins: Networking Logics and the Cultural 
Politics of Autonomous Space’, Ephemera, 5: 253-272.
—. 2008. ‘Spaces of Intentionality: Race, Class and Horizontality at the United States Social 
Forum’, Mobilization, 13: 353-372.
—. 2012. ‘Reflections on #Occupy Everywhere: Social Media, Public Space, and Emerging Logics 
of Aggregation’, American Ethnologist, 39: 259-279.
Juris, Jeffrey S., Khasnabish Alex (eds.). 2013. Insurgent Encounters: Transnational Activism, 
Ethnography, and the Political. Durham: Duke University Press.
Lichterman Paul. 1996. The Search for Political Community: American Activists Reinventing 
Commitment. New York: Cambridge University Press.
López Alfredo. 2007. ‘The Organic Internet’, in López Alfredo et al. (eds.), The Organic Internet: 
Organizing History’s Largest Social Movement. New York: May First/People Link: 7-41. 
Retrieved 6 January 2013 from https://mayfirst.org/sites/default/f iles/organicinternet.1.5.pdf.
Markoff John. 1996. Waves of Democracy: Social Movements and Political Change. Thousand 
Oaks: Pine Forge Press.
226 jAcKie SMitH 
Massiah Gustave. 2012a. ‘The Future of the World Social Forum International Council’. Retrieved 
4 January 2013 from http://www.ritimo.org/article4568.html.
—. 2012b. ‘Ref lections on the Current Social Forums Process’, WSF International Council, 
Dhaka, 23rd November 2011. Retrieved 4  January 2013 from http://www.cadtm.org/
Reflections-on-the-current-social.
NPC (US Social For um National Planning Committee). 2012 . ‘Meeting notes 
6-8  January’. Retrieved 4  January 2013 from http://wiki.ussocialforum.net/wiki/
Jan_6-8_NPC_Planning_Meeting_Notes.
Pickerill Jenny, Krinsky John (eds.). 2012. ‘Special Issue: Occupy!’, Social Movement Studies, 11 
(3-4).
Pleyers Geoffrey. 2011. Alter-Globalization: Becoming Actors in the Global Age. Malden: Polity 
Press.
Preparatory Assembly to the World Social Forum. 2012. ‘Another Tunisia is possible, in another 
Maghreb and another world’, World Social Forum, Monastir. Retrieved 4 January 2013 from 
http://ffm-online.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/sozforum1.jpg.
Reitan Ruth, Gibson Shannon. 2012. ‘Climate Change or Social Change? Environmental and 
Leftist Praxis and Participatory Action Research’, Globalizations, 9: 395-410.
Sen Jai. 2003. ‘Tale of Two Charters’, in Sen J. et al. (eds.), Challenging Empires: the World Social 
Forum. Waterman: Third World Institute. Available in Pdf format at www.choike.org.
Smith Jackie. 2012. ‘Connecting Social Movements and Political Moments: Bringing Movement 
Building Tools from Global Justice to Occupy Wall Street Activism’, Interface, 4: 369-382. 
Retrieved 4 January 2013 from http://www.interfacejournal.net/wordpress/wp-content/
uploads/2012/11/Interface-4-2-Smith.pdf.
Smith Jackie, Glidden Bob. 2012. ‘Occupy Pittsburgh and the Challenges of Participatory 
Democracy’, Social Movement Studies, 11 (3-4): 288-294.
Staggenborg Suzanne. 1998. ‘Social Movement Communities and Cycles of Protest: The Emer-
gence and Maintenance of a Local Women’s Movement’, Social Problems, 45: 180-204.
Tarrow Sidney. 1995. ‘Cycles of Collective Action: Between Moments of Madness and the 
Repertoire of Contention’, in Traugott M. (ed.), Repertoires and Cycles of Collective Action. 
Durham: Duke University Press, 89-116.
—. 1988. ‘National Politics and Collective Action’, Annual Review of Sociology, 14: 421-440.
Teivainen Teivo. 2007. ‘The Political and its Absence in the World Social Forum’, Development 
Dialogue, 49: 69-81.
US Social Forum. 2012. ‘Interviews with Maureen Taylor, Michigan Welfare Rights and George 
Friday, Independent Progressive Politics Network’, in USSF Updates, https://www.ussocial-
forum.net/civicrm/mailing/view/?id=87&reset=1.
von Bülow Marisa. 2010. Building Transnational Networks: Civil Society and the Politics of Trade 
in the Americas. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Walton John, Seddon David. 1994. Free Markets and Food Riots: The Politics of Global Adjustment. 
Cambridge: Blackwell.
Whitaker Chico. 2012. ‘World Social Forum Co-founder Chico Whitaker Offers an International 
Perspective on the Occupy Wall Street Movement’, USSF Updates: Newsletter of the U.S. Social 
Forum. Retrieved 4 January 2013 from http://www.ussocialforum.net/node/373.
Wuthnow Robert. 1998. Loose Connections: Joining Together in America’s Fragmented Communi-
ties. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
9 A Global Movement for Real 
Democracy?
The Resonance of Anti-Austerity Protest from Spain and 
Greece to Occupy Wall Street
Leonidas Oikonomakis and Jérôme E. Roos
How do instances of popular protest spread across borders?1 This question, 
which has eluded social scientists for decades, appears to have become more 
salient than ever in the wake of the mass protests that rocked the world in 
the wake of the Arab Spring in early 2011. In this chapter, we look at the dif-
fusion of anti-austerity protests from Spain to Greece to the United States, 
focusing in particular on the claims and organizational forms behind these 
mobilizations. We note that, despite clear local varieties between them, the 
15M movement in Spain, the Movement of the Squares in Greece, and the 
Occupy movement in the United States have a number of basic elements 
in common, most notably their critique of representation, their insistence 
on autonomy from political parties and the state, and their commitment 
to a pref igurative politics based on horizontality, direct democracy, and 
self-organization.
So how did this critique of representation and these alternative or-
ganizational models spread so rapidly across such widely divergent and 
geographically distant contexts? In approaching questions like these, social 
movement scholars have historically drawn on the concept of diffusion. In 
this chapter, we problematize some of the core assumptions behind classical 
diffusion theory and argue that its conceptual framework may be too linear 
to account for the local and transnational dimensions behind these protests. 
Instead of posing a clear-cut distinction between a ‘transmitter’ movement 
and an ‘adopter’ movement, we identify multiple sources of inspiration 
that simultaneously fed into each particular mobilization. We argue 
that – much more than simply mimicking the claims and organizational 
1 The authors would like to thank John Holloway, Donatella Della Porta, Alice Mattoni, Gaston 
Gordillo, Eduardo Romanos, and the editors of this volume for their comments on an earlier 
draft. Any remaining errors or omissions are our own. This chapter develops the same argument 
as in a previous publication (Roos and Oikonomakis 2014) from a global and more theoretical 
perspective, emphasizing the commonalities between the various national instantiations of 
what we call the Real Democracy Movement.
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models of movements elsewhere – each of the aforementioned mobiliza-
tions drew upon extensive local movement experience and pre-existing 
activist networks to develop its own autonomous and horizontal forms of 
self-organization. Rather than mindlessly copying models from elsewhere, 
activists drew inspiration from other movements to activate latent poten-
tialities for mobilization back home. We refer to this process as a pattern 
of resonance.
Finally, we hypothesize that the claims and tactics of the movements 
resonated due to the shared background against which they occurred: the 
dramatic deepening of a ‘crisis of representation’ in the wake of the 2008 
f inancial meltdown and the consequent First World debt crisis. We also 
note that this crisis of representation – expressed in a dramatic fall of public 
trust in political representatives and democratic institutions – has been 
particularly deep in Spain and Greece, while it was also very pronounced 
in the United States. For our research, we draw on extensive participant 
observation in the occupations of Puerta del Sol in Madrid and Syntagma 
Square in Greece, as well as several return trips to both Greece and Spain 
for the shooting of two documentaries. We also rely on dozens of informal 
conversations held with fellow activists in both countries; independent 
research for the activist blog ROAR Magazine, of which we are the editors; 
and participation in Take the Square, the international commission of 15M 
in Spain, of which one of us was an organizer.2 Through Take the Square, 
we were actively involved in the transnational coordination of two days 
of global action (17 September 2011, the day Occupy Wall Street began, and 
15 October 2011, when protests took place in over 1,000 cities in 80 countries 
on all inhabited continents).3
This chapter is divided into four parts: the f irst briefly discusses the 
theory of diffusion and introduces the concept of resonance; the second 
deals with the occupation of Puerta del Sol in Madrid; the third looks at 
the occupation of Syntagma Square in Athens; and the fourth deals with 
the occupation of Wall Street in New York. In the conclusion we briefly 
2 Oikonomakis was present for most of the duration of the occupation of Syntagma Square; 
Roos joined for two weeks in late June and early July and also spent two weeks in Madrid in July 
2011. Both authors returned to Athens several times, including for the shooting of a documentary 
on the occupation of Syntagma Square in March 2012 (Utopia on the Horizon, 2012). Roos returned 
to Madrid on f ive occasions between 2011 and 2013 for protest-related activities and the shooting 
of an (unreleased) documentary on the 15M movement.
3 For the numbers, see for instance the following report in The Guardian on 14 November, 
‘Occupy protests arounds the world: full list visualised’. Retrieved 1 May 2014 from http://www.
theguardian.com/news/datablog/2011/oct/17/occupy-protests-world-list-map. 
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discuss our f indings and propose that the mobilizations in Greece, Spain, 
and the United States were about more than just austerity – they were part 
of a transnational cycle of struggles for real democracy.
Our Argument: Not Diffusion but Resonance
The concept of diffusion has long been used by social scientists to describe 
the process by which certain ideas or practices are disseminated within or 
between countries. In his original formulation, Katz (1968: 178) described 
diffusion as “the acceptance of some specif ic item, over time, by adopt-
ing units – individuals, groups, communities – that are linked both to 
external channels of communications and to each other by means of both 
a structure of social relations and a system of value, or culture”. Building 
on this formulation, social movement scholars have identif ied a number 
of elements that are essential to the process, namely: (1) a ‘transmitter’; 
(2) an ‘adopter’; (3) an ‘item’; and (4) a ‘channel’ through which the item 
reaches the adopter from the transmitter. Most of the academic debate on 
diffusion has focused on what channels for diffusion matter more: the direct 
channel, by which diffusion occurs through pre-existing contacts between 
the transmitting and adopting movements (a process also referred to as 
relational diffusion); the indirect channel, through non-personal links like 
the mass media, social media, or word of mouth (non-relational diffusion); 
or a combination or interplay of the two (McAdam and Rucht 1993). Tarrow 
(2005) has further noted that diffusion can also be mediated by a third party 
fulf illing the role of a broker.
As this brief discussion reveals, the concept of diffusion hinges funda-
mentally upon a clear-cut distinction between the transmitter and the 
adopter, and assumes a linear relationship running from the former to the 
latter. In this chapter, we argue that these assumptions fail to capture the 
complexity of the pattern by which recent protest movements actually 
spread across such radically different contexts. Instead, we suggest that each 
of the national movements drew on a combination of: (1) shared indignation 
with the structural conditions of a deepening crisis of representation, and (2) 
pre-existing autonomous activist networks and extensive local movement 
experience with horizontal modes of self-organization. The occupations 
of public squares in Madrid, Athens, and New York took off thanks to the 
inspiration provided by multiple movements in other countries, whose 
perceived successes motivated protesters back home to translate their 
common grievances and local movement experience into action. Instead 
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of assuming the adopter’s mindless imitation of a ‘transmitter’ movement, 
we therefore switch our focus to the conscious process whereby endogenous 
potentialities for mobilization – which already lay dormant in each of the 
national contexts – are actualized through the inspiration drawn from 
successful movements elsewhere.
We refer to this process as a pattern of resonance. The concept of reso-
nance is not new. In their 2008 pamphlet, The Coming Insurrection, the 
Invisible Committee already noted that “revolutionary movements do not 
spread by contamination, but by resonance. Something that is constituted 
here resonates with the shock wave emitted by something constituted over 
there” (p. 6). Seen in this light, protest movements are “not like a plague 
or forest f ire – a linear process which spreads from place to place after an 
initial spark”, but rather take the shape of sound waves, which, “though 
dispersed in time and space, succeed in imposing the rhythms of their own 
vibrations, always taking on more density” (ibid). Rather than a series of 
copycat movements that simply imitate the ideas and practices of some 
more innovative ‘vanguard’ movement elsewhere, we see shared structural 
conditions between – and historical continuities within – each of the lo-
cal contexts. The combination of these shared structural conditions and 
pre-existing activist networks and local movement experience shapes the 
potentialities for mobilization, which can in turn be actualized through the 
inspiration provided by successful movements elsewhere. Note that ‘suc-
cessful’ here does not necessarily refer to a particular movement achieving 
its declared objectives but rather to its immediate success in mobilizing a 
large segment of the population behind a common cause.
Holloway (2005) has described the phenomenon of resonance in similar 
terms in connection with the Zapatistas’ influence on the global justice 
movement, arguing that “there is no linear progression here. It is not the 
spread of an organisation that we are speaking of […] Neither is it really 
a question of the spread of an influence from Chiapas […] It is rather a 
question of resonance and inspiration”. Selbin (2009), meanwhile, has 
explained the spread of revolutionary movements through a comparable 
concept of mimesis, which, as opposed to mimicry, emphasizes how the 
struggle of a group in one place can provide revolutionaries elsewhere 
with the inspiration to start or intensify their own struggles back home. 
As Selbin notes, the process by which one movement inspires another 
is really quite simple, and was captured in a statement by a Nicaraguan 
Sandinista on the Cuban revolution: “if they can do it there, we can do it 
here.” Knight describes essentially the same process when he speaks of a 
‘demonstration effect’:
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The formula seems simple enough: in one place or more, people who 
perceive themselves oppressed learn of others who they can identify 
with who have sought to change the material and ideological condi-
tions of their everyday lives; duly inspired, they too seek to make such 
fundamental and transformational changes. Again, it is worth noting 
that these may be their own ancestors, their contemporaries, or people in 
other places, perhaps nearby but at times far distant – one need look no 
farther than the great swath cut by the Paris Commune or the incredible 
resonance of the Cuban Revolution. (cited in Selbin 2009: 72)
As Knight points out, the resonance of this demonstration effect works not 
only through space but also through time. In fact, social movements may 
very well draw on inspiration provided by movements that preceded them 
within their own countries, as well as the immediate inspiration provided 
by ongoing mobilizations elsewhere. All of this goes to show how the linear 
concept of diffusion, running from the transmitter of an item to its adopter, 
may overlook a very basic affective process by which movements are simply 
inspired to take action by the (perceived) successes of another movement, 
while always building on local experience and networks to mobilize large 
groups of people.
#15M: “No-one Expects the Spanish Revolution”
In trying to uncover the pattern of resonance behind recent anti-austerity 
protests, our story begins in Spain on 15 May 2011, when an independent and 
decentralized citizen platform called Democracia Real YA (DRY), constituted 
by a loose coalition of over 200 social groups and civil society associations, 
organized a large march in Madrid and 57 other cities throughout the 
country. Their aim was to protest the handling of the country’s devastating 
financial crisis, the corrupting power of private banks over government, and 
the unwillingness of political representatives – and the inability of the po-
litical system more generally – to respond to the needs of the people. Under 
the slogan “We are not goods in the hands of bankers and politicians”, up to 
130,000 people took to the streets and made their voices heard in the single 
biggest protest march since the start of the crisis in 2007-2008 (Castells 2012). 
Deliberately unaligned with any political party, DRY effectively functioned 
as an organizing platform for a leaderless convergence of pre-established 
movements aimed at coordinating a broad-based citizen mobilization in 
def iance of the political and f inancial establishment.
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Up until that moment, the people of Spain had already suffered tre-
mendous hardship as a result of the deflation of a massive housing bubble. 
More than one in f ive Spaniards and almost half of the country’s young 
people were out of work, over 11 million people were at risk of falling into 
poverty, and hundreds of thousands of families had been evicted from their 
homes. Meanwhile, bank executives enjoyed impunity as their banks or 
cajas were bailed out by the government after years of reckless speculation 
in the housing market. A little before, in mid-2010, the socialist government 
of Prime Minister Zapatero had made a U-turn in its economic policies, 
shifting from a ‘heterodox’ stimulus package to an orthodox austerity 
budget, putting further stress on the already embattled lower and middle 
classes. With a nominally socialist government now pursuing essentially 
conservative economic policies, the conditions for widespread indignation 
were in place: the market-imposed shift towards austerity took away the 
last remaining grounds on which people could distinguish between the two 
mainstream parties – socialists and conservatives – thus undermining the 
appeal of electoral politics and making other forms of political intervention 
necessary.
As a number of recent surveys clearly illustrate, levels of public trust in 
the political system have fallen to historic lows since the start of the global 
f inancial crisis in 2008, and in particular the onset of the European debt 
crisis in 2010. A Eurobarometer survey found that, while it fell across the 
EU, public confidence in European institutions fell most dramatically in 
Spain: from 65 per cent in 2007 to 20 per cent in 2013, while mistrust was 
up from 23 per cent to 72 per cent (Traynor 2013). Another survey f inds that, 
“compounding their doubts about the Brussels-based European Union, 
Europeans are losing faith in the capacity of their own national leaders to 
cope with the economy’s woes” (Pew Research 2013). Similarly, the European 
Social Survey of April 2013 argues that sky-rocketing unemployment and 
a pervasive sense of social insecurity are responsible for “overall levels 
of political trust and satisfaction with democracy declining across much 
of Europe”, noting that the trend is “particularly notable” in Spain and 
has reached “truly alarming proportions” in Greece (Economic and Social 
Research Council 2013: 16). In response to these f indings, José Ignacio 
Torreblanca, an analyst for the European Council of Foreign Relations, 
remarked that “both debtor and creditor countries basically feel that they 
lost control of what they are doing” (Naumann 2013). He concludes that most 
Europeans “now think that their national democracy is being subverted by 
the way the euro crisis is conducted,” providing evidence for a deepening 
crisis of representation (Traynor 2013).
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This is the structural background against which the initial DRY demon-
stration occurred on 15 May 2011. Following the official march, some clashes 
broke out between protesters and police during a sit-in in Gran Vía, after 
which a group of around 100 protesters marched on the city’s iconic central 
square, the Puerta del Sol. Once there, around 20 of them formed a circle 
to discuss what to do next (conversation with Take the Square organizer 
in May 2012). At some point, one of the DRY organizers suggested to his 
companions that they should act like the Egyptians and camp out in the 
square that night (Elola 2011). Deciding that a coordinated march was not 
enough, the group accepted his proposal, which some later said could have 
been made by anyone else in the group, as it just seemed to be a logical 
evolution to the day’s events (Take the Square organizer). That night, some 
30 protesters camped out in Sol, and the next day, on 16 May the f irst off icial 
assembly was held (El País 2011). As the #spanishrevolution hashtag went 
viral on Twitter, word reached Barcelona, where another group of protesters 
decided to occupy Plaça Catalunya.
In the early hours of 17 May, however, the authorities of Madrid made 
what turned out to be a fateful mistake: they tried to remove the protest-
ers – whose numbers had swelled to 200 – from the square (Hernández and 
Arroyo 2011). The attempted forceful eviction, during which two people were 
arrested and one was injured, immediately backfired. Independently from 
DRY, the protesters who had camped out in Sol disseminated a viral call to 
action via Facebook, Twitter, and SMS: to gather in Sol at 8pm that evening in 
def iance of the authorities and in anticipation of an indefinite occupation. 
That evening, thousands of people gathered in Sol, some of whom organized 
into an impromptu assembly in which the decision was made to set up 
camp and occupy the square (Cortés 2011; Take the Square organizer). As 
the protest grew, Twitter and Facebook were abuzz with a straightforward 
imperative: ¡Toma la Plaza! (‘Take the Square!’) That night, the assembly 
set up its different working groups and committees, appointing a com-
munication team which quickly established links with the 30 other cities 
in which occupations were already under way. Again, hundreds of people 
stayed the night as a large tarp canopy was set up marking the start of a 
Tahrir-style tent camp. Acampada Sol was born. As one sign proclaimed: 
“No-one expects the Spanish revolution!”
Another sign, held up by a teacher, summed up everything that needed 
to be known about the movement’s stance on traditional representative 
politics: “The young took to the streets and suddenly all the political par-
ties got old”. According to a reporter for El País who was embedded in the 
protest camp at Sol from the very beginning, 17 May “revealed the magic 
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of spontaneity. The miracle of communication. The power of spreading the 
message through social networks. The strength of a new generation.” (Elola 
2011) “Tuesday the 17th was magical,” the El País reporter went on: “magical 
because nothing had been prepared. Fed by social networks, a spontane-
ous demonstration bloomed into existence. The 15M protests, by contrast, 
had been the fruit of conscious and conscientious labor. Three months 
of preparation. Tuesday was something else. Something new. Something 
different.”
So where did this sudden rush towards “spontaneous” mass mobilization 
come from? Numerous commentators and activists have rightly stressed 
the precedent of the Egyptian revolution and the occupation of Tahrir 
Square. As one of our friends in Take the Square – who wishes to remain 
anonymous – put it, “Of course Egypt inspired us! The Egyptians showed us 
that it was possible to have a revolution without leaders. That it was possible 
to overthrow a regime through a non-violent occupation of a square. Of 
course that inspired us.” (conversation in January 2013). But while Tahrir 
clearly played a seminal role in inspiring the decision to occupy Puerta del 
Sol, the idea that the 15M movement was therefore ‘diffused’ from Egypt 
and simply imitated the Egyptian revolutionaries seems overly simplistic. 
After all, the practice of occupying public space was not new to all the 
early participants in Acampada Sol, some of whom came out of the city’s 
thriving Okupa (‘squatters’) movement (Flesher Fominaya 2013). Squats 
like Patio Maravillas, which describes itself as an “autonomously governed 
space” and which contains a “HackLab” that was seminal in building up the 
movement’s communications resources, have been experimenting with 
the occupation of public spaces for decades. These hubs played a key role 
in providing experience and resources for the occupation of Sol.
Similarly, the idea of autogestión – or self-management – is well-estab-
lished in Madrid and in Spain more generally. Apart from the country’s 
well-known anarchist tradition of the 1930s, which continues to live on 
today in the anarcho-syndicalist union CNT (but which may not have 
had a very direct impact on the 15M movement), the 1960s witnessed the 
blossoming of a strong movement of neighborhood associations in Madrid. 
Although these associations have since lost most of their radical f lavor, the 
idea of neighborhood assemblies survived and was later reincorporated 
by the 15M movement following the voluntary disbanding of the protest 
camp at Sol. The consensus model of decision-making thus did not ar-
rive at Sol out of a vacuum, nor was it adopted from abroad. Rather, it was 
endogenous to local movement experience and already institutionalized 
at an early stage in the decision-making model of the DRY platform as well 
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as the movements and collectives that constituted the platform. One of the 
core groups in DRY, Juventud Sín Futuro (JSF, ‘Youth Without Future’), was 
created in February 2011 and brought together dozens of movements and 
associations that had been involved in the student resistance against the 
Bologna process in 2008-2009. Many of these groups had been organizing 
through assemblies for years.
Furthermore, to think that Egypt was the sole source of inspiration for 
the movement would be a mistake. First of all, the protesters derived their 
name – the Indignados – from a short pamphlet by French resistance hero 
Stéphane Hessel entitled Indignez-Vous! (2010). Even if the media initially 
made the connection, the protesters themselves also adopted the name. 
Second, Fabio Gándara, the 26-year-old lawyer who set up the digital 
DRY platform with two friends, has claimed that he looked to Iceland’s 
so-called “kitchenware revolution” for inspiration, as did two of the key 
organizers with Take the Square. After all, in 2009, after Iceland’s banking 
sector collapsed, the small country experienced the largest protests in its 
history, leading eventually to the fall of its government, a re-writing of 
its constitution, and the prosecution of banks and politicians held to be 
responsible for the crisis. Does that mean that the 15M movement diffused 
from Iceland, and that Spain merely adopted Icelandic ideas or imitated 
Icelandic practices? Clearly such an assertion makes little sense. Rather, 
just like Egypt’s leaderless struggle for democracy resonated with indignant 
Spaniards, so did Iceland’s popular protests against the bankers and politi-
cians. Others similarly took inspiration from Greece, where the resistance 
to austerity had been f iring up with a number of general strikes, mass 
marches, and widely broadcast riots ever since May 2010. Tellingly, despite 
an unspoken ban on political symbols, the only f lags visible at Sol were 
the Greek, Icelandic, and Spanish Republican flags – the latter indicating 
a degree of historical resonance with the anti-fascist resistance during the 
Spanish Civil War (1936-1939).
The Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca (PAH, ‘platform of mortgage 
victims’) is another example of the multiple sources of inspiration that fed 
into the 15M movement. In late 2010, the platform started one of its most 
visible campaigns – Stop Desahucios – which was aimed at stopping or 
paralyzing foreclosures through direct action. This form of direct action, 
often involving occupations of properties about to be evicted, preceded the 
occupation of the public squares in 2011. Interestingly, the Madrid charter 
of the PAH emerged in close cooperation with CONADEE – the National 
Coordination of Ecuadorians in Spain – which struggles for the rights of 
Ecuadorian migrants. It is worth observing in this respect that Ecuador had 
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a major f inancial crisis of its own in the late 1990s and early 2000s, feeding 
a wave of migration to Spain, where many Ecuadorians took up jobs in the 
booming construction sector. While the number of Ecuadorians in Spain 
stood at only 10,000 in 1998, it climbed to 200,000 in 2002 and hit 500,000 in 
2005 (Weismantel 2008). When the Spanish housing bubble f inally began to 
deflate in 2007-2008, many of these Ecuadorians lost their jobs and could no 
longer afford to pay their mortgages or rent. Since they were heavily affected 
by the crisis, and since they were well organized through CONADEE, and 
since they had already fled from one major debt crisis and could not afford 
to flee from another, the Ecuadorians proved to be a formidable force for 
mobilization in Madrid’s social movement landscape.
In an interview with the authors, Aïda Quinatoa – spokeswoman for 
CONADEE, a key organizer in PAH Madrid, and an active participant 
in the 15M movement – recounted that she helped set up PAH Madrid 
on the basis of what she describes as indigenous Andean values: a com-
munitarian ethos revolving around consensus decision-making. The 
PAH joined DRY two months before 15M, because, as PAH spokesman 
Chema Ruiz recounted, they found in DRY a group of people loyal to the 
same horizontal and autonomous processes as their own – a group that 
organized through popular assemblies just like they had been doing for 
years. And, as would become clear later on, PAH and the DRY were far 
from the only ones.
#25M: “Be Quiet, or You’ll Wake up the Greeks!”
Our story continues in Greece, where on 23 February 2011 – months before 
the occupation of Puerta del Sol – yet another general strike took place, 
and yet another demonstration reached its f inal destination at Syntagma 
Square in front of parliament. As is common with such demonstrations, it 
began to dismantle after a short clash with riot police and the usual tear 
gas bombs, stun grenades, and Molotov cocktails.
At this point, Greece was still at the beginning of her self-destructive 
dance with the Troika of foreign lenders, made up of the European Com-
mission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary 
Fund. The start of this dance had been signalled by Prime Minister Giorgos 
Papandreou’s simple televised message from Kastelorizo island on 23 April 
2010, and the second step was taken on 5 May 2010 with the signing of the 
f irst memorandum of understanding between Greece and the Troika. On 
that day, Athens and other major Greek cities witnessed large-scale protests 
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that ended with the tragic burning down of the Marf in Bank in Stadiou 
Street, Athens, where three employees were burnt alive.
The demonstrations, riots, and general strikes continued throughout 2010 
and 2011 as the Troika kept demanding ever-tighter austerity measures. At 
the demonstration and general strike of 23 February 2011, however, there was 
something different in the air. Inspired by the example of the occupation 
of Tahrir Square that had led to the overthrow of Egypt’s President Hosni 
Mubarak just 12 days before, a group of people from a newly established 
small extra-parliamentary leftist party (MAA, or the Solidarity and Over-
throw Front, which split off from the Coalition of the Radical Left, or Syriza), 
started encouraging protesters to “stay in the square like the Egyptians”. 
The call, however, failed to build up momentum and was ultimately unsuc-
cessful – not least because the sectarian nature of those calling for the 
occupation failed to resonate with the wider population. Still, anti-austerity 
protests continued, and another general strike took place just days before 
the Spanish occupied Puerta del Sol on 15 May 2011.
After 15 May, the news about the occupation of squares across Spain 
spread to Greece, initially through social media and later through the main-
stream media as well. From the very f irst days, a number of Greeks who had 
been involved in the global justice movement and the December Uprising 
of 2008, and others who had personal contacts with people in Spain, started 
following the Spanish mobilizations, and the idea of something similar 
occurring in Greece slowly began to appear – first as a distant prospect, later 
as a serious possibility. “If they did it in Egypt and Spain, why can’t we do it 
here?” the Greeks now seemed to think, inspired by their neighbors on the 
other side of the Mediterranean. From that moment onwards, discussions 
started taking place among activists and previously apolitical citizens, not 
necessarily to ‘imitate’ the Spaniards but rather to adress a widespread 
feeling that the structural conditions in Greece were even worse, and that a 
massive reaction of the people was an absolute necessity. After all, as we saw 
before, the decline of “overall levels of political trust and satisfaction with 
democracy” had reached “truly alarming proportions in Greece” (Economic 
and Social Research Council 2013: 16).
While news about the Spanish Indignados continued to spread through 
social media, and while the mass media also slowly started making refer-
ences to the protests in Spain, a group of Spanish expats living in Greece 
– mainly students but also workers who had not directly participated in 15M 
but whose friends and relatives had – organized the f irst demonstrations in 
solidarity with their compatriots outside the Spanish embassy in Athens. In 
Athens, as elsewhere, the call to action was made through Facebook, and 
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the f irst to join the solidarity protests were some Greeks who happened to 
be in the Spanish community networks (students, friends, and co-workers), 
and some activists from the anarchist groups of Athens. The first action took 
place on 20 May 2011 and soon moved to a nearby area in Thisio. There, the 
Spanish-Greek assembly was set up and the protesters divided into thematic 
groups. Some of the participants also brought their tents and spent the 
night, forming a small acampada. The big issue was how to attract more 
people and achieve a scale shift towards mass mobilization. With that aim 
in mind, the group decided to set up a website, discussed the best domain 
name, and ended up picking real-democracy.gr. The website was set up 
within a day and immediately attracted 6,000 visitors in its f irst 24 hours.
Around the same time, a ‘rumor bomb’ began to circulate on social media 
networks: one of the banners or slogans of the Indignados was rumored 
to have urged protesters in Spain to “be quiet, or else you’ll wake up the 
Greeks”. No photograph or any other form of proof of this claim ever ap-
peared anywhere, but the mass media in Greece soon picked up on the 
story and reproduced the news. It worked. After a group of people from 
Thessaloniki created a Facebook page for the occupation of Lefkos Pyrgos 
and another one for Syntagma and other squares throughout the country 
(Indignants at Syntagma − Αγανακτισμένοι στο Σύνταγμα),4 their call went 
viral. A few days later, on 25 May, a peaceful anti-austerity demonstration 
ended at Syntagma and occupied the square. The occupation of Syntagma 
was to last for 72 days and nights, from 25 May until 30 July 2011. Indicating 
how the movement’s deliberate and self-conscious autonomy from the 
political system directly arose from the deepening crisis of representation, 
Dimitris – a mathematics tutor and playwright who would later evolve into 
a respected facilitator of the Syntagma Popular Assembly – told us that: 
“because it wasn’t a call from a political party or from a union, I thought 
here there might be something happening from the people. That’s why I 
participated.” (interview in March 2012).
4 The Greek movement of the squares is often referred to as the aganaktismenoi, or the 
Greek Indignados. It should be mentioned that this name was coined by the media, which 
saw Syntagma as a copy of Sol. The movement itself never really accepted this term. While the 
Facebook page calling for the occupation was called ‘Indignants at Syntagma’, the people who 
made the call were not the ones who actually occupied the square. For that reason, following 
a suggestion at the Syntagma Popular Assembly on 31 May 2011 (Syntagma Popular Assembly, 
2011), a huge banner was unfurled over the square reading: “We are not indignant, we are 
determined!” The banner remained there for the duration of the occupation, highlighting the 
Greeks’ self-conscious refusal to simply ‘emulate’ their Spanish counterparts.
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So how did the occupation adopt its autonomous, horizontal, and direct 
democratic model of decision-making? Dimitris was unequivocal about 
the movement’s sources of inspiration: “what happened in Egypt, what 
happened in Spain – it’s not irrelevant for what happened here in Greece. 
Or what’s happening now. Or what’s going to happen.” Like Niki, a young 
activist who participated in both the 15M movement in Spain and the 
movement of the squares in Greece, Dimitris similarly stressed how the 
struggle of the Egyptians and Spaniards resonated with the revolutionary 
desires of many Greeks. At the same time, however, to claim that the move-
ment was therefore diffused from Spain or Egypt would again be overly 
simplistic. For one, Greece’s social movements themselves have extensive 
experience with direct democracy and self-organization, and Athens had 
a well-formed pre-existing network of autonomous activist collectives, 
ranging from the city’s well-known anti-authoritarian movement centered 
around the anarchist neighborhood of Exarchia to the various offshoots of 
the global justice movement – including the No Border Camps and other 
migrant rights movements and civil society organizations – many of which 
have been organizing through assemblies for years.
After Syntagma was occupied, a large banner was unfurled outside the 
Spanish Embassy – and later in front of parliament – reading: ¡Estamos 
despiertos! ¿Que hora es? ¡Ya es hora de que se vayan! (‘We are awake! What 
time is it? Time for them to go!’). The reference was not only to Spain, but 
also to the famous slogan of protesters in Buenos Aires during the Argentine 
crisis of 2001-2002: ¡que se vayan todos! (‘Away with them all!’). Another very 
popular slogan at the square was “One magical night, just like in Argentina, 
let’s see who will get on the helicopter f irst!”, referring to the escape of 
President De la Rua from the Presidential Palace following the spontaneous 
popular uprising of 19 and 20 December 2001 in Buenos Aires. Meanwhile, 
the crowd-funded Greek documentary Debtocracy was being screened in the 
square, detailing the experience of Ecuador and how the pressure of social 
movements there helped the country to repudiate its odious debt. During 
protests, slogans like “Bread, Education, Freedom!” – borrowed from the 
occupation of the Athens Polytechnic in 1973 which marked the beginning 
of the end of the dictatorship of the colonels – were regularly chanted by the 
protesters, indicating the historical resonance of past grassroots struggles 
for democracy. In a word, multiple sources of inspiration simultaneously 
converged upon the square.
Within days, the nightly protests in front of parliament swelled to over 
100,000 protesters for several nights on end. Although the exact numbers 
remain very diff icult to calculate, it is estimated that as many as 2.6 million 
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people either ‘occupied’ or ‘passed by’ – but in any case experienced – 
Syntagma Square in those days, constituting half of the population of 
Attica, the administrative region to which Athens belongs (Sotiris 2011 
cited in Leontidou 2012). From the very f irst day of the occupation at 
Syntagma, a general assembly was organized in the square. The group 
that had previsouly set up camp in Thisio, having the experience and the 
equipment of the previous days, provided the microphone set-up and the 
f irst facilitators. The anarchists of Exarchia, who were initially reluctant 
to join the protests because of their seemingly ‘apolitical’ character, later 
did join in and brought a better sound system to facilitate the assemblies 
and live concerts. In Athens, the anarchists’ influence on the occupations 
appeared to be stronger than in Madrid – something that was illustrated 
in the refusal of the Greeks to embrace the “real democracy now” slogan, 
which many argued could be wrongly construed as a liberal argument 
for a properly functioning representative democracy. Instead, the Greeks 
embraced the more explicitly anarchist-inspired slogan “direct democracy 
now” (Sotirakopoulos and Sotiropoulos 2013).
The General Assembly of Syntagma and its thematic working groups 
summarized their demands in two claims: (a) cancel the memorandum of 
understanding and prevent the vote on the mid-term agreement of 29 June 
2011; and (b) ‘real, direct democracy’ in the country, since the representative 
parliamentary system was seen as having become submissive to local and 
foreign f inancial interests. Although the f irst demand was restricted to the 
Greek political reality of the time, the second transcended national borders. 
Of course, the General Assembly of Syntagma Square was not fully aware 
of what direct democracy exactly was, how it could be achieved, whether it 
could be practised on a large scale – beyond a small village or a square – and 
so on; but what the protesters did know was that the current system simply 
did not represent them, and that some kind of alternative had to be devised. 
And so, in their quest for real democracy – and in between other initiatives 
directed towards the more urgent f irst demand – the square embarked on a 
journey to “discover and explore” a new model, directly experimenting with 
consensus decision-making in the assemblies and organizing educational 
initiatives detailing the experiences of other autonomous movements. In 
the spring and summer of 2011, Syntagma essentially reflected Holloway’s 
summary (1996) of the Zapatista motto: preguntando caminamos (‘asking 
we walk’).
One such initiative was organized on 17 June 2011, the “Day of Popular 
Information and Discussion on Direct Democracy”. Apart from the academ-
ics invited to speak on the issue, there were also two speakers who had some 
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practical experience with direct democratic experiments: WWII resistance 
hero Manolis Glezos, who had practised direct democracy in his village on 
Naxos island while he was mayor there, and Professor Stavros Stavridis, 
who had come across the Zapatista reality while involved in the ‘School for 
Chiapas’ campaign – highlighting the existence of both local experience and 
inspiration from abroad. The Zapatista experience was discussed at least 
once more at Syntagma, on 8 July 2011, with the main speaker (via Skype) 
being the well-known Mexican activist Gustavo Esteva. Given this recurrent 
interest in living examples of direct democracy, the Greek movement of 
the square – like its counterpart in Spain – went far beyond being a mere 
anti-austerity protest: it began to actively explore alternatives to liberal 
democracy, openly experimenting with autonomous and horizontal modes 
of self-organization.
#27S: “America’s Tahrir Moment”
At some point in early July 2011, while we were embedded in the Multimedia 
Team at Syntagma Square writing daily reports for ROAR Magazine and 
assisting in the coordination of transnational actions – like the upcoming 
global day of action of 15 October – and the dissemination of informa-
tion to other movements elsewhere, we received an email on the Take the 
Square account. It was Micah White, senior editor of the Canadian activist 
magazine Adbusters. Micah had an important piece of information to share 
with us: together with editor Kalle Lasn, he was about to launch a ‘tactical 
brief ing’ to the 90,000-strong Adbusters network calling for the occupation 
of Wall Street. Kalle and Micah now wanted advice from European activists 
on how to bring about the kind of scale shift required for such an occupation.
As with the occupations of Sol and Syntagma, the call to Occupy Wall 
Street did not arise out of a vacuum. Just as in Europe, there has been a 
long-term trend in the United States of declining levels of public trust in 
political leaders and institutions – a trend that was gravely intensif ied by 
the handling of the 2008 f inancial crisis. At the time of writing, Gallup’s 
most recent annual trust poll found that only 19 per cent of Americans trust 
the government to do what is right “just about always” or “most of the time”, 
while 81 per cent trust the government to do what is right only “some of 
the time” or “never” (Gallup 2013). The same numbers stood at 32 per cent 
and 67 per cent, respectively, during George W. Bush’s second term. Going 
back even further, to 1960, 73 per cent of Americans still believed their 
government would do the right thing “just about always/most of the time”. 
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Less than half the American population now trusts the federal govern-
ment to handle international and domestic problems, marking a 25-point 
decline since Gallup f irst asked the question in 1972, while 66 per cent are 
convinced that legislators “never” or only “some of the time” do the right 
thing – marking an inversion from 2002, when public trust in legislators 
stood at 67 per cent. Two leading pollsters for former Presidents Bill Clinton 
and Jimmy Carter remark that “this harrowing lack of trust in confidence 
in politicians and institutions today has been a long time coming […] As 
it stands, our system only serves the elite, not the mass public. And the 
American people know it.” (Schoen and Caddell 2013: online).
As in Greece and Spain, part of the Americans’ frustration with the 
Democratic government may reside in the fact that a nominally progressive 
or center-left government ended up following an essentially conservative 
neoliberal policy package, thus leaving little to no room for distinction be-
tween the dominant political parties. President Obama, who had mobilized 
a large contingent of grassroots liberal activists to support him in his f irst 
election campaign, in fact reproduced and intensif ied many of the policies 
of the Bush era, most notably the massive Wall Street bailouts and the failure 
to bring about meaningful f inancial reform, thus leaving the economic 
problems of most Americans largely unaddressed, condemning millions 
to unbearable levels of student, mortgage, credit card, and medical debt. 
Even though the federal government and the Federal Reserve remained 
committed to a mild form of f iscal and monetary stimulus, at the municipal 
and state level, austerity budgets were already starting to bite. This trend 
f irst came to light in California in 2009, where budget cuts in education at 
the state level and large losses in university endowments following the Wall 
Street meltdown forced the University of California Board of Regents to an-
nounce a 32 per cent rise in tuition fees, sparking a wave of student protests 
and campus occupations across the state. An influential text written by 
the Research and Destroy collective at UC Santa Cruz, Communiqué from 
an Absent Future, resonated widely among America’s “graduates without a 
future” (Mason 2013).
The California student protests of 2009 were not the only anti-austerity 
mobilizations in the US to precede Occupy. In June 2011, a coalition of NGOs 
and movement organizations called New Yorkers Against Budget Cuts made 
a call to action to set up a protest camp – nicknamed ‘Bloombergville’ in 
reference to New York City mayor Michael Bloomberg – in City Hall Park, 
New York, vowing “to stay till Bloomberg’s budget is defeated” (NYABC 
2011). The Bloombergville initiative, in turn, was inspired by the Walkerville 
occupation that had been staged by workers in Wisconsin earlier in June. 
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Wisconsin was itself emerging from the 100,000-strong labor union protests 
that had taken place in February following Governor Walker’s move to 
abolish collective bargaining rights as part of a radical new austerity budget. 
The occupation of Wisconsin’s State Capitol occurred around the same 
time as the Egyptian revolution and strongly resonated with it. And in 
July 2011, a coalition of social movements and organizations called Anticut 
organized a series of anti-austerity marches in the San Francisco Bay Area. 
A group of explicitly anti-capitalist activists in Oakland – called ‘Bay of 
Rage’, in reference to Egypt’s Day of Rage – released a communiqué stating 
the following:
Now, f inally, the money is gone. The world has run out of future, used it 
up, wasted it on the grotesque fantasies of the rich, on technologies of 
death and alienation, on dead cities. Everywhere the same refrain, the 
same banners and headlines: there is nothing left for you. From the US to 
Greece, from Chile to Spain, whatever human face the State might have 
had: gone. The State is no longer a provider of education or care, jobs 
or housing. It is just a police force, a prison system, a bureaucracy with 
guns. (Bay of Rage 2011)
On 9 June, a month before Micah White contacted Take the Square and 
launched the call to Occupy Wall Street, Adbusters had already emailed its 
followers arguing that “America now needs it own Tahrir”. Greece, Spain, 
and Egypt thus had a clear influence on activists on the other side of the 
Atlantic. Indeed, according to Micah White and Kalle Lasn, “the spirit of this 
fresh tactic, a fusion of Tahrir with the acampadas of Spain” was captured 
in a quote by professor and Barcelona-based activist Raimundo Viejo: “The 
anti-globalization movement was the f irst step on the road. Back then our 
model was to attack the system like a pack of wolves. There was an alpha 
male, a wolf who led the pack, and those who followed behind. Now the 
model has evolved. Today we are one big swarm of people” (Adbusters 2011). 
Meanwhile, Micah and Kalle deliberately distanced themselves from the 
organizing process in New York so as to avoid being seen as leaders: “our 
role […] could only be […] to get the meme out there and hope that local 
activists would empower themselves to make the event a reality,” Micah 
White told David Graeber (2013: 36). In a way, Adbusters simply fulf illed 
the same function as the group of Thessaloniki activists who set up the 
Facebook page with the call to occupy Syntagma Square.
David Graeber (2011a, online) has recounted in great detail the process 
that led up to the actual occupation of Zuccotti Park. In the early days, on 
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2 August, Graeber responded to an invitation by a Greek anarchist to join a 
‘General Assembly’ at Bowling Green, where a discussion was to be held on 
how to respond to Adbusters’ call to action and organize for the Wall Street 
protest on 17 September. Once he arrived there, however, he found a meeting 
that had been ‘hijacked’ by a group of veteran protesters associated with 
the Worker’s World Party (WWP). Far from being interested in a genuine 
leaderless assembly, the group imposed its own hierarchical structures and 
demands on those assembled. Speech after speech was held dictating to 
participants the rules and terms of the protest that was to be held. Fed up, 
Graeber and a number of friends he recognized from his time in the global 
justice movement decided to break away and form their own circle at the 
margins of the meeting and hold an assembly:
We realized we had an almost entirely horizontal crowd: not only 
Wobblies and Zapatista solidarity folk, but several Spaniards who had 
been active with the Indignados in Madrid, a couple of insurrectionist 
anarchists who had been involved in the occupations at Berkeley a few 
years before, a smattering of bemused onlookers who had just come 
to see the rally, maybe four or f ive, or an equal number of WWP (not 
including anyone from the central committee) who reluctantly came 
over to monitor our activities… (Graeber 2013: 36)
Eventually, this group of ‘horizontals’ managed to draw most participants 
in the meeting away from the WWP, with its hierarchical and central-
ized leadership, and organized itself into the New York General Assembly 
(NYGA), which was to become the key decision-making platform for Occupy 
Wall Street. The assembly quickly made a couple of key decisions that were 
to determine much of the movement’s nature and course over the months 
to come. During the NYGA’s regular meetings in Tompkins Square Park, 
which featured “a smattering of activists who had been connected to the 
global justice movement” and a large group of younger participants “who 
had cut their activist teeth on the Bloombergville encampment” earlier that 
summer, it was decided that “what we really wanted to do was something 
like had already been accomplished in Athens, Barcelona, or Madrid: occupy 
a public space to create a New York General Assembly, a body that could 
act as a model of genuine, direct democracy to counterpose to the corrupt 
charade presented to us as ‘democracy’ by the US government” (Graeber 
2011a).
As a result of this rejection of representative institutions, numerous 
participants and observers have noted the anarchist roots of the Occupy 
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movement, as well as its continuities with the similarly anarchist-inspired 
global justice movement (Graeber 2011b, 2011c, 2002). It may be noted that 
these anarchist roots were both organizational, ref lected in the move-
ment’s direct democratic principles and practices, and personal, arising 
from the presence of anarchists and anarchist-inspired activists among 
the core group of organizers. Sociologist Williams (2012) thus notes that 
“the most immediate inspiration for Occupy is anarchism” and even goes 
so far as to claim that anarchism forms the very “DNA” of the movement. 
Similarly, taking note of the somewhat curious nature of the “We are the 
99%” slogan, Paolo Gerbaudo has identif ied the ideology of contemporary 
movements like Occupy and the Indignados in a non-pejorative sense as 
“anarcho-populism” (2013). Anarchism, then, with its long history of revo-
lutionary struggle against both capital and the state, and with its embrace 
of autonomy and horizontality as key organizational principles, can be 
understood as an increasingly dominant trend within contemporary anti-
capitalist movements, not least the ones in Spain, Greece, and the United 
States discussed in this chapter.
The claim that Occupy Wall Street was somehow diffused from a single 
transmitting movement like the Spanish Indignados therefore seems to 
overlook the multiple sources of inspiration that simultaneously converged 
upon New York’s activist community as well as the latent potentialities 
for mobilization that already lay dormant within the US context. To be 
sure, there was a degree of relational diffusion here, as Spanish expats who 
participated in the occupation of Puerta del Sol were also actively involved 
in the core group of Occupy organizers (Romanos 2013). But there were 
also Greek anarchists involved as well as Zapatista-inspired autonomists, 
ex-occupiers from Bloombergville, and former alter-globalization veterans. 
The convergence of these multiple sources of inspiration, combined with 
the existence of pre-established autonomous activist networks and local 
horizontal movement experience, produced an interesting blend of ideas 
and tactics that appears to defy the somewhat simplistic linearity of clas-
sical diffusion theory.
And so, during a global day of action against the banks on 17 September 
2011 – coordinated internationally by Take the Square, Global Revolution, 
and several other activist collectives – 5,000 protesters stormed into Lower 
Manhattan and set up camp in Zuccotti Park. As OccupyWallSt.org, the 
unoff icial website for the New York-based movement, later put it, OWS 
sought to “[f ight] back against the corrosive power of major banks and 
multinational corporations over the democratic process, and the role of 
Wall Street in creating an economic collapse that has caused the greatest 
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recession in generations”. Two days after the occupation at Zuccotti took 
off, Lasn and White (2011) wrote an op-ed for The Guardian with a title that 
said it all: “The call to Occupy Wall Street resonates around the world.”
A Lesson in Democracy
Several important conceptual and theoretical questions arise from this 
empirical discussion that seem to challenge the capacity of classical diffu-
sion theory to explain the way in which anti-austerity protests spread across 
Europe and the United States. If the activists in Spain, Greece, and the US 
all claim that they were inspired by several other movements from within 
their own countries as well as from abroad, to what extent is it still justif ied 
to continue speaking of a linear relationship between a single transmitter 
and a series of imitating adopters? If, as the linear conceptualization of 
diffusion would have it, the occupation of Puerta del Sol diffused from 
the occupation of Tahrir Square; Syntagma from Sol; and Zuccotti from 
Syntagma (or was it Sol?), then where did the protests and occupations in 
over 1,000 cities and 80 countries on 15 October 2011 diffuse from? If the 
movements we examined above drew inspiration from multiple sources 
and arose in a shared structural context that instils in all a shared sense 
of indignation with ruling elites and political institutions, and if these 
movements in turn helped to inspire others elsewhere, performing both 
the role of the transmitter and adopter, to what extent does it make sense 
to pose a stark division between the two? How far, in other words, can 
classical diffusion theory really take us?
In order to overcome these conceptual and theoretical challenges, we 
propose – at least in the case of the post-2011 cycle of struggles – to move 
beyond the linear view of diffusion in favor of the non-linear concept of 
resonance. As we theorized in this chapter, and as our empirical discus-
sion further illustrated, the transnational resonance of social mobilization 
is closely connected to the existence of shared structural conditions that 
connect grievances and ease the mutual identif ication between geographi-
cally and historically distant struggles. It also depends on the existence of 
local horizontal movement experience and pre-formed autonomous activist 
networks that can activate their own latent potentialities for mobilization by 
harnessing the ‘shock wave’ emitted by movements elsewhere, translating 
shared indignation into concrete action. Drawing on both a local dimension 
highlighting the latent potentialities for mobilization and a transnational 
dimension highlighting shared structural conditions and foreign sources 
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of inspiration, the concept of resonance may help overcome some of the 
rigidities of a purely linear account.
All of this, however, still leaves us with a bigger question: if the move-
ments we discussed here all claim that political and corporate elites do not 
and cannot represent them – that capitalist democracy is in fact not really 
democratic at all – then is it really justif ied to merely speak of a series of 
‘anti-austerity protests’, or can we identify something more substantive in 
these mobilizations? In our empirical discussion, we briefly tried to show 
that the occupations in Madrid, Athens, and New York each contained both 
a negative and a positive element: they were at once a rebellion against 
austerity and a mobilization for autonomy and real, direct democracy. 
Whether a lasting transnational movement will emerge out of these mobi-
lizations is another question, but what seems clear is that citizens in these 
three countries were asking themselves the same questions at roughly 
the same time: if austerity erases our future, and capitalism is inherently 
anti-democratic, then what is real democracy? And how can we mobilize 
and organize ourselves in order to bring such real democracy about, even 
if only temporarily in pref igurative form?
Some have noted that the general assemblies at Sol, Syntagma, and Zuc-
cotti Park – marking a sort of return to the old Athenian model of the polis 
– may be a seedling of real democracy. More recently, these experiments in 
horizontality have been joined by the neighborhood forums in Istanbul, the 
assemblies in Brazil, and the ‘plenums’ in Bosnia and Herzegovina. So is that 
real democracy? We asked Manolis Glezos, the respected 91-year-old WWII 
resistance hero, direct democracy advocate, and anti-austerity campaigner, 
who is now an MP for the Coalition of the Radical Left (Syriza) in Greece. 
To our initial surprise, Glezos’s stern reply was: “No. This is not democracy. 
How can a few thousand people assembled in a square claim to speak on 
behalf of the millions that live in the region?” But, Glezos continued, “it is 
a lesson in democracy. If this movement is to survive, its direct democratic 
models will need to spread to the neighborhoods and the working places”. 
For real democracy to stand a chance, in other words, the movements will 
have to do a lot more than occupy a square: they will have to revolutionize 
productive social relations and the material basis of everyday life. In this 
sense, 2011 was really only just a beginning.
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Part 4
When the Crisis Is not Enough

10 Camps as the Sole Symbolic 
Expression of Protest
The Diff iculties of Occupy in Ireland
Clément Desbos and Frédéric Royall
Shortly after the start of Occupy Wall Street (OWS) in New York City, a 
number of people set up similar camps in Dublin in early October 2011. 
Following Dublin’s lead, Occupy-style campaigns were soon established in 
some of the Republic of Ireland’s major cities such as Cork, Galway, Limerick, 
and Waterford.1 Though varying in size and in intensity – the occupations 
lasted from between several weeks in the case of Limerick to seven months 
in that of Galway – protesters in each of these cities occupied public spaces 
in community-like encampments and mounted rallies and demonstrations 
attended by citizens numbering anywhere from several dozen to several 
hundred people.
As in New York, Madrid, Buenos Aires, and London, Irish Occupiers 
expressed their anger and frustration over a number of social and eco-
nomic issues. In Ireland, this concerned issues such as falling incomes, 
declining living standards, and crippling public and private indebtedness 
arising from the 2008 economic crisis. What compounded the situation in 
Ireland was the gradual but consistent retreat of the state from many of 
its social welfare commitments combined with the adoption of neoliberal 
privatization practices, especially during the post-1995 ‘Celtic Tiger’ years. 
But however novel Occupy movements may have been around the world 
(Pickerill and Krinsky 2012), Irish occupiers struggled to gain widespread 
public support despite some initial displays of solidarity. The mainstream 
media dedicated some print space and air time to the Indignados in Spain, 
to the Arab uprisings, and to OWS but devoted little space and time to the 
home-grown Occupy campaigns. When it did, the media overwhelmingly 
portrayed the Irish occupiers as irrational activists fueled by anger, despair, 
and frustration. Overall, occupiers sought to challenge such dominant 
depictions by justifying or clarifying their actions to a wary and skeptical 
1 This chapter focuses on two of the camps: Occupy Dame Street (based in Dublin) and Occupy 
Galway.
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public. But despite such noble efforts, we argue that their efforts were of 
limited impact and fraught with diff iculties.
This chapter is based on f ield research carried out between October 2012 
and November 2014. During this period, we interviewed former Occupy 
leaders and activists from Limerick, Galway, and Dublin as well as union 
leaders, community organizers, media f igures, and political activists. We 
also carried out participant observations in protest marches organized by 
Occupy Galway and spin-off organizations in this city in November 2012. 
And finally, we systematically analyzed occupiers’ printed, audiovisual, and 
electronic documents (blogs, minutes, protest videos, correspondence, etc.).
The chapter is divided into two parts. The f irst section briefly reviews 
the country’s recent social and economic context as a backdrop to the 
camps’ establishment. The following section describes Occupy Galway 
and Occupy Dame Street (ODS) in Dublin and presents some of their key 
internal characteristics – non-hierarchical structures, sociological diversity, 
loose network relations, etc. The final section reviews some of the dominant 
ways the camps and activists were depicted, and considers the occupiers’ 
frames of experience and representations so as to assess ODS and Occupy 
Galway’s political signif icance.
Social and Economic Context
Compared to the historically lethargic performance dating from inde-
pendence in the early 1920s, Ireland’s economy underwent a remarkable 
transformation during the 1990s. By 2000, economic growth was averaging 
10 per cent per annum, and there was a solid budget surplus and a very low 
ratio of debt to gross domestic product (GDP). Emigration – the country’s 
perennial nemesis – had virtually disappeared and had been replaced by 
very strong immigration flows from forthcoming European Union accession 
countries such as Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovakia. By the end of the 
decade, however, the high-growth and high-performing economy had fallen 
into a macro-economic abyss. The Celtic Tiger housing boom, the backbone 
of the high-growth and high-performing economy, had been transformed 
into a property market bubble through excessive and reckless credit crea-
tion. Buoyed by strong property-related taxes, successive profligate coali-
tion governments – led by Fianna Fáil from 1997 to 2011 – over-spent and 
under-taxed, thus contributing to the overheated property market bubble 
(Donovan and Murphy 2013). Few political leaders recognized and/or heeded 
the danger signals because the prevailing neoliberal economic ideology 
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suggested that f inancial markets could regulate themselves. Blinded by 
his government’s achievements, the prime minister responded to criticism 
with arrogance.2 But in the face of the unprecedented economic collapse in 
September 2008, the coalition government provided highly controversial 
– and ultimately ruinous – comprehensive guarantees on all deposits and 
borrowings for six troubled Irish-owned banks.3 Despite the guarantees, 
economic growth had plummeted by 2010, the budget def icit had spiralled 
out of control, the debt-to-GDP ratio had risen to over 100 percent, and 
unemployment had increased sharply (see Figure 10.1).4 As the comprehen-
sive guarantees proved to be insuff icient, the government was left with no 
alternative, according to some commentators, but to apply for an emergency 
€85 billion (US$113 billion) rescue package in November 2010 from the 
so-called Troika: the European Commission, the European Central Bank, 
and the International Monetary Fund. In a catastrophic reversal of fortune, 
the property market bubble led to the Celtic Tiger’s fall and the Republic 
entered the most unprecedented and traumatic period in its short economic 
and f inancial history.
In the context of growing economic and f inancial diff iculties, the gov-
ernment was obliged to impose a series of austerity measures such as tax 
increases, reductions in public spending, salary restrictions in the public 
sector, and limits on social welfare entitlements. To some critics, the rise 
and demise of the Celtic Tiger were the result of long-standing free-market 
decisions based on the slavish adoption of a neoliberal agenda that set 
greater importance on kowtowing to international capitalist investors – and 
subsequently on reimbursing the international banking creditors – than 
on the needs of the Irish people (Kirby 2010). Such critics also saw the 
2 “My message to you this morning is about conf idence for the future. Conf idence, in the 
strength of the economy that we have created together over recent decades. […] Conf idence, in 
our own judgement in the face of commentators and others who regularly cast doubt, not only 
on our future, but even on the reality of our past achievements […] There are those who believe 
that our recent successes are an illusion. That they will disappear and we will be back to the 
natural order, an Ireland of unemployment and under-achievement. Some of these voices were 
telling us, not so long ago, that our approach was all wrong. […] They were wrong then, and 
they are still wrong. […] Sitting on the sidelines, cribbing and moaning is a lost opportunity. I 
don’t know how people who engage in that don’t commit suicide”. Bertie Ahern, Taoiseach, Irish 
Congress of Trade Unions, Bundoran, 4 July 2007.
3 The banks covered were the Allied Irish Bank, the Bank of Ireland, the Anglo Irish Bank, the 
Irish Life & Permanent, which owned Permanent TSB, the Irish Nationwide Building Society, 
and the Educational Building Society.
4 For an overview of the 2008 crisis and its international ramif ications, see Ross’s chapter in 
this volume.
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emergency rescue package as imposing a signif icant burden on the most 
vulnerable members of society.
The austerity and reimbursement measures – imposed f irst by the bank 
guarantees and then by the Troika’s emergency rescue package – led to an 
unprecedented number of anti-austerity demonstrations organized by the 
Irish Congress of Trade Unions. For example, 120,000 people marched in 
Dublin on 21 February 2009,5 and 100,000 did so on 27 November 20106. Also 
significant is that a number of demonstrations and marches were organized 
independently of the trade union movement. These protesters focused 
essentially on the government’s cost-saving measures: the reduction in the 
number of people entitled to medical cards, the reinstatement of third-level 
fees, the cuts in pension entitlements, the reduction in the number of sub-
stitute teachers made available to schools, the closing of local hospitals, the 
reductions in child benefits, etc.7 For example, according to data from the 
5 Retrieved 10  November 2013 from http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/
ALeqM5h-2YAiEAC9OSrsNnMxYl0ZbagLrw.
6 The Observer, 27 November 2010.
7 Dáil Debates, 11 November 2008.
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Irish Times, 25,000 students demonstrated on 3 November 2010, 2,000 people 
marched in an anti-austerity protest in Dublin on 27 November 2011 and, 
one year later, 10,000 people participated in another. By 2013, anti-austerity 
protests were rather common across the country, even if most struggled to 
gather over 5,000 people. Such numbers compare perhaps unfavorably with 
the major anti-austerity protests that took place in other rescue-package 
countries such as Italy, Greece, Portugal, and Spain (Zamponi 2012).8 But 
of key importance in Ireland is that many of these protests focusing on 
economic issues were not organized by the trade union movement and 
thus were of a kind not seen hitherto. What these protests had in common 
was a deep-set opposition to the austerity measures resulting from the 
economic and f inancial crisis and the perceived sense that the country had 




ODS and Occupy Galway were inspired by the Madrid Indignados move-
ment of May 2011 and by the many American Occupy movements that 
were well-established by early October 2011. It is perhaps therefore of 
little surprise that Irish occupiers were inspired by many of the activities, 
structures, and processes drawn from these international protest-tent 
campaigns. ODS started as a campaign launched online by a number of 
people who had been active in various left-leaning organizations including 
Real Democracy Now and who had been interacting via Facebook and 
Twitter.9 The organizers sent out a call on social media for people to attend 
a protest rally on October 8 against the f inancial sector and to attend 
another one on October 15 in support of the global Occupy movement. 
Organizers also posted invitations around central Dublin, and potential 
protesters were told “Yes we camp!” and encouraged to “bring a tent”. 
The protest started as a traditional rally on the afternoon of 8 October 
with approximately 30 people and grew to 150 people in attendance out-
side the Central Bank of Ireland’s main off ice on Dame Street, Dublin. 
8 ‘Workers Across Europe Synchronize Protests’, The New York Times, 14 November 2012. See 
also the various contributions in this volume.
9 Interview, Mo…, female, employee, 20+, Dublin, 7 January 2013.
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Approximately 50 protesters stayed overnight.10 They were soon joined by 
a number of other people and ODS thus got underway. In the following 
days and weeks, a considerable number of Occupy events were organized 
such as media workshops, teach-ins, musical and poetic performances, 
and rallies. By mid-November 2011, the Central Bank announced that 
it would seek a court order to put an end to ODS, but it continued until 
8 March 2012 when the national police force, Garda Síochána, dismantled 
the camp.
For its part, Occupy Galway was launched on 15 October, one week after 
ODS. The occupation started with about 50 people and was timed to link up 
with the international day of solidarity with the global Occupy movement. 
Since it was to have been a one-day event, protesters in Galway did not 
necessarily intend to occupy Eyre Square, but a number of them simply 
stayed on the square when the police did not ask them to move on.11 Off icial 
requests for the camp’s removal only came later when city off icials wrote 
to the occupiers and made public their concerns about health and safety 
issues.
The Occupiers
Overall, there were relatively few occasional occupiers and even far fewer 
permanent occupiers in both Dublin and Galway.12 There were at most 
several dozen occasional occupiers in Dublin and between ten and twenty 
in Galway.13 In the early days, ODS and Occupy Galway brought together an 
interesting mix of people from all walks of life: students, artists, academics, 
trade union activists, service workers, local community organizers, and 
10 Interview, Th…, male, unemployed, 25+, Dublin, 7 January 2013. Once the camp was dis-
mantled, gates were installed, thereby limiting the public’s use of this space.
11 “Superintendant N. Kelly stated that Occupy Galway were not committing an illegal act 
and that he was not aware that there was a national position on the occupation of public places” 
(Minutes of the Galway City Joint Policing Committee, 20 February 2012). The occupation of 
public space was also a feature of the other Irish camps. For instance, Cork and Waterford 
occupiers set up their camps along main thoroughfares (respectively at a main intersection and 
on the quays, both in the heart of the city). By contrast, the Limerick Occupy camp suffered from 
a ‘lack of visibility’ since it was located in a by-street, far removed from the city’s busy shopping 
district and away from through-traff ic.
12 Occasional occupiers spent neither the night nor the entire day at the camp. They were 
around only for a few hours a day. Permanent occupiers, in contrast, stayed day and night. 
13 Much of the information presented in this section is derived from the interviews we did 
of Occupy activists and leaders and, in particular, of those that had participated continuously 
from the very f irst days in October 2011 to their eventual eviction by the police several months 
later.
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seasoned political, social and environmental activists. The occupiers were 
also quite diverse in terms of age, gender, origin, experience of political 
and social activism, and social and economic profile. The mean age of the 
occupiers was below 30. Men and women participated in more or less equal 
numbers.14
Although most of the occupiers were Irish, some European backpackers 
who had been involved in Occupy movements in their own country also 
visited the camps and stayed for short periods. Some of these occasional 
occupiers used their visit to show a type of international solidarity with 
the Irish occupiers, as shown by the posters they drew up in Spanish or in 
French while there. Although some ODS activists knew each other because 
of their involvement in Real Democracy Now,15 most of the occupiers f irst 
met in the camp. Many of the younger occupiers had never before been 
involved in a protest movement and had no clear agenda.16 This was also 
the case in Galway where most of the occupiers did not know each other 
before joining the movement,17 although some of the longer-serving pro-
testers had some experience of activism, notably as part of the Corrib gas 
protest movement.18 One factor that played a key part as the occupations 
moved from autumn to winter and then to spring is that, students apart, a 
majority and growing number of the ODS occupiers came from the more 
disadvantaged sectors of society such as unemployed workers or young 
homeless people.
Because life in the camp was hard and because many sympathizers had 
family or professional obligations, the gender, age, and socio-economic 
mix of the camps soon withered away. In Dublin, for instance, as the camp 
became a haven for an increasing number of very young and homeless 
people, it became less ‘open’ to the general public and more self-fulf illing 
14 Irish occupiers are in many ways sociologically similar to what has been identif ied in other 
Occupy movements around the world (see Benski et al. 2013: 548-50).
15 Interview, Mo…, female, employee, 20+, Dublin, 8 January 2013. Real Democracy Now is a 
group formed out of the 15M movement in Spain. See http://www.realdemocracynowireland.
org/.
16 Interview, He…, female, retired, 65+, Dublin, 19 November 2012. By comparison with OWS, 
the “episode as a whole has become an irresistible magnet for radical academics of the cultural-
theory sort; indeed, for them it seems to have been a sort of holy episode, the moment they were 
waiting for, the putting into practice of their most treasured beliefs” (Frank 2012).
17 Interview, Gil…, male, unemployed, 50+, Galway, 17 November 2012.
18 The Corrib gas project concerned the extraction of a natural gas off the northwest coast of 
Ireland, in County Mayo. This project was opposed by local residents and activists for environ-
mental and security reasons. Several protesters were jailed following confrontations with the 
police in 2005.
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and inward-looking. In such circumstances, we may well ask if the very 
young and homeless people stayed in the camp because they supported 
the movement’s ideals or rather because they were looking for moral or 
material support.
Quite a large public was generally well-disposed to the Occupy move-
ment. If they weren’t, it wouldn’t have lasted as long as it did. That it didn’t 
become a mass, a massive movement is, I think, a case of people saying 
‘What can I do? I can’t go down there, I have a job!’. And, as time went on, 
it is true that the places did start to attract people who had nothing to do 
with it. Just people who thought it was a good place to pan-handle […] 
You just get professional beggars turning up. This was bound to happen. 
I don’t see this as anything particular to the Occupy movement. […] 
All body-politics get inf iltrated by parasites. The Occupy movement is 
nothing special in that case.19
By December, we noticed that most of the permanent occupiers were in 
fact homeless young men. They weren’t really interested in the movement. 
All they really wanted was a place to sleep and to get warm. […] This led 
to a lot of problems.20
Depictions: The Symbolic Background of Mobilization
Along with the diff iculties in ensuring the camps’ social and economic 
diversity, occupiers found it diff icult to develop their mobilization po-
tential.21 One reason for this is that it is particularly tricky for vulnerable, 
underprivileged, or powerless people and groups to ‘voice’ their concerns or 
to impose their vision on society especially when their actions are denied 
political content and/or meaning. When ‘marches’, ‘sit-ins’, or ‘occupations’ 
do take place, they are often interpreted or depicted in negative terms 
by the very people, or by the social categories – the political, social, and/
or economic elites – who have the most to lose from the protests. So it is 
particularly important to understand what the vulnerable, underprivileged, 
or powerless people seek to gain from their actions, that is, how they un-
derstand or give meaning to their actions (Goffman 1967). What may seem 
irrational to an outside observer may make perfect sense to a protester. In 
19 Interview, Da…, male, independent f ilmmaker, 35+, Dublin, 19 February 2013.
20 Interview, Mo…, female, employee, 20+, Dublin, 8 January 2013.
21 For a wider discussion of the impact of Occupy movements, see Benski et al. (2013: 554-557).
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other words, looking at the common and dominant ways that the Occupy 
campaigns were depicted is perhaps not the best way to understand what 
took place or to assess the political signif icance of the events. It is perhaps 
more useful to consider what the occupiers did or said they were doing 
and thus to look at how they challenged the ways they were commonly 
portrayed. When individuals try to understand why they are subjected to 
what they feel to be arbitrary decisions and/or forms of discrimination, their 
subjective feelings may be enough to put in place mobilization processes 
(Gamson 1975). As Snow and Benford suggest, “movement organizations and 
actors are actively engaged in the production and maintenance of meaning 
for constituents, antagonists, bystanders and observers” (1992: 136). We 
will now summarize briefly the main ways that the Occupy camps were 
described before considering the experiences and the representations of 
the occupiers themselves (Snow 2004).
The camps were portrayed in several ways, the majority of them 
negative. In the most common depictions, many small businessmen and 
local politicians scorned and mocked the occupations. The camps were 
condemned as illegal gatherings and the occupiers decried as irrational 
radicals, unpatriotic social misf its, and outdated eco-warriors who were 
carrying out ridiculous actions.22 The mainstream media rarely referred to 
the camps, but in the rare moments that journalists broached the subject, 
the comments had condescending overtones. One such example is a feature 
published in the Irish Times:
I stopped by the Occupy Dame Street protest on the way home the other 
night and what struck me most was how extraordinarily nice the whole 
thing is. It’s so polite and well-behaved that it could almost be some kind 
of civic amenity laid on by City Hall.23
Such commentators were either incapable or unwilling to take the camps 
seriously. ODS and Occupy Galway were also deemed to be socially desta-
bilizing, illegal, and even illegitimate. Local politicians in Galway were 
particularly anxious to dismantle the encampment before the start of a 
major international ocean race in June 2012 so as not to harm the city’s 
international reputation.24 In Dublin, local businesses expressed increasing 
22 Interview, Th…, male, politician, 50+, Limerick, 5 January 2013.
23 Frank McNally, The Irish Times, 15 October 2011.
24 Retrieved 7 November 2013 from http://www.thejournal.ie/unoccupied-gardai-remove-
protesters-from-eyre-square-452640-May2012/.
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levels of dissatisfaction and annoyance as ODS became a permanent local 
f ixture.25 These views were based on the belief that camps were giving the 
country a bad name at a time when all that really mattered was to secure 
tourist revenue and to promote Ireland’s image as a safe and stable country 
in the eyes of foreign investors.
A second series of depictions focused on the social and economic deter-
minants of the camps. For some commentators, Irish public authorities’ 
subservience to international capital during the ‘Celtic Tiger’ years – and the 
subsequent collapse of the Irish economic miracle as of 2008 – precipitated 
and ultimately led to the country’s very rapid move from a high-growth and 
high-performing economy to that of an economic basket case represented 
by its banking, f iscal, and f inancial crises (Kirby 2010; Kitchin et al. 2012). 
Ironically, occupiers even received the indirect and unexpected support 
from one of the country’s main business journals.26 They were, perhaps 
surprisingly, seen by such commentators as the unlikely opponents of the 
destructive forces of international capital and of the unbearable social 
consequences of neoliberal, free-market economics policies.
A third series of depictions focused on the occupiers’ amateurism. A 
number of commentators alluded to the utopian nature of the camps (Mc-
Donald 2012). But criticism was perhaps the more pronounced and damning 
when it originated specif ically from the left of the political spectrum. Here, 
references to Occupy Galway and ODS camps heralded a ‘new dawn’ for the 
working class in Ireland but under the specif ic leadership and guidance of 
enlightened and campaign-hardened left-wing political activists. Occupiers 
were portrayed as political amateurs whose conceptual frameworks were 
redolent of conspiracy theorists lacking in class understanding.27 In many 
ways, the very small left-wing parties from whom the most negative depic-
tions emerged seemed more interested in scoring political points against 
25 Retrieved 7 November 2013 from http://www.thejournal.ie/occupy-dame-street-camp-is-
killing-temple-bar-businesses-335948-Jan2012/.
26 “Over the previous two decades, f inancial market regulation has been pared back to almost 
observer status. The thinking was that any sort of regulation that hemmed in market forces 
was unnecessary and bureaucratic. It was an orthodoxy that became a cornerstone of economic 
policy throughout OECD countries. It obviously hasn’t worked. Consequently it would be a 
mistake to ignore the incipient protests against Wall Street as the vacuous bleatings of profes-
sional radicals. It is symptomatic of a much deeper and wider malaise that western government 
would do well to heed” (Business & Finance October 2011, Retrieved 5 November 2013 from http://
www.businessandf inance.ie/index.jsp?p=1026&n=996).
27 Retrieved 7 November 2013 from http://www.communistpartyof ireland.ie/sv2011-11/03-
dame-st-2.html.
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one another, in decrying the occupiers’ “false consciousness”, and in denying 
political meanings to the occupiers’ actions.
These varied and widespread depictions all rest on the belief that Oc-
cupy Galway and ODS did not have any signif icant political value. The 
f irst series of depictions considered them to be no more than public order 
disturbances. The second viewed them as being economic in origin and 
that improvements in the country’s social and economic conditions would 
resolve all issues. The third was based on politics, but the occupiers were 
curiously absent from the analysis in that they were denied a political status 
and their experiences and representations were not taken either seriously 
or into consideration. The following section looks at the experiences and 
representations of the occupiers to see how they themselves framed their 
actions.
Experiences and Representations
As noted above, many occupiers criticized the systematic failings of the Irish 
economic system and wished to show their anger, despair, and frustration 
at the increasingly widening gap between Celtic Tiger expectations and 
current economic realities.28 Many of them were convinced that the country 
had been brought to its knees by the collective greed of Irish f inanciers.29 
Many occupiers aired their loathing of the greed culture that had spread 
during the Celtic Tiger years and of the reckless investments of f inancial 
institutions which had brought the economy to such depressingly low lev-
els.30 They felt that international economic actors including the European 
Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary 
Fund were now playing an invidious role in diminishing the Republic’s 
economic sovereignty and democratic foundation. A number of occupiers 
also stated that they joined the encampment and stayed on for several 
weeks because they were deeply troubled by the Irish social and political 
state of affairs.31 They felt that they had been betrayed by the abject failure 
of the political class to protect Irish people’s interests and that their own 
and their children’s future offered little more than economic hardship 
and emigration.32 They pointed out that the government-imposed cuts 
28 Ibid. 
29 Interview, Ch…, male, unemployed, 25+, Galway, 17 November 2012.
30 Interview, St…, male, unemployed, 35+, Galway, 9 December 2012.
31 Interview, Fi…, female, student, 20+, Galway, 17 November 2012.
32 Interview, He…, female, retired, 65+, Dublin, 19 November 2012.
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were unfair, and they stressed that the cuts overwhelmingly targeted the 
poor and the weak (pensioners, the young, single parents, the unemployed, 
social welfare recipients, etc.) while those responsible for the deep recession 
(bankers, speculators, property developers) were not held to task. They 
vented much of their anger against the Irish political elite that had allowed 
the economic crisis to develop. For some occupiers, the need to ‘kick out the 
government and the politicians in power’ was an instrumental factor that 
led to their participation in the occupations.33 Others stated that they saw 
the camps as useful insofar as they represented a forum where they could 
raise the public’s awareness about the Irish political elite’s responsibility for 
the crisis. Many of these occupiers also saw the camps as extremely useful 
from an educational point of view because the camps allowed them to see 
and to understand the extent of corruption at local and national levels that 
had led to the economic morass. In Galway, for example, some occupiers 
indicated that the camp was for them a “wake-up call”34 in that it helped 
them to become active within their community.
Many occupiers felt that conveying their anger and despair in this 
collective format was therapeutic, as it allowed them to give voice to the 
frustration that they often found hard to express publicly. Many other 
occupiers also found personal comfort, solace, and solidarity in the camps. 
For these people, the camp helped them to break feelings of loneliness, 
personal failure, guilt, solitude, and/or despair.35 Other occupiers felt that 
the camp allowed them to do something concrete for the country, but many 
of them despaired at the level of passivity in Ireland.36 Some attributed 
this passivity to the lack of political conscience, to a poor level of political 
education, or to the ever-present moral dictates of the Catholic Church.37 
Since this was the f irst time that many of the younger activists had ever 
participated in a collective action, they were enthusiastic about learning 
how to become politically active.38 Many of them also pointed out that they 
learned very quickly how to deal with practical issues such as how to build 
33 Interview, Ch…, male, unemployed, 25+, Galway, 17 November 2012.
34 Interview, El..., female, student, 20+, Galway, 17 November 2012.
35 Interview, Fi…, female, student, 20+, Galway, 17 November 2012.
36 In some ways, the public’s passivity shows that high levels of anger and frustration do not 
necessarily lead to mobilization.
37 One occupier also attributed the passivity to the renowned inclement Irish weather (Inter-
view, Fi…, female, student, 20+, Galway, 17 November 2012). Another attributed the passivity to 
prevailing begrudging attitudes (Interview, Mo…, female, student, 20+, Dublin, 8 January 2013).
38 Although the more seasoned activists were often frustrated that the movements were not 
more militant, many of the younger participants stated that they became politically aware 
because of their involvement in the cause. These younger participants thus became increasingly 
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and to maintain a viable camp when faced with adverse conditions such as 
bad weather, security issues, or the lack of hygiene. But in essence, learning 
from others’ experiences and raising the public’s awareness were for many 
occupiers the key incentives for their involvement in Occupy.39
Occupy Galway and ODS protesters were inspired by the demands, forms, 
rituals, and models used by Spanish and North American Occupy activists 
and, as such, put forward rather broad demands:
The issue of demands has been a contentious one, particularly at OWS, 
although not so much at ODS […] Elsewhere in the Occupy movement 
there was a reluctance to make demands, as demands imply acceptance of 
a system that the movement has set out to undermine or even overthrow. 
These were broad demands on which everyone could agree, but could not 
easily be conceded. (Sheehan 2012: 5)40
In ODS, Real Democracy Now activists – inspired by the Spanish 15M 
movement – framed the movement’s original demands but they only re-
ally focused on the Irish situation.41 The demands – adopted by Occupy 
Galway one week later – were formulated as follows: (1) the departure of the 
International Monetary Fund from Ireland; (2) the end to public ownership 
of private banks’ debts; (3) the implementation of what was entitled “real 
participatory democracy”; and (4) the return to public ownership of Ireland’s 
privatized oil and gas reserves.42
Another way Occupy Galway and ODS were inspired by North American 
activists was by using their strategies, forms, and rituals. For example, 
Occupy Galway and ODS encampments were manned round-the-clock. In 
Galway, ten to twelve people on average were present daily, with occupi-
ers staying mainly in blocks of two to three days. Participation rates in 
Dublin were slightly higher. Both camps lasted for what may be considered 
a remarkably long period (f ive months in the case of ODS and seven in 
aware that they had a political role to play but that they did not necessarily need to do so via 
representative democracy or through party politics. 
39 Interview, Se…, male, student, 25+, Dublin, 16 February 2013.
40 Helena Sheehan is a US-born, Dublin-based academic, now retired. A former member of the 
Irish Labour Party, she has been very active in left-wing circles since the 1970s and was one of 
the early activists involved in ODS. In publishing a personal account of her involvement in ODS, 
she provides a rich analysis of the conflicting narratives at hand in ODS (leadership, agenda, 
strategy, etc.).
41 Interview, Mo…, female, employee, 20+, Dublin, 8 January 2013.
42 Retrieved 5  January 2013 from http://www.thejournal.ie/video-occupy-dame-street-
protesters-explain-aims-of-peoples-movement-251277-Oct2011/. 
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that of Occupy Galway) considering the very diff icult living and security 
conditions occupiers faced (cold and wet weather, sustained pressure from 
local authorities and the police, harassment from local residents, passers-by 
and late-night revelers, etc.).43 ODS protesters also organized daily general 
assemblies and used ‘open mics’ by passing a microphone from one speaker 
to the next so that all opinions could be heard and no one could dominate 
procedures. An ODS activist had also seen the successful use of ‘mic-check 
rituals’ (protestors telling their stories in a call-and-response formats) in 
YouTube videos of Philadelphia protests and thought it would go down 
well in Dublin as the ultimate democratic way to proceed. So as in many 
international protest-tent campaigns, Irish occupiers depended on the 
crucial role of social media in encouraging people to come together in high 
visibility public places – Eyre Square in central Galway and outside the 
Central Bank of Ireland in downtown Dublin.44 These public places were 
chosen because protesters could not be evicted or arrested for trespassing 
and since such spaces “belong to everybody and to nobody at the same 
time”.45 For Occupy Galway activists, the camp’s central location was also 
important because they would not run the risk of being part of an “invisible” 
protest and it would be easier for them to put their views to the general 
public. As in OWS, the camps’ locations and the available material and 
symbolic resources also helped shaped the emerging relations between 
the occupiers themselves and with the general public. Much of Occupy 
Galway’s or ODS’s material resources such as tents, sleeping bags, or food 
came from public donations.46 Local businesses gave food, members of the 
public donated money, tradesmen offered their expertise and building 
material, etc.47 These donations helped to sustain the occupiers and allowed 
them to provide small-scale support services for some homeless people or 
for the occasional occupiers who were encouraged to stay in the camp for 
however long they wished. All these initiatives were well supported initially 
43 One Occupy Galway activist described herself as a bouncer. Interview, Ao…, female, student, 
20+, Galway, 17 November 2012.
44 “We are in Eyre Square because the public owns the square and because the protest is a 
visual statement”. Michael Lyndon, protester of Occupy Galway quoted by Andrews (2011).
45 Interview, Ch…, male, unemployed, 25+, Galway, 17 November 2012.
46 “People have come with blankets and food and words of encouragement, others stay for a 
while in solidarity. […] Even people who are opposed to what we do, when we explain what we 
are about see what we are getting at”. Michael Lyndon, protester of Occupy Galway quoted by 
Andrews (2011).
47 Interview, Mo…, female, employee, 20+, Dublin, 8  January 2013; Interview, Gi…, male, 
unemployed, 50+, Galway, 17 November 2012.
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but, as we indicated above, in time many locals became far less disposed 
towards the camps.
Occupy Galway and ODS also resisted the establishment of hierarchical 
structures. Occupy Galway and ODS preferred f luid processes based on 
open, democratic objectives. For instance, general assemblies were often 
held twice daily where all comers could bring up any subject even if it meant 
that general assemblies often led to “tortuous discussions”.48 The rituals of 
participatory democracy, borrowed from OWS in particular, were much 
welcomed in the early stages of Occupy Galway and ODS, but they soon 
became fraught with diff iculty especially when new occupiers tried to 
settle in or when practical decisions needed to be made quickly to address 
immediate problems, most notably in ODS. Two such examples in ODS were 
the diff iculties associated with stopping the theft of laptops, cell phones, 
and money, or the problems linked to the organization of direct-action 
initiatives. ODS also facilitated public meetings and debates involving 
trade unionists, political activists, and the general public. But again in 
Dublin, perhaps more so than in Galway, the meetings also often led to many 
increasingly intractable disputes that had more to do with petty concerns 
than with substantive issues.49
Occupy Galway and ODS were, nonetheless, vastly different in some 
key respects from the many Spanish and North American movements 
that inspired them. The comfort, solidarity, and strength that many Irish 
occupiers felt by participating in the camps did not mean that the vast 
majority of them considered that it was imperative that ODS or Occupy 
Galway become politically active. Many occupiers found it very diff icult to 
acknowledge that they were engaging in political acts or that they could ever 
align themselves with a political organization. In fact, most of the occupiers 
never really framed their claims in radical, ideological terms, as had been 
the case, for instance, of the Indignados in Spain or in OWS (Castañeda 2012). 
Although a minority of the occupiers attributed the country’s problems to 
fundamentally unjust and neoliberal economic priorities, the majority 
stayed away from politics per se. Most simply felt that greed and political 
expediency were at the root of the problems and that restoring Irish values 
and sovereignty would be suff icient.
A leading Galway occupier proclaimed often and proudly that “we are 
not a political group”.50 In ODS, however, discussions centered far more on 
48 Interview, He…, female, retired, 65+, Dublin, 19 November 2012.
49 Interview, Mo…, female, employee, 25+, Dublin, 26 November 2014.
50 Interview, Gi…, male, unemployed, 50+, Galway, 17 November 2012.
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the movement’s political mission than on its identity, at least in the initial 
stages.
I returned on day two, a Sunday, which was a much quieter day. I par-
ticipated in a smaller assembly and found it really frustrating. It was 
about def ining what we were. Over and over in the next days, I heard 
things that made me cringe at the conceptual confusion that seemed to 
prevail: assertions that this was not a political movement, that it was 
neither right nor left, that participants were welcome as individuals but 
had to leave their politics at the door. I tried to be patient, to argue that 
a person’s political philosophy was something integral to his/her being 
and not something that could be left at the door, aside from the other 
absurdity of this constant injunction – the fact that we had no door! I 
invoked a conception of politics that was broader and deeper than party 
politics. We need to reclaim the polis, I contended. Some took the point, 
but others continued with the ‘no politics’ rhetoric regardless (Sheehan 
2012: 2)
Occupy Galway and ODS activists were also quite pragmatic. The ODS 
organized various working groups: a security group, a food group, a media 
group, and an ‘Open University’ group. However, although the ‘Open Uni-
versity’ group organized scores of public lectures, it became a particularly 
key source of contention. One reason is that, in Dublin in particular, some 
‘working-class’ occupiers felt that ‘middle-class’ occupiers were far too 
active in ‘intellectual’ pursuits such as the ‘Open University’ but that they 
were not doing their share of the more mundane tasks such as getting food, 
building shelters, or dealing with security issues.51
In some ways, the following stringent criticism of OWS could be ap-
plicable in the case of ODS in the f irst few weeks but no longer after that 
since most of the ‘intellectuals’ or the ‘politically active’ had been pushed 
to the margins or simply gave up coming to the camp.
A while later I happened to watch an online video of an Occupy panel 
discussion held at a bookstore in New York; at some point in the record-
ing, a panellist objected to the way protesters had of saying they were 
‘speaking for themselves’ rather than acknowledging that they were part 
of a group. Another one of the panellists was moved to utter this riposte: 
‘What I would note, is that people can only speak for themselves, that 
51 Interview, Mo…, female, employee, 25+, Dublin, 26 November 2014.
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the self would be under erasure there, in that the self is then held into 
question, as any poststructuralist thought leading through anarchism 
would push you towards [...]. I would agree, an individualism that our 
society has def initely had inscribed upon it and continues to inscribe 
upon itself, ‘I can only speak for myself ’, the ‘only’ is operative there, 
and of course these spaces are being opened up [...].’ My heart dropped 
like a broken elevator. As soon as I heard this long, desperate stream 
of pseudo-intellectual gibberish, I knew instantly that this thing was 
doomed. (Frank 2012: 1)52
So the discourse in Occupy Galway and ODS was far different from some 
of the radical viewpoints expressed in OWS in particular (Flank 2011). 
Although Occupy Galway and ODS protesters decried the state and the 
scale of inequality in Ireland, radical policy proposals were never high 
on the agenda. Occupiers in Ireland understood very well that the bank 
guarantees and the emergency rescue package led to cutbacks in social 
welfare, in educational support, or in health provision, but they were not 
necessarily sure how the policy decisions could be overturned nor did they 
seem willing to offer concrete, alternative political solutions. So in this sense 
they reacted to events rather than devised and proposed alternatives. They 
also seemed aware that they were involved in a unique type of protest event 
for Ireland, but they were reluctant or unsure how to broaden the scope of 
the protest.53 The physical occupation of public space until eviction was 
the extent of the radical measures taken, although one Dublin occupier 
considered that the “camp was too inward looking and that it drained away 
from the movement”.54
Equally important is that while the consensus approach inspired by OWS 
was of help in building solidarity in the small and relatively homogeneous 
Galway group, it was not of much use in the larger and far more diverse 
ODS. Resistance to formal structures in ODS notably led to a situation 
whereby cliques soon formed and whereby some of the stronger and more 
vocal personalities dominated proceedings. For example, tensions in ODS 
were particularly apparent when some of the camp’s ‘permanent residents’ 
suggested that only they, as ‘real’ occupiers, should have a higher status in 
52 Thomas Frank is the co-founder and was co-editor of the Chicago-based left-wing magazine 
The Baffler, which focuses on cultural, political, and business issues.
53 “At one assembly I asked: ‘Do you want to build a camp or do you want to build a move-
ment?’ I believed that a camp obsession, even narcissism, was subverting the attempt to build 
a movement” (Sheehan 2012: 13).
54 Interview, He…, female, retired, 65+, Dublin, 19 November 2012.
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decision-making and only they should be allowed to def ine, to decide, and 
to voice demands.55 For many of the round-the-clock occupiers, only they 
had the legitimacy to speak out. This led to constant strife between the 
‘real’ and the ‘moral’ occupiers in particular and limited the movement’s 
public reach or alliance-building potential. For instance, some guests were 
not allowed to speak at organized events because of their trade union or 
political backgrounds, protest marches were abandoned because they had 
not received ‘proper’ approval, and general assemblies were set during 
working hours so that only permanent occupiers could realistically attend. 
These types of problems of rivalries were rampant and existed very early 
on within the camps. They often led older and more seasoned activists 
to become frustrated with the idealism and naivety expressed by these 
younger activists who wished above all to be apolitical.56
Some of those camping became obsessed with the camp and with an 
inf lated image of themselves as the core of this movement. ‘I camp 
therefore I am’ I said of them on one occasion, when I was frustrated by 
the camp narcissism, paraphrasing Descartes to ends he never intended. 
One habitually referred to himself and others in the camp as ‘heroes of 
the revolution’ […] I believed that a camp obsession, even narcissism, was 
subverting the attempt to build a movement. (Sheehan 2012: 7)
In Dublin, some of the initial organizers also felt that the newer, younger, 
and more permanent occupiers failed to appreciate the history of the left 
and of the trade union movement in Ireland (as in the United States, as Smith 
demonstrates in this volume). “It was as if all protest started in October 
2011.”57 For many of the ‘moral’ activists, the ‘real’ occupiers were doomed to 
fail because they refused to frame the movement in class-based terminology 
and to seek the support of more seasoned and radical social and political 
groupings. In Dublin in particular, the newer (and younger) activists were 
extremely wary of being inf iltrated by radical political organizations, and 
they were also extremely distrustful of and disillusioned with the trade 
55 One ODS participant attributes this division as based on class. The ‘permanent’ occupiers 
came mainly from the more disadvantaged parts of Dublin and many of them were young 
homeless people, whereas the occasional or ‘moral’ occupiers were principally middle-class, 
rather well educated, and often in stable jobs. In Dublin, this also led to some minor disputes 
between students and some of the less economically privileged occupiers. Interview, Mo…, 
female, employee, 20+, Dublin, 8 January 2013.
56 Interview, Ge…, male, employee, 50+, Dublin, 5 January 2013.
57 Interview, He…, female, retired, 65+, Dublin, 19 November 2012.
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union movement. This ‘no politics’ approach was fundamentally different to 
what had emerged in OWS. In New York, the “episode as a whole has become 
an irresistible magnet for radical academics of the cultural-theory sort; 
indeed, for them it seems to have been a sort of holy episode, the moment 
they were waiting for, the putting into practice of their most treasured 
beliefs” (Frank 2012). By comparison, occupiers in ODS and in Occupy 
Galway had different views:
[We wanted] to create a movement with no aff iliation to political parties 
and to resist entryism on the part of any existing political formations [...] 
There was an obsession with a ban on political and trade union banners 
and literature. There was fear of any organisation bringing its own agenda 
into this movement. [...] From the beginning, in fact before the occupation 
actually started, much of the discussion was driven by hostility to the 
Socialist Workers’ Party. (Sheehan 2012: 3)
In Galway, we took a pragmatic stance. We let the various parties or 
organizations that gravitated around Occupy access to the camp but 
they couldn’t use it as a platform to get recruits for themselves because 
we were not linked to anyone and we didn’t share the Socialist Workers’ 
Party’s political views.58
Some of the more seasoned – but ultimately shunned – activists in Dublin 
considered that this ‘no politics’ stance was naive and ultimately destruc-
tive.59 For them, ODS ran the risk of withering away if broad social and 
political alliances could not be established. This is part of what Lipsky (1968) 
suggests when stating that the powerless in society have many ways of 
expressing themselves politically but that their political existence depends 
very much on the help provided by third parties. But as time passed, oc-
cupiers in both Occupy Galway and ODS were particularly adamant that 
they would not enter into alliances, as also happened in other Occupy 
campaigns around the world (Uitermark and Nicholls 2012). They took this 
stance despite evidence that allies in the trade union movement or even 
within some of the parties of the ‘left’ may well have helped to diffuse and 
to support their cause. The occupiers also took the ‘no-alliance’ approach 
even though many of them were well aware that this stance would limit 
their chances of diffusing their viewpoints and that this could cut off public 
58 Interview, Ch…, male, unemployed, 25+, Galway, 17 November 2012.
59 Interview, Ge…, male, employee, 50+, Dublin, 5 January 2013..
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support. Theirs was a conscious and tactical decision. Occupiers believed 
that by refusing to enter into alliances, they would be preserved from ac-
cusations of being politically inclined and thus were ensuring the purity 
of their cause.
But collaboration and communication between the various Occupy 
camps around the country was also remarkably poor. Only a very small 
minority of occupiers travelled to other camps to see what was taking 
place or to discuss common issues. An even smaller number took part in 
Occupy’s National Assembly. This lack of communication and incapacity 
to share information and experiences certainly hindered the camps’ ability 
to organize collective actions and campaigns, to ref ine their goals and 
strategies, or to set up a national platform to voice their claims.60 But, yet 
again, many of the occupiers had limited interest in national issues and 
preferred to concentrate on improving their own lot in life.
In short, internal characteristics and tactical decisions limited Occupy 
Galway and ODS’s capacity to widen their campaigns, to secure positive 
public opinion and sympathy, and to create spaces that were open and 
inclusive of people most harmed by the effects of the recessions such as 
the ‘new poor’ and the homeless. It could well be argued that the increas-
ing presence of homeless people weakened Occupy Galway and ODS’s 
mobilization potential, since many middle-class members (with relevant 
social capital) became increasingly reluctant to take part. As the Occupy 
Galway and ODS became less and less diverse in terms of their social and 
economic make-up, the camps soon became ends in themselves, generating 
an exclusionary group dynamic and contradicting the slogan “We are the 
99%” that made it diff icult to build a wider movement.61 This allowed the 
Occupy Galway and ODS to lose their way in the mist of internal conflicts. 
Ultimately, the camps wore themselves down by dealing with a host of 
relatively minor daily issues, leaving little time for collective action. In 
retrospect, it could be argued that the camps were the sole expression of the 
movement. Rooted to a location, they ‘traveled’ with diff iculty. Attempts 
to widen the movement were f iercely resisted and became practically 
impossible, not only because of the movement’s internal characteristics 
and tensions (and lack of resources) but also because the occupation of a 
60 In February 2012, during a National Assembly of the Occupy movement, some participants 
wondered: “What happened to the other Occupies? Are they worn out, no funds, divided, dis-
banded, or just too busy?” (Minutes of Occupy National Assembly, Rossport, 4 February 2012). 
The question highlights the remarkably poor level of communication between the campaigns, 
as well as the perceived lack of impact and visibility at the local, regional, or national levels.
61 On the lack of credibility of the slogan, see Smith’s chapter in this volume.
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public space for an undetermined period of time became the participants’ 
sole symbolic expression of protest. But did they really want anything else?
* * *
In this chapter we focused on the Occupy Galway and ODS camps. We 
pointed to a number of key issues and questions occupiers faced: how 
to overturn common depictions of them; how to generate mass support 
and participation; how to transform narrow interests into symbols that 
concerned Irish society as a whole; and how to be seen as champions of the 
public good? All proved diff icult to bring about. Although the occupiers 
gradually slotted into the daily routine of the local community where they 
garnered some support, when the camps became ‘eyesores’, local support 
turned sharply against them.62 As for public authorities and the police, they 
never considered the protesters to be suff iciently disruptive or threatening 
that they had to be removed urgently. They simply waited for the initiatives 
to run their course before serving orders on the few remaining occupiers to 
dismantle the camps and evicting them. Only at this point did a few minor 
public disorder incidents arise.63
Aside from the euphoric f irst few weeks, the camps existed in a social and 
political vacuum and proved to be especially unattractive and uninviting to 
the victims of the economic crisis and, more widely, to the general public. 
One key reason for Occupy Galway and ODS’s diff iculty in spreading their 
message is that the activists refused to take a political stance and to enter 
into alliances similar to their Spanish colleagues’ position but with different 
outcomes (see chapter 5 in this volume).
Many of the younger protesters – many of whom came from the more 
disadvantaged parts of Dublin or Galway – were also radically opposed 
to the idea of building alliances with the trade union movement or with 
left-wing parties as they felt this would co-op the movement and distort 
its original raison-d’être. This led to ongoing conflicts between many of 
these f irst-time younger protesters and many older, middle-class, and more 
seasoned activists who believed that Occupy Galway and ODS could not 
evolve without the help of such key allies. In addition, occupiers were deter-
mined not to make specif ic claims or to deal with public authorities. Their 
preferred strategy was to snub the ‘enemy’ and to refuse to acknowledge 
62 Irish Independent, 23 January 2012.
63 Interview, El…, female, student, 20+, Galway, 17 November 2012; Interview, Mo…, female, 
employee, 20+, Dublin, 8 January 2013.
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the ‘system’s’ legitimacy so as to preserve the camps’ independence and 
purity. Although the practical benefits of such an approach are questionable 
(Smith and Glidden 2012), the strategy is understandable in theory at least. 
But by refusing to engage with public authorities or even with potentially 
important allies, Occupy Galway and ODS protesters consciously and will-
ingly reduced their capacity to have a wide-ranging political or social impact 
or even to make the camps more attractive to their focus group, the victims 
of the Celtic Tiger’s collapse. As a result, the slogan “We are the 99%” proved 
to be particularly ill-adapted to Occupy Galway and, even more so, to ODS. 
Although Occupy Galway and ODS activists expressed the view that the 
camps were open to one and all, ODS especially did little to make many 
of these victims feel welcome. Pressure was put on newcomers to become 
‘permanent residents’ or to leave aside their political feelings. These ex-
amples point to a movement that was guided by people who were, in some 
cases, rather inflexible and intolerant. Limited by their strategic choices 
and by the small number of the occupiers who had relevant organizational 
experience and knowledge, Occupy Galway and ODS never truly managed 
to widen their appeal.64
But it is perhaps unreasonable to focus solely on some of these negative 
elements of the Occupy Galway and ODS. Despite some of the camps’ dif-
f iculties as described above, there were a number of key positive outcomes. 
Many young and previously politically apathetic people had come to take 
part for the f irst time in a collective action. An ODS activist has pointed 
out that these young and ‘naïve’ protesters were frustrated at not knowing 
why their world was crumbling around them.65 They were fed up with the 
‘lies’ and sickened by the depressing state of affairs. They wanted to ‘do 
something’ but they could not express clearly exactly what they wanted. 
These protesters were taking a plunge into the unknown. Although they had 
no specif ic claims aside from the four described above, they were adamant 
that the movement should have no leaders and they really wanted to stay 
together in the camps for as long as they could. As one protester stated, all 
he really wanted was to stay put “until they forced us to move”.66 These 
occupiers thereby seized the occasion to develop personally. Even though 
public authorities, the mainstream media, and the general public largely 
ignored the camps and their occupiers, many of the f irst-time protesters 
stated that they benef ited immensely from the experience. Some of the 
64 Interview, Mo…, female, employee, 20+, Dublin, 8 January 2013.
65 Interview, Da…, male, independent f ilmmaker, 35+, Dublin, 19 February 2013.
66 Interview, Ch…, male, unemployed, 25+, Galway, 17 November 2012.
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more seasoned and politically engaged activists took another view. Some 
found it particularly frustrating to see their younger colleagues shun the 
well-established traditions of protest in favor of what they viewed to be a 
narcissistic and utopian exercise. For these seasoned and politically engaged 
activists, Occupy Galway and ODS activists never appeared able – or really 
willing – to project themselves beyond the camps, with the result that the 
camps became the sole symbolic expression of protest. One such activist 
who left the Dublin camp in protest in December considered that this was 
an ‘ironic’ stance for a movement that claimed to be largely inclusive – “We 
are the 99%” – and that pretended to be the voice of all the victims of the 
crisis.67 Nonetheless, many of the younger and longer-standing occupiers 
felt that participating in the camps was the most important thing they 
had ever done in their lives and pointed out the educational or formative 
experience of Occupy: “The main aim of occupy is to educate and empower 
people to change the system. We must be patient with the ‘people’ and with 
each other and keep an eye on the big picture to avoid bickering.”68
In short, a key element of ODS and Occupy Galway relates to the activists’ 
frames of experience and of representations and thus to ODS and Occupy 
Galway’s political signif icance. Weak public support, few alliances, weak 
resources, and occupiers’ subsequent feelings of isolation or of despair may 
have led them to feel that they had ‘nothing to lose’ by taking action and by 
remaining in the camps as long as they could. Perhaps because Dublin and 
Galway occupiers did not put forward specif ic claims or because they did 
not want to have hierarchical structures, they did not conform to expected 
means of actions. But this was not necessarily a sign of weakness or an 
indication that their efforts were futile. The longest-serving occupiers in 
Dublin and in particular Galway told us that Occupy ignited a flame in them 
as it allowed them to become aware of a host of key social and economic 
issues. Occupy also showed them how hard it is to initiate collective action. 
The occupiers felt they built a collective cause, however limited in scope 
and in impact. They condemned the social and economic problems they 
faced and they also denounced the socially disseminated representations 
and institutional practices. In doing so, they expressed and justif ied their 
actions in political terms and actions. But also of paramount importance is 
that Occupy allowed these politically apathetic people to become politically 
active in the defence of a number of causes in the f inal stages of the camps 
67 Interview, Ge…, male, unemployed, 30+, Dublin, 6 January 2013.
68 Minutes of Occupy National Assembly, Rossport, 4 February 2012.
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and in the months that followed the camps’ dismantlement.69 These are 
positive elements, irrespective of the total number of people who were 
involved in Occupy from October 2011 to May 2012. Occupy Ireland shows, 
therefore, the importance of listening to what the occupiers were saying, 
of considering why they acted in the ways they did, and of taking account 
of what they gained from the experience.
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11 The Occupy Movement in France
Why Protests Have Not Taken Off
Didier Chabanet and Arnaud Lacheret
Many observers were surprised that the Occupy Movement attracted very 
little support in France, while in other neighboring countries, notably Spain, 
street protests were huge and numerous. The cry of Stéphane Hessel – in his 
book Indignez-vous! (‘Time for outrage!’) – is said to have been a remarkable 
bestseller1 but had hardly any knock-on effects. Although this observation 
is accurate, we feel the need to add several comments that mitigate its scope. 
First, the Occupy movement, as strong as it may be in certain regions of the 
world, is a phenomenon which remains globally limited. On the European 
scale, most countries have not witnessed any signif icant mobilization, as 
the Italian case shows (cf. Zamponi 2012). From this angle, France does not 
stand out as an exception and follows the general trend. The astonishment 
is based largely on the idea that France is traditionally a country with a high 
level of social and political contention. This belief seems to be borne out 
by statistical analysis, in any case over the period of 1990-1995, in which 
France was the European country that experienced the most protest events, 
far more than Germany or Spain (Nam 2007: 108). At the same time, this 
capacity for mobilization was not linear and often led to extremely intensive 
peaks, such as in the 1995 strikes in the public sector or the 2006 protest 
against the reform of the labor law (Contrat de première embauche, CPE) 
(Lindvall 2011). It is possible, therefore, that mobilization has undergone 
a momentary slump or is following a temporality of its own, without this 
pref iguring its future development. One may add that the density of civil 
society in France, especially its associative and trade union sectors (Béroud 
et al. 2008), is notably weak (Balme and Chabanet 2008: 48), which may 
partly explain the somewhat eruptive and unpredictable nature of social 
protest. Thus, the situation is at once complex and relatively paradoxical, 
combining a high level of social and political agitation with a decline in 
the structures which were for a long time the main channel of expression 
of popular discontent (Fillieule 1997).
In France, the f irst Occupy demonstrations took place at the end of May 
2011, in the capital but also in the provinces, particularly in Lyon, Marseille, 
1 With sales of almost two million copies in under a year.
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Poitiers, Toulouse, and in several towns in the southwest of the country. 
In all, twenty or so towns were involved. Settlements were rare or of short 
duration, with the exception of Bayonne where they lasted for six weeks. 
The gatherings involved a few hundred people, except in Paris where two 
demonstrations brought together between 2,000 and 3,000 protestors. On 
15 October 2011, the Occupy demonstrations organized simultaneously in 
several dozen countries made it possible to measure the level of mobiliza-
tion on a world scale. In Paris and in France’s main provincial towns, no 
gathering of more than 3,000 people was recorded, while in several dozen 
towns abroad, processions of over 5,000 people were frequent. In Madrid 
(500,000), Barcelona (300,000), Rome (100,000), Valencia (50,000), Lisbon 
(80,000), Santiago de Chile (80,000), New York (40,000), Berlin (10,000), 
Frankfurt (10,000), Brussels (7,000), or even Toronto (5,000), the crowd was 
even much larger.2 Without being non-existent, the mobilization in France 
did not really take off. Thus, in the spring of 2012, several processions of 
a few dozen people coming from different provincial towns converged on 
the heart of the capital after marching through deprived inner districts of 
the Paris suburbs, able to gather only a few hundred demonstrators at its 
peak on 21 April 2012.
To understand the inability of Occupy to mobilize large numbers of 
people in France, we set out a series of reflections that relate to the social, 
political, and economic circumstances of the country. We begin by examin-
ing the effects of the political calendar, particularly in the specif ic context 
of the presidential election campaign of 2012. We then show that access 
to the labor market and the employment situation in general remain less 
catastrophic than in many European countries where the Occupy move-
ment or the Indignados have grown. In France, the diploma continues 
to protect a large proportion of young people from the most aggravated 
forms of exclusion and precarity. But the relative protection of some is 
associated with a deterioration for others, especially in districts where the 
most marginalized populations are concentrated. One of the main failures 
of Occupy was precisely not having been able to rally to its cause those 
who, in the suburbs, were the most socially exposed. Unable to spread 
throughout French society and remaining isolated, the mobilization attempt 
was vulnerable and completely exposed to police repression. In the f inal 
section of the chapter, we seek to understand – on the basis of a survey 
carried out amongst participants of Occupy Lyon – why the latter did not 
succeed in arousing a broad mobilization impetus.
2 The f igures used in this paragraph were average estimates given in the non-activist press.
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From a methodological standpoint, our approach is resolutely qualita-
tive. Given that our study commenced after the end of the mobilization, 
in the fall of 2012, we initially tried to contact activists. Our research led 
us to identify a local radio host and trained sociologist who had organized 
several broadcasts with Occupy and had himself taken part sporadically 
in mobilizations. We questioned him at length at the outset, and he put us 
in touch with other militants, each of whom in turn provided us with one 
or several names. This snowball sampling strategy allowed us to carry out 
seven in-depth telephone interviews and one face-to-face conversation at 
the home of one Occupy participant, each interview lasting about an hour. 
We also watched several dozen hours of online broadcasts made by the local 
media (radio, TV) devoted to the Occupy movement in Lyon and which was 
an invaluable source of information.3 Lastly, we analyzed the ‘archives’ of 
Occupy in Lyon, made up of f ifty or so typescript pages in a pouch. These 
archives are the only written traces of the movement on itself that we have 
been able to track down. They outline its internal organization, actions, 
programme, and political claims.4
The Ballot Box Rather Than the Street?
The diff iculty that Occupy experienced in attracting large numbers of 
people in France cannot be explained by the absence of grievances and 
discontent. Generally speaking, the French are particularly worried about 
their future, especially young people under the age of 25. In addition, French 
citizens are among the most critical towards globalization, capitalism, and 
the market (Cahuc and Carcillo 2012: 21-30).
The mobilization of Occupy must f irst be understood in the light of 
recent struggles, which resulted in scathing failures and which may have 
discouraged some potential militants. Thus, in France, the two most recent 
large protest movements – against the reform of universities in 2007 and 
against reform of the retirement system in 2010 – were marked by the 
intransigence of the government, which did not yield to demonstrators. 
It is possible that this intrasigence prompted most of those who struggled 
against liberal globalization to withdraw, at least for the time being, to 
3 See for instance http://www.mediascitoyens.org/Retrouver-la-capacite-d-agir-3.html; 
http://www.radiopluriel.fr/spip/Les-indignes-rassemblements-a-Lyon.html.
4 Analysis of the situation in France since 2011 and testimonies by the activists themselves 
can be found at: http://paris.reelledemocratie.net/taxonomy/term/186. 
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the private sphere, in accordance with Hirschman’s theory (1982) about 
shifting involvements.
Some observers later pointed out that the Occupy mobilization began to 
emerge on the international and European scene in the middle of 2011, at 
a time when the main thrust of French political activity had turned to the 
presidential election of May 2012. This latter event harnessed a large part 
of the social discontent. With some representatives of left-wing political 
parties being ideologically very close to Occupy, the very real possibility of a 
left-wing victory in the elections may have convinced some French citizens 
to opt for change via the ballot box rather than a strategy based on the 
streets. It is true that, during the presidential campaign, the visibility of the 
Left Front and the rhetoric of certain Greens or that of certain leaders of the 
Socialist Party on the necessity of ‘deglobalization’ gave the impression that 
the ideas of Occupy might be translated into policy if the left won the elec-
tion. One could argue that an open structure of political opportunities, and 
in particular the presence of influential allies supporting the mobilization 
and even picking up some of its demands, may have lessened its mobilizing 
capacity (Tarrow 1994: 85-89).5 One would f ind here the symptoms of a 
strongly politicized society, even amongst the youth (Bréchon 1998), whose 
expectations would still broadly f ind an institutional political expression. 
During the same period, the context was very different in Spain and in 
Greece, where governments were totally discredited in the eyes of the public 
(Wieviorka 2011). Certain analysts were expecting a surge of indignation 
in France in the event that the new ruling government would not succeed 
in f inding solutions to the social problems facing the country. One must, 
however, note that the grave crisis of confidence and credibility that the 
left-wing government has been going through, and its incapacity to reverse 
the unemployment trend, did not benef it Occupy, which prompts us to 
search for other types of explanation.
Diplomas, the ‘Open Sesame’ of the Labor Market
The political context correlates closely with the economic crisis that France 
is going through. Without playing down the importance of the problems 
being faced, the country has been relatively protected and has suffered a 
5 One of the main weakness of the POS argument is that, for some, a favorable POS enhanced 
mobilization and social movement development while for others, it was the reverse, like for the 
Indignados in France. For a discussion of the approach, see Fillieule and Mathieu 2009.
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less severe crisis than many others, especially those in southern Europe (see 
chapter 2 in this volume). If poverty, social exclusion, and unemployment are 
on the increase in France, the situation is ‘less worse’ than in Spain, Portugal, 
or Greece. In 2011, the share of people at risk of poverty after social transfers 
was 14 per cent in France, 21.8 per cent in Spain, 18 per cent in Portugal, and 
21.4 per cent in Greece (Eurostat 2012). The French welfare state is able to 
soften the adverse effects of social inequalities better than in most other 
countries. The French universalist system (Esping-Andersen 1990) fulf ills 
its role of buffer and regulator of conflicts, which is the main function of 
social protection in periods of recession and mass unemployment (Piven 
and Cloward 1990). Applied to the whole population, the explanation can 
be convincing, but it is weaker with regard to those under the age of 25. 
Certainly, the youth unemployment level in France may be two times lower 
than in Spain or Greece, but it remains signif icantly higher than the French 
national average.6 Above all, the main social assistance provisions in force 
in France remain inaccessible – in fact if not by law – to youths under the 
age of 25 who are therefore particularly vulnerable socially (Chabanet and 
Guigni 2013).
But more than the level of unemployment as such, it is the structure of, 
and access to, the labor market that stand out. Although diplomas represent 
a kind of ‘open sesame’ against precarity and still guarantee that one will 
eventually be able to obtain stable employment, most recruitment of young 
people today takes the form of an insecure contract or one of limited dura-
tion (Conseil d’orientation pour l’emploi 2011). The French labor market 
operates according to a dichotomous rationale that protects the most 
educated wage earners at the expense of those who leave the education 
system early and are often untrained.
A survey carried out in 2010 amongst several thousand young people who 
completed their education in 2007 showed that 92 per cent of those holding 
a doctorate were employed, stable or otherwise, just as did 88 per cent 
of those who had graduated from an engineering or commerce institute, 
and 80 per cent of those with an undergraduate degree (bachelor). On the 
other hand, only 55 per cent of those with a college diploma and 48 per 
cent of young people leaving the school system without a diploma were 
employed (Cereq 2011). The capacity of the French labor market to absorb 
young qualified people, as opposed to Greece or Spain for example, would be 
one of the reasons for Occupy’s failure to mobilize large numbers of youths. 
6 In December 2012, the unemployment rate of 15-24 year-olds in the active population 
exceeded 24 per cent, compared to 10 per cent for the total population (Insee 2012).
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Because the rise in unemployment and the phenomenon of exclusion do 
not affect French youth as a whole to the same degree, the families of the 
French middle and upper classes have always, for good or ill, the feeling 
that their children will escape the worst. Despite the relative worsening of 
the economic crisis, the most socially sheltered classes, also often the most 
politically active, no doubt still cling to individual strategies, focusing for 
example on the academic achievement of their offspring.
The Fragmentation of Territories: When Indignation is Selective
“Youth is only a word” (Bourdieu 1978: 143-154). In relation to social vulner-
ability factors, its heterogeneity is indeed glaring. The inequalities that 
cut across it allow us to outline the sociological prof ile of Occupy and, 
hence, one of the characteristics of the French case. What is noticeable, in 
fact, is the inability of Occupy to open itself up to the most marginalized 
populations, who are moreover at the heart of the economic, social, and 
political domination that activists denounce.
Admist widespread indifference, riots are in fact growing in France, 
giving an almost banal status to events which were hitherto relatively 
exceptional and thereby demonstrating the irresolvable relegation of a 
segment of French youth, literally shunned by society (Lapeyronnie 2008). 
The anger and despair upon which these insurgencies thrive refer back to 
several issues that are at the center of Occupy’s discourse. In these “exile 
districts” (Dubet and Lapeyronnie 1992), the level of youth unemployment 
is often the same as for young Greeks or Spaniards. The issues of wealth 
distribution, access to jobs, dignity, respect one for another, or equality of 
opportunity which are emphasized by a multitude of civil society actors in 
deprived suburbs did not lead to any convergence with Occupy even though 
the latter hold fundamentally the same aspirations.
This fragmentation of French youth is not new. Already in 2006, demon-
strations against the First Recruitment Contract (CPE)7 had revealed a split 
between, on the one hand, young people concerned about their future but 
generally educated and on the verge of entering the labor market and, on 
7 Restricted to those under 25 years of age, the measure involved establishing a period of 
‘consolidation’ of two years during which the employer could sack his or her young employee 
without notice nor justif ication and with a payoff reduced to a pittance. The idea, promoted by 
the government and the French employers’ organization, involved de-regulating recruitment 
conditions for young people so as to encourage their entry into the labor market and thus, 
paradoxically, speed up their obtaining stable employment.
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the other hand, a segment signif icantly more excluded. The f irst became 
heavily mobilized, while the second did not. The weakness of Occupy stems 
from the same phenomenon and reflects its isolation in the space of social 
movements (Mathieu 2012). The paradox is all the more remarkable that 
the phenomena of class downgrading and urban violence are much more 
present in France than in most other European countries, with the excep-
tion of Great Britain (Chabanet 2014). Increasingly, mobilizations play out 
in segmented areas, which mutually ignore each other. In Paris, Occupy 
initially mobilized downtown and took over the main public places, with 
few links or contacts with the suburban areas where social problems are 
often concentrated. This pattern is the consequence of a long process that 
began at the end of the 1970s and progressively saw the ‘urban question’ 
replace the ‘social question’ (Viard 1994). In this sense, the diff iculties of 
Occupy in France cannot be simply attributed to an economy that is less 
affected by the crisis than that of other countries.
Between Isolation and Repression
A series of different but converging phenomena contributed to marginalize 
Occupy politically. From the outset, the mobilization was built out of a radi-
cal critique of representative democracy. Refusing in particular the principle 
of the delegation of power, the movement sought to exist by itself with 
neither leader nor spokesperson. Acting in this way may have reinforced 
Occupy detachment from a certain number of activists networks – trade 
unionists in particular – which in other countries were able to make the link 
between various forms of opposition to austerity policies implemented by 
governments (see chapter 9 in this volume). This isolation was accentuated 
by the fact that French political life traditionally reserves an overriding 
place to political parties and, to a lesser degree, to trade union organiza-
tions, that is to say to actors whose role is institutionally recognized, who 
operate internally according to relatively hierarchical rules, and who tend 
to monopolize the social and political debate (Mathieu 2012). Lastly, given 
the importance the presidential election has in French national political 
life, the bulk of the forces on the left – especially the Left Front, which 
includes the Left Party and the Communist Party – preferred to focus on 
the preparation of this decisive event rather than actively support diverse 
groups from Occupy, themselves very attached to their autonomy of action.
Struggling to mobilize, Occupy did not win over the press either. One can 
clearly see in this situation a consequence of the dynamic specif ic to the 
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French political f ield, largely built around a few predominant organizations. 
Whatever the reasons, the main French media, whether newspapers or 
television, have given wider coverage to Occupy demonstrations abroad 
than in France. Some could criticize the timidity of a journalistic environ-
ment traditionally suspected of indulgence with regard to the economic 
or political elites (Gamson and Wolfsfeld 1993) – accessories of the system 
that Occupy denounces. In any case, Occupy was the subject of residual and 
relatively critical coverage in the traditional media, while more alternative 
channels (independent media, local radios, social networks, etc.) gave them 
more coverage and were often favorable.
The low visibility of Occupy in France, both as a force for mobilization and 
as an issue in the public sphere, has consequences for the policing to which it 
is subject. We know that the conditions of interaction between the police and 
a protest movement are one of the constituent dimensions of the latter, more 
or less facilitating its existence and development (Della Porta and Fillieule 
2004). In France, repression was all the more easy given that it passed – as the 
mobilization itself did – almost unnoticed. The very modest size of the Oc-
cupy marches as well as the weak interest shown by the mainstream media 
allowed the police, almost as numerous as the demonstrators themselves, to 
disperse the gatherings quite quickly and to prevent highly symbolic public 
places such as the Bastille in Paris from being occupied for any substantial 
period of time (Mille Babords 2011). Police repression can be a resource for 
a social movement when it is broadly visible and can then be the subject of 
public denunciation. In France, none of these two conditions were met, so 
much so that nearly everywhere across the territory, gatherings were almost 
systematically dispersed, some demonstrators arrested and prosecuted on 
the spot, making lengthy occupation of public places extremely diff icult. 
No other civil society actor intervened in solidarity.
While in Spain, the daily magnitude of demonstrations led the police to 
tolerate the occupation of the Puerta del Sol square in Madrid for one month 
and half (from 15 May to the end of June 2011), in France this phenomenon 
never happened. The media coverage of France’s less visible mobilizations 
was far from homogeneous, but the way in which France Info – the main 
continuous information radio in the country – covered, on 21 May 2011, the 
evacuation of the Place de la Bastille in Paris clearly shows that, without 
open hostility, the principal French media insisted, more or less insidiously, 
on the weakness of the movement and its immaturity:
It was after 9 p.m. that the CRS [riot police] went into action, on the Place 
de la Bastille which this afternoon had the airs of the Puerta del Sol. 
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The demonstrators had set up tents, some hoping to spend the night on 
the spot, like the Madrid indignados. But the law enforcement services 
dismantled them, accompanied by boos from the crowd. A rapid evacu-
ation, with tear gas, after a day spent dreaming of direct democracy and 
another world. This Sunday, the French ‘Occupy movement’, after ten 
days of confidential meetings, f inally succeeded in bringing together a 
good thousand people.8
Even if it is based on protest of a moral nature whose political content 
remains somewhat broad and blurred, Occupy has in different countries 
formulated a number of issues which give it a relative specif icity: employ-
ment and housing in Spain, austerity measures imposed by the Troika 
in Greece (see chapter 6 in this volume), the denunciation of the fall in 
purchasing power in Israel (see chapter 4 in this volume), or the banking 
system in the United States. In France, Occupy rapidly abandoned the 
Bastille to concentrate on the business district of La Défense, the Parisian 
symbol of f inancial capital, borrowing thereafter from Occupy Wall Street 
the slogan “We are the 99%”. At the same time, a link was forged with 
associations like Droit au logement (DAL, ‘Right to Housing’) or ATTAC, 
which thereafter took part in some Occupy demonstrations. But Occupy 
was not capable of getting back to concrete and clear-cut slogans having 
meaning in the public arena. This critical analysis was, moreover, made 
internally by Occupy activists themselves:
From the outset, the movement rejected parties and trade unions. But 
when the task of elaborating a platform of proposals came up, it was not 
able to do more than generalities and declarations of intent. […] However 
eff icient this self-organisation might be in its practices, it cannot conceal 
forever the absence of a clear and debatable political project.9
It is diff icult to highlight a particular element that explains the inability 
of the Occupy movement to grow and develop in France. Rather, it is the 
combination of economic and political factors but also the fragmentation 
of French social movements that nipped the mobilization in the bud. In this 
context, two segments of the population, active in other countries, were 
8 http://w w w.franceinfo.fr/france-societe-2011-05-29-l-evacuation-expeditive-des-
indignes-de-la-bastille-539963-9-12.html. 
9 Independent and ordinary collective for a radical self-transformation of society: https://
www.nantes.indymedia.org/articles/23974.
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only very weakly engaged in France: on the one hand, young educated and 
graduates; on the other hand, youths facing social insecurity, especially in 
the suburbs, whose despair and resentment f ind little political expression. 
For different reasons that are beyond the scope of this chapter, these two 
segments of the French population did not take to the streets, leaving the 
issue of insecurity, unemployment, and rising inequality in the hands of 
institutional actors.
A Case Study: Occupy in Lyon
The genealogy of Occupy Lyon is very enlightening and can help us to make 
sense of its diff iculties to develop.10 In Lyon, as in Paris or even Bayonne, 
the f irst steps were taken by young Spaniards, often students in training in 
France. It is they who, echoing the Spanish mobilization, were the f irst to 
gather in the spring of 2011 to discuss their desire to see the emergence of a 
similar movement in France. Even if the mobilization subsequently spread 
to other nationalities, it was born out of a feeling of international solidarity, 
which while evolving remained one of its main features. In Lyon, hardcore 
activists took part several times a week, sometimes almost continuously, 
in meetings and demonstrations. This group was made up of thirty or so 
people, often involved in humanitarian action such as defending the rights 
of refugees, immigrants, or Roms. Most of them were sensitive to ‘major 
causes’ such as protection of the environment, the struggle against world 
poverty, or support for the Palestinians. Overall, their profile doubtless did 
not allow them to f it in with the local militant network, a factor that often 
contributes to the success of a mobilization (Uitermark and Nicholls 2012).
From the outset, several elements stand out. On the one hand, this group 
was made up of people coming from different backgrounds whose unity 
was problematic and not built around a project and clearly identif ied objec-
tives. For example, the mobilization was not established as a reaction to a 
government decision, which could have provided political cohesion. It was 
rather born out of the willingness to participate in an event which began to 
emerge abroad and which met a strong desire for change in the militants in 
Lyon. In the absence of a clear and unambiguous slogan, people from quite 
diverse walks of life found themselves a common ethic which led them to 
10 The investigation was carried out after the mobilization phase. The remarks which follow 
are therefore the fruit of an a posteriori analysis, based mainly on processing information 
collected through interviews and on documents supplied by Occupy activists themselves.
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refuse to tolerate “a world led by a caste of the rich”11 in which the interests 
of a very small number of the privileged override those of the vast majority.
The values and expectations that these militants harbor undoubtedly 
have a strong political dimension, but they do not f ind their expression 
through traditional forms of participation. Thus their rhetoric did not 
make any reference to a particular party or trade union commitment. More 
broadly, for them, the right/left divide, which continues to dominate the 
bulk of institutional political life in France, appears almost devoid of any 
meaning.
The world such as it is today, it is the whole political class that has built 
it, or let it go unrestrained for ages. Frankly, why trust them? For me, they 
all failed. We are now faced with immense, gigantic problems which we 
are going to have to resolve on our own otherwise we will not make it. 
That is the Occupy movement. For me, it is also a way of saying in the 
face of all those in power ‘that’s enough! Stop the crap, it’s us the ordinary 
people, the citizens, who decide’.12
Among protestors, the specter of political opinions is extremely broad, rang-
ing from the centre-right to social catholicism, anarchism, libertarianism, 
or the extreme-left – which in itself reflects a high level of heterogeneity 
– without any of these currents being really structuring. The influence of 
Trotskyist networks, often linked with youth movements, remained very 
limited. In the absence of strong support, the mobilization never exceeded 
more than a few thousand individuals, on an intermittent basis. With its 
weaknesses, it demonstrates the changes affecting contentious action today. 
The sociology of Occupy activists f its perfectly with what scholars have been 
arguing over the last twenty years concerning the renewal of contemporary 
militant practices (Ion 1997; Perrineau 1994). On average, Occupy is made 
up of a relatively educated public. Human sciences students are quite well-
represented in these mobilizations, which may be explained both by this 
group’s tendency towards social criticism and a greater diff iculty than 
students from other academic background in f inding stable employment. 
On the whole, the activists we interviewed thought that the majority of 
participants in Occupy were under the age of 30 and often had unstable 
11 Interview with Patrice, presenter at Radio Pluriel, occasional militant, and sympathetic to 
Occupy (8 January 2013).
12 Interview with Marie, project leader and community activist, highly committed in Occupy 
Lyon.
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employment or little jobs. Cultivated without being politicized,13 they were 
both very open to the world, expressing ideas and strong convictions, but 
only rarely adhered to a militant organization. In the slogans and rhetoric, 
their discontent shows up in two versions: one takes the form of general 
disgruntlement faced with the injustices of the world and sticks to a logic of 
denunciation; the other goes a bit further and calls for “leaving the system”. 
The movement’s archives thus never raise the question of class struggle or 
social exploitation. Instead, they describe a form of organization gasping 
for breath, making of each individual a slave. The world is thus said to be at 
“a total dead end, simultaneously at the economic, f inancial and monetary, 
social, media, political, and demographic levels”.14
 Very quickly, it appeared obvious that we had one sole and same objec-
tive: that of changing a world that is not like us, because it does not care 
about our basic needs.
 A world in crisis deserted by the future.
 A world where our natural habitat is in great peril, putting even our 
survival in danger.
 A world of false images where our creativity is perpetually corrupted 
and diverted.
 A world where our daily life is encapsulated in advertising.
 A world where the only links that bind us are marked by the seal of 
greed, of lust, of prof it.
 “Real democracy now’, like a call to wake up from the bad dream into 
which we have plunged.15
For the Occupy activists, it is above all a question of “resisting” and putting 
human beings at the heart of all circumstances in life, to struggle against 
ambient dehumanization. The expected change will then be the result of the 
awareness amongst individuals, in other words the voluntarism of everyone.
Generally, Occupy is wary of classical forms of participation, which are 
considered ineff icient, constraining, and/or corrupt. More or less explicitly, 
it aspires to a balance between individual opinions and the organizational 
requirements of a collective movement. The desire to not sacrif ice the f irst 
to the second is a constant concern, which results in the importance given 
13 Interview with Régis, teacher, activist in Occupy Lyon (8 March 2013).
14 Unsigned, undated archive entitled text read at the beginning of the AG of 9 June: ‘Our cry 
of hope’.
15  Ibid.
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to everyone’s opinion and in the search for consensus during meetings. Such 
an objective requires the total involvement of those who keep the movement 
going day after day and resulted sometimes in exhaustion tinged with 
discouragement when it became clear that the mobilization was not taking 
off. If Occupy demands no other aff iliation than that of “citizen movements 
that rise up throughout the world”,16 it may be considered the successor of 
all the struggles which, in France as in most developed societies, call for the 
emancipation and free will of individuals or citizens, rejecting by the same 
token the traditional forms of commitment and representative democracy 
(Inglehart 1977): “We advocate democracy that is direct, participative, self-
managed, and anti-hierarchical.”17
In the spring and summer of 2011, older people, often better integrated 
in the labor market and coming mostly from the communist left, took 
part in organized demonstrations and contributed somewhat to get the 
movement out of its lethargy. Occupy tried hard to attract social categories 
more exposed to greater deprivation or class downgrading by contacting 
associations established in diff icult districts, but to no avail. After a few 
months, having failed to reach a positive momentum, the mobilization of 
Occupy ultimately ran out. In Lyon, the demonstrations did not exceed a 
few hundred people except for a gathering of about 5,000 supporters that 
took place on 16 October 2011.18
Finally, the group was weakened by internal tensions. A major split 
emerged between two tendencies. On one side were those who favored 
the occupation of public places, in particular campsites, and who openly 
drew inspiration from Occupy Wall Street. On the other side were those 
who concentrated even more on the construction of Internet exchange and 
communication networks, putting the accent on the dissemination of ideas 
and theoretical reflection. The f irst sometimes prided themselves on being 
‘real’ militants on the grounds that they were more exposed and took more 
risks by facing up to the police, while the second expressed their satisfaction 
of contributing to the cognitive enhancement of the mobilization through 
the use of social networks. These two approaches moreover come within 
different timeframes (also present in the Spanish Indignados, see chapter 
5 in this volume), some seeking to provoke through action a short-term 
response from public authorities so as to get the movement established 
16 Undated and unsigned archives, entitled ‘Who manages the debt of our lives. Moods and 
analyses’.
17 Undated, unsigned archive entitled ‘A societal project?’
18 Until now the largest Occupy meeting in France.
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in the public sphere and on the political agenda; the others regarding the 
battle of ideas as the most important, and engaging in discussions to make 
possible, in the long term, the emergence of a better and less unjust world.
* * *
In France, Occupy’s inability to grow has multiple causes arising from 
economic (the impact of the crisis was less severe than in other countries 
and academically qualif ied youths have been broadly spared the most 
acute forms of unemployment and insecurity) and political factors (the 
prospects of the left coming to power and the existence of a bid from the 
extreme-left, which served to snuff out discontent). Other explanatory 
factors are more worrisome and point to growing fractures within French 
society. Autonomous and isolated at the same time, the mobilization was 
unable to prevail. Against this background, the case of Occupy Lyon suggests 
that this weakness is also explained in part by the sociological features 
of Occupy, which comprises a group at once heterogeneous and divided, 
lacking local roots.
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12 Conclusion
Place-Based Movements and Macro Transformations
Pascale Dufour, Héloïse Nez and Marcos Ancelovici
The chapters in this volume have detailed a great variety of situations. As 
far as the empirical translation of the crisis into concrete manifestations of 
discontent is concerned, we could insist on the fact that each society and 
its protests are unique. Instead, we seek general trends and patterns. How, 
then, should we move from empirical details to future research paths worth 
exploring? We propose two basic elements. First, we stress the influence 
of capitalism on protests in conditions of austerity. Is there a clear link 
between the current crisis of capitalism and the emergence of new families 
of protest? To what extent are there material foundations to such protests? 
How has the economic crisis concretely affected different struggles? What 
do we need to do analytically to develop this line of inquiry? Second, the 
contemporary crisis of representative democracy has its counterpart in the 
space of protest, as some contributors of this volume have shown. How have 
profound changes in the relationship between, on the one hand, individuals 
and groups and, on the other hand, formal politics structured today’s protest 
movements?
Bringing Capitalism Back In: Not a Mechanical Effect but an 
Important Factor
As mentioned in our introduction to this volume, many things converged to 
link the f inancial crisis that began in 2008 with the resurgence of protest. 
First, temporality: most of the protests studied in this book occurred in the 
wake of the economic collapse of 2008. Second, discourse: the protesters 
denounced recent transformations in capitalist economies, including both 
the process of f inancialization and the deepening of inequalities. Activists 
in North America and Europe have struggled against the stagnation or 
decline of low and medium wages, sharp increases in unemployment – in 
Spain, for example, the unemployment rate was about 20 per cent when the 
Indignados emerged – and the extravagant explosion of high incomes in the 
financial sector. The protests they organized contributed to a repolarization 
of the debate around globalization and the distribution of wealth. For 30 
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years, sociologists had announced the end of social classes and of their 
role as the main organizing principle of identities, interests, and collec-
tive action (Pakulski and Waters 1996). Yet, the post-2010 mobilizations 
call for a reconsideration of the centrality of class and capitalism in social 
movement studies (cf. Hetland and Goodwin 2013; Della Porta 2015). Such a 
reconsideration should not entail sweeping and generalizing claims, for it 
is clear that the current global f inancial crisis has not produced the same 
effects everywhere, even if poverty and inequality did increase in all the 
countries under scrutiny in this book.
To address the role of capitalism, we follow two lines of inquiry. First, 
in order to claim that the protests have had a material basis, we need to 
distinguish the victims of the crisis from the people who actually mobilized 
and ask: Who was hurt by the crisis and how? And who were the protestors 
sociologically speaking? Second, we propose different paths to research the 
dynamics and diversity of capitalism as well as the dynamics and diversity 
of protests.
Searching for the Material Basis of Protest: Complex Inequality 
Regimes
In chapter 1, Ross showed that one of the most striking differences between 
the US and Europe concerns the question of who has been hurt by the crisis. 
In the US, it was much less a middle-class affair than it was in Europe, 
and this was especially true for the youth in Europe, who faced a level of 
unemployment never reached before. Although young educated adults 
were at the core of North American Occupy movements, the absence of 
work prospects, including for the most educated segment, has been much 
more a European than a North American problem. For example, in 2011, 
the youth unemployment rate in Greece and Spain was around 45 per cent! 
It is also clear that those most hurt by the crisis are not always the ones 
who protest (see Rüdig and Karyotis 2014). Here, we need to distinguish 
between those actively involved in the protests and those who support 
them, sometimes in massive numbers, as in Israel, Greece, and Spain. In 
chapter 4, Perugorría, Shalev, and Tejerina convincingly show that protest-
ers enjoyed broader support in Israel than in Spain, but not because of 
economic factors. In Israel, protest was a widespread middle-class affair 
in which other ideological divisions were minimized for the sake of future 
generations. In Spain, the left-right cleavage was more important, with 
those actively supporting the protests coming mainly from the left side of 
the political spectrum.
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It is clear from this book that there are substantial sociological differ-
ences between activists depending on the location of protest. The ‘material 
bases’ of mobilization are not the same everywhere. One possible path for 
future research is to explore the articulation between class and generations. 
Rosenhek and Shalev (2013) point out that beyond the factor of downward 
social mobility – which lies at the heart of conflicts in Spain, Greece, and 
Israel – there is also the labor market exclusion and bleak prospects that 
youths face. This context was illustrated, for example, by the Occupy slogan 
‘Searching for a future’ and two slogans of the Spanish group ‘Juventud sin 
Futuro’ (Youth Without Future), ‘You won’t have a house of your own in your 
fucking life!’ (¡No tendrás casa en la puta vida!) and ‘Without a house, with-
out a job, without a pension, without fear’ (Sin casa, sin curro, sin pensión, 
sin miedo). In order to test such claims, we need to avoid selecting on the 
dependent variable and also include ‘negative’ cases, that is, cases where 
there was little or no mobilization. For example, in chapter 11, Chabanet 
and Lacheret contend that the lack of resonance of Occupy’s discourse and 
the de facto exclusion of marginalized populations – such as immigrant 
youths living in poor suburbs – from the movement were a central factor 
accounting for the weak mobilization in France.
Another dimension worth investigating, from a political economy 
perspective, is the increasing role of socioeconomic inequalities in mobiliza-
tion. The mobilizing potential of perceived and experienced inequalities 
varies across countries and over time. In the United States, some studies 
have shown that the level of acceptance of inequalities is higher than in 
Northern and Continental Europe, because Americans believe more in the 
possibility of upward social mobility even though the country actually has 
a lower level of social mobility than France (Dubet 2011). The literature also 
frequently discusses the middle-class decline that accompanies dramatic 
increases in inequalities. How do such macro-structural patterns interact 
with a trend toward the individualization of inequality, and how does that 
affect potential mobilizations?
Furthermore, although the Occupy slogan “We are the 99%” contrib-
uted to bringing income inequality back into the public debate, it also 
fostered a rather simplistic representation of contemporary inequality 
and domination (Ancelovici 2012). In particular, it avoided the internal 
differentiation of the 99% (Juris et al. 2013). In chapter 8, Smith argues that 
Occupy participants in the United States were less equipped than global 
justice activists elsewhere to help diffuse and take over mobilization in a 
diversity of contexts, especially among the poorest, and were less able to 
consider the cumulative effects of class, race, and gender issues. Given the 
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widespread recognition that class intersects with ethnicity and gender, 
discussions of inequality need to move beyond one-dimensional and linear 
understandings of stratif ication and look at how intersectionality condi-
tions contemporary mobilizations and protests. In this respect, the concept 
of complex inequality regime, put forward by scholars such as Acker (2006) 
or Dubet (2011), could turn out to be a useful analytical tool.
To sum up, contemporary anti-austerity protests suggest that we need to 
pay more attention to socioeconomic factors. We should not, however, insert 
them in a ‘simple’ class-against-class narrative; we need to take into account 
multiple dimensions and sources of domination. Moreover, the material 
bases of mobilization do not necessarily reflect existing socioeconomic 
conditions. They are also shaped by institutional and discursive factors 
that can play an important role in determining interests and the categories 
of people who will take to the streets. As Kousis argues in chapter 6, these 
material bases are connected to, and articulated by, particular organiza-
tions like trade unions. And as Nez shows in chapter 5, they derive their 
meaning partly from the space and historical narratives in which they are 
inscribed. The constructed character of the material bases of mobilization 
suggests that the latter could vary cross-nationally, depending on particular 
varieties of capitalism and welfare regime.
Varieties of Capitalism and Varieties of Protest
The main argument of the varieties of capitalism (VOC) approach is that 
the global political economy does not create uniform domestic capitalist 
economies. There is no convergence of national models around a set of 
universal best practices. Instead, diverse national institutions lead to differ-
ent ways of producing goods and services, and to particular configurations 
of the labor market (Hall and Soskice 2001; Hancké et al. 2007). From the 
VOC perspective, we can hypothesize that distinct institutional contexts 
generate distinct forms of contentious politics (Ancelovici 2002: 455; Bair 
and Palpacuer 2012). In other words, varieties of capitalism could imply 
varieties of protest.
This volume does not propose a clear-cut answer to the question of 
whether there is a correlation between certain types of capitalism and 
certain types of protest. Much more research needs to be done before 
reaching such a conclusion. Furthermore, the literature on varieties of 
capitalism has not demonstrated yet that national institutions have led to 
signif icantly different ways of dealing with the 2008 global f inancial crisis. 
As Heyes, Lewis, and Clark show:
coNcluSioN 299
While the specif ic content of policies differs between countries, efforts 
to reduce workers’ rights are currently occurring across all varieties of 
capitalism, thus calling into question the prediction of VOC analysis 
that responses to ‘exogenous shocks’ will differ between varieties in 
fundamental respects. (2012: 16)
These authors also show that major changes in the balance of power be-
tween unions and employers have occurred almost everywhere and that the 
mobilization capacities of unions have declined since the 1990s. In spite of 
different national institutions, all advanced economies have experienced 
the development of the f inancial sector at the expense of the productive 
one. Therefore, some forms of convergence seem to be taking place, and it 
does not seem possible to establish signif icant correlations between the 
ideal-typical varieties of capitalism identif ied by Hall and Soskice (2011) – 
that is, either liberal (USA, UK, Ireland, Canada, Australia, New Zealand) 
or coordinated (Germany, Austria, France, etc.)1 – and types of protest. 
Moreover, within a single country, the level of protest can vary dramatically 
over time independently of the socioeconomic context.
Several paths for future research can nonetheless be derived from the 
chapters in this volume. The contrast between Israel and other cases is 
striking in this respect. It is clear, from Perugorría, Shalev, and Tejerina’s 
chapter, that the type of capitalism developed in Israel over the last two 
decades has favored the emergence of mass protest. For the f irst time since 
World War II, educated youths have lower expectations of well-being than 
their parents had. This development can be traced to the political choices 
of successive governments in sectors like housing or education. Here state 
intervention – or more precisely, state retrenchment from earlier commit-
ments – has affected both the scope and nature of the protesters’ grievances.
In Greece, the economic crisis was much more severe than in Israel. The 
elimination of many social policies pushed hundreds of thousands of Greeks 
into poverty and precariousness and undermined the very existence of 
national collective solidarity. The welfare regime in place has progressively 
ceased to offer reasonable protection to low-paid workers, unemployed 
people, and poor students. The particular combination of a given variety of 
capitalism and welfare regime is likely to determine who is most negatively 
affected and how. In France, those most in need are the ones outside the 
1 Other authors have complexif ied Hall and Soskice’s typology and introduced other varieties. 
For example, Schmidt (2002) talks about three types of capitalism whereas Amable (2003) talks 
about f ive types. 
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labor market for long periods of time and who rely on social assistance for 
survival. However, the economic crisis, if it is any consolation, did not make 
them more worse off than they already were, and this social category has not 
really taken to the streets so far. Those more likely to engage in protests are 
the people who are employed and relatively well protected by institutional 
arrangements (Giraud and Lechevalier 2012). Following this logic, it seems 
reasonable to consider some recent mobilizations as the result of changes 
in the employment regime and its underlying institutional arrangements.
In the introduction to this volume, we chose to narrow our focus to a 
comparison of ‘anti-austerity’ protests def ined as contentious collective 
actions opposing austerity policies (cuts in education, housing, health care, 
pensions, government jobs, and services, etc.) implemented by governments 
under pressure from f inancial markets and/or supranational institutions 
in connection with def icit and debt problems (Walton and Ragin 1990: 
882). The brief discussion above indicates that not only will the degree of 
austerity vary across countries, so will the particular way in which austerity 
is experienced as well as the meaning of anti-austerity protests. Put differ-
ently, the political significance and impact of austerity policies partly derive 
from the institutional context in which they are inscribed.
Back to Democracy: From Representative Democracy to ‘Do-It-
Yourself’ Politics?
In chapter 3, Kriesi’s contribution exposes the complex links between 
street politics and partisan changes in a context of austerity. He argues 
that in the US, the main changes have occurred at the level of party politics, 
in particular because of the growing influence of the Tea Party, while in 
Greece and Spain, protests translate into a growing distrust of socialist 
parties, a decrease of participation in elections, and demands for profound 
changes in the system of representation. Nonetheless, the victory of Syriza 
in Greece in the legislative election of 25 January 2015 and the success of 
Podemos in Spain in the European election of 25 May 2014, the Andalusian 
parliamentary election of 22 March 2015, the 13 other regional parliamentary 
elections of 24 May 2015, and the national legislative election of 20 Decem-
ber 2015, show that discontent has found an expression in party politics 
in southern European countries as well.2 These electoral results directly 
2 In the 25 January 2015 legislative election, Syriza received 36.3 per cent of the vote and 149 out 
of 300 seats. Short of an absolute majority, it then formed a coalition government. In the 25 May 
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challenge bipartism in Spain. In the 2014 European elections, the PP and 
the PSOE each lost 2.5 million votes. The collapse of bipartism is even more 
pronounced in regional elections. Although the PP and the PSOE often 
kept leading positions, they have now been forced to strike deals and make 
alliances with other smaller parties like Podemos and Cuidadanos. They 
did not manage to obtain an absolute majority in any single region while 
they had won 8 regions out of 13 in 2011. So far, however, the most severe 
downfall has taken place at the municipal level, where the PP and the PSOE 
not only lost the lead but were even removed from power in several cities. 
The most noticeable and symbolic ones, in this respect, were the victories 
of ‘popular unity’ candidacies in the two largest cities of Spain: Barcelona 
and Madrid. The 2015 national legislative election has confirmed the end 
of bipartism in Spain: the PP and the PSOE, far from achieving an absolute 
majority, have each lost more than 5 million votes compared to the previous 
2011 results, while Podemos has increased by 4 millions the votes it obtained 
since the 2014 European elections.
For Oikonomakis and Roos in chapter 9, the strongest shared element 
of recent protests is the f ight for ‘real democracy’, largely inspired by left 
libertarian and anarchist currents and characterized by self-representation, 
direct participation, and leaderless activism. From their standpoint, this 
search for ‘real democracy’ questions the participation in the formal 
system of representative democracy, which is seen as less and less able 
to mediate the interests and claims of the population. Such a critique of 
representative democracy is not new. Already in the 1960s and 1970s, many 
social movements advocated participatory democracy and put forward 
what some authors called an ‘anti-politics’ stance (see for example Berger 
1979; Maeckelbergh 2011). More recently, in the mid-1990s, the Zapatistas in 
Mexico celebrated and practiced horizontal and decentralized grassroots 
modes of local government (Baschet 2014). We f ind similar discourses and 
practices in the global justice movement (Maeckelbergh 2012) and in the 
neighborhood assemblies that emerged in the wake of the economic crisis 
of 2001 in Argentina (Sitrin 2012).
2014 European elections, Podemos won 8 per cent of the vote and 5 out of 54 seats allocated to 
Spain in the European Parliament. In the 22 March 2015 Andalusian parliamentary elections, 
Podemos obtained 14.8 per cent of the vote and 15 out of 109 seats. In the 24 May 2015 regional 
elections, the results of Podemos varied between 7.99 per cent in Extremadure and 20.51 per 
cent in Aragón. Finally, in the 2015 national legislative election, Podemos reached 20.7 per cent 
of the vote and gained 69 out of 350 seats, becoming the third national political party in Spain, 
after the PSOE (22 per cent) and the PP (28.7 per cent).
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Some authors contend that contemporary anti-austerity protests are 
directly and structurally related to “a perceived situation of political dis-
empowerment and opacity in the democratic process (…): people realized 
that representative institutions were no longer serving the public good, but 
the interest of a few else, generally, business and economic elites” (Cini and 
Drapalova 2014: 5). For these authors, the denunciation of collusion between 
economic and political elites by Spanish activists and their search for a ‘real 
democracy’ can be read as a direct consequence of this ‘institutional cor-
ruption’. But the crisis of representative democracy does not mechanically 
translate into protests and new movements. The emergence and possibility 
of mobilizations for a ‘real democracy’ are not only related to economic 
structures and democratic ‘def icits’ but also to cultural evolutions endog-
enous to social movements. For example, in the 1990s Lichterman (1996) 
analyzed the development of a new style of activism in the US that he called 
‘personal politics’. More concerned with changes inside social movements 
and organizations, this style of activism refers to a kind of ‘do-it-yourself 
politics’ (Dufour, Bherer and Rothmayr, 2015).
Such research, which is more sensitive to endogenous factors, also sug-
gests that structural changes are not enough for protest to take place. The 
‘negative’ cases of Ireland and France in this volume clearly show that 
additional factors must be present, as many social movement scholars have 
demonstrated, for anti-austerity protests in the vein of Occupy to emerge. 
In chapter 10, Desbos and Royall argue that in Ireland some dimensions 
of Occupy, such as the refusal to build alliances with other organizations 
(unions, political parties) despite a low level of participation, limited the 
potential for the development of a wider movement. In chapter 11, Chabanet 
and Lacheret contend that in France there were political opportunities, but 
the segmentation of the space of protest and the relegation of unemployed 
youth in relatively isolated poor suburbs did not create a favorable context 
for mobilization.
We began this volume by proposing to problematize contemporary 
protests rather than assume that synchronicity necessarily entailed that 
a new ‘wave of protest’, as def ined by Koopmans (2004), was taking place. 
In chapter 6, Kousis answered this question by considering mid-term 
campaigns (two years) in Greece and their expression in different cities 
and showing that place (as a location of struggles) played a crucial role. 
Place not only defines a socio-political context but can also imply space for 
experimentation. Thus, in chapter 10, Desbos and Royall explained how in 
Ireland, Occupy activities developed as experiments for a fringe of young 
activists who had not planned a long-term strategy or campaign. Similarly, 
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in chapter 7, Ancelovici treated the occupation as a socio-political and 
material space. He analyzed how Occupy Montreal activists constantly 
improvized and gradually redefined their preferences over horizontalism 
and the general assembly as they addressed problems related to the specif ic 
tasks in which they were involved in the camp. In chapter 9, Oikonomakis 
and Roos focused on the intersection of global diffusion patterns and local 
characteristics, and proposed the concept of ‘resonance’ to understand both 
local potentialities and outside stimulation. It follows that contemporary 
protests have both a global and a very local dimension. Finally, in chapter 
8, Smith situated Occupy movements in the same cycle of protest as the 
global justice movement, underlining the distinctive modes of organizing 
and activism of the two movements.
All in all, we can tentatively conclude that a new family of protest has 
emerged, related to macro-structural and institutional transformations, 
such as the erosion of trade union power and political parties, the develop-
ment of a powerful f inancial elite, and rising inequalities. These protests 
can be distinguished from others on the basis of particular discourses 
and practices stressing horizontalism and ‘do-it-yourself politics’ as well 
as the way in which they are inscribed in local places and networks. This 
family of protest opposes austerity, but does so in way that differs from 
traditional labor movements and the global justice movement. It is thus a 
good instance of bounded innovation, at the crossroads of past struggles 
and transnational diffusion.
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